


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United Nations  
Peacekeeping  
in the Congo:  
1960-1964

An analysis  
of political, executive  
and military control

IN FOUR VOLUMES

Volume 2: Full Text



prepared for the  
U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency  
by Ernest W. Lefever and Wynfred Joshua  
of the Foreign Policy Studies Division  
of the Brookings Institution  
Washington, D.C.  
June 30, 1966

465

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## FOREWORD

This report has been prepared by the Brookings Institution for the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency under contract RS-63. Ernest W. Lefever of the senior staff was the project director and principal author. His research associate was Miss Wynfred Joshua. The study was conducted under the general supervision of H. Field Haviland, Jr., Director of Foreign Policy Studies.

The report is accompanied by two supporting documents. Volume 3 contains 27 appendixes, and Volume 4 is a chronology of developments in the Congo. In addition, the summary and conclusions of the report (Chapter 20) have been reproduced as Volume 1.

Mr. Lefever wrote the report except for Chapters 7-13 which were written by Miss Joshua. Background material was prepared by the following consultants: J. Gérard-Libois of Brussels (Chapter 11); Donald Gordon, University of Alberta (Chapter 12); Thomas Hovet, Jr., New York University (Chapter 13); and Lt. Col. Austin W. Bach, USA, Ret., of Washington (Chapters 14-18) who also served as a special military consultant.

The Brookings Institution is grateful for the constructive comments on the report from an Advisory Committee consisting of Robert E. Osgood, Director of the Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research of The Johns Hopkins University; Lt. Col. Bach, currently with the Atlantic Research Corporation; Colonel Clarence Nelson, USA, of the U.N. Military Staff Committee; Nathan Pelcovits and William Schaufele of the State Department; Robert E. Asher and Ruth B. Russell of Brookings. Messrs. Osgood and Asher and Miss Russell also served on the Reading Committee.

On behalf of the staff I should like to acknowledge the assistance of a number of persons here and abroad who went beyond the call of duty: Clare H. Timberlake, the first U. S. Ambassador to the Congo; G. McMurtrie Godley, the present Ambassador there; William P. Mahoney, Jr., former U.S. Ambassador to Ghana; Edward M. Korry, U.S. Ambassador to Ethiopia; U.S. Consul Arthur Tienken in Elisabethville; Colonel Knut Raudstein, USA, and Lt. Col. Harold D. Asbury, USA, former Military Attache and Assistant Attache in Leopoldville; Colonel Arthur B. Swan, USAF, formerly of the U.N. Military Staff Committee; General Sean McKeown, Chief of Staff of the Irish Army; Lt. Col. Bjørn Egge of the Norwegian Army; Lt. Col. L. M. K. Skern of the Danish Army; and Herman Noppen, the Cultural and Press Attache of the Belgian Embassy in Washington.

This study depends to a considerable extent upon material gained in background interviews with American officials, representatives of other governments, and present and former members of the U.N. Secretariat. Mr. Lefever interviewed military and civilian officials in a score of states in Asia, Africa, and Europe. Miss Joshua made a field trip to Belgium, France, and Britain. Since most of the interviews were on a non-attribution basis, precise identification of the source is not given in certain footnotes.

The views expressed in the report are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the persons consulted or of the trustees and officers, or other staff members of the Brookings Institution. Nor should they be construed as reflecting the views of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency or any other agency of the United States Government.

Robert D. Calkins  
President

June 30, 1966

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## CHAPTER 1

### STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

The United Nations peacekeeping effort in the Congo, 1960-64, was the largest field operation ever authorized by any international organization or managed by an international secretariat.<sup>1</sup> For nearly three years the United Nations Force (UNF) exceeded 15,000 men. At its height it included almost 20,000 men, officers, and specialized personnel from 28 states. Because of the rotation of units, more than 93,000 men from 35 countries served in the UNF. During its four years, the Congo operation was the overwhelming preoccupation of the U.N. Secretariat and a heavy strain on the administrative structure and financial resources of the Organization. The total cost of the military operation from July 1960 through June 1964, was \$411 million, of which the United States provided 41.5 percent, or \$170.7 million.

The large and sustained peacekeeping effort in the Congo, operating in an arena of domestic turbulence and conflicting national

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1. The Korean operation, nominally under the U.N. Command, and involving military assistance from 22 governments, was initiated, planned, managed, and largely financed by the United States. When President Harry Truman's initiative was endorsed in the Security Council, on June 27, 1950, due to the absence of the Soviet delegate, the operation gained the moral approval of the United Nations. In legal terms, the United States could be called the executive agent of the United Nations in Korea. See Ruth B. Russell, United Nations Experience With Military Forces: Political and Legal Aspects. (Brookings Staff Paper, 1964), pp. 24-43.

interests, established new procedural and legal precedents, aroused an international political controversy, and precipitated a constitutional crisis at the United Nations that culminated in the unsuccessful demand by the Soviet Union for a Secretariat subject to a Communist veto. The Congo crisis also produced a major financial crisis for the Organization. For these reasons, a study of the operation may be expected to yield lessons bearing on the authorization and implementation of future peacekeeping efforts.

### The Persistence of Politics

Neither internal politics in the Congo nor international politics related to the Congo was suspended for the duration of the U.N. peacekeeping operation. The motivations behind the authorization of an international presence sprang from the interests of the states most concerned with the Congo crisis. One important reason for "internationalizing" military assistance to the Congo was to preclude direct or indirect intervention by the United States or the Soviet Union. At the same time, the very fact that the Security Council became seized of the problem insured that the Congo would become a major issue in international politics. When the late Adlai Stevenson once said that "the only way to keep the Cold War out of the Congo is to keep the U.N. in the Congo,"<sup>2</sup> he did not really mean that Soviet and American interests would not continue to be in conflict there. He meant that the United States wanted the contest between opposing interests in the Congo to be conducted by acceptable rules and with minimum risk. The U.N. presence was expected to provide a framework of procedures and decisions acceptable to Washington.

Throughout the first four years of Congolese independence, there was severe internal political strife. There were three major secession efforts, Katanga, Orientale, and South Kasai. Within the first three months the Central Government was confronted with a profound constitutional crisis with two claimants to legitimacy, President Joseph Kasavubu and Prime Minister

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2. United Nations, Security Council, Official Records, S/PV 943, Feb.15, 1961, p.9. (henceforth referred to as U.N., SCOR.)

Patrice Lumumba.<sup>3</sup> Throughout the period there was considerable tribal unrest and fighting. The Congolese National Army (ANC), divided into political and tribal factions and without a competent officer corps, was generally a source of disorder rather than order. After a constitutional government was established in August 1961 and the secession of Katanga was ended in January 1963, there was a brief period of comparative calm, but even during this period the Congolese Army was still divided and incapable of coping with internal disorder and the Central Government was ineffectual and corrupt.

Taking advantage of these weaknesses, several groups in different parts of the Congo initiated rebel activity against the Leopoldville Government in the latter half of 1963. These rebel movements became an increasingly serious threat to the Government in the first half of 1964. When the last U.N. troops left the Congo on June 30, 1964, rebel groups controlled approximately one-fifth of Congolese territory.

Because of its wealth and strategic importance, the new Congo state was from the beginning an object of international concern and attention. The Soviet Union strongly supported Lumumba with the aim of developing in Central Africa a government sympathetic to its political objectives. Certain of the more militant African states, such as Guinea, Ghana, Mali, and the United Arab Republic, wanted the Congo to join the militant camp.<sup>4</sup> The more moderate African states simply wanted the new sister state to succeed. Belgium, the former metropolitan power, sought a stable and prosperous Congo which would confirm the prudence of Belgian colonial policy and safeguard its substantial financial investments. Britain and France, both with wide and varied interests in Africa, also wanted a stable Congo.

The United States, with virtually no financial investments or other economic interests in the country, was likewise interested in political stability, though from the broader perspective of a power with

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3. See Appendix F for brief biographies of major Congo leaders.

4. The adjectives "militant" and "moderate" are used in this Report according to the working definitions in the first section of Chapter 13.

global responsibilities. American foreign policy generally placed a premium on stability, not as a sanction of the status quo but as a precondition for sound economic and political development.

The neutralist countries in Asia, like those of Africa, had been calling for speedy decolonization and were especially eager to see the Congo succeed because of the unusual circumstances attending the abrupt and premature granting of independence.

#### Purpose of the Study

The central purpose of this study is to examine the problems of political, executive, and military control of the U.N. peacekeeping operation. The control problem is closely related to the degree of integrity in the operation and the extent to which the effort succeeded in achieving its objectives. There is presumably a rough correlation between control and effectiveness and between integrity and control.

As far as integrity and control are concerned, the study focuses on the operations of the international instrument and the behavior of member states in relation to this instrument. Of crucial importance is the role of the Secretary-General who was charged by the Security Council with the responsibility of arranging for "military assistance" to the Congo. The Security Council resolutions provide the basic point of reference for evaluating the integrity of the Secretary-General's behavior.<sup>5</sup> Four basic questions are examined:

1. Did any state or group of states succeed in using, modifying, or subverting the U.N. peacekeeping operation for purposes contrary to those implied in the Security Council resolutions?

2. Did any political faction in the Congo, with or without outside help, ever succeed in using, modifying, or subverting the U.N. operation for purposes contrary to those implied in the resolutions?

3. Did the Secretary-General; any elements within the Secretariat; any official, civilian or military, appointed by the Secretary-

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5. All relevant Security Council and General Assembly Resolutions on the Congo are found in Appendix B.

General; or any national contingent of the U.N. Force, ever exceed the authority of the Security Council mandate or otherwise violate its intention? Did the U.N. operation ever get out of control, by accident or design?

4. To what extent was there inadequate political, executive, or military control of the operation, and to what extent was any such loss of control inherent in a multinational peacekeeping effort authorized by the Security Council or General Assembly and managed by an internationalized secretariat? To what extent could any control weaknesses or problems be corrected within these limitations?

(Along with an analysis of the control problem, the effectiveness of the operation in terms of its fundamental purposes is also evaluated. To what extent did the Secretary-General succeed in achieving his objectives as he understood them? To what extent was success or failure the result of a loss of control or other factors essentially beyond the control of an internationally authorized and managed operation? To what extent was the mandate itself inadequate?)

A distinction should be made among the three kinds of control--political, executive, and military:

Political control refers to the capacity of the Security Council to exercise effective authority over the Secretary-General and the disposition of the Secretary-General to adhere to the political-legal mandate of the Security Council. Political control implies a disposition on the part of the Security Council to discipline the Secretary-General if it believes he is behaving contrary to the mandate.

Executive control refers to the capacity of the Secretary-General to enforce his orders designed to implement the political intention of the Security Council resolutions. It implies a disposition on the part of the Secretary-General to discipline any subordinate who by negligence or design fails to carry out his orders.

Military control refers to the capacity of the U.N. Force Commander and his chief officers to enforce their orders and their willingness to discipline insubordination and disobedience.

As the person ultimately accountable for the implementation of the Security Council resolutions, the Secretary-General was under heavy and conflicting political pressures from the very beginning of the crisis. The pressures continued for four years, the volume and diversity varying with the intensity of the Congo crisis. Strong pressures came from contending factions within the Congo. They came from Belgium. They came from the permanent members of the Security Council, no two of which saw the problem in identical terms. Some neutralist states in Asia and Africa had a special interest in Congo developments. The governments that contributed troops contingents for the U.N. Force frequently pressed their views on the Secretary-General.

Any U.N. member obviously had a right to communicate its views to the Secretary-General. Security Council members had a special responsibility because the enabling resolutions were a product of their deliberations and vote. Such written or oral advice could be offered at any of three levels of the U.N. operation:

1. Defining the basic intention of the mission: Advice was given on this broad and basic level in the debate preceding the various Security Council resolutions. Security Council members also offered their views confidentially to the Secretary-General.

2. Defining the operational rules of the mission: Given the deliberately vague and somewhat ambiguous character of the early resolutions the operating rules formulated by the Secretary-General for implementing the mandate were of great importance. Security Council members and other states gave their views in public and private to the Secretary-General.

3. Actual operations of the U.N. Force: Advice was also offered at this stage, but since operations carry out the basic intention in harmony with the accepted rules, there was less room for legitimate political influence. This was as it should be. Nevertheless, it is precisely at this working level that some questionable pressures were applied. Occasionally, there were direct pressures on U.N. civilian or military officers in the Congo who were charged solely with carrying out policy, not with making it.

Political pressures by interested states or factions at the operational level are more questionable than attempts to exercise influence at the policy level. And any pressure accompanied by a threat to take action in the Congo contrary to the U.N. operation, or any actual behavior designed to affect adversely the operation, is obviously questionable.

The U.N. peacekeeping and civilian presence in the Congo, operating under a mandate which gave it certain exclusive rights and responsibilities, did not preclude normal diplomatic and trade relations between outside states and the Congo. But the U.N. presence did rule out certain other activities by foreign governments in the Congo. Direct military assistance, for example, was prohibited, at least for the first year.

It should be emphasized that there is no simple distinction between the international legal mandate on the one hand and national political interests on the other. The mandate itself was the product of the interplay of both conflicting and compatible interests, and reflected a working political consensus of the governments chiefly concerned. The Security Council resolutions were not drawn straight from the Charter nor based solely upon agreed-upon principles of international law, but were a political-legal response to an emergency in the Congo in accordance with the Charter.

The United Nations is not an independent entity standing above and apart from the states which constitute it. It possesses no authority or capacity to act distinct from that granted it by a number of states acting jointly under the Charter and through accepted procedures. The United Nations is an instrument of the multistate system, not something above or apart from it.

In July 1960 there was an agreement among a majority of members of the Security Council that the Secretary-General ought to do something about the Congo. Consequently, the legal-political mandate reflected both legal principles enshrined in the Charter and a temporary working



political coalition. The mandate never represented the unanimous view of the great powers. In carrying out the mandate, the Secretary-General was obligated to adhere to the principles of the Charter and to precedents of the United Nations and, at the same time, to remain sensitive to significant changes in the political coalition that supported the Congo operation.

This analysis is essentially a study of a four-year drama, the most important action of which occurred in the first year and a half, and more especially in the first four months. This early period has correspondingly received greater attention, particularly as far as the legal and political problems of the U.N. operation are concerned.

The study will conclude with observations about the U.N. intervention in the Congo that may suggest precedents and pitfalls for future peacekeeping operations.

## CHAPTER 2

### HOW THE CONGO CRISIS WAS INTERNATIONALIZED

Since the establishment of the United Nations in 1945, there have been scores of international crises and conflicts, but relatively few have been internationalized, i.e., made the object of international concern by formal action in the U.N. Security Council or General Assembly. During this period, about a dozen peacekeeping operations involving the use of military personnel have been authorized.

According to two studies, there have been thirty-eight wars between 1945 and 1962, with an average duration of 5.8 years.<sup>1</sup> This same pattern has persisted since 1962. When states are in trouble they cannot cope with, they usually turn to a friendly state or ally for assistance. In January 1964, for example, the governments of Kenya, Tanganyika, and Uganda requested direct military assistance from Britain, the former colonial power, to put down mutinous army units shortly after they received their independence.

Among the many conflicts for which the Security Council did not authorize a U.N. military presence were the Algerian war (1954-62), the Mau Mau uprising in Kenya (1953-55), the pre-independence conflict in Cyprus (1955-58), China-Burma clashes (1950-53), the Cuban revolution

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1. These statistics have been derived from Evan Luard, Peace and Opinion (London: Oxford University Press, 1962); and L.F. Richardson, Statistics of Deadly Quarrels (Boxwood Press, 1960). See also Fielding Lewis Greaves, "'Peace' in Our Time," The Military Review, Vol. 42 (December 1962), pp.55-58.

(1957-59), and the French Indo-China war (1947-54). The Security Council did not act in these instances for a variety of political reasons, even though each conflict was an actual or potential threat to or breach of international peace and security.

All of the U.N. peacekeeping operations to date, with the exception of the U.N. Command in Korea, were "peaceful settlement" operations as opposed to "enforcement" operations. "Peaceful settlement" operations may or may not employ military personnel; they are carried out with the consent of the states directly involved; and they are usually associated with Chapter VI of the U.N. Charter which in part defines the authority of the Security Council to deal with "any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger . . . international peace."<sup>2</sup> Such operations are primarily the responsibility of the Security Council, but may also be authorized by the General Assembly under Chapter IV, Articles 10-12 or 14. Enforcement operations may be taken against the will of a member state and are associated with Chapter VII.<sup>3</sup>

With this record of rare and limited involvement in international problems, why did the United Nations intervene so promptly and eventually so deeply in the Congo crisis? The simple answer is that the Secretary-General, under Article 99 of the Charter, requested the Security Council to consider the Congo crisis and that the Security Council responded by authorizing the Secretary-General to "take the necessary steps" to provide "military assistance" to deal with the situation. Why did Mr. Hammarskjöld lay this matter before the Security Council and why did it respond so quickly? The answers to these questions lie in the nature of the Belgian colonial legacy, the abruptness with which the Congo was given its independence, the deep commitment of the Afro-Asian states to rapid decolonization, and the temporary policy concurrence of the United States and the Soviet Union in support of a U.N. presence.

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2. See Appendix A for relevant portions of the U.N. Charter.

3. The legal distinction between these two kinds of actions are further elaborated in Chapter 3.

### The Belgian Colonial Legacy

While an analysis of Belgian colonial policy in the Congo is not essential, several major attributes of that policy should be mentioned.<sup>4</sup> From the time that Brussels took over the responsibility of administering the Congo from King Leopold II in 1908, the vast expanse and diversity of the Congo was under effective control firmly exercised by Belgian political authority, supported by European investment in the Congo, and by the missionary presence of the Roman Catholic Church. Because of this efficient and stern administration, the Congo was sometimes referred to as a "model colony."

The Belgian Congo was also unusually isolated. For a variety of reasons, Brussels sought to insulate the Congo from Europe and from other parts of Africa, and to a considerable extent it succeeded. Congolese from different parts of the country were also isolated from one another. This lack of political contact was reinforced by the geographical location of the country which lies in the heart of Africa with only a narrow neck reaching westward to the Atlantic Ocean.

Belgian policy, according to Catherine Hoskyns, was based upon the theory that the Congo could eventually be transformed "from a backward and underdeveloped country dependent upon the colonial power to a fully industrialized modern state capable of running its own affairs."<sup>5</sup> Consistent with this belief, the Belgians followed a system of gradual economic, social, educational, and political development. Hoskyns describes the approach:

... a horizontal rather than a vertical system of development was adopted, aimed at raising the living standards and the

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4. For a description of Belgian policy see Catherine Hoskyns, The Congo Since Independence: January 1960 - December 1961 (London: Oxford University Press for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1965), pp. 1-41; Crawford Young, Politics in the Congo (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), pp. 10-161; Rene Lemarchand, Political Awakening in the Belgian Congo (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964), pp. 55-163.

5. Hoskyns, op. cit., p.8.

education of the whole population a few degrees rather than elevating rapidly a small elite to which power could be transferred. To the Belgians, the idea of handing over a show of power to an African minister while the real work was done by a European permanent secretary was abhorrent; they intended that the Africans should take responsibility slowly and gradually from the bottom up and that in the meantime the top positions in all sections of society should be held by expatriate Belgians. No African should hold a post until he was as well qualified as the Belgian he replaced. In this way they hoped to build up a local administration which would be the equal of that operating in metropolitan Belgium. They regarded themselves as holding the Congo in trust for the Africans, and at no time did they consider giving power to settlers as Britain had done in Kenya and Rhodesia. 6

Implementing this system of "horizontal development," education and administrative advancement in the Congo was much slower than in the British and French colonies in Africa. On the eve of independence only a few Congolese had advanced to positions of responsibility while the Belgians had a virtual monopoly in the highest ranks in all fields. This pattern is dramatically revealed in the areas of medicine and education.

At the end of 1959 the Congo had 761 doctors, 75 pharmacists, 44 dentists, 11 biologists, 1,233 nurses, 25 midwives, and 623 public-health officers, all of whom were Belgians, and 136 medical assistants, 1,001 male nurses, 3,852 assistant nurses, 460 assistant midwives, and 112 public-health assistants, all of whom were Congolese. In the year 1959-60 there were 1,460,000 primary-school children and only 28,961 secondary. In the same year only 136 children completed full secondary education and were ready to go to a university or for technical training. Of the teachers there were 2,600 Belgian but no Congolese secondary-school teachers. At primary level there were 564 Belgians, mostly headmasters, 24 Congolese with six years' training, 9,916 with 3-4 years' training, 11,896 who had done an emergency training course, and 13,408 with no training at all. The Congo had two universities, one Lovanium, twelve miles outside Leopoldville, and one in Elisabethville, but by 1960 they were only turning out a trickle of Congolese graduates. By the end of the 1959-60 academic year 20 had qualified from Lovanium, 2 from Elisabethville, and 4 from universities in Belgium. 7

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6. Ibid., pp. 8-9

7. Ibid., pp. 12-13 [Emphasis added.]

The Belgian theory and practice of gradual development has been criticized by some advocates of more rapid decolonization, especially since 1955. One observer has characterized postwar "political development in the Belgian Congo" as "negligible."<sup>8</sup> This criticism was based primarily on the fact that very few Congolese were in the upper reaches of the Administration and that there were no indigenous political parties.

#### Premature Independence

The Congo received its independence abruptly and prematurely. As Crawford Young observed, "total colonialism was replaced by total independence virtually overnight," and after the army mutiny in July 1960, "Africa's most revolutionary decolonization was followed by its most radical Africanization."<sup>9</sup> There are a number of interrelated factors which contributed to this abrupt transfer of power from Brussels to Leopoldville.

Perhaps most important was the strong emphasis on decolonization among African and Asian leaders, especially as it was expressed in the corridors of the United Nations. By 1958 several African countries had received their independence and others were scheduled to follow. This mood of expectation had a considerable influence on the Congolese who attended the Brussels World's Fair in 1958, where for the first time leaders from different parts of the Congo had an opportunity to talk with one another and to learn what was going on elsewhere in Africa. Also important was the Brazzaville speech by President de Gaulle in August 1958, in which he offered the French African territories a choice between complete political independence and autonomy within a French community. Since this announcement affected the French Congo just across the Congo River from Leopoldville, it hit the leaders of the embryonic political movement in the Congo with special force. The Leopoldville riot in January 1959, in which about 50 Congolese were killed, tended to galvanize

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8. Emil J. Sady, The United Nations and Dependent Peoples (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1956), p. 40.

9. Young, op. cit., pp. 572 and 575.

the recent but growing nationalist sentiment among the Congolese.

Taken together these factors created pressures which found their expression in the eloquence of Patrice Lumumba, who became the Congo's best known nationalist leader. At the Brussels Round Table Conference in January and February 1960, Lumumba became the spokesman for the 126 Congolese political leaders who attended. To his surprise and to the surprise of virtually everyone in the Congo, in Belgium, and in the world at large, the government of Prime Minister Gaston Eyskens decided to grant independence on June 30, 1960, only five months in the future.

Why did Brussels surrender to extremist pressures for instant independence when every Belgian official knew that the Congolese were not able to manage their own affairs without substantial and continued assistance from Belgian administrative, military, and technical personnel? Why was not a three- or five-year transitional plan adopted? Most observers believe that Brussels, under novel and conflicting domestic and external pressures, acted in a mood of panic. Some Belgian politicians wanted to avoid what they called a "Belgian Algeria."<sup>10</sup> Other Belgian political leaders, emphasizing the extent of Congolese dependence upon Belgian personnel, believed that the Belgian presence and influence could continue after independence day much as it had before. Even though there would be a fundamental shift in authority, they felt that most Belgian administrators, civil servants, and Army officers could stay on serving the new government much as they had served the colonial administration. Another factor was the absence of a "colonial mentality" among the Belgian people--they were happy to be freed of the Congo.

In any event, on June 30, 1960, the Congo received its independence amid the mingled emotions of hope and anxiety. As the tragic drama unfolded, the hopes were dashed and the anxieties were confirmed.

#### Immediate Cause of the Congo Crisis

The basic cause of the crisis in July 1960 was the incapacity of the Congolese political leaders to govern the new state and the absence

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10. Robert Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors (New York: Doubleday, 1964), pp. 332-3.

of effective arrangements on the part of the Belgian Government or any other outside authority to compensate for the internal weakness. The proximate cause for the crisis was mutiny on July 4 among some Congolese soldiers of the Force publique at Camp Leopold II in Leopoldville and at the Thysville Camp 95 miles away the following day, and the failure of the Belgian officers or the Congolese authorities alone or in cooperation with one another to stop these two small and isolated disorders before they got out of hand.<sup>11</sup>

The Force publique in 1960 was a 25,000-man national security force combining the functions of an army and a police establishment. Its entire officer corps of 1,100 was Belgian. Even after independence day its commander was a Belgian, Lieutenant General Emil Janssens, who made no plans for accelerating the training and promotion of Congolese. He assumed that his white officers would continue to serve until equally qualified Congolese could replace them. The mission of the Force was to maintain law and order, protect property, and secure the border. It had a good reputation for discipline and effectiveness.

Discipline within the Force publique under the Belgians was, by African army standards, excellent. Life on and off duty was carefully regulated. The Congolese soldier accepted the harsh discipline well and felt that his new way of life was superior to tribal ways. He was loyal to the Force publique as an institution and a way of life, but not to the state or nation, which to him was merely a foreign power represented by Belgian officers. He readily fired upon his own countrymen provided they did not belong to his own tribe. As a result, troops employed in punitive operations against Congolese were regularly drawn from distant parts of the country. The civilian [African] population regarded the Force publique with respect born of fear. 12

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11. No attempt will be made to record the fast-moving events of the first days of the Congo crisis. For a brief and coherent account of the first fourteen days, see Hoskyns, op.cit., pp. 85-104. For a chronological picture of unfolding developments, see Annex I, A Chronology of the Congo Crisis: 1960-64. An overall view is presented in the Concise Chronological Chart found in Appendix D.

12. U.S. Army, Area Handbook for the Republic of the Congo (Leopoldville), Special Operations Research Office, American University (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1962), pp. 622-23.



While the Belgian officers at Leopoldville and Thysville may have been physically capable of restoring order on July 5, they were hesitant to act decisively because of the uncertainties of their role under an independent Congolese Government. Had they so acted, one can speculate, they might well have been able to pacify the situation. Such forthright action also might have deterred similar disorder at other Force publique camps or provided a precedent for dealing with such disturbances should they occur. In the very first hours of the mutiny, the Belgians could have probably restored order without the actual use of violence. But even if they had found it necessary to punish a few ring-leaders (and had thereby been able to prevent the mutiny) the Congo crisis as we know it probably would not have occurred.

The object of this speculation is to emphasize the small scale of the initial trouble. Ineptitude, inexperience, and panic on the part of the Belgians and the Congolese and a general atmosphere of anxiety enflamed by rumor and mutual suspicion, permitted the situation to get out of hand. The failure to employ effectively minimum coercion for a brief period at the early stage of civil disorder, compelled the use of greater and more prolonged coercion at a later stage.

In the first hours and days of the crisis, the Belgian Government did not use its metropolitan troops then stationed in the Congo because it could not get permission to do so from Lumumba.<sup>13</sup>

After the mutiny spread and many Europeans fled in panic, the Belgians flew in paratroopers from Belgium to reinforce their two Congo bases. From July 10 through July 18, Belgian troops were peaceably deployed in twenty-six places (ten in Katanga and sixteen elsewhere) where they restored order and helped in the evacuation of Europeans who wanted to leave. Among the places assisted were Leopoldville, Elisabethville,

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13. The Belgian troops were located in two Belgian bases, one at Kitona at the mouth of the Congo River and the other at Kamina in Katanga. These bases were held by Brussels under the Treaty of Friendship signed with the Congolese on the eve of independence day, but not approved by either Parliament. The text of the Treaty is found in Appendix C.

Coquilhatville, Luluabourg, Jadotville, Kongolo, and Albertville.<sup>14</sup>

In sharp contrast to this peaceful deployment, Belgian intervention in Matadi, the port city about 90 miles west of Thysville, on July 11, led to fighting in which 12 to 20 Congolese were killed and 13 Belgians wounded.<sup>15</sup> The Matadi incident,<sup>16</sup> which was considerably exaggerated by the Congolese and broadcast throughout the Congo, was a significant turning point in Belgian-Congolese relations. This event, plus the declaration of Katangan independence by President Moïse Tshombe that same evening, made further cooperation virtually impossible between the Lumumba Government and Belgian authorities in the security field.

By this time the Force publique was torn by internal conflict and had ceased to exist as a cohesive and disciplined army. Lt. General Janssens and the great majority of the Belgian officers had been summarily dismissed and replaced by inexperienced Congolese noncommissioned officers. On July 8 the name of the Force was changed to Armée Nationale Congolaise (ANC).<sup>17</sup> On the same day President Kasavubu, as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Prime Minister Lumumba, as Minister of National Defense, promoted a former Sergeant, Victor Lundula, to the rank of Major General and placed him in command of the ANC. Joseph Mobutu was named Chief of Staff.

The charges made at the time that the Force publique mutiny was a plot on the part of the Communists, or the Belgians, or Lumumba, cannot

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14. W. J. Ganshof van der Meersch, Fin de la Souveraineté Belge au Congo (Brussels: Institut Royal des Relations Internationales, 1963), p. 460.

15. Belgian troops were also involved in hostilities on July 22, 1960, in Kolwezi in Katanga. In a clash between Belgian paratroopers and 250 Congolese soldiers, "a dozen or more Congolese and two Belgians were killed." Hoskyns, op. cit., p. 142.

16. This and other military incidents and developments are briefly summarized in Appendix P.

17. Centre de Recherche et d'Information Socio-Politiques, Congo: 1960, Vol. I prepared by J. Gérard-Libois and Benoit Verhaegen (Brussels: Les Dossiers du CRISP, n.d.), p. 408. (Hereinafter cited as CRIS', Congo: 1960, or Congo: 1961, etc.)

be sustained by the facts. Most close observers reject the plot theory. It was a tragedy of errors on all sides. Neither the Congolese nor the Belgians sought to destroy the unity or the reliability of the Force.<sup>18</sup>

In the beginning the soldiers simply wanted better pay and the hope of modest promotion. They were more hostile toward Lumumba than toward their Belgian officers. They were prepared for Belgian officers above the NCO rank to stay on until Congolese could be trained to take their places.

The abrupt Africanization of the officer corps of the ANC was a disaster which has plagued the Congo ever since. The new Congolese officers were seldom respected or obeyed by their troops. Many of the officers themselves did not take orders from their superiors. The Army Headquarters in Leopoldville had little control beyond the capital city. The division, disunity, and demoralization within the ANC was both a cause and a symptom of the political and tribal disunity and chaos in the Congo. Rather than being an instrument of stability and security, most units of the ANC during the four years of U.N. peacekeeping were a source of disorder and violence. The indiscipline and irresponsibility of Congolese soldiers constituted a major, if not the major, threat to internal law and order throughout the entire period.

#### How the United Nations Intervened

When the Lumumba Government realized it was incapable of controlling the ANC and of maintaining civil order, it sought outside assistance. Belgium was ruled out for obvious political reasons. During a hectic four-day period, various Congolese leaders requested military assistance from the United States, the Soviet Union, Ghana, and the United Nations. Briefly noted below are the key developments leading to the Security Council decision of July 14, adopted just a week after it had recommended the admission of the Congo as a full member of the United Nations.

On July 10, 1960, the day before the Matadi incident and the

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18. The evidence to support this conclusion is summarized in Hoskyns, op. cit., pp. 101-4.

declaration of Katanga's independence, Kasavubu and Lumumba acted on the advice of American Ambassador-designate Clare H. Timberlake, who had been in the Congo since June 28. They made an oral request for U.N. assistance to restore discipline in the ANC and to shore up the administration which was depleted by the exodus of Belgian administrators, civil servants, and technicians.<sup>19</sup> The appeal, vaguely limited to technical assistance, was addressed to Under Secretary Ralph J. Bunche, who was representing the Secretary-General in Leopoldville at that time. Bunche immediately cabled the appeal to Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold who was in Geneva. Hammarskjold promptly returned to New York and, on July 12, called together the U.N. delegates from Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Libya, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia, and the United Arab Republic to discuss possible African contributions to a program of "technical assistance in the security field" for the Congo.

On the same day, July 12, in Leopoldville, Timberlake was invited to a Congolese Cabinet meeting, along with several Belgian diplomats. Kasavubu and Lumumba were absent; they were traveling around the country together trying to calm down the soldiers and helping to supervise the selection of Congolese officers for the ANC. During the meeting, Deputy Prime Minister Antoine Gizenga and Foreign Minister Justin Bomboko asked Timberlake to request 3,000 American troops to restore law and order.<sup>20</sup> They formalized the request in writing. Before forwarding it to Washington, Timberlake told them that direct U.S. aid was unlikely and that in any event the matter was already before the Secretary-General because of the oral request by Kasavubu and Lumumba to Bunche. Almost immediately after the receipt of the Congolese appeal for American military assistance, President Dwight D. Eisenhower advised Leopoldville to seek help through the United Nations.

A delegation from Ghana, which had just arrived in Leopoldville (and which included Andrew Djin, President Kwame Nkrumah's special representative to the Congo; Brigadier General S. J. A. Otu; and John

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19. Hoskyns, op. cit., p. 113.

20. Hoskyns, op. cit., p. 114.

Elliot, the Ghanaian Ambassador in Moscow) advised the Congolese against accepting American military aid and suggested they address their appeal to the United Nations.

Also on July 12, Kasavubu and Lumumba, on the basis of exaggerated reports of the Matadi incident, demanded that Belgian troops withdraw from the Congo within two days. From Luluabourg they sent their first cable, via Bunche, to the Secretary-General. This message solicited urgent U.N. "military assistance" because of the "external aggression" and "colonialist machinations" of Belgium which were described as "a threat to international peace" and a violation of the Treaty of Friendship. They also protested against Belgian support of Katanga's secession. This written message differed in both tone and substance from the original oral appeal which had focused on the restoration of internal law and order.

On the following day, July 13, when Kasavubu and Lumumba heard of the appeal of some of their cabinet ministers to the Americans, they sent a second telegram to the Secretary-General, making it clear that the requested aid was to deal with aggression and not with internal disorder and that they wanted a force from neutral nations and not from the United States.<sup>21</sup>

Also on July 13, Deputy Prime Minister Antoine Gizenga, apparently acting on his own, requested troops from Ghana as a stopgap until U.N. authorized troops could be sent.

Still greatly disturbed by the Gizenga-Bomboko request for U.S. assistance, Lumumba sought the advice of Soviet representatives in Leopoldville. On July 14 he persuaded Kasavubu to join him in a cable to Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev stating that the Congo "is occupied by Belgian troops and the lives of the Republic's President and Prime Minister are in danger," and begging the Soviet Union "to watch hourly over the situation," which was generally interpreted as a veiled request for military assistance.<sup>22</sup> Khrushchev replied that Moscow would provide "any assistance

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21. See Appendix J for the text of two cables from Kasavubu and Lumumba.

22. van der Meersch, op.cit., p. 447

that might be necessary for the victory" of the Congo's "just cause."

The significant difference between the original oral request to the Secretary-General from Kasavubu and Lumumba and their subsequent written requests was prompted primarily by the Matadi incident and Katangan secession. This difference reflected two ways of looking at the Congo crisis. One emphasized the Congo's internal weakness and the other external interference. These diverging viewpoints were expressed by various delegates in the Security Council debates and attempts to bridge them accounted for some of the vagueness and ambiguity in the resulting resolutions.

It was in this confusing atmosphere, exacerbated by rumors and less-than-balanced reporting of developments in the Congo, that Hammarskjold acted and acted quickly. Invoking Article 99, which gives the Secretary-General the authority to "bring to the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security" Hammarskjold called an urgent meeting for the evening of July 13 and gave his interpretation of the crisis and what ought to be done.

Hammarskjold's initiative in the Congo crisis was a logical extension of his deep commitment to decolonization in Africa, his desire to protect the new states and isolate them from the Cold War, his interest in making the United Nations a more effective peacekeeping instrument, and his readiness to strengthen the executive capacity of the Secretary-General. His special interest in the Congo grew out of his six-week African tour in early 1960 and reflected the importance he attached to this large and potentially influential country.<sup>23</sup>

On July 14, the Security Council adopted a compromise resolution presented by Tunisia and in harmony with Hammarskjold's interpretation of the problem. Citing no specific Article of the U.N. Charter, the resolution called upon "Belgium to remove its troops" from the Congo and authorized the Secretary-General "to take the necessary steps, in consult-

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23. The role of the Secretary-General is dealt with in detail in Chapter 4.

ation with the Government of the Republic of the Congo, to provide the Government with such military assistance as may be necessary" until the "national security forces may be able, in the opinion of the Government, to meet fully their tasks."<sup>24</sup> The U.S.S.R. and the Afro-Asian states failed to get the Security Council to brand Belgium as an aggressor or to indicate how and when the Belgian troops should be withdrawn. Washington and the more moderate states felt that the resolution, at least by implication, placed sufficient emphasis on the necessity to restore law and order. The resolution was adopted by eight votes to zero, with China, France, and the United Kingdom abstaining.

#### Why the United Nations Intervened

Why was this particular crisis internationalized? Most important was the fact that the United States and the Soviet Union preferred U.N. intervention to any plausible alternative, at least in the beginning. This was also true of the majority of the Security Council members. Neither France nor Britain, each unenthusiastic about the sending of a peacekeeping force into the Congo, felt strongly enough to veto the compromise resolution.

Each government represented on the Council saw the Congo problem in terms of its own interests. Their views are discussed in detail later in the Report; their various ways of assessing the crisis as of July 14, 1960, are indicated briefly here as essential background for understanding the legal problems discussed in Chapter 3.

United States: Though the only government to receive a formal Congolese invitation for military assistance, Washington from the outset preferred to channel its assistance through the United Nations. The basic objective of the United States in Central Africa was then, as it is now, to maintain sufficient stability for effective political and economic development.<sup>25</sup> To this end, Washington wanted a united Congo with a moderate government representing all major factions and capable of sustaining

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<sup>24</sup>. For full text and the vote of this and subsequent U.N. resolutions, see Appendix B. The legal basis of the Security Council's action is discussed in Chapter 3.

<sup>25</sup>. The U.S. position is discussed in detail in Chapter 7.



mutually beneficial relations with Western states. The United States was prepared to accept the Congo as an unaligned state as it had accepted other newly independent states in Asia and Africa.

With these broad objectives, Washington was concerned primarily with the breakdown of law and order and with the danger that the Soviet Union would exploit this disorder for purposes inimical to peace in the area and to the best interests of the Congolese. Washington also wanted the new state to succeed, but it regarded the U.S.S.R., not Belgium, as the major threat to genuine independence.

Direct U.S. military assistance was quickly ruled out because it might be used as a pretext for more substantial Soviet intervention on behalf of Lumumba which, in turn, might lead to an unwanted confrontation of the two great powers.

The State Department was anxious to avoid charges of "neocolonialism" which could be expected to greet direct American military aid. Washington also wanted to avoid being torn between the expectations of Afro-Asian leaders on the one hand and its responsibilities to NATO allies on the other. Further, the United States tended to regard aid to independent African states as primarily the responsibility of the former metropolises. The United States was prepared to play a quiet supporting role. Added to these considerations was the high level of confusion, resulting from poor communications and inadequate reporting, about the nature of the Congo crisis and how much aid of what kind was required for how long.

The United States had long advocated U.N. peacekeeping in principle and had been the most consistent supporter of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) and the other previous U.N. missions involving military personnel. This largely favorable experience with multilateral peacekeeping reinforced a general disposition to turn to the United Nations in certain types of crises where bilateral or alliance action was held to involve unacceptable political costs.

For all these reasons the United States preferred to channel its aid through the United Nations.



Argentina, Ecuador, and Italy, representing the smaller Western states on the Security Council, voted for the resolution for reasons similar to those of the United States.

Soviet Union: The major objective of Moscow in the Congo was to support the Lumumba Government and transform it into a regime with close political and economic ties with the Soviet bloc.<sup>26</sup> Regarding itself as the chief proponent of "national liberation" in Africa, the U.S.S.R. was eager to demonstrate its zeal in supporting efforts to expel the "Belgian colonialists" from their former possession. For tactical and pragmatic reasons Moscow decided that its objectives could be accomplished at less risk by a U.N. peacekeeping presence, which it apparently felt would preclude neither normal Soviet diplomatic influence in the Congo nor covert operations designed to strengthen and influence the Lumumba regime. It appears that Moscow's main reason for supporting the July 14 resolution was to prevent direct U.S. assistance which probably would have jeopardized the achievement of Soviet objectives in the Congo. Poland followed the U.S.S.R. in voting for the resolution.

The Afro-Asian States: Tunisia, as the spokesman for the unaligned world, was the author of the compromise resolution.<sup>27</sup> The Afro-Asian states were interested in successful decolonization and in avoiding a big-power confrontation. Although a professed concern at the time, subsequent events suggest they were less interested in the maintenance of internal stability as such, than they were in expelling the Belgian military and "colonial" presence. Speaking for these states generally, the Tunisian Foreign Minister, Mongi Slim, characterized Belgian intervention as aggression, but did not insist on any such condemnation in his draft resolution. Ceylon, representing the Asian states, took a position similar to that of Tunisia.

Britain: Like the United States, London sought stability and peaceful change in Central Africa, but it had serious reservations about

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26. The Soviet position is elaborated in Chapter 8.

27. The roles of the Afro-Asian states that contributed troops to the U.N. Force in the Congo are discussed in Chapter 13.

the authorizing of a U.N. peacekeeping mission.<sup>28</sup> The Foreign Office was concerned about how the resolution would be interpreted and carried out by Hammarskjold, whose advocacy of speedy decolonization in Africa had occasioned some misgivings. London also feared that the U.N. operation might interfere in Congolese internal affairs, thus establishing an unfortunate precedent for U.N. intervention in the Rhodesian Federation and elsewhere in Africa. The British U.N. delegate specifically objected to the first paragraph of the resolution which called for the withdrawal of Belgian troops because by implication it stigmatized Belgium as an aggressor. Though London said it had no objection to the second paragraph which authorized the Secretary-General to "take the necessary steps" to provide "military assistance" to the Congo, its delegate was instructed to abstain on the resolution as a whole.

France: Embracing all of the elements of the British view, Paris carried its position somewhat further.<sup>29</sup> France was opposed to U.N. intervention in principle. President de Gaulle preferred and later recommended that the Congo crisis should be settled by joint action on the part of Britain, France, and the United States. France also abstained.

The working consensus supporting U.N. intervention, symbolized by the eight affirmative votes in the Security Council, was the product of mixed motivations which reflected the compatible and conflicting interests of the states involved. As such, the decision of the Security Council can be seen as a temporary consensus, not based upon a common understanding of the crisis or of what the United Nations should do, but rather upon a minimal agreement that the crisis in one way or another endangered the interests of each and that the least risky way of dealing with it was through the United Nations. There was no agreement on precisely what the Secretary-General should do; there was agreement only that he should do something.

The two basically different ways of looking at the crisis which divided the governments supporting the original resolution persisted

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28. The British position is discussed in Chapter 10.

29. The role of France is discussed in Chapter 9.

throughout the four years of the peacekeeping effort. The Soviet Union and the militant African states continued to insist that Belgium (and sometimes the United States) was the main threat to the integrity and independence of the Congo. The United States, other Western countries, and some of the moderate Afro-Asian governments placed more emphasis on the internal weakness of the Congo. The Western states generally regarded direct or indirect Russian intervention in Congolese internal affairs as a serious danger.

From the beginning of the U.N. operation, the United States was the leader of a moderately stable coalition of supporting governments working through and operating under the mandate of successive Security Council resolutions. Without the active diplomatic support of Washington and the promise of financial and logistical support, it is doubtful that the U.N. operation would have ever been authorized. Had American diplomatic, financial, and logistical support been withdrawn at any point during the four years, the operation would have collapsed, or at least would have been forced to alter drastically its character. The important role of the United States, as the subsequent analysis will demonstrate, does not mean that the U.N. operation was simply an extension of the State Department as the Soviet Union has charged. For a variety of reasons the interests of the United States and its interpretation of the crisis corresponded closely to the interests of a working coalition of states as well as to the interpretation of the Secretary-General of what the nature of the peacekeeping effort should be.

### CHAPTER 3

#### LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS

The Congo crisis erupted with little notice and quickly developed into an international emergency. The fast-moving events were partially obscured by an atmosphere of panic and rumor. It was in this turbulent political situation that the Secretary-General and the Security Council acted in mid-July, 1960, and in the months that immediately followed. In spite of, and in part because of, the political confusion and the unprecedented aspects of the crisis, questions of legality played an important role in the thinking of Hammarskjold, the deliberations of the Security Council, and the decisions of interested governments.

The legal problems of the U.N. peacekeeping effort are discussed within the larger context of the domestic and international political struggle.<sup>1</sup> After examining the legal basis for U.N. action in the Congo and the nature of the obligation of member states toward that action, the objectives and legal constraints of the operation are considered. The analysis concludes with an answer to these questions: Was the Secretary-General's legal interpretation of the resolutions correct? Was his interpretation of the objectives of and constraints on

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1. The political factors are dealt with only to the extent they are essential for understanding the legal point at issue. These factors are elaborated in Chapters 5 through 13.

U.N. military assistance to the Congo reasonable and impartial?

Legal Basis for U.N. Action

Assuming that actions of the Security Council or General Assembly in accordance with the U.N. Charter are legitimate and enjoy the status of legality in international relations, what was the basis of U.N. action in the Congo and was it consistent with the Charter?

The Congo crisis was placed before the Security Council by Hammarskjöld under Article 99 which states that the Secretary-General "may bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security." He made his urgent request for a Security Council meeting on July 13, 1960, in the light of two cables he had received from President Kasavubu and Prime Minister Lumumba. This first cable, dated July 12, requested the "urgent dispatch by the United Nations of military assistance" not because of internal disorder in the Congo, but because of "the dispatch to the Congo of metropolitan Belgian troops in violation of the Treaty of Friendship signed between Belgium and the Republic of the Congo." The cable also stated that "the essential purpose" of the aid was "to protect the national territory of the Congo against the present external aggression which is a threat to international peace."<sup>2</sup> A second cable from Kasavubu and Lumumba, dated July 13, reasserted the international basis of the request for aid and said the Congo would be compelled to appeal to the Bandung Powers if U.N. assistance were not sent promptly.

Hammarskjöld summarized the general view of the eight states that voted for the first Congo resolution on July 14 when he said that internal chaos "had created a situation which through its consequences imposed a threat to peace and security justifying United Nations intervention." He added that the finding of "a conflict between two parties," presumably meaning two states, was "legally not essential for the justification" of U.N. action.<sup>3</sup>

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2. The texts of both cables are in Appendix J.

3. U.N., SCOR, Supplement for July, Aug., Sept., 1960, S/4389, (July 13, 1960), p.17.

### Objectives of the Force: The Changing Mandate

In sharp contrast to the comparatively calm post cease-fire situation in the Middle East which the UNEF had been policing since 1956, the Congo crisis was complex, ever changing, and compounded by a profound internal conflict. Unlike the Congo, Egypt the host state for UNEF troops, had no internal conflict and there was a government in control. UNEF had a clear-cut international agreement authorizing U.N. troops to patrol a specified area from which Egyptian forces were excluded. From the outset, the purpose of UNEF was to deter border violations by both sides, to report violations by either, and to serve as an international plate-glass window should either Egypt or Israel attack the other. This mandate has never been revised.<sup>4</sup>

In the Congo there were two unsettled and interrelated problems. One was the continued Belgian military presence (and later the presence of other foreign nationals,) particularly in Katanga. The other much more difficult and persistent problem was the breakdown of law and order. The latter problem was characterized by a power struggle among ill-disciplined Congolese political factions exacerbated by a fragmented and irresponsible Congolese Army without a reliable officer corps. The situation at times was so bad that the Secretary-General had no competent Central Government to deal with.

Given this chaotic situation, the lack of any adequate precedent, and the diverging interests of the Security Council members, the original July 14, 1960, resolution was necessarily vague. Subsequent resolutions,

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4. UNEF was authorized by the General Assembly on November 4, 1956, and has been operating quietly and effectively ever since. For brief summaries of the constitutional bases of UNEF see Ruth B. Russell, United Nations Experience with Military Forces: Political and Legal Aspects, (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1964), pp. 50-71 and D.W. Bowett, op.cit., pp. 90-151. For a longer analysis, see Gabriella Rosner, The United Nations Emergency Force, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963).

which supplemented but never superseded the first one, were for the same reasons little better. They were less vague on the issue of the withdrawal of the Belgian military presence than they were on the problems related to the restoration and maintenance of internal order. The precise objectives to be achieved by U.N. assistance were unspecified and left to the determination of the Secretary-General. There was no specific reference to the duration of the mission.

The Security Council mandate unfolded in response to the changing drama in the Congo and its changing significance to the principal actors. Very important were the reactions of Security Council members to Hammarskjold's interpretation of what should be done and to the supporting measures he recommended or undertook.

#### Withdrawal of Belgian Troops and Other Prohibited Persons

The visible presence of Belgian troops in uniform in an independent state against the wishes of President Kasavubu and Prime Minister Lumumba was an obvious problem and, as it turned out, a relatively simple one for the Secretary-General to deal with compared to the larger law-and-order mandate.

The July 14, 1960, resolution called upon "the Government of Belgium to withdraw" its troops from the Congo.<sup>5</sup> The July 22 resolution reaffirmed the first resolution and urged Belgium to withdraw its troops "speedily" and authorized "the Secretary-General to take all necessary action to this effect." The August 9 resolution reaffirmed the first two and called upon Belgium to "withdraw immediately its troops from the Province of Katanga under speedy modalities determined by the Secretary-General." Nowhere did the resolutions specify the "modalities" to be employed.

By September 1960 all Belgian troops had been voluntarily withdrawn in compliance with the resolutions, except for those in Katanga. Even there the troops were officially withdrawn, though 114 Belgian

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5. The texts and votes of U.N. resolutions on the Congo are found in Appendix B.

officers remained and were seconded to Tshombe's Government to direct his gendarmerie.<sup>6</sup>

The General Assembly resolution of September 20, 1960, did not mention Belgium, but supported the prior Security Council resolutions. The Security Council resolution of February 21, 1961, with an unmistakable, but not explicit, reference to the continued Belgian presence in secessionist Katanga, called for "the immediate withdrawal and evacuation from the Congo of all Belgian and other foreign military and para-military personnel and political advisers not under the United Nations Command, and mercenaries." The first of three resolutions adopted by the General Assembly on April 15, 1961, reaffirmed the February resolution and called the continued presence of prohibited foreigners "the central factor" in the Congo situation. Washington joined London and Paris in abstaining on this vote.

The final Security Council resolution of November 24, 1961, adopted after the first clash between U.N. troops and Katangan gendarmes the previous September, known as Round One,<sup>7</sup> did not mention Belgium, but deplored the "armed action" of Katanga "with the aid of external resources and foreign mercenaries." It authorized the Secretary-General "to take vigorous action, including the use of a requisite measure of force, if necessary for the immediate apprehension, detention pending legal action and/or deportation of all foreign military and para-military personnel and political advisers not under the United Nations Command, and mercenaries." The United States voted for this resolution; Britain and France abstained.

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6. In the "Second Progress Report to the Secretary-General from his Special Representative in the Congo," Rajeshwar Dayal wrote: "As of October 31 [1960], there remained . . . 231 Belgian nationals (114 officers and 117 of other ranks) in the Katangese gendarmerie and 58 Belgian officers in the police." United Nations Review, Vol. 7 (December 1960), p. 27.

7. The three clashes between the UNF and Katangan forces are referred to in this study as Rounds One, Two, and Three. For a brief description of these and other military incidents, see Appendix P.



The mandate with respect to prohibited foreign personnel evolved with changing circumstances. Initially, it was directed toward Belgian troops, later toward all military and paramilitary personnel, especially in Katanga. Finally, it included Belgian political advisers and non-Belgian foreigners in all these categories. From the outset, calls for withdrawal of foreign personnel were directed almost exclusively toward eliminating outside support for Katangan secession, but there was some ambiguity on this point. A number of Belgian nationals continued to serve in advisory positions in Leopoldville and elsewhere in the Congo. The employment of Belgian military officers as advisers in Leopoldville by General Mobutu was, however, protested by some U.N. officials, but Mobutu refused to send them out of the country.<sup>8</sup>

#### Maintenance of Law and Order

The greater proportion of the text of the seven U.N. resolutions was devoted to law and order in the Congo, the absence of which was considered a threat to international peace. These broader questions were, of course related to the "Belgian problem," but for analytical purposes they may be considered separately. Such a separation also appears valid politically because the supporters of the U.N. effort tend to divide between those who were primarily interested in "expelling the Belgian colonialists" and those primarily interested in helping the Central Government to develop the capacity to maintain order. This summary will focus on the peacekeeping aspects of the mandate as distinct from the civilian activities of the United Nations and the internal political and constitutional problems in the Congo.

The July 14 resolution authorized the Secretary-General to take "the necessary steps" to provide "such military assistance as may be necessary" until Congolese "national security forces may be able, in the opinion of the Government, to meet fully their tasks." The July 22 resolution stated that "the complete restoration of law and order . . . would effectively contribute to the maintenance of international peace

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8. The role of Belgium is dealt with in Chapter 11.

and security." It requested:

. . . all States to refrain from any action which might tend to impede the restoration of law and order and the exercise by the Government of the Congo of its authority and also refrain from any action which might undermine the territorial integrity and the political independence of the Republic of the Congo.

Declaring that "the entry of the United Nations force into the Province of Katanga is necessary for the full implementation" of the first two resolutions, the August 9 resolution reaffirmed that the U.N. Force "will not be a party to or in any way intervene in or be used to influence the outcome of any internal conflict, constitutional or otherwise." The September 20 General Assembly resolution reaffirmed the previous Security Council resolutions.

The broadened mandate and increased authority of the U.N. operation provided by the February 21, 1961, resolution was a direct outgrowth of the unfolding Congo crisis, particularly the Mobutu coup of September 14, 1960, the ensuing political vacuum, and the "killing" of Lumumba announced during the Security Council meetings. Noting "a serious civil war situation," the resolution urged the Secretary-General to:

. . . take immediately all appropriate measures to prevent the occurrence of civil war . . . including arrangements for cease-fires, the halting of all military operations, the prevention of clashes, and the use of force, if necessary, in the last resort.

The constitutional crisis was held to increase the "dangers of conflict within the Congo" and thus to "threaten international peace." The resolution urged the "convening of the Parliament" and that "Congolese armed units and personnel should be reorganized and brought under discipline and control" so they would be prevented from "any possibility of interference" in the "political life of the Congo." This is the first explicit mention of ANC units. This belated reference to the ANC is significant because from the beginning of the crisis the unruly Congolese soldiers were acknowledged to be one of the chief causes of disorder. It is also significant that this reference to the ANC was not addressed to any particular party and did not indicate who was to be responsible for

bringing the ANC units "under discipline and control."<sup>9</sup> The General Assembly resolutions of April 15, 1961, reaffirmed all previous resolutions.

The final Security Council resolution, November 24, 1961, focused largely on the Katanga situation. It extended the permissible use of force by the UNF to the "apprehension" of prohibited personnel, meaning Europeans assisting Tshombe's administration or security forces. The Security Council declared its "full and firm support for the Central Government of the Congo" and its determination to assist the Government "to maintain law and order and national integrity."

Facing the Security Council resolutions as a whole, the law-and-order objectives of the UNF directed largely toward the internal situation, can be summarized as follows:

- . Restore and maintain law and order throughout the Congo.
- . Prevent civil war and curb tribal conflict
- . Transform the ANC into a reliable instrument of internal security.

As far as the Congo's relation to external factors was concerned, there were two major objectives of the U.N. peacekeeping presence:

- . Restore and maintain the territorial integrity and political independence of the Congo.
- . Protect the Congo from external interference in its internal affairs, particularly by the elimination of foreign military officers and advisers hired by secessionist Katanga.

#### Obligations of Member States

One of the most controversial legal questions of the U.N. involvement in the Congo has to do with the obligations of member states toward the peacekeeping operation. This question is related to the authority under which the peacekeeping mission was undertaken and to the specific language of the Security Council resolutions.

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9. The ANC question is dealt with in Chapter 6.

On the question of the authority for the United Nations to act in the Congo crisis, the Secretary-General in bringing the matter before the Security Council was acting in accordance with the Charter, and the Council in authorizing the mission was also operating within the Charter's terms of reference.

The Charter provides two major ways by which the Security Council may authorize the dispatch of military personnel to a trouble spot.<sup>10</sup> Under Chapter VI, the Security Council may "at any stage of a dispute" that is "likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security" recommend "appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment" with a view to "a pacific settlement of the dispute."<sup>11</sup>

Under Chapter VII, the Security Council may "decide what measures shall be taken" in response to any situation it determines to be a "threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression." The measures may include a wide range from the creation of a conciliation mission to "action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security" (Article 42). U.N. enforcement action under Article 42 has never been expressly invoked by the Council, which even in the case of Korea only recommended that member states provide assistance to the Republic of Korea.

The first two Congo resolutions make no reference to the specific articles of the Charter under which the Congo effort was author-

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10. Under certain circumstances, the General Assembly may also act. This authority, made explicit in the Uniting for Peace Resolution, illustrates the flexibility of the Charter. For an early study which anticipated the evolving role of the General Assembly, see H. Field Haviland, Jr., The Political Role of the General Assembly (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1951), especially pp. 168-80. On several occasions a stalemate in the Security Council on the Congo question resulted in its being transferred to the General Assembly. It was the latter organ which, because of its control over financial matters, determined the duration of the UNF.

11. These quotations are from Articles 33-38 of Chapter VI. These and other relevant articles of the U.N. Charter are found in Appendix A.

ized, but the August 9, 1960, resolution invoked Article 49 of Chapter VII. It can be said that the peacekeeping effort was based on parts of both Chapters VI and VII. A U.N. presence dispatched under this broad authority may be either military or civilian, and may range in size from one man to a force of 20,000 or more troops. Such pacific settlement presence must have the consent of the host state. The troops which compose it are voluntarily contributed by member governments. By definition, it is not a sanctions force, that is, it may not take enforcement action against any state.

There was no need at any point for the Security Council to establish a finding of "aggression" by any state as a basis for acting in the Congo. No such finding was ever made in spite of attempts by the Soviet Union and some Afro-Asian states to have Belgium so condemned. The Council's determination that the crisis constituted a danger to international peace was legally sufficient grounds for the action it took.

An analysis of the first three Council resolutions, July 14 and 22 and August 9, 1960, and the debate preceding these resolutions, leads to the conclusion that member states had a legal obligation to support, at least passively, the U.N. peacekeeping operation.<sup>12</sup>

Belgium was clearly a special case since it was the only state, other than the Congo, mentioned in the resolutions. Further, Belgium was by implication doing something wrong. It would seem that Brussels was legally obligated to comply with the repeated requests of the Security Council to withdraw its troops, though all three resolutions only "call upon" and never order Belgium to do so; the invocation of Articles 25 and 49 in the August 9 resolution resolved this ambiguity.

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12. Arguments supporting this conclusion have been persuasively advanced by various legal authorities, including Oscar Schachter, director of the U.N. General Legal Division and D.W. Bowett of Cambridge University. See Oscar Schachter's views presented in E.M. Miller, "Legal Aspects of the United Nations Action in the Congo," American Journal of International Law, Vol. 55, No. 1, (January, 1961), pp. 1-28. For a slightly different line of argument, see D.W. Bowett, United Nations Forces: A Legal Study (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964), pp. 174-82.

The question of the responsibilities of other member states, never mentioned by name, is more complicated. Had "measures" been decided according to Articles 41 and 42, the decisions would automatically have been binding. But they were not. In fact, the possibility of Article 42 action was raised by Hammarskjold for the purpose of making it clear that such action was not authorized. Nevertheless, he did invoke Articles 25 and 49. In a statement to the Council on August 8, Hammarskjold referred to the relevance of these two Articles which read in full:

Article 25: The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter.

Article 49: The Members of the United Nations shall join in affording mutual assistance in carrying out the measures decided upon by the Security Council.

These two Articles were mentioned in paragraph five of the August 9, 1960, resolution:

Calls upon all Member States, in accordance with Articles 25 and 49 of the Charter, to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council and to afford mutual assistance in carrying out measures decided upon by the Security Council.

There is a further question whether the two Articles, with their obligatory character, are applicable if the Security Council decisions in question were not expressly authorized under Articles 41 and 42. It may, however, be argued that the Council in effect acted under Article 40 of Chapter VII which does not necessarily imply an enforcement action but which uses the more permissive language of "call upon;" this may or may not indicate obligatory compliance. The Article states in part that, to "prevent an aggravation" of a threat to or breach of the peace, "the Security Council may, before making recommendations or deciding upon the measures provided for in Article 39, call upon the parties concerned to comply with such provisional measures." (Emphasis added.)

In sum, the Security Council decided that the Congo crisis was a danger to international peace. This being the case, it "called upon" Belgium to remove its troops from the Congo and authorized the Secretary-

General to take "the necessary steps" to provide "military assistance" to the Leopoldville Government. By explicitly invoking Articles 25 and 49, the Council apparently placed on all member states a legal obligation to "accept" the decisions of the Council and a similar, if imprecisely defined, obligation to assist "in carrying out measures decided upon by the Security Council." In the February 21, 1961, resolution, the Security Council reminded "all States of their obligation under" the previous resolutions.

This common-sense interpretation was not challenged by most member states, and most of them actively or passively complied with the U.N. effort. The Soviet Union later challenged the validity of the Security Council resolutions themselves on other grounds. France, while accepting the right of the Security Council to act, probably did not feel bound to cooperate actively with the mandate, though she voted for the July 22 resolution.<sup>13</sup>

Even for those states which accepted Hammarskjold's interpretation in principle, there was ample room for debate and maneuver. What was a member state obligated to do? To do anything the Secretary-General requested, to assist in some ways, or simply to refrain from obstructing the U.N. effort? Clearly, the interpretation did not imply that a state was obligated to do anything the Secretary-General requested, since troop contributions were voluntary. The provision of equipment and logistical support was also voluntary. Later, part of the financial support for the U.N. Force was made obligatory.<sup>14</sup> In practical terms, Belgium was obligated to withdraw its troops and other prohibited personnel; other states, including the Congo, were obligated to cooperate with and not obstruct the effort. A government, for example, was not required to provide planes for the United Nations, but was presumably obligated to grant overflight and landing rights for planes on U.N. business traveling to and from the Congo.

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13. The French position is discussed in Chapter 9.

14. The financial issue is discussed in Chapter 19.

### International Character of the Force

To achieve the security objectives of the United Nations, the Secretary-General established a multinational peacekeeping force. Neither the July 14 resolution nor any subsequent resolution ever mentioned a force or explicitly authorized the Secretary-General to establish one. The governments voting for the first resolution, however, knew that Hammarskjold planned to create a U.N. force if the draft resolution were adopted, so its establishment and deployment were in full harmony with their intention and understanding.

The basic character of the UNF for the Congo differed substantially from that of the U.N. Force in Korea and UNEF. In the Korean case, the "Council adopted a recommendation which entrusted a particular country, the United States, with the responsibility of providing independently for a multi-national force . . . the command was entirely the responsibility of the United States and the personnel in the national contingents were not subject to the obligations or discipline of an international military service."<sup>15</sup>

UNEF was established by the General Assembly "as a subsidiary organ with a U.N. Commander appointed by the Assembly, who acted under the instructions and guidance of the Secretary-General. Moreover, unlike the military operation in Korea, the expenses of UNEF were borne by the United Nations."<sup>16</sup>

Though much like the UNEF in its basic conception, the Congo UNF was established by the Secretary-General under the authority of the Security Council. As such the Force may be considered a "subsidiary organ" of the Security Council in accordance with Article 29, operating under the exclusive command and control of the Secretary-General. This placed great responsibility upon Hammarskjold, a responsibility which he sought conscientiously to discharge by clarifying the objectives of the

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15. E. M. Miller, op.cit., p. 10.

16. Ibid., p. 10.



Force and the ground rules for its formation and deployment, and by reporting fully his views to the Security Council.

From the outset Hammarskjold insisted on the international status of the UNF which was composed of voluntarily contributed national contingents and administered by a multinational headquarters staff. The Force, according to his view, had to be under the "exclusive command" of the Secretary-General and could not take orders from the host government or from governments contributing troops or other military personnel.<sup>17</sup> U.N. operations had to be "separate and distinct from activities of any national authorities." This meant that:

. . . the basic rules for the United Nations for international service should be considered as applicable, particularly as regards full loyalty to the aims of the Organization and to abstention from actions in relation to their country of origin which might deprive the operation of its international character and create a situation of dual loyalty. 18.

More specifically, military personnel in the Congo should neither seek nor follow instructions from their governments and should refrain from any act or statement which would jeopardize the international or impartial status of the Force.<sup>19</sup>

In selecting the national contingents for the UNF, Hammarskjold insisted that he alone should decide its composition, although the views of the host state would be taken into account. He believed in the principle of geographical universality, but qualified it in three ways to meet the special needs of the Congo. First, as in the case of UNEF, units

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17. Hammarskjold's major operating principles, based largely on the UNEF experience, were made clear to the Council on several occasions. For a summary of these principles, see his First Report on the Congo problem: U.N., SCOR, Supplement for July, Aug., Sept., 1960, S/4389 (July 18, 1960), pp. 16-20. The First Report is reproduced in Appendix K.

18. See Appendix K, paragraph 14.

19. See Article 100 of the U.N. Charter, Appendix A.

from permanent members of the Security Council should be excluded.

Second, assistance should be sought first from "sister African nations, as an act of African solidarity." Third, contingents from any state "possibly having a special interest in the situation" should be excluded.<sup>20</sup>

The actual composition of the Force was also affected by the availability of politically acceptable and militarily qualified contingents. No government seriously challenged Hammarskjold's selection principles, although France protested his emphasis on African troops. On one occasion the Soviet Union objected to Hammarskjold's use of a Canadian signals unit because Canada was a member of NATO. The Secretary-General replied that he did not feel compelled to exclude a state simply because it was a member of NATO or the Warsaw Pact "or any other grouping of that kind."<sup>21</sup>

#### Contractual Relation With Contributing States

Charged with the responsibility of establishing a U.N. force, Hammarskjold immediately requested certain African and European governments to provide troop contingents and specialized military units in accordance with his principles of selection and his understanding of the international character of the Force. In an exchange of letters or cables with each contributing state he entered into a contractual relationship. The general conditions of the agreement may be summarized as follows:

1. The contributing government will make available a military unit (size and character specified) for a period of six months (or a year, hopefully renewable) to serve in the U.N. Force in the Congo in support of the objectives identified in the Security Council resolutions as interpreted by the Secretary-General.

2. The national contingent will be used in accordance with the constraints placed upon the UNF by the Security Council resolutions as interpreted by the Secretary-General. This means that they will not

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20. See Appendix K, paragraph 10

21. U.N., SCOR, S/PV. 888, August 21, 1960, pp. 26 and 52.

initiate military action against any organized group and will not be engaged in combat. They will use military force only in self-defense. (This stipulation was probably modified after the February 21, 1961, and November 24, 1961, Security Council resolutions.)

3. While in the service of the United Nations the unit will be under the exclusive control of the Secretary-General and his Force Commander in the Congo, except for any cases of indiscipline involving men from the unit. Such cases will be handled by the national contingent commander in accordance with the national military code. In serious cases, the U.N. Command may request the government to withdraw the person or persons involved from the Congo.

4. The contribution of national military units is voluntary, but at the same time by contributing them in good faith for the purposes specified in the Security Council resolutions, there is an implied obligation not to withdraw contributed units before the stipulated termination date, except for compelling reasons of national interest. (Articles 25 and 49 invoked in the August 9, 1960, resolution, may have been mentioned.)

5. While in the Congo, all officers and troops will enjoy rights, privileges, and immunities usually accorded foreign soldiers stationed or serving in a state with the consent of that state. In turn, they will be expected to observe the obligations of their status to the host state.<sup>22</sup>

6. The United Nations will be responsible for the transportation of all units to and from the Congo and for the full maintenance and welfare of all officers and men while in the Congo.

The contract also included a section on the financial responsibilities of both parties. Usually the contributing state continued to pay

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22. These obligations and rights are elaborated in the Status Agreement between the Secretary-General and the Congolese Government [see Appendix L] and in the Regulations for the UNF in the Congo, especially Chapters II and V [see Appendix Q].

the salary of its men, but this was not always the case. In every instance the United Nations agreed to pay all extra or extraordinary costs plus a daily allowance for each man and officer.<sup>23</sup>

Throughout the four years there was only one major conflict between contributing governments and the Secretary-General serious enough to result in the threat and subsequent withdrawal of national contingents for political reasons. During September and October 1960, the governments of Yugoslavia, Indonesia, and two militant African states--the United Arab Republic and Guinea--became increasingly dissatisfied with the Secretary-General's alleged support of Kasavubu and Mobutu over Lumumba and the unwillingness of the UNF to join the Central Government in military action against Katanga. Their opposition came to a head with the capture and imprisonment of Lumumba by Mobutu's troops on December 2, 1960.

Shortly thereafter these governments announced their intention to withdraw their units in an obvious attempt to force a change in Hammarskjold's Congo policies. At the same time, Morocco, for somewhat different reasons, also indicated its intention to withdraw its 3,200 men. Earlier Mali had pulled out its unit of 575 troops, also for different reasons. In early January 1961, at the Casablanca Conference, however, the four African states reaffirmed their decision to withdraw their troops. By April, the six national contingents, totalling slightly more than 6,000 troops, had left the Congo.<sup>24</sup>

Prior to this joint withdrawal of national units, Ghana attempted to influence policy unilaterally by threatening to withdraw its contingent from the U.N. Command, but not from the Congo. It apparently wanted to use its troops independently on behalf of Lumumba. On August 11, 1960, the Permanent Representative of Ghana told Hammarskjold that if the United Nations was unwilling or unable to observe the instructions of the Security Council, Ghana would "in agreement with the

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23. The financial question is discussed in Chapter 19.

24. This withdrawal is subsequently referred to simply as the Casablanca pullout.

Government of the Congo and, if necessary, in concert with other African States, be justified in taking independent action."<sup>25</sup> The Secretary-General gave his reply on September 9:

Were a national contingent to leave the United Nations Force, they would have to be regarded as foreign troops introduced into the Congo, and the Security Council would have to consider their continued presence in the Congo, as well as its consequences for the United Nations Operation, in this light.<sup>26</sup>

Shaken by these efforts of contributing governments to force a change in his Congo policy by direct action, Hammarskjold issued a special report on January 26, 1961, stating it was perfectly legitimate for a member state to express its view on U.N. policy, or challenge the interpretation or action of the Secretary-General, but that this should be done in the Security Council or General Assembly, not by direct pressure in the Congo. Unless the governments critical of his policies could succeed in persuading either of these organs to alter its position, these governments were morally and legally bound by the existing decisions.

The contributing states also had a more direct if less formal channel for expressing their views and criticisms to the Secretary-General; the Congo Advisory Committee, which was established by Hammarskjold on August 23, 1960, and consisted of the Permanent Representatives of the states which provided troops for the UNF.<sup>27</sup>

#### Consent of the Host State

One of the most difficult legal and political problems of the entire Congo effort derived from the basic principle of host state consent for a U.N. operation, a principle which could be applied relatively easily with respect to Egypt in the case of UNEF. In the Congo,

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25. U.N., SCOR, Supplement for July, Aug., and Sept., 1960, S/4427, (August 11, 1960), p. 93.

26. U.N., SCOR, S/PV 896, September 9-10, 1960, p. 20.

27. The role of the Congo Advisory Committee is discussed in Chapter 4.

however, where there was profound internal chaos, the Secretary-General was at times confronted with the problem of identifying the legitimate host government among rival claimants, even of determining if there was any government at all. Before the overthrow of the Lumumba Government, Hammarskjold, assuming he would have a government to work with, developed a number of ground rules defining the relationship between the Central Government and the Force.

One of these rules dealt with the selection of national contingents. In choosing military units for the Congo, Hammarskjold said he would "take fully into account the viewpoint of the host government as one of the most serious factors," adding that "serious objections" by the host state to the participation of a specific country would usually "determine the action of the Organization." If the Secretary-General wanted to use a particular unit despite host state objections, "any resulting conflict would have to be resolved on a political rather than a legal basis."<sup>28</sup> On a number of subsequent occasions Congolese officials criticized Hammarskjold for his use of non-African troops, but he refused to capitulate to this pressure. Several Security Council members supported him on this matter.<sup>29</sup>

The problem of host state consent was theoretically more serious with respect to the presence and duration of the UNF. If the July 14, 1960, resolution were taken literally, the answer in any conflict between the two parties would be simple. The resolution stated that U.N. "military assistance" would continue until "the national security forces may be able in the opinion of the Government, to meet fully their tasks." (Emphasis added.) This would mean that the Central Government could terminate the UNF unilaterally and at will.

But from the start, following the UNEF precedent, the "good

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28. U.N., GAOR, A/3943, October 9, 1958, Annexes, Agenda Item 65. This document is known as the Secretary-General's "Summary Study" derived from the UNEF experience. Many of the "rules," including the language, for the Congo were taken directly from this study.

29. U.N., SCOR, S/PV 889, August 21-22, 1960, pp. 8, 16, 31, 36, and 56.

faith" of both parties was emphasized. Further, the July 22 resolution tied the "complete restoration of law and order in the Congo" to the prospects of "international peace," and requested all states, presumably including the Congo itself, to "refrain from any action which might impede the restoration of law and order." Whatever obligation there was for other member states to cooperate with the U.N. effort would seem to be at least as applicable to the Congo itself.

In the July 29, 1960, agreement between the Secretary-General and the Congolese Government, the Government stated that, in

. . . any question concerning the presence and functioning of the United Nations Force in the Congo, it will be guided, in good faith, by the fact that it has requested military assistance from the United Nations and by its acceptance of the resolutions of the Security Council of 14 and 22 July 1960; it likewise states that it will ensure the freedom of movement of the Force in the interior of the country and will accord the requisite privileges and immunities to all personnel associated with the activities of the Force.<sup>30</sup>

The August 9 resolution, by invoking Articles 25 and 49, also implied that the Congo Government had an obligation to support the UNF as long as it was authorized by the Security Council. In the final analysis, the matter of terminating the UNF was assumed to rest with the Security Council, which would be expected to take very seriously the views of the host government in any such decision. As matters developed it was neither the Security Council nor the Leopoldville Government which determined the termination date, but the General Assembly because the duration of the UNF became closely linked to the problem of financing peacekeeping operations.

The UNF needed the consent and cooperation of the host government if it was to function effectively. At the same time, the UNF, according to Hammarskjold's rules, had to remain independent of the Government and could not take orders from the Government nor act "in competition with . . . or in cooperation with" it.<sup>31</sup> This statement that the

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30. See Appendix E.

31. U.N., SCOR, Supplement for July, Aug., Sept., 1960, S/4389 (July 18, 1960), pp. 16-24.



United Nations could not act "in cooperation with" the Central Government was obviously too strong. The third paragraph of the July 29 agreement states that the Congo and the United Nations "have agreed to work together to hasten the implementation" of the Security Council resolutions. Hammarskjold meant that the United Nations should not become an instrument of the Central Government, but that it could cooperate with the Government for the objectives and by the means authorized by the Security Council. The actual working relationship between the Secretary-General and his chief representatives in the Congo on the one hand and top Government officials on the other was often characterized by friction, mutual distrust, and conflict.<sup>32</sup>

The basic principles identified in the July 29 agreement were elaborated on November 27, 1961, in a long and carefully drawn Status Agreement between the Secretary-General and the Government which was, in effect, a status of forces agreement covering both military and civilian personnel serving the United Nations in the Congo.<sup>33</sup> In most respects this document was like a conventional status of forces treaty between two states specifying the rights and duties of each party.

On the U.N. side all personnel, according to the agreement, "shall refrain from any activity of a political character in the Congo and from any action incompatible with their international responsibilities."

On the question of jurisdiction in criminal cases, paragraph 9 states: "Members of the Force shall be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of their respective national State in respect of any criminal offenses which may be committed by them in the Congo. Officials serving under the United Nations in the Congo shall be immune from legal process in respect of all acts performed by them in their official capacity. They shall be immune from any form of arrest or detention."

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32. The relationship between the Secretary-General and the host state is discussed in Chapters 5 and 6.

33. See Appendix L.



### Authority and Constraints of the Force

The far-reaching security objectives assigned the United Nations in the Congo were virtually tantamount to those of a government, but the U.N. effort was endowed with none of the fundamental legal, political, or military attributes of a state. The U.N. Force was not given the authority of an occupying power, nor was it granted the powers of a substitute government. It required the consent of the host government and its active or passive cooperation for the achievement of the Security Council goals. The UNF was both helped and constrained by the supporting states and their willingness to provide troops, money, and logistical assistance. The Secretary-General was also limited by the diplomatic pressures, non-cooperation, and occasionally outright obstruction of those states politically opposed to the Congo operation in whole or in part.

As a non-enforcement, peaceful settlement Force, the UNF was severely restricted by limitations on the use of military force placed upon it by the Security Council resolutions and the Secretary-General's interpretation of them. In the beginning the supporting states accepted Hammarskjold's view that U.N. troops should use force "only in self-defense," and should not exercise "any initiative in the use of armed force."<sup>34</sup> After the threat of civil war became more evident, the February 21, 1961, resolution authorized "the use of force, if necessary, in the last resort" to "prevent the occurrence of civil war." The Security Council discussion preceding this resolution neither changed the legal basis of U.N. action nor "the basic self-defense posture of the Force," according to Oscar Schachter; he adds:

What it did was to authorize the Force, for the first time, to take up positions for the purpose of preventing civil-war clashes (as in support of cease-fire arrangements and neutralized zones); if the troops were attacked while holding such positions, they could use force in defense, but this did not mean they were

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<sup>34</sup>. U.N., SCOR, Supplement for July, Aug., Sept., 1960, S/4389 (July 18, 1960), pp. 16-24.

entitled to "take the initiative in an armed attack on an organized army group in the Congo." 35

After Round One in Katanga in September 1961, the permissible use of force was extended to that necessary to apprehend and detain prohibited foreigners (November 24, 1961, Security Council resolution). Even with this broadened authority to use force, the UNF was still essentially on a self-defense basis. It was never given the authority to perform many of the duties of a normal police establishment within a state, such as the right to inspect border crossing points for prohibited persons or military supplies.

These strict limitations on the use of force should be considered along with the right of the UNF to "freedom of movement" within the Congo. This right was "ensured" by the Congo Government in the July 29, 1960, agreement and reconfirmed in the Status Agreement of November 27, 1961. Paragraph 30 of the latter states:

The Government shall afford the members of the Force and officials serving under the United Nations in the Congo full freedom of movement throughout Congolese territory and to and from points of access to Congolese territory. This freedom shall extend to the operation of vehicles, aircraft, vessels and equipment in the service of the United Nations.<sup>36</sup>

Neither the Secretary-General nor any of his Force Commanders ever interpreted "freedom of movement" in a broad and unrestricted sense. From the beginning this authority meant, as in UNEF, the right of the UNF to establish certain positions essential to perform its functions, and the right to defend these positions, with force if necessary, against attack. Freedom of movement did not give the UNF the right to establish such positions by the initiation of military action. Given the turbulence

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35. Oscar Schachter, "Preventing the Internationalization of Internal Conflict: A Legal Analysis of the U.N. Congo Experience," Proceedings of the American Society of International Law, 1963, p. 218.

36. See Appendix L.

in the Congo, the presence of armed groups, and the incapacity of the Central Government or local authorities in Katanga or elsewhere to control the situation, the UNF under the law-and-order mandate felt compelled to establish roadblocks, checkpoints, and other positions. When these positions were attacked with the intention to dislodge the UNF, it had a legal right to fight back in self-defense. Freedom of movement, so defined, was essential to the UNF precisely because it lacked the authority to initiate the use of military force.

The legality of U.N. military action has been most sharply questioned in connection with the three armed clashes between the UNF and Tshombe's forces in Katanga--September and December 1961, and December 1962. With the possible exception of Round One in September 1961, it can be said that the UNF did not initiate the use of military force. Its military action to defend its existing positions, as in Round Two and the first phase of Round Three in Elisabethville, was well within the limits of the permissible use of force. In the second phase of Round Three, units of the UNF moved out from Elisabethville and occupied Jadotville, Kolwezi, and other towns in Katanga. This may have involved a greater exercise of initiative than was originally contemplated under the freedom of movement doctrine. Speaking of this action, Secretary-General Thant said that the United Nations could never have discharged its mandate to maintain law and order, prevent civil war, and eliminate mercenaries without freedom of movement in Katanga. He pointed out that for this reason the right of freedom of movement was reaffirmed in the U.N. Plan of National Reconciliation promulgated on August 20, 1962.<sup>37</sup> Round Three was a reasonable and restrained application of freedom of movement, especially in view of Tshombe's repeated promises of such freedom to U.N. troops in Katanga. Further, the UNF never actually initiated hostilities based on its right to freedom of movement.

To conclude that the UNF, with the possible exception of Round One, did not exceed its legal authority to use force and did exercise

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37. U.N., SCOR, Supplement for Jan., Feb., March, 1963, S/5240 (February 4, 1963), p. 94.

freedom of movement with restraint, is not to say that the U.N. operation, especially in Katanga, was above reproach. Two questions are appropriate at this point. One question relates to the small number of atrocities allegedly committed by U.N. troops and the other to the larger legal question of whether U.N. action in Katanga was in violation of the nonintervention clause of the August 9, 1960, resolution.<sup>38</sup>

#### Application of the Geneva Conventions

In considering the problem of atrocities or other illegal acts allegedly committed by men serving in the UNF, it is important to note that in military terms the three rounds in Katanga were modest police-type actions in which probably fewer than 300 Katanga gendarmes and 50 civilians, including about a dozen Europeans, were killed by U.N. troops. On the U.N. side, 42 soldiers and officers were killed and approximately 200 wounded.

Though small in scale, the U.N. forces in Katanga were engaged in hostilities of a warlike character, whatever their legal status may have been. Prisoners were taken and exchanged. Innocent civilians were killed. A small number of atrocities were committed by and against U.N. troops. The Secretary-General has been criticized for his reluctance to acknowledge in more explicit terms than he has the unnecessary use of force by some members of the UNF.

The United Nations itself has been criticized for not adhering formally to the Geneva Conventions on the laws of war, on the treatment of prisoners, and for the protection of the civilian victims of war. This criticism appears to be based on a technicality. While no organ of the United Nations declared its adherence to the Conventions as a whole in behalf of the UNF, the Regulations for the U.N. Congo operation did affirm the humanitarian principles of the Conventions. Paragraph 43 of the Regulations reads as follows: "The force shall observe the principles

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38. The principle of nonintervention is dealt with in a later section of this chapter. The application of this principle to the Katanga situation is discussed in Chapter 6.

and spirit of the general international conventions applicable to the conduct of military personnel."<sup>39</sup> This meant, in effect, that the Secretary-General accepted the moral and legal obligations of Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions which reads:

In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions:

- 1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded in race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria.

To this end, the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons:

- (a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture;
- (b) taking of hostages;
- (c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment;
- (d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.

- 2) The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for.

An impartial humanitarian body, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, may offer its services to the Parties to the conflict.

The Parties to the conflict should further endeavor to bring into force, by means of special agreements, all or part of the other provisions of the present Convention.

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<sup>39</sup>. See Appendix Q. This identical paragraph was included in the Regulations for UNEF and the U.N. Cyprus operation. See also Bowett, op.cit., pp. 222-24.

The application of the preceding provisions shall not affect the legal status of the Parties to the conflict. 40

#### Claims Against the United Nations

In the Congo, as in Korea and UNEF, claims were made against the United Nations for alleged damages suffered by the Congolese Government, Congolese citizens, and foreign civilians residing in the Congo.<sup>41</sup> The Secretary-General acknowledged that the United Nations was a legitimate defendant.

The acceptance by the Secretary-General of responsibility for damages to persons and property caused by U.N. personnel in the Congo, can be illustrated by the Belgian claims case. Some 1,400 claims were submitted by Belgian nationals against the Organization. After a thorough investigation, in which all "claims of damage . . . solely due to military operations or military necessity were excluded," Thant agreed that 581 cases were "entitled to compensation."<sup>42</sup> He said the United Nations was prepared to pay \$1.5 million to the Belgian Government to settle all these claims with the understanding that the Government would disburse the money accordingly. The matter was finally settled on May 17, 1965, when Brussels accepted Thant's offer.

Thant used his explanation of the Belgian case to reaffirm the United Nations' claims policy: "It has always been the policy of the United Nations, acting through the Secretary-General, to compensate individuals who have suffered damages for which the Organization was legally liable. This policy is in keeping with generally recognized legal principles and with the Convention on Privileges and Immunities of

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40. Geneva Conventions of August 12 1949 for the Protection of War Victims Department of State Publication 3938, General Foreign Policy Series 34. U.S. Government Printing Office: Washington D.C., Aug. 1950.

41. See the Status Agreement between the Secretary-General and the Congolese Government, Appendix L. For a discussion of claims and responsibilities, see Bowett, op.cit., pp. 242-48.

42. U.N. SCOR, S/6597, August 6, 1965, (mimeographed), pp. 1 and 2. See Appendix S.

the United Nations."<sup>43</sup> He also stated that similar arrangements were being discussed with other governments involving about 300 unsettled claims of individuals who suffered damage in the Congo.

As well as being the legal defendant on the above claims, the United Nations was also a legally capable plaintiff in claiming damages against a government or an individual.

#### The Principle of Nonintervention

Drawing largely from the UNEF experience, where there was no internal struggle in the host state, and regarding the Congo operation as a nonenforcement action, the Secretary-General from the beginning insisted upon the principle of strict noninterference by the United Nations in the internal affairs of the Congo. In his July 18, 1960, statement of principles, he said the United Nations could not become a party" in internal conflicts." This point is made explicit in the August 9, 1960, resolution which states that the UNF "will not be a party to or in any way intervene in or be used to influence the outcome of any internal conflict, constitutional or otherwise." This principle was never abandoned by the Secretary-General and was never seriously challenged by any member of the Security Council.

It was in the application of the principle of nonintervention that trouble arose. There were two kinds of political conflict in the Congo. One was the conflict between factions, each claiming to be the legitimate Central Government. The other was the conflict between the Central Government and dissident or secessionist provinces, or parts of provinces. It is clear that the UNF had no legal right to interfere in any purely domestic political conflict or civil war. If, however, such conflict could endanger international peace, the UNF had a right and an obligation to act. This being the case, both U.N. officials and the UNF itself were inescapably involved in the Congo's internal struggles.

The application of the nonintervention principle was greatly

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<sup>43</sup>. Ibid., p. 1.

complicated by serious disagreement both on what constituted an internal conflict that would jeopardize the peace and on what was meant by intervention. The British, for example, tended to look upon Tshombe's efforts to achieve autonomy in Katanga as an essentially internal conflict, while the Russians claimed that the Katanga problem was caused by the illegal activities of external interests, including the Belgian Government, and that it was a threat to decolonization and thus to peace. Obviously both internal and external elements played a role in the Katanga problem.

Under pressure from Lumumba for the UNF to assist his Government in military action against Katanga, Hammarskjold elaborated his nonintervention principles on August 12, 1960:

1. The United Nations Force cannot be used on behalf of the Central Government to subdue or to force the Provincial Government to a specific line of action;

2. United Nations facilities cannot be used to transport civilian or military representatives, under the authority of the Central Government, to Katanga against the desire of the Katanga Provincial Government;

3. The United Nations Force has no duty, or right, to protect civilian or military personnel, representing the Central Government arriving in Katanga beyond what follows from its general duty to maintain law and order;

4. The United Nations has no right to prevent the Central Government from taking any action which by its own means, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter, it can carry through in relation to Katanga. <sup>44</sup>

These principles of aloofness toward and noncooperation with the Central Government in its efforts to subdue Katanga by force were, of course, applicable to the Katangan regime as well. <sup>45</sup>

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<sup>44</sup>. Quoted from E. M. Miller, op.cit., p. 16, and based on U.N. SCOR, Supplement for July, Aug., and Sept., 1960, S/4417 (Aug. 12, 1960), Add. 6, p. 70.

<sup>45</sup>. The application of these nonintervention principles in dealing with the Katanga problem is discussed in Chapter 6.



### The Role of the Secretary-General

The burden of formulating, elaborating, and applying legal principles for the Congo mission fell largely upon Hammarskjold. He also developed the operating roles for the mission and played a central role in the entire effort until his death on September 17, 1961. He requested the first Security Council meeting. The Security Council, acting in accordance with his recommendations, authorized him to "take the necessary steps." He helped draft subsequent resolutions, interpreted their meaning, and based his decisions on this interpretation. More than anyone else, he defined the objectives and constraints of the peacekeeping mission, always, of course, consulting widely. When Thant took over, he also had the responsibilities and authority of his predecessor, but by that time the basic legal framework had been set.

In legal terms did either Hammarskjold or Thant misuse his authority? Did either misinterpret the intention of the resolutions or exceed the mandate? Did either overstep the rules which Hammarskjold formulated? Was their interpretation and implementation of the changing mandate reasonable and disinterested?<sup>46</sup>

In spite of the vague mandate, the lack of adequate legal precedents, and continuous political pressures, both Hammarskjold and Thant largely succeeded in their attempt to adhere to the legal principles of the Charter and to observe the fundamental intent of the successive resolutions. They may have made errors of analysis or judgment, but they sought conscientiously to serve the purposes of the mandate rather than the interests of particular governments or Congo factions. The role of the UNF in Katanga may be criticized on political grounds, and Hammarskjold may not have had full control of the UNF on September 13, 1961, when Conor Cruise O'Brien launched his controversial operation to end secession. But the actions authorized by Hammarskjold and Thant as a whole fell well within the objectives and constraints of the resolutions.

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<sup>46</sup>. The role of the Secretary-General with respect to political and executive control is discussed in Chapter 4.

Many of the charges of illegality made against the Secretary-General appear to be rooted in criticism of his political judgments. This introduces a different level of analysis. The purpose of the resolutions, themselves legal documents, was to serve the collective aims and interests of the member governments. This collective intent underwent important modifications in response to a changing situation in the Congo. The Secretary-General had to serve this collective political intent which was the parent of the legal mandate. Considerable disagreement developed among the supporting states, to say nothing of the other states which protested aspects of the U.N. mission. Under these circumstances, the Secretary-General attempted to be responsive to the changing political consensus supporting the effort within the framework of the Council resolutions.

Neither Hammarskjold nor Thant was ever censured by a majority vote of the Security Council or the General Assembly. When Hammarskjold interpreted the nature of the mandate, defined the constraints, or outlined his future plans for the UNF, he was never opposed by the Security Council. In fact, he was repeatedly commended. His authority was reaffirmed, and on several occasions he was directed to take stronger measures. This suggests that any charges of illegality should be directed not toward the Secretary-General but toward the Security Council. If the Secretary-General was exceeding his mandate or otherwise misusing his authority, he should have been censured by the Security Council. If the resolutions were so ambiguous that the Secretary-General could undertake action under one paragraph that was apparently prohibited by another, the Security Council should have cleared up the ambiguity by adopting new resolutions or by other means.

## CHAPTER 4

### THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND EXECUTIVE CONTROL

The Secretary-General played the key role in the Congo peace-keeping operation. He was never free from the burden of administering the many facets of the largest and most complex enterprise ever managed by an international organization. The operation was organized rapidly without adequate administrative, legal, or logistical precedents. Lines of communication from New York to Leopoldville and from Leopoldville to strategic points throughout the Congo had to be set up overnight to support a newly created command structure.

The problems of executive control as distinct from political or military control (insofar as these overlapping kinds of control can be separated) have to do with the basic integrity and efficiency of the command structure.<sup>1</sup> Executive control refers to the capacity of the Secretary-General to enforce his orders and implies a disposition on his part to discipline any subordinate who has failed to carry out his orders. Were the orders of Hammarskjöld and Thant carried out by their civilian and military subordinates? To the extent that they were not carried out efficiently or were ignored, what were the causes--communication failures, unqualified personnel, a faulty command structure, or disloyalty?

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1. The problems of political control are discussed in Chapters 3 and 5-13. The question of military control is dealt with in Chapter 15.

### Central Role of the Secretary-General

Even before the Security Council acted on the Congo crisis, Hammarskjold played a leading role in bringing it before that body. It was he who drafted the first resolution that authorized "the Secretary-General to take the necessary steps" and requested him to "report to the Security Council as appropriate." This was a broad authority indeed. Further, it was Hammarskjold who interpreted the mandate of the Security Council resolutions, who undertook measures in support of his interpretation of the mandate, who hired and fired his civilian and military subordinates, and who issued orders to them.

Though the Secretary-General was formally accountable only to the Security Council and the General Assembly, there were many informal constraints on his interpretation and implementation of the mandate. The United Nations is both a legal and political instrument, and both Hammarskjold and Thant were responsive to the balance of political forces in the world as they were reflected within the U.N. system.

As might be expected there was considerable criticism of Hammarskjold's broad authority, especially from the Soviet Union which proposed the Troika arrangement of a three-man office of the Secretary-General designed to make the Communist veto effective over all significant executive action. Others felt that the Security Council evaded its responsibility by entrusting so much to the Secretary-General. The phrase, "leave it to Dag!" was often heard.<sup>2</sup> It must be said, however, that Hammarskjold attempted conscientiously to pursue the objectives and observe the constraints set forth in the resolutions.<sup>3</sup>

To a great extent the Congo operation was directed by persons

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2. This statement was used by the U.A.R. Representative on December 9, 1960. U.N., SCOR, S/PV 960, December 20, 1960, p. 1497. He added: "this escapism on the part of the United Nations bodies was hardly fair either to the Secretariat or to the United Nations as a whole."

3. See Chapter 3, "The Role of the Secretary-General," pp. 56-7.

rather than by detailed procedures, rules, or laws. With the vague and sometimes contradictory aims and limitations in the resolutions, this heavy dependence upon the Secretary-General was inevitable. Lacking specific directives from the Security Council, the Secretary-General was compelled to exercise initiative on a wide range of questions. The incapacity of the Council to be more specific was a consequence of divided counsel among its members and the varying degrees of confidence in the Secretary-General among the permanent members. The United States trusted him more than France or Britain. The Soviet Union had very little confidence in him. Nationalist China showed little active interest in the whole Congo affair.

For these reasons the personality and outlook of the Secretary-General, especially during those first formative months, was of considerable interest.

Hammarskjold was a skilled, artful, and ambitious diplomat. One of his great skills was that of deliberate ambiguity. Not only were the Security Council resolutions vague, but Hammarskjold's interpretation of them was often couched in a language which meant different things to different people. This was not duplicity on his part. He regarded such abstruseness as essential in allowing him sufficient latitude to do the job in situations where the member states were able to agree only that he should do something. Both the British and the French criticized him for this quality. On one occasion a French representative called him a "master of the calculated imprecision."<sup>4</sup>

Hammarskjold's considerable initiative and alacrity in the Congo situation can be explained in part by three major interests he had developed since he was first elected to office in 1953--his conviction that the United Nations had a positive role to play in dampening down brushfire conflict, his commitment to speedy decolonization and economic development in Africa, and his desire to serve both of these objectives by strengthening the executive powers of the Secretary-General.

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4. Joseph P. Lash, Dag Hammarskjold: Custodian of the Brushfire Peace. (New York: Doubleday, 1961), p. 6.

The success of UNEF encouraged him to believe that the Organization could and should play a larger role in peacekeeping in the third world outside of the Cold War orbit.

Hammaraskjold's increasing interest in Africa, whetted by his trip to twenty-four African states and territories in 1960, coincided with the influx of the new and weak states from that continent into the United Nations. He welcomed the growing voice of the Afro-Asian bloc in the Organization. He regarded the United Nations as a special guardian of the rights and interests of the fledgling states. He was a strong advocate of decolonizing the remaining white-governed areas south of the Sahara and of keeping the Cold War out of Africa. With his liberal Western orientation, he was wary of "neo-colonial" economic interests which continued to exercise what he regarded as excessive influence in states that had recently received their political independence.<sup>5</sup> In this connection, many observers considered Hammaraskjold as "anti-Belgian."<sup>6</sup>

Hammaraskjold also wanted to strengthen the executive arm of the United Nations, not by amending the Charter, but by exercising it, particularly in third world conflict situations where U.N. intervention had a reasonable chance of success. He looked upon the Congo as precisely this type of opportunity, though at the outset he thought only in terms of traditional economic assistance and technical military assistance to shore up the lower levels of the ANC's officer corps, the latter primarily from other African states. The situation drastically changed when he received the Kasavubu-Lumumba cable of July 12, 1960, which referred to Belgian intervention as "external aggression" and called for urgent "military assistance." Hammaraskjold quickly adjusted to the new and larger challenge, and he continued to exercise his characteristic initiative until his death in September 1961.

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5. For an elaboration of Hammaraskjold's views, see Lash, op.cit., pp. 203-12 and 223-28. See also Catherine Hoskyns, The Congo Since Independence: January 1960-December 1961. (London: Oxford University Press for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1965), pp. 106-13.

6. See Chapter 11.

Thant had the same authority under the Charter and the Security Council and General Assembly resolutions as his predecessor, but he was a different man operating in a different situation. He inherited a complex task, aggravated by big-power disagreement over the role of the Secretary-General and disappointment among the Afro-Asian states over the course of events in the Congo. Though in some respects he was less bold than Hammarskjold, he followed the pattern set by his predecessor in the Congo. It may be recalled that Round Three, in which the UNF ended the secession of Katanga, was authorized by Thant. After that he was preoccupied with the financial problem and the effort to phase out the UNF.

One can speculate that the Congo drama might have turned out quite differently if Hammarskjold had not died during the first clash between the UNF and Katanga. There is no doubt that Hammarskjold left a deep imprint on the first fifteen months of the peacekeeping mission, but evidence suggests that the playing out of the drama depended less on the personality of the Secretary-General than on the interplay of national interests which created the environment to which he had to respond. Especially important were the views of the coalition of states from which the Secretary-General drew his support and advice.

#### Relation to Member States

Both Hammarskjold and Thant were sustained and guided, formally and informally, by a moderately stable coalition of states which stood behind the peacekeeping effort throughout its four years. The most important was the United States without whose political, financial, and logistical support the effort would have collapsed. States such as India, Ethiopia, and Nigeria, each of which provided more than 50,000 man-months in the UNF, were also important.

The Secretary-General was the constant target of conflicting pressures and interests in the Congo and the larger world. Both Hammarskjold and Thant took into account the opinions of all interested states, usually taking more seriously the views of the governments that supported

the operation. Hammarskjold was under more severe pressure than Thant and modified his course of action somewhat in response to criticism from the Soviet Union, Belgium, France, and Britain.<sup>7</sup>

The views of the Congolese Government and various competing political factions there were frequently pressed upon the Secretary-General, particularly with respect to the Katanga problem. He engaged in correspondence with a half dozen Congolese leaders and often conferred with them. Their overtures were taken into account, but as in the case of pressures from outside governments, both men successfully resisted efforts to alter substantially the course which Hammarskjold originally set in July and August 1960.<sup>8</sup>

Hammarskjold also successfully resisted the effort of the U.A.R., Mali, Guinea, Yugoslavia, and Indonesia to change his policies by first threatening to withdraw their troops from the UNF and then actually withdrawing them.<sup>9</sup>

At the outset Hammarskjold confined his formal consultation to the Security Council to which he was directly responsible. The Security Council, however, was so divided that its directives were necessarily vague. It met infrequently after the initial burst of activity during the first month of the crisis. Furthermore, Tunisia and Ceylon represented the only African and Asian voices in this limited forum. While he was obviously free to seek advice from any member state, and did in fact consult widely, he was particularly anxious to obtain the advice and support of the Afro-Asian states, especially in the face of criticism from

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7. For an assessment of the impact of these governments upon the operation, see: Soviet Union, Chapter 8; Belgium, Chapter 11; France, Chapter 9; and Britain, Chapter 10.

8. See Chapters 5 and 6.

9. See Chapter 3, "Contractual Relation with Contributing States," pp. 41-44.



Congo factions or elsewhere in Africa. When the rift developed between Hammarskjold and Lumumba in August 1960, Deputy Prime Minister Gizenga urged the Secretary-General to "share his responsibilities" with a group of Afro-Asian neutralist states.<sup>10</sup> Hammarskjold replied that he would welcome a "more formal and regular arrangement" for consulting with states contributing troops to the Congo and proposed establishing an Advisory Committee along the pattern of a similar committee in UNEF.<sup>11</sup> On August 23, 1960, he established the Congo Advisory Committee, made up of representatives of contributing states.<sup>12</sup>

Though the consultative group was called an Advisory Committee, Hammarskjold used it also as a buffer against criticism and as a means of promoting his views and policies. He never shared responsibility with the Committee which is what Gizenga wanted. It would have been inappropriate for the Committee to serve as a substitute for the Security Council or General Assembly. It had no authority. Though the Secretary-General often referred to the advice of the Advisory Committee to support his decisions, he made it clear that he alone was responsible. It is difficult to assess accurately the extent of the Secretary-General's reliance on the Committee or indicate with precision how he used the advice he received, since no records of the meetings have been published. The Committee was an especially useful political instrument to Hammarskjold in dealing with sensitive issues such as the implementation of the February 21, 1961, resolution, and the investigation of Lumumba's death.<sup>13</sup>

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10. U.N. SCOR, S/PV 887, August 21, 1960, p. 16.

11. U.N. SCOR, S/PV 887, August 21, 1960, p. 8.

12. The Committee functioned until the withdrawal of the UNF in 1964, though some of the governments that pulled out their troops early in 1961 did not send a representative thereafter.

13. On the February 21 resolution, see U.N., SCOR, Supplement for Jan., Feb., March, 1961, S/4752 (February 27, 1961), p. 176. On the Lumumba investigation, see U.N., SCOR, Supplement for Jan., Feb., March, 1961, S/4771 (March 20, 1961), p. 259.

The Security Council, because of serious conflicts of interests among its members, was never able to give Hammarskjold either the guidance he wanted or the legitimacy he felt he needed for his executive acts. For some of the same reasons the Congo Advisory Committee was unable to fill the vacuum. On several occasions the Secretary-General lamented this fact. Early in the operation he had made clear to the Security Council the necessity of moving ahead in the absence of specific guidance:

I have a right to expect guidance. That guidance can be given in many forms. But it should be obvious if the Security Council says nothing I have no other choice than to follow my conviction. . . . Implementation obviously means interpretation. 14

He returned to this problem on December 13, 1960, chastising the political organs for evading their responsibility:

. . . there are daily decisions, involving interpretations in detail of the extent of our power, which I and my collaborators now have had to take alone for five months. Representatives of the Council or the Assembly might well shoulder on behalf of the General Assembly or the Council the fair share of the responsibility of those organs for current interpretations of the mandate. 15

#### Relation to the Secretariat

It was precisely because of the incapacity of the Security Council and the General Assembly (that is, the member states) to provide adequate guidance that Hammarskjold had to rely so heavily on his own resources and on the advice of his chief aides in the Secretariat.

The Secretariat staff as international civil servants are pledged to be nonpolitical and to formulate plans and execute orders of the Secretary-General without regard to the interests of or pressures from the states to which they owe allegiance as citizens. According to Article 100 of the Charter, "the Secretary-General and his staff shall not seek or receive instructions from any government or from any other

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14. U.N., SCOR, S/PV 888, August 21, 1960, p. 21.

15. U.N., SCOR, S/PV 920, December 13, 1960, p. 24.

authority external to the Organization. They shall refrain from any action which might reflect on their position as international officials responsible only to the Organization." Conversely, each member state shall "respect the exclusively international character" of the Secretariat and shall "not seek to influence them in the discharge of their responsibilities."<sup>16</sup> Article 101 states in part that the staff shall be recruited "on as wide a geographical basis as possible."

A man of great initiative, deeply committed to the proposition that the United Nations could manage the Congo situation successfully, Hammarskjold and his closest colleagues quickly generated ideas and plans which they discussed with members of the Security Council, the Congo Advisory Committee, and directly with especially interested states. From the beginning the Secretary-General relied heavily upon a small group of men in the Secretariat who came to be known as the "Congo Club." The nucleus of this intimate advisory and action group included:<sup>17</sup>

Ralph J. Bunche (U.S.), Under-Secretary for Special Political Affairs

Andrew W. Cordier (U.S.), Under-Secretary for General Assembly  
Affairs

C. V. Narasimhan (India), Staff Aide to the Secretary-General

Brigadier I. J. Rikhye (India), Military Adviser to the Secretary-  
General

Sir Alexander MacFarquhar (U.K.), Special Adviser on Civilian  
Operations in the Congo

Heinz Wieschhoff (U.S.), Deputy to the Under-Secretary for Special  
Political Affairs.

Other staff aides who joined the "club" from time to time included Robert W. Gardiner (Ghana), who later became the Officer-in-Charge in Leopoldville; Francis C. Nwokedi (Nigeria); and Taieb Sahbani (Tunisia).<sup>18</sup>

This inner group of the Congo Club, which directed the day-by-day

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16. See Appendix A, Article 100.

17. New York Times, October 19, 1961.

18. Lash, op.cit., p. 259.

operations under Hammarskjold's guidance, consisted of three Americans, two Indians, and one Briton. Later, when Africans were included they were from the notably moderate governments of Tunisia and Nigeria. Gardiner did not reflect the prevailing political views of the Ghanaian Government. By design on the part of Hammarskjold, the members of the Congo Club were citizens of states supporting the Congo effort. This policy explicitly excluded citizens of the Soviet Union who were in the Secretariat. In fact, according to one high Secretariat official, tight controls were placed over communications to and from the Congo primarily to prevent messages from falling into the hands of unauthorized members of the staff, particularly Russians and citizens of other states pursuing policies similar to those of the Soviet Union in the Congo. One code system, for example, was restricted to Hammarskjold, Bunche, and Rikhye.

Under the circumstances Hammarskjold's exclusion of Soviet staff members could be justified in practical operational terms, even though the primary motivation for the policy may have been political. In any event, the Soviet Representative in the Security Council had full access to the written documents and the oral statements of the Secretary-General, and it was there that political decisions were made, not in the Secretariat whose function it was to implement the decisions.

The problem of dual loyalty is ever present in the Secretariat of an international organization. Staff members are not required to and do not renounce their state citizenship nor their love of country. They are pledged to act as disinterested civil servants. Some governments seem to have nominated persons for high Secretariat posts who were expected to report back to their capitals on the confidential operations of the Organization. Communist states are more inclined to use their nationals on the U.N. staff in this way than Western states because official Communist doctrine insists there are no neutral or disinterested men. Khrushchev's Troika proposal was based on this proposition. He believed it was impossible for a Secretary-General to be genuinely neutral, so he wanted a politically balanced triumvirate which could act only when there was unanimity.

As far as the Congo operation is concerned, there was no evidence

of serious dual or conflicting loyalties on the part of key persons in the Secretariat. Nor was there evidence that hidden loyalties substantially altered the Secretariat's interpretation or implementation of the Security Council mandate. Hammarskjold and Thant sought diligently to be impartial, and to a great extent succeeded. Their own political philosophy as well as the political pressures upon them doubtless had some effect on the decisions they made. The effect of the pressure on the man was probably related more to his prior disposition than to its source. For example, Hammarskjold was probably influenced more by the "advice" of African states than the "advice" from Stockholm.

Turning to Hammarskjold's formal relations with the Secretariat, it should be noted that the magnitude and complexity of the Congo operation placed a heavy strain upon the total resources of the U.N. bureaucracy in New York and overseas. Most directly involved were seven of the Offices of the Secretary-General and the Field Operations Service. These offices and the pertinent subordinate positions can be listed thus:

Offices of the Secretary-General

Executive Office

Under-Secretary for General Assembly Affairs

Military Adviser to the Secretary-General

Under-Secretary for Special Political Affairs

Office of Legal Affairs

Office of the Controller

Special Assistant for Peacekeeping

Office of Personnel

Office of General Services

Communications, Archives and Records Service

Telecommunications Section<sup>19</sup>

Purchase and Transportation Service

Field Operations Service

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19. By 1963 there were "eight major U.N. transmitters, located in New York, Geneva, Pisa, Gaza, Jerusalem, Karachi, Bangkok, and Seoul; the establishment of each transmitter required the consent of the host govern-

These supporting offices and services, not all of which are included, had both consultative and operational functions.<sup>20</sup> Relevant members of the Secretariat were consulted in the formulation of general and detailed policies. When these policies were adopted by the Secretary-General, he ordered the appropriate office or service to implement them. The Military Adviser's office and the Field Operations Service are of special significance to the problem of executive control.

#### Military Adviser to the Secretary-General

Shortly after the July 14, 1960, resolution Hammarskjold named Brigadier Indarjit Rikhye of India as his Military Adviser for the Congo operation. Three years later the position was made permanent under the title, Military Adviser to the Secretary-General, though Rikhye had been giving advice on non-Congo questions for some time before this change. From April 1958 to February 1960, Rikhye had been the Chief of Staff for UNEF. Hammarskjold provided Rikhye with a small supporting staff of one colonel and two majors. The function of this staff was to advise the Secretary-General on the strictly military aspects of the operation.

Rikhye had no command responsibilities, but there were two developments which confused and probably compromised his role as a staff adviser. The first occurred at the very beginning of the effort, in August and September 1960, when Rikhye visited the Congo to help organize the military effort. Major General Carl von Horn of Sweden, who was then the UNF Commander, had done a satisfactory job as commander of the U.N. Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine, but his experience had not qualified him for commanding the more complex and demanding Congo operation. Rikhye moved in, probably with the approval of Hammarskjold, to fill this widely recognized command vacuum. Rikhye actually exercised authority and

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ment. Messages are relayed by cable to points not covered in the system--for instance, from Seoul to Tokyo. The network is used primarily by the field missions and peacekeeping missions." Edward H. Bowman and James E. Fanning, "The Logistics Problems of a U.N. Military Force," International Organization, Vol. 17, No. 2, (Spring 1963), p. 356.

20. The titles of the offices and services were taken from the U.N. Telephone Directory issued by the Office of General Services, April 1965. Some offices changed their name during the Congo operation and some new subdivisions were created in part to deal with the additional work load occasioned by that operation.

became deeply involved in command. Evidence suggests that he acted not to undercut von Horn or to pursue policies different from what a disinterested and competent commander would have done under the circumstances. He was, nevertheless, clearly exceeding his formal terms of reference.<sup>21</sup>

The other development that confused Rikhye's role as adviser was his appointment by Hammarskjold as the acting civilian Officer-in-Charge in Leopoldville, temporarily replacing Rajeshwar Dayal from November 3 to 23, 1960. This appointment was unwise on three counts. First, Hammarskjold probably had a better use for his military adviser than making him the civilian head of the operation, thus violating the principle of civilian supremacy at the field level. Second, administratively it was unfortunate because a "civilian" Brigadier was placed in a position of giving orders to a higher ranking officer, Major General von Horn, with whom his previous relations had been less than satisfactory. Third, to replace Dayal, who was disliked by the Congolese authorities, partly because he was an Indian, with another Indian, tended to aggravate the situation.

While these two developments doubtless caused friction and may have impaired efficiency, there is no substantial evidence to indicate that they significantly eroded the integrity of the operation.

Rikhye made about thirty "trouble-shooting" trips to the Congo at the request of Hammarskjold.<sup>22</sup> Several ranking U.N. officers in the Congo complained that he interfered in their affairs. Further, he did not get on well with the ANC Commander, General Mobutu. It appears, therefore, that it was unwise to have Rikhye become so deeply involved in command.

In New York Rikhye performed most useful work in helping the Secretary-General determine his Force requirements and in recruiting contingents and specialized military personnel for the Congo. He was a key

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21. Military aspects of this development are discussed in Chapter 15.

22. Interview with Major General Rikhye, New York, April 27, 1965.

member of the Congo Club. He also gave advice on the transportation of men and materiel to the Congo. In this transportation function he, along with officials of the Field Operations Service, was greatly assisted by the U.S. Government which provided the bulk of the airlift to the Congo. During the four-year operation, the Defense Department transported 118,091 troops and 18,569 tons of cargo into or out of the Congo, and airlifted 1,991 troops and 3,642 tons of cargo inside the Congo.<sup>23</sup> Washington also provided a great deal of arms, equipment, and food. The U.S. Air Force was designated the executive agent for the material support of the operation by Washington, and Rikhye and staff members of the Field Operations Service were in virtually daily contact with American military officers in the U.S. delegation to the United Nations, in Washington, and overseas. Other governments supporting the effort were likewise, though not so deeply, in touch with the Office of the Military Adviser.

#### Field Operations Service

Established by the General Assembly in 1949 to provide technical support for the overseas activities of the United Nations, particularly UNEF, the Field Operations Service played a key role in fielding and maintaining the Congo operation. This service, along with other technical support operations, functioned under the Office of General Services. While Field Operations Service did a fair job under novel and extenuating circumstances, there were two major reasons why its support of the Congo operation failed to meet minimum standards of efficiency. First, it lacked both the experience and facilities for handling an operation as large and complex as the Congo effort. As two industrial management experts observed:

The logistic and administrative capabilities of the Secretariat, although adequate for supporting most U.N. missions, are strained when military missions like UNEF and ONUC are to be initiated. The U.N. is simply not designed to initiate and sustain large military missions. . . . The Secretary-General

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23. Data from Capt. William Alexander, USN, J-3, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense, September 16, 1964.



has only one principle military adviser, and this post was established only to aid in dealing with the military problem in the Congo mission. 24

The other reason for less-than-efficient logistical support was the strained relations between the Office of General Services, and in particular Field Operations Service, on the one hand, and the Office of the Military Adviser and the U.N. Command on the other. One high U.N. official described this relationship as "atrocious" and said it resulted in inefficiency, waste, and confusion. The problem was largely inherent in the situation. Normally military establishments operate their own procurement, supply, transportation, and communications systems at all levels. In the case of the Congo mission, the U.N. Command had to depend entirely upon an external civilian agency for all forms of technical support outside the Congo, and for most of these supporting services in the Congo. The U.N. Command did have its own separate communications system. This unfamiliar dependence upon a civilian agency, plus the fact that that agency, the Office of General Services, lacked the requisite experience and facilities, obviously led to complaints of inefficiency from both sides. The military officers tended to blame General Services for unnecessary duplications, delays, and interference, while officers in General Services tended to blame the U.N. Command for failing to anticipate its materiel and manpower needs sufficiently in advance. The inherent problem was exacerbated by administrative and planning weaknesses on both sides, occasioned in part by the presence of personnel not fully qualified for their assignments. Everyone agrees that the Congo operation was considerably less efficient than a similar operation undertaken by a competent national military establishment, but the question here is whether the resulting waste, duplication, and delays had any serious impact on executive control. Though inefficiency doubtless led to higher costs, slower progress in some field operations, and even some bungling,

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24. Edward H. Bowman and James E. Fanning, "The Logistics Problems of a U.N. Military Force," International Organization, Vol.17, No.2 (Spring 1963), pp. 356-57. The logistical problem as such is discussed in Chapter 16.

there is no convincing evidence to suggest that the Secretary-General lost control of the operation or that his orders were disobeyed or seriously delayed because of it.


#### The Chain of Command

The command structure of the Congo operation embodied the principle of civilian supremacy. The Secretary-General was clearly the Commander-in-Chief under the mandate given him by the political organs of the United Nations. Paragraph 11 of the Congo Operation Regulations stated:

The Secretary-General, under the authority of the Security Council and the General Assembly, has full command authority over the Force. The [Force] Commander is operationally responsible to the Secretary-General through the [civilian] officer-in-charge for the performance of all functions assigned to the Force by the United Nations, and for the deployment and assignment of troops at the disposal of the Force. <sup>25</sup>

Further, under Regulation 16, the Secretary-General had authority over "all administrative, executive, and financial matters affecting the Force" and was "responsible for the negotiation and conclusion of agreements with governments concerning the Force."<sup>26</sup>

In terms of these Regulations, the chain of command was direct and uncomplicated. It can be diagrammed thus:<sup>27</sup>



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25. The Regulations are included in Appendix Q.

26. Ibid.

27: A chart showing the official U.N. command structure, including

In the New York Headquarters the Secretary-General was controlled only by the Security Council or the General Assembly, representing the political control of the member states. He was advised formally by the Congo Advisory Committee and informally by interested governments. He was both advised and assisted by his staff. His chief formal staff aides on the Congo were his Military Adviser and his Adviser on Civilian Operations, but he actually received his day-by-day advice from the informal Congo Club discussed above.

In Leopoldville, the Officer-in-Charge, a civilian except for the brief period when Brigadier Rikhye filled the post, was the Secretary-General's top representative in the Congo. The Force Commander took his orders from the Secretary-General through the Officer-in-Charge. The Commander was advised by his multinational Headquarters Staff.

The same pattern was duplicated in Elisabethville where there was a Sector Commander for Katanga and a Chief Civilian Representative. In practice the role of the Civilian Representative in Elisabethville was less clear than that of the Officer-in-Charge in Leopoldville. Certainly the Representative could not order the Katanga Commander to act; such orders had to come from or be endorsed by the Force Commander in Leopoldville. It would appear that the Representative was an adviser rather than a link in the chain of command.<sup>28</sup>

The Force Commander had "full and exclusive authority" over his

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advisory functions, is reproduced as Appendix X. The military aspects of command and control are discussed in Chapter 15.

28. In an interview in Elisabethville, September 26, 1962, Eliu Mathu (Kenya), the U.N. Civilian Representative, said that he was sometimes bypassed in the communications between the Force Commander in Leopoldville and the Katanga Commander. This may have been a matter of personalities. During the four years there were eleven different Civilian Representatives, of ten different nationalities, in Elisabethville. On the military side, the operation was commanded most of the time by Indians, who were in charge during each of the three armed clashes between the UNF and Katangan forces.

Headquarters Staff and all other members of the Force, except in the area of discipline where serious cases were handed over to the jurisdiction of the national contingent commanders.<sup>29</sup>

In this simple administrative structure the straight line of command was sometimes breached by the intrusion of the Secretary-General's Military Adviser, blurred by inefficiency, or temporarily violated by unusual circumstances in the field. In addition to the problem of Brigadier Rikhye's involvement in command, three other incidents, treated elsewhere in this Report, may be recalled here to illustrate further the command and control problem.

1. The Alexander Incident: Sensing a command vacuum due to the delayed arrival of General von Horn, the Force Commander designate, Major General H. T. Alexander, the British commander of the Ghanaian contingent, assumed a degree of control in the first hectic days of the operation in July 1960. This in itself might have been permissible, or even laudable, under the circumstances, especially if he had requested and been given temporary authority so to act from Ralph J. Bunche, then the Officer-in-Charge in Leopoldville. The more serious problem, however, was caused by Alexander's disarmament of ANC units in Leopoldville. Bunche reacted quickly, censuring Alexander, not for the usurpation of authority, but for disarming the ANC in the name of the UNF, an action for which the United Nations had no explicit authority. Alexander claims, however, that Bunche completely backed him in persuading the soldiers "to hand in their weapons."<sup>30</sup>

2. The O'Brien Incident:<sup>31</sup> In this episode, which erupted on September 13, 1961, and launched Round One, Hammarskjold temporarily lost control of the U.N. operation. Conor Cruise O'Brien, the Civilian Representative in Katanga (with the collaboration of Mahmoud Khiary, Chief of Civilian Operations in Leopoldville, and Brigadier K. A. S. Raja, the

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29. See Regulations 12-15, Appendix Q.

30. Major General H. T. Alexander, African Tightrope: My Two Years as Nkrumah's Chief of Staff (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966), p. 38. The Alexander incident is discussed in Chapter 6, pp. 128-130.

31. See Chapter 6, pp. 109-117.

Katanga Commander, and with the tacit approval of Sture Linner, the Officer-in-Charge), launched an action which called for the capture of key positions in Katanga and the arrest of Katangan ministers in an effort designed to end secession. This action was almost certain to involve the UNF in fighting and, as things turned out, this is precisely what happened. Moreover, some UNF troops used unnecessary force.

The most generous explanation of this unfortunate development is that it was caused by a breakdown of communication: not a technical failure, but a failure of the Secretary-General and his subordinates to keep each other informed. The responsibility, however, seems to rest primarily with O'Brien and Khiary, both of whom developed a strong commitment to the overthrow of the Tshombe regime, and who, in light of this commitment, interpreted certain instructions from Leopoldville as a go-ahead signal for their plan. It may be that either or both of these men, taking advantage of the temporary absence of Linner, manipulated the signals so they could be construed as explicit authority for the September 13 action. O'Brien implies that they deliberately timed what they knew would be a controversial operation to coincide with the period of Hammarskjold's flight from New York to Leopoldville in order to present him with what they hoped would be a successful fait accompli upon arrival.<sup>32a</sup>

O'Brien exceeded his authority and his instructions, whatever his intentions may have been. The UNF had no authority to end secession by any means or arrest mercenaries by force. It was only after these developments that the UNF was given authority to use force to apprehend prohibited personnel.<sup>32</sup>

Hammarskjold's less-than-candid public explanation, which attempted to place the blame on Europeans who fired from "the building in which the Belgian Consulate was located" upon U.N. troops who were going

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32. See paragraph 4 of the November 21, 1961, Security Council resolution, Appendix B.

32a. Conor Cruise O'Brien, To Katanga and Back (Simon and Schuster, 1962), p. 251.

about their business putting out a fire, was accepted at face value by very few if any observers. His statement certainly did not dispel the generally held view, also shared by key members of the Secretariat, that O'Brien had in fact exceeded his authority, and that Linner, Khiary, and Raja collaborated in O'Brien's violation of the U.N. mandate and his usurpation of authority.

3. The Lufira River Incident:<sup>33</sup> During Round Three, December 1962-January 1963, the UNF was moving outward from Elisabethville to exercise "freedom of movement" in Katanga. The U.N. Commander in Katanga Major General D. Prem Chand, was cognizant of instructions from New York not to go beyond the Lufira River. Brigadier Reginald S. Noronha, the Commander of the Indian Brigade, was leading a column on the road to Jadotville and was stopped temporarily at the Lufira because the road and rail bridges were out. Since the column was encountering little resistance, though under sporadic sniper fire at the Lufira, Noronha ordered his troops across. When they arrived in Jadotville they were warmly welcomed by Congolese crowds.

Bunche was sent from New York to investigate this "serious breakdown in effective communication and coordination," but concluded that there had been no insubordination.<sup>34</sup> Later Secretary-General Thant said that Noronha's on-the-spot decision was "in accordance with good military practice" and contributed to the "remarkable success" and "low cost" of the operation.<sup>35</sup> This judgment is sustained by the evidence. The U.N. field commander had simply made a prudent tactical decision compatible with the larger UNF objectives in Round Three.

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33. See Chapter 15.

34. U.N. SCOR, Supplement for Jan., Feb., March, 1963, S/5055, Add.14 (January 10, 1963), pp. 156 and 157.

35. Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, June 16, 1962, to June 15, 1963, U.N. Document A/5501, p. 7.

### Concluding Observations

Throughout the four years the Secretary-General maintained reasonably effective executive control of the Congo peacekeeping operation. Though the integrity of this control was challenged by political pressures, administrative inefficiency, unqualified personnel, and several specific incidents, it was never seriously eroded. It may be of value at this point, to note briefly the character and impact of some of these challenges.

1. The Secretary-General was operating under a broad political-legal mandate and had to be sensitive to the shifting balance of political forces. Hammarskjold and Thant recognized this, but they both made a distinction between political advice that was in general harmony with the Security Council mandate and political pressures contrary to the letter or spirit of the resolutions. It was precisely this distinction which enabled them to profit from the former and resist the latter.

2. The considerable degree of administrative inefficiency in the operation can be attributed largely to inherent factors such as the vague mandate, the multinational character of the Force, and the fact that the Secretariat was simply not equipped to handle a field operation of that size and complexity. This inefficiency led to waste, delay, and unnecessary expense, but it did not seriously compromise the executive control of the Secretary-General.

3. The few top-ranking civilian and military officers who failed to perform their functions to the satisfaction of the Secretary-General constituted perhaps the most serious threat to the integrity of the operation. The "Dayal problem"<sup>36</sup> and the O'Brien incident are clearly linked to personalities. In important respects these men did not measure up to the demands of their sensitive positions. The same can probably be said of Khiary. Competent observers believe General von Horn and Linner were not qualified by training or experience to handle the responsibilities given them. All of these men created difficulties which their replacements, confronting

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36. The Dayal problem is discussed in Chapter 5.

virtually the same problems, were able to avoid. Ironically, all of these men were personally appointed by Hammarskjold. A number of Hammarskjold's close associates have said that the Secretary-General was not always the best judge of character and competence. It must be said in Hammarskjold's defense, however, that some of these appointments were made under the pressure of time and that he did select several very good men, notably Robert Gardiner, the highly respected Officer-in-Charge of the Congo operation from February 1962 to May 1963. Further, the need for geographical and political spread in appointments and the restriction of top positions largely to nonaligned countries, narrowed the field of choice. Nevertheless, Hammarskjold had an acknowledged weakness at this point, a weakness also illustrated by asking or permitting his Military Adviser, Brigadier Rikhye, to intrude into the line of command.

While his unfortunate personnel choices certainly added confusion, demoralization, and inefficiency, they did not, except in the case of the O'Brien incident, actually rupture executive control. And that rupture was quickly repaired. Control was temporarily lost also in the Alexander affair, occasioned by the concurrence of a command vacuum and a vigorous general, but again control was quickly restored.

The factor of dual loyalty was apparently not present in the cases of Dayal, O'Brien, or Alexander. In each case evidence suggests that the man was doing what he believed he should be doing on behalf of the United Nations. O'Brien and Dayal claimed they were following Hammarskjold's instructions. In the Alexander affair, the General acted in the absence of instructions. There is no evidence to indicate that any of these men was taking instructions from his own government or any other government.



## CHAPTER 5

### THE HOST STATE: CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS

The Congo drama was played on several stages. Important acts took place in Washington, London, Paris, Brussels, and Casablanca, as well as in the Security Council and the General Assembly in New York.

The most intense drama unfolded in the Congo which provided some of the major actors and the chaotic and tragic backdrop for intrigue and statesmanship.

The relationship between the United Nations and the host state, more specifically between the Secretary-General and his subordinates on the one hand and the chief leaders of the Congolese Government on the other, is the theme of this chapter. The analysis will deal with the problems that arose between a weak but legally sovereign government and a foreign but invited international presence.

This foreign presence was large, painfully obtrusive to the Congolese, and obvious to the world. The presence was endowed with authority, prestige, and physical force, but it was neither a substitute government nor an occupying power. It was there with the consent of the Congolese Government, because that Government was in serious trouble.

Under these circumstances tension and conflict between the host state and the guest presence were inevitable. Matters were seriously aggravated by political chaos and confusion. At times two competing factions claimed to be the legitimate government, and at other times there

was virtually no government at all.

The brief chronology of major political events in the Congo (see page 82) identifies some of the turbulent developments confronting the Secretary-General, his chief civilian and military representatives in Leopoldville, and the U.N. Force. In four years there were four different Central Governments, two of which were regarded as illegal by the Secretary-General--the Council of Commissioners and the Ileo Government. The Lumumba Government lasted only two months. Cyrille Adoula was Prime Minister for almost three years. Throughout the period Kasavubu served as President.

There were three different rebel movements challenging the authority of Leopoldville--Katanga, Stanleyville, and South Kasai. The two most serious challenges to the Central Government were secessionist Katanga and rebellious Stanleyville. For two and a half years Leopoldville was preoccupied with the problem of getting Katanga to recognize its authority.<sup>1</sup> From the end of 1960 Stanleyville was an intermittent headache for the Central Government because Lumumba's heirs had established there a rival leftist regime which received political and some military support from the Communist bloc and associate states.

#### United Nations-Host State Rules

It was in this turbulent Congo that the Secretary-General and the UNF sought to fulfill the mandate of the Security Council. Hammarskjold formulated three rules to govern the relations between the U.N. presence and the Congo Government. They can be summarized as follows:<sup>2</sup>

1. The U.N. peacekeeping Force requires the consent of the host state for its entry, but as long as the Force is authorized by the Security Council, the Congolese Government has an obligation to cooperate with it.<sup>3</sup>

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1. The Katanga problem is analyzed in Chapter 6.

2. See Appendixes E and L.

3. See Chapter 3, "Consent of the Host State."

MAJOR PODITICAL EVENTS IN THE CONGO: 1960-64

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1960

<u>LUMUMBA</u>	July 5-14	- Congolese Army mutiny, panic, and Belgian action
<u>GOVERNMENT</u>	July 11	- Tshombe declares Katanga independent
June 30-Sept. 5	July 14	- First U.N. resolution authorizes peacekeeping mission
	September 5	- Kasavubu dismisses Lumumba; appoints Ileo

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<u>COUNCIL OF</u>	September 14	- Mobutu coup establishes Council of Commissioners
<u>COMMISSIONERS</u>	November 22	- Kasavubu delegation seated at the United Nations
Sept. 14-Feb. 9	December 12	- Gizenga establishes rival regime in Stanleyville

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1961

<u>ILEO</u>	February 13	- Lumumba's death in Katanga announced
<u>GOVERNMENT</u>	February 21	- U.N. authorizes military force to prevent civil war
Feb. 9-Aug. 2	March 8-12	- Tananarive Conference (Confederation Plan)
	Apr. 24-May 28	- Coquilhatville Conference (Federal Plan)
	July 27-Aug. 2	- Lovanium Parliament (Crisis ended by electing Adoula)

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<u>ADOULA</u>	August 5	- Gizenga recognizes Adoula Government
<u>GOVERNMENT</u>	Sept. 13-21	- <u>Round One</u> (Inconclusive clash between UNF and Katanga)
Aug. 2, 1961-	Dec. 5-19	- <u>Round Two</u> (Inconclusive clash between UNF and Katanga)
June 30, 1964	Dec. 20-21	- Kitona Accord; Tshombe recognizes Adoula Government

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1962

January 16	- Adoula removes, arrests, Deputy Prime Minister Gizenga
March-June	- Adoula-Tshombe talks on Katanga inconclusive
August 20	- Thant Plan for National Reconciliation announced

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1963

Dec. 23-Jan 21	- <u>Round Three</u> (Katanga secession ended by UNF)
June 14	- Tshombe leaves the country for self-imposed exile
September 29	- Parliament indefinitely adjourned
October 2	- National Liberation Committee formed in Brazzaville

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1964

January	- Rebellion breaks out in Kwilu
Feb. - June	- Rebellion spreads through one-third of Congo
June 26	- Tshombe returns to Leopoldville from "exile"
June 30	- Last UNF troops leave Congo

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2. The U.N. Force should cooperate with the host government, but it should not become an instrument of the government.

3. The U.N. presence, including the Force, should not "be a party to or in any way intervene in or be used to influence the outcome of any internal conflict, constitutional or otherwise."<sup>4</sup>

These rules or principles were not entirely consistent with one another and were subject to varying interpretations. But they provided a norm rooted in the authority of the Security Council and agreed to both by the Secretary-General and the Central Government. The various developments in the Congo will be examined to ascertain the extent to which the two parties failed to observe these rules.

#### The Constitutional Crisis: 1960-61

The Government was plunged into a constitutional crisis by President Kasavubu's dismissal of Prime Minister Lumumba on September 5, 1960, from which it did not fully emerge until Adoula was elected as Prime Minister by Parliament on August 2, 1961. During these eleven months of chaos the relations between the U.N. officials and the de facto government in Leopoldville were seriously strained. Three internal political developments of this period--the dismissal of Lumumba, the Mobutu coup, and the constitutional conferences--illustrate the problems of this relationship.<sup>5</sup>

#### Kasavubu's Dismissal of Lumumba

President Kasavubu and Prime Minister Lumumba were natural rivals. This rivalry began long before independence day and persisted during the first two months. Lumumba's conniving with the Soviet bloc, his lack of self-control, and his unwillingness to accept a disinterested role for the UNF led the more moderate and calculating Kasavubu to lose

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4. See Chapter 3, "The Principle of Nonintervention."

5. These complex developments are summarized as briefly as possible here. For a fuller account of internal politics during this period, see Catherine Hoskyns, The Congo Since Independence: January 1960-December 1961. (London: Oxford University Press for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1965), pp. 197-383.

whatever confidence he may have had in Lumumba. Charging that the Prime Minister was plunging the "nation into fratricidal war," Kasavubu dismissed him on September 5, 1960, and appointed Joseph Ileo, President of the Congo Senate, as Prime Minister.

That same day, in angry retaliation, Lumumba in three fiery speeches over Radio Leopoldville denounced Kasavubu, "dismissed" him as President, and called upon the workers and the Congolese Army to rally to his cause.

These fast-moving developments confronted the Secretary-General with the immediate problem of how to maintain law and order in the crisis and the long-range problem of what to do in face of two contenders for the control of the Central Government, each of which had support in the international arena.

Andrew W. Cordier, an American and the U.N. Under-Secretary for General Assembly Affairs, then serving as Hammarskjold's temporary Special Representative in the Congo,<sup>6</sup> was confronted with the task of dealing with mounting disorder without interfering illegally in Congolese internal affairs. He acted quickly. On the evening of September 5 he closed all major airports in the country to non-U.N. traffic "in the interests of the maintenance of peace." In a supporting move the following day, he closed temporarily the Leopoldville radio station. Five years after the event, Cordier said:

One move I made was to close the airports. Thus we checked the influx of reinforcements to those centers of gravest danger, particularly Leopoldville and South Kasai. It was also essential to turn off the transmitter of the Leopoldville radio station, since highly charged emotional appeals inciting the people were on the verge of producing a totally uncontrollable situation . . . these steps had to be taken as temporary measures to preserve law and order.

The various actions taken did contain the conflict, and respect for the United Nations Force and its individual members was

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6. A list of the chief U.N. civilian and military representatives in the Congo, 1960-64, is found in Appendix G.

greatly increased.<sup>7</sup>

The closing of the airports and radio station also had a significant impact on the struggle for control of the Leopoldville Government. Closing the airports blocked unilateral Soviet military action in behalf of Lumumba. (Such direct Soviet aid was a violation of the Council resolutions.) Specifically, it prevented Soviet IL-14 planes from transporting Lumumbist troops to Leopoldville and elsewhere.

The closing of the radio station was a more serious deprivation for Lumumba than for Kasavubu because Lumumba was the more persuasive orator and Kasavubu had access to Radio Brazzaville. After vigorous protests from both men, the Leopoldville radio was returned to the Central Government on September 12. The airports were retained under U.N. control.

Did Cordier, whose actions were supported by Hammarskjold, violate the nonintervention rule? The net political effect of his actions, whatever their intention, was to frustrate the ambitions of Lumumba and his outside supporters and to advance the fortunes of Kasavubu and other moderate leaders. Under the circumstances it was virtually impossible for U.N. Representatives or the UNF to take any significant initiative in the Congo without affecting its internal affairs. Further, many domestic matters had such immediate international implications that the two could not be separated in the real world of political decision, even if they could be in the world of legal abstractions.

The conclusion seems warranted that Cordier's closing of the airports to ground Soviet planes and his closing of the radio station can be justified under the law-and-order mandate, even though both actions substantially affected the internal political struggle. If Cordier had not acted in this way, the result of his failure to act may have influenced the internal situation even more, and in quite another direction.

Cordier's action in the emergency did not mean that the Secretary-

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7. Andrew W. Cordier, "Challenge in the Congo," Think, Vol. 31 (July-August 1965), p. 28.

General had decided to accord legitimacy to Kasavubu's dismissal of Lumumba or his appointment of Ileo. The question of which leaders represented the legitimate government, a question made more complex by the Mobutu coup on September 14, 1960, was not answered to the satisfaction of Hammarskjold until August 2, 1961, with the election of Adoula.

#### The Mobutu Coup and Aftermath

As the rival Kasavubu and Lumumba delegations arrived in New York on September 12, each demanding to be seated, Colonel Joseph Mobutu, ANC Chief of Staff, arrested and later released Lumumba. Two days later Mobutu announced that the Army would take over until the end of 1960 to "neutralize" the "governments" of both Ileo, who had been designated by Kasavubu, and Lumumba. He then established what came to be known as the Council of Commissioners. The Council, made up of university students and graduates, subsequently received Kasavubu's blessing.

At the same time Mobutu expelled the Czech and Soviet diplomatic missions from the country for interference in the Congo's affairs. Kasavubu himself dismissed Parliament which had tended to side with Lumumba. The Mobutu coup strengthened Kasavubu's hand, but obviously could not be squared legally with the Fundamental Law, the Congo's provisional constitution. Lumumba who continued to claim he was the legitimate Prime Minister, was later placed under house arrest by Mobutu in Leopoldville where he had U.N. protection.

The problem of responding to the Mobutu coup, which U.N. officials observed but did not participate in, fell upon Rajeshwar Dayal of India, Hammarskjold's new Representative who arrived in Leopoldville on September 6, 1960. Dayal described his mission as one "to help but not to intervene, to advise but not to order, to conciliate but not to take sides."<sup>8</sup> Though he assessed the chaos around him with considerable realism

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8. U.N., GAOR, Supplement No. 1, Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, 16 June, 1960, to 15 June, 1961, A/4800 p. 18.

he was destined to play a controversial role. In his first report on September 21, he said:

By mid-September the constitutional crises had resulted in the breakdown of the formal structure of government into . . . competitive power groups headed by the Chief of State, the Prime Minister, the Parliament and, more recently, the Army. 9

Dayal's problem was to decide which rival contender he should cooperate with and how to remain neutral at the same time. This was literally an impossible task. There was no clear legal answer as to who the legitimate Prime Minister was. From the beginning, however, Hammarskjold held that the position of the chief of state, President Kasavubu, had not been compromised in the crisis.

The legal arguments cut both ways. A literal reading of the Fundamental Law gave the President the clear right to dismiss the Prime Minister. The Fundamental Law also gave Parliament the authority to designate the Prime Minister. While Kasavubu appeared to have a sounder legal position than Lumumba, the constitutional crisis should be understood primarily as a political question and only secondarily as a legal one. The extent of external political support for Kasavubu was indicated by the vote of the General Assembly which seated his delegation on November 22.<sup>10</sup>

The Soviet bloc and the militant African states continued to back Lumumba and to condemn Hammarskjold for not supporting him as Prime Minister. This pro-Lumumba sentiment was strong enough to precipitate in early 1961 the withdrawal from the UNF of the contingents from the U.A.R., Guinea, Mali, Morocco, Yugoslavia, and Indonesia--totalling more than 6,000 troops.<sup>11</sup> The Western powers and the moderate Afro-Asian states, on

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9. U.N., SCOR, Supplement for July, Aug., Sept., 1960, S/4531 (September 21, 1960), p. 180. A substantial portion of this report is reproduced as Appendix N.

10. The vote was 53 to 24, with 19 abstentions; the Soviet bloc, Ghana, Guinea, United Arab Republic, Morocco, and Mali were among those supporting the Lumumba delegation. See Appendix B.

11. The political motives were varied, but the Lumumba faction was the most important element. See Chapter 3, pp. 43 and 44, and Chapter 14.



the other hand, were disposed to support Kasavubu and work with the Council and later with Ileo who was formally installed as Prime Minister on February 9, 1961.

This choosing up of sides in the larger world put Hammarskjold and his Representative in Leopoldville in the middle. Both men were unhappy about the Mobutu coup and both stoutly maintained they did not take sides, though many Western observers insisted that Dayal's sympathies lay with the Lumumba forces.<sup>12</sup> Evidence suggests that on balance Dayal's action tended to favor Lumumba and his heirs over the Kasavubu forces. This orientation, however, had limited impact on concrete U.N. policies in the Congo.

Hammarskjold and Dayal expressed their policy of "disinterestedness" by aloofness toward the Council of Commissioners and the Ileo Cabinet, according legitimacy only to Kasavubu. This policy of aloofness irritated both the moderates who supported the de facto regime and the militants who sought the return of Lumumba. Some Western diplomats suspected that the Secretary-General was more interested in saving his reputation for impartiality than in saving the Congo. He was obviously trying to do both, but if he did emphasize his impartiality it was understandable in face of the increasingly bitter Soviet attack against the office and person of Hammarskjold at that time. In routine matters, the U.N. officials in the Congo transacted business with the man they "found at the head of government departments."<sup>13</sup>

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12. Dayal, in two interviews with Ernest W. Lefever (Oslo, February 21, 1964, and New Delhi, February 22, 1965), insisted that he was not pro-Lumumba, and that he did not take sides in the political struggle. He also said that the closing of the airports by Cordier was a practical mistake and legally questionable. It might have been better, he added, for the United Nations to have stood aside and permitted the Congo factions to fight it out so there would have been a clear winner with which he could have dealt.

13. U.N., A/4800, op.cit., p. 20

The deposed Lumumba continued to play a major role in Congolese politics. On November 27, 1960, he managed to escape from Leopoldville where he had been under U.N. protection to join his supporters in Stanleyville. Four days later he was recaptured in Kasai by Mobutu's troops, returned to Leopoldville, and imprisoned to await trial.

Katanga radio announced on February 13, 1961, that Lumumba had been killed in an attempted escape the day before. He had been transferred to Katanga from Leopoldville the previous month in accordance with a carefully negotiated agreement between Kasavubu and Mobutu on the one side and Tshombe on the other.<sup>14</sup> In the meantime, Lumumba's lieutenant, Antoine Gizenga, had established himself in Stanleyville and had secured recognition for his regime from the Communist bloc (including China and Cuba,)<sup>15</sup> Iraq, Morocco, and several of the more militant African states: the United Arab Republic, Ghana, Guinea, and Mali. With this development, Mobutu and Tshombe had a mutual interest in eliminating the challenge in Stanleyville.

#### The "Dayal Problem"

In this confused political situation the relations between the Secretary-General and the Leopoldville regime continued to deteriorate until Dayal was recalled to New York for consultations and temporarily replaced by Mekki Abbas on March 10, 1961. Dayal resigned on May 25, 1961, without returning to Leopoldville. The "Dayal problem," as it came to be called, deserves analysis because it was at the heart of United Nations-host state relations. The problem was a product of many political

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14. J. Gérard-Libois, Secession au Katanga (Brussels: CRISP, 1963), pp. 164-65. (After holding sixty-six meetings, the U.N. Commission set up to inquire into Lumumba's death reported on November 11, 1961: "Mr. Lumumba, Mr. Okito, and Mr. Mpolo were executed by a Belgian mercenary on 17 January 1961 not far from Elisabethville, and in all probability in the presence of certain members of the Government of Katanga Province, namely Mr. Tshombe, Mr. Munongo, and Mr. Kibwe." U.N., GAOR, Supplement No. 1, A/5201 (16 June 1961-15 June 1962), p. 8.

15. See Chapter 8.

and psychological factors.

On the political-psychological side, the very presence of the UNF was an embarrassing reminder, especially to General Mobutu, of the Government's inability to control the ANC, and as such was an affront to the Congo's sovereignty and pride. Dayal's frank reporting and his criticism of the ANC further enflamed the relationship. In a conversation with Mobutu he once referred to the ANC as "armed rabble," which hurt because it was all too true. Most observers agree that Dayal had a style and manner which irritated the Congolese as well as the Western diplomats in Leopoldville. As an Indian, he was suspect among the Congolese.

The "Dayal problem" was also rooted in important policy differences between him and the de facto Government. As the visible symbol of Hammarskjold's policy of not recognizing the Council or Ileo governments, he had to bear the brunt of that unpopular posture. For this and other reasons he was widely regarded as pro-Lumumba and anti-Belgian.

Dayal's views toward Belgium were expressed in his objection to the use of Belgian technicians and advisers by the Leopoldville Government.<sup>16</sup> Hammarskjold supported this position. This angered the Congolese who, even when the tensions were most severe, relied upon Belgian advisers, both civilian and military. The Congolese were never indiscriminately anti-Belgian. In psychological terms Kasavubu, Mobutu, and other moderate leaders did not think of the "Belgians" as their "enemy." They were much more inclined to regard the Lumumba forces, the militant African states, the Soviet bloc, and Dayal himself in those terms.

This orientation of the Leopoldville leaders is illustrated by the response of Kasavubu to U.N. efforts to have Belgian military advisers

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16. In a letter to the Belgian Representative at the United Nations, Hammarskjold, on October 19, 1960, protested against Belgian experts hired by "what is called" the Council of Commissioners. U.N., SCOR, Supplement for Oct., Nov., and Dec., 1960, S/4557 (October 19, 1960), Part B, p. 45. This matter is discussed in Chapter 11.

in the Ministry of Defense expelled from the Congo. From July 1960 on, a small number of Belgian Army officers were retained as advisers. On several occasions Dayal informed Congolese authorities that the Secretary-General regarded the employment of Belgian nationals by the Congolese Government as contrary to the Security Council resolutions. The Kasavubu-Ileo telegram protesting aspects of the February 21, 1961, resolution, made it clear that the "Congo intends to recruit the technicians it requires wherever it thinks fit" and said that Dayal's efforts on this matter violated the noninterference rule.<sup>17</sup>

Leopoldville again formally criticized Hammarskjold on this point in a Kasavubu-Bomboko letter which referred to the Secretary-General's urgent request of "simply ejecting the Belgian military personnel" as "over-simplified and completely Utopian."<sup>18</sup> The letter acknowledged that General Mobutu was using the services of fourteen Belgian officers. Speaking as Supreme Commander of the ANC, Kasavubu added:

. . . the departure of these fourteen officers will solve absolutely nothing, as any sensible person will concede. On the contrary . . . it is likely to be a further source of disturbance and apprehension in the Army. 19

As matters developed, the Congolese refused to "expel" the Belgian officers and Brussels did not recall them. In light of the great need in the ANC for competent officers, the U.N. attempt to have the Belgians expelled was politically unwise. In strictly legal terms, the February 21 resolutions prohibited the Belgian officers and all foreign advisers "not under the United Nations command," but this prohibition was generally considered to be directed toward Katanga. After the advent of the Adoula regime the

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17. Telegram from President Kasavubu to the President of the Security Council. U.N., SCOR, Supplement for Jan., Feb., and March, 1961, S/4743 (February 22, 1961), p. 151. See Appendix U.

18. Letter from Kasavubu to the Secretary-General, U.N. SCOR, Supplement for Jan., Feb., and March, 1961, Add. 3, S/4752 (March 6, 1961), p. 199. See Appendix U.

19. Ibid., p. 200.

Secretary-General modified this rather narrow anti-Belgian posture.

In any event, this problem combined with the other factors led to repeated demands by Leopoldville that Dayal be replaced. On January 14, 1961, Kasavubu, in a letter to Hammarskjold, demanded Dayal's recall.<sup>20</sup> After Dayal was temporarily replaced, the Government threatened to abrogate the April 17 agreement<sup>21</sup> with the Secretary-General if Dayal were returned to Leopoldville.<sup>22</sup> Hammarskjold respected Dayal and only with reluctance did he respond to Congolese and other pressures to relieve him. When Dayal's replacement, Mekki Abbas, a Sudanese, arrived on March 10, he was welcomed in Leopoldville with a brass band. A week later Abbas told Kasavubu and Bomboko that the Secretary-General had revised his nonrecognition policy and that he, Abbas, would now recognize and work with the Congolese civilian and military leaders appointed by the Government. The mood had changed toward greater cooperation, but the deep distrust of the U.N. military presence on the part of Mobutu and other Congolese officials persisted with varying degrees of intensity until June 1964.

#### The Conciliation Efforts

During the eleven-month political vacuum between the Lumumba and Adoula regimes, there were two conferences and a special session of Parliament designed to resolve the constitutional crisis and forge a Central Government representing all regions and major factions. These efforts were undertaken against the backdrop of four largely provincially centered factions, each with the support of some ANC units.

At the beginning of 1961, Kasavubu in Leopoldville had about

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20. New York Times, January 15, 1961

21. In this agreement, the Congo accepted the February 21 resolution and the Secretary-General agreed to assist Leopoldville in expelling prohibited foreigners and in other ways. U.N., SCOR, Supplement for April, May, and June, 1961, S/4807 (April 17, 1961), Annex I, pp. 46-47.

22. A statement to this effect was made on May 21, 1961, by Deputy Foreign Minister, Julien Kasongo, in Leopoldville, just six days before Dayal's permanent replacement assumed his duties. New York Times, May 22, 1961.

7,000 troops, Gizenga in Stanleyville had about 5,500 troops, Tshombe in Elisabethville had between 5,000 and 7,000 troops, and Albert Kalonji in South Kasai had about 3,000 troops. Both Leopoldville and Stanleyville claimed national jurisdiction and campaigned for unity. Elisabethville alternately sought complete independence and membership in a loose Congo confederation. Kalonji in South Kasai operated autonomously, seeking ties first with Tshombe and then with Leopoldville.

The Secretary-General and his Representative in the Congo continued to pursue a policy of impartiality toward all claimants, though they had developed a posture of hostility toward Tshombe on the ground that he flouted the Security Council resolutions and failed to keep his word to U.N. Representatives.

During this period, the American Ambassador to the Congo worked closely with U.N. officials in attempting to get the Congolese factions together. In early January 1961, the U.N. Conciliation Commission, created the previous November by the Secretary-General, arrived in Leopoldville.<sup>23</sup> The Commission, like the Congo Advisory Committee, was composed of the fifteen Asian and African states with troops in the Congo. Its function was to help the Congolese restore parliamentary institutions and create a united government. The United Arab Republic, Guinea, and Mali refused to join the U.N. Conciliation Commission because they believed it would not support Gizenga. On March 20, 1961, the Commission issued a report endorsed by the United States and a great majority of the other U.N. members. It made these points:

1. Representative Congolese leaders should meet to discuss "a federal form of government," but the Fundamental Law should be upheld until it was amended or replaced.

2. Parliamentary government should be established.

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23. The Congo Advisory Committee, which had been established on August 23, 1960, by the Secretary-General, consisted of the Permanent Representatives of the states which had provided contingents for the United Nations Force. See Chapter 4, pp. 64-65.

3. Tribal warfare and undisciplined armed groups were a serious danger.

4. Until the ANC could be reorganized and disciplined, the UNF should continue to maintain law and order. To carry out "its increased responsibilities," the UNF would have to be "strengthened to a considerable extent, both in men and modern equipment."

5. Foreign interference should be ended, especially military aid to any faction. The continued presence of "Belgian and other foreign military and paramilitary personnel, political advisers, and mercenaries" was deplored.<sup>24</sup> This reference was directed primarily toward Katanga.

The first constitutional conference of Congolese leaders was held, March 6-12, 1961, in Tananarive, Malagasy Republic. Kasavubu and Tshombe participated, but not Gizenga, though all major political leaders had been invited. The conference agreed to form a confederation of Congo states.

A second constitutional conference, also marred by partial representation, was held at Coquilhatville in April. It agreed that the Congo should become a "Federal Republic" of states with a single diplomatic service, a unified military force, and one currency. These two conferences contributed little to genuine national reconciliation because there was no central authority strong enough to implement the decisions and because each faction interpreted the results in his own way.

On the advice of the Security Council, the General Assembly, and U.N. officials in the Congo, Parliament was reconvened under U.N. protection on July 27, 1961, at Lovanium University near Leopoldville. The U.N. arrangements for the meeting were unusual, but agreed to by the Central Government. Armed Congolese soldiers and police were not permitted to move about in the city. During the session, all members were

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<sup>24</sup> U.N., GAOR, Agenda Item 85, Report of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for the Congo, A/4711 (March 20, 1961), pp. 43-51.

housed in the university buildings and were permitted no outside contacts. No participant was allowed any weapons, money, or other negotiable instruments of any kind when entering or departing from Lovanium.

After two weeks, the diplomatic pressure to find a solution to the constitutional crisis yielded results. President Kasavubu's designation of Adoula as Prime Minister was unanimously endorsed by the Congolese Assembly and Senate on August 2, 1961, ending eleven months of chaos following the dismissal of Lumumba. Though the Congo finally had a legal and widely recognized government, the Government itself had little effective political or military control in many areas of the Congo, and no control at all in the southern part of secessionist Katanga. From this point on, Katanga was the major problem for the new Central Government and the United Nations.

#### Host Government Requests for UNF Assistance

##### Lumumba's Demand for Help Against Katanga

The greatest point of strain between the Secretary-General and the host state occurred during the Lumumba regime when the Prime Minister insisted that the UNF become an instrument of his Government in subduing secessionist Katanga by force. Lumumba was irritated by Hammarskjold's refusal to employ U.N. troops against Katanga, his peaceful escorting of two companies of Swedish troops into Elisabethville on August 12, 1960, his refusal to permit an official Congolese Government delegation to accompany the U.N. party to Katanga, and his alleged failure to consult closely with Lumumba.<sup>25</sup>

In a sharply worded letter to Hammarskjold on August 14, two days after the introduction of the token U.N. Force in Katanga and five days after the August 9 resolution which declared that the entry of the UNF into Katanga was "necessary," Lumumba insisted that his Government had a legal right to "call upon" the United Nations "to transport civilian

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25. The role of the UNF with respect to Katangan secession is dealt with in Chapter 6.



and military representatives of the Central Government to Katanga in opposition to the provincial government."<sup>26</sup> In the same letter, he accused Hammarskjold of conniving with Tshombe and the Belgians, and of acting as though his Government "did not exist." He concluded with four demands:

1. That UNF guard units be withdrawn from all airfields and be replaced by Congolese soldiers and police.
2. That all non-African UNF troops in Katanga be replaced immediately by Congolese and other African troops.
3. That U.N. aircraft be placed at Lumumba's disposal "for the transportation of Congolese troops and civilians engaged in restoring order throughout the country," meaning Katanga.
4. That the UNF immediately "seize all arms and ammunition distributed by the Belgians in Katanga" and hand it over to the Leopoldville Government.

Hammarskjold immediately rejected these demands and the interpretation behind them. In the remarkably frank exchange of letters that followed, Lumumba asserted that "the Government and people of the Congo have lost confidence in the Secretary-General of the United Nations."<sup>27</sup> Lumumba's emotional state was illustrated by an unusual request to Hammarskjold contained in the same note. He asked Hammarskjold, who was then in Leopoldville, to delay his scheduled departure to New York for twenty-four hours to permit Lumumba's delegation to the Security Council to "travel on the same aircraft." Finally on August 20, Lumumba sent a telegram to the President of the Security Council in the name of his Council of Ministers, reiterating his earlier demand that the troops and facilities of the UNF be placed at his disposal.<sup>28</sup>

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26. U.N., SCOR, Supplement for July, Aug., and Sept., 1960, S/4417, Add. 7 (August 15, 1960), p. 72.

27. Ibid., August 15, 1960, p. 76.

28. U.N., SCOR, Supplement for July, Aug., and Sept., 1960, S/4448 (August 20, 1960), p. 107.

In his replies to Lumumba's demands, the Secretary-General simply said that the UNF must operate under his exclusive control and that, while he wanted to cooperate with the Congolese Government, he had no legal obligation to become its instrument. Hammarskjold pointed out that the Security Council had accepted his interpretation and that he would follow it until the Security Council gave him new instructions. No new instructions were forthcoming, and Hammarskjold's position was sustained.

Hammarskjold's refusal to permit U.N. troops and facilities to become an adjunct to Lumumba's Government did not preclude consultation between them. Nor did the Secretary-General's position preclude cooperation with the Government when joint or parallel action was in accord with the Security Council mandate. The increasingly abusive posture of the Prime Minister, however, made consultation less and less frequent and cooperation virtually impossible.

Hammarskjold's forthright dealing with Lumumba reinforced the rule that the UNF should be independent of the Central Government. There was no significant attempt during the Council of Commissioners and Ileo Governments to make the United Nations an instrument of Leopoldville.

#### Adoula's Request for Aid Against Gizenga

Eighteen months after Lumumba's blatant attempt to use the UNF, Prime Minister Adoula requested U.N. assistance for the specific purpose of occupying Stanleyville and arresting Gizenga. In this case the Secretary-General complied, and provided military assistance to the satisfaction of the host government because he believed that the request was in harmony with the Security Council mandate.

Certain details of this incident are instructive. On October 4, 1961, Deputy Prime Minister Gizenga, with the explicit permission of the Central Government, left for an eight-day visit in Stanleyville. Ignoring his promise to return, he stayed on, organized a Lumumbist political party, established a 300-man militia, loyal only to him, and openly attacked the Leopoldville Government. On January 8, 1962, the Chamber of Representatives voted 66 to 10 to order his return within 48 hours to face

charges of secessionism. He refused.

On January 12, in the Chamber, 41 Representatives supported a motion of censure against Gizenga. Thereupon, he mobilized his militia, who took positions around his residence and erected roadblocks. General Victor Lundula, the provincial ANC Commander who had sworn allegiance to Leopoldville on November 13, 1961, took counter-measures to maintain order. In a clash between Gizenga's militia and General Lundula's soldiers on January 13, eight of the former and six of the latter were killed.

On the same day, Adoula requested UNF assistance to maintain order in Stanleyville. Acting Secretary-General Thant authorized the assistance, and his order was conveyed to Colonel Teshome, the Commander of the 980-man Ethiopian Battalion in Stanleyville. Teshome conferred with General Lundula and provided assistance. By the evening of January 14, all of Gizenga's militia except 50 men had been disarmed. During the entire operation, only one UNF platoon had been engaged, and it had "not fired a shot."<sup>29</sup> In the afternoon of January 15, the Parliament removed Gizenga from his ministerial post by a vote of 67 to one. On January 20, at the request of Adoula, Gizenga was flown in a U.N. plane to Leopoldville, where he was subsequently placed under detention by the Prime Minister.

By assisting Leopoldville in this limited and essentially law-and-order operation, the UNF aided Adoula in bringing down the secessionist pretensions of Lumumba's heir. But it did not become the instrument of the Adoula Government. Does this mean that it was illegal U.N. intervention in internal affairs? It certainly favored Adoula over Gizenga, but the latter was a rebel whose activities posed a threat of civil war. The U.N. action, therefore, was an appropriate implementation of the February 21, 1961, resolution, which authorized the use of force to prevent civil war. Even without this resolution, the Stanleyville operation, which

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29. Report by the Officer-in-Charge, ONUC (Opération des Nations Unies au Congo - United Nations Operation in the Congo), January 20, 1962, United Nations Review, Vol. 9 (February 1962), p. 27.

did not involve the UNF in hostilities, could probably be legally justified under the original law-and-order mandate.<sup>30</sup>

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30. The conclusions of this chapter are combined with the conclusions of Chapter 6.

## CHAPTER 6

### THE HOST STATE: THE KATANGA PROBLEM AND THE ANC

From the arrival of the first UNF contingents in the Congo until the end of Tshombe's secession on January 21, 1963, there was tension between the Secretary-General and the host government over the Katanga problem. This tension was most severe during the Lumumba regime. Katanga was much stronger and better organized than any other regional challenge to Leopoldville's authority. In dealing with the Katanga issue the Secretary-General was confronted with two almost insurmountable problems: How could he assist Leopoldville in restoring territorial integrity (i.e. ending Katangan secession) without becoming an instrument of the Central Government and without taking sides in the internal political struggle? How could he exercise freedom of movement in Katanga without exceeding his authority to use force and, again, without taking sides?

These questions can be examined with respect to five developments: the original entry of the token UNF into Katanga; the August 28, 1961, roundup of mercenaries by the UNF; and the three armed clashes between the UNF and Katangan forces--Rounds One, Two, and Three. These events must be seen not only in terms of the original mandate (represented by the July Security Council resolutions and Hammarskjold's interpretation of them) but in the light of the changing political situation inside and outside the Congo which was reflected significantly in the August 9, 1960, and the February 21, 1961, Security Council resolutions.

### Initial Entry of the UNF into Katanga

Although the July 14, 1960, resolution gave the UNF the legal right to enter any part of the Congo, the introduction of U.N. troops into breakaway Katanga presented serious political and military problems. As of early August there were approximately 8,600 Belgian troops deployed in Katanga, though Brussels assured Hammarskjold that they would not oppose the entry of U.N. troops. Furthermore, the UNF had no authority to shoot its way in, even if it had had the military capacity to do so. With the passage of the second July resolution, the increasing pressure from Lumumba, and the threat of direct Soviet intervention,<sup>1</sup> the Secretary-General decided that the UNF should enter Katanga, but by negotiation and not by force and without altering the balance of power between Lumumba and Tshombe. He announced, on August 2, that an advance UNF guard escorted by Under-Secretary Ralph J. Bunche would arrive in Elisabethville on August 5, to be followed by UNF units the next day. The immediate and strong protests from Katanga authorities and European groups in the province, expressed diplomatically in London and Brussels, forced Hammarskjold to revise his plan. He sent Bunche a day earlier without the U.N. guard and with instructions to negotiate the matter with Belgian military authorities and through them with Katangan officials.

During Bunche's one-day visit in Elisabethville, he was told on every side that Katanga would forcibly oppose the entry of U.N. troops, which some officials and many Europeans believed would mean the capitulation of "independent" Katanga to Leopoldville. Godefroid Munongo, Tshombe's Minister of the Interior, who had ordered general mobilization on August 3, told Bunche that if U.N. troops tried to enter they would have to parachute in and would confront warriors who "will riddle your

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1. By this time there were already indications that the Soviet Union was providing unilateral military assistance to the Lumumba Government. At the end of August, 16 Soviet transport planes with Russian crews, 100 Soviet transport trucks with a complete repair shop, spare parts and technicians; and reportedly also a supply of Soviet bloc arms were in the Congo. Soviet assistance is dealt with further in Chapter 8.

soldiers with their arrows."<sup>2</sup>

Bunche was reportedly shaken. Not willing to take the risk of armed opposition, Hammarskjold cancelled his plans for introducing a token UNF presence and returned to the Security Council for further instructions. The result was the August 9, 1960, resolution which called upon "Belgium to withdraw immediately its troops from the Province of Katanga" and declared that "the entry of the United Nations force" into Katanga was "necessary for the full implementation of this resolution." It reaffirmed that the UNF "will not be a party to or in any way intervene in or be used to influence the outcome of any internal conflict."

Armed with this resolution, which invoked the authority of Articles 25 and 49,<sup>3</sup> which obligate member states to cooperate with decisions of the Security Council, Hammarskjold made arrangements to introduce a token UNF unit in Katanga on August 12. In the meantime Katangan authorities had become more cooperative.

Before entering on the appointed day the Secretary-General issued a statement, emphasizing again that he was interested in the Katanga problem only to the extent that Katanga policies were based on or influenced by "the presence of Belgian troops."<sup>4</sup> Once it was clear that Katanga was relying solely on "its own military means in order to achieve certain political aims," he added, the United Nations had no right to interfere. He also pointed out to Lumumba that U.N. planes could not be used to transport Central Government officials to Katanga, a position which angered Lumumba and Gizenga.

Hammarskjold arrived in Elisabethville on August 12 with two

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2. Catherine Hoskyns, The Congo Since Independence: January 1960-December 1961 (London: Oxford University Press for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1965), p. 163.

3. These and other relevant Articles of the U.N. Charter are found in Appendix A.

4. U.N., SCOR, Supplement for July, Aug., and Sept., 1960, S/4419, Add. 6 (August 12, 1960), p. 65.

companies of Swedish troops, the first U.N. soldiers to touch Katangan soil. Brigadier General Indarjit Rikhye, the Secretary-General's military adviser, and General Ben Hammou Kettani of Morocco, also accompanied him. The party was welcomed at the airport by Tshombe, and the U.N. military presence was peacefully introduced into the province.

Although the Secretary-General formally rejected the specific conditions for entry that Tshombe had stipulated three days before, Hammarskjöld's behavior and the behavior of the UNF for the next six weeks suggested that he was trying to comply with those conditions he believed were not inconsistent with the mandate. It is significant that U.N. troops from Guinea and Ghana, the African states most critical of Tshombe, were not used, though they were already in the Congo. The UNF did not, as Tshombe had requested, interfere in the administrative, financial, or military arrangements of Katanga. U.N. planes did not transport Central Government officials. Tshombe's Government was permitted to control Katangan borders and to hire foreign technicians of its own choice. At all these points U.N. behavior was in accord with Tshombe's conditions. On the other hand, Tshombe's demands that the United Nations recognize the Katanga constitution and disarm "para-military organizations" in the rest of the Congo were not met.<sup>5</sup>

On August 13, Swedish troops assumed guard duty at the Elisabethville airport and plans were made to build up the UNF in Katanga to 4,000 by bringing in additional Swedish soldiers and a Moroccan contingent. By September 1, all Belgian troops, except for 231 officers and other ranks seconded to the Elisabethville regime, had been withdrawn from Katanga.

At this point Hammarskjöld had succeeded in entering Katanga without using military force and without significantly altering the political balance between Lumumba and Tshombe. This was regarded as a positive achievement by the Western governments and by the moderate neutralist states, but not by the U.S.S.R. and the militant African states which

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5. For details of Tshombe's conditions and of Hammarskjöld's entry, see Pierre Davister, Katanga: enjeu du monde (Brussels: Editions Europe-Afrique, 1960), pp. 146-55



continued to side with Lumumba against Hammarskjold.

#### The Mercenary Problem

A major source of tension between the United Nations and the host state was the mercenary problem in Katanga. Among most supporters of the U.N. effort, the first step for dealing with the Katanga issue was the expulsion of the seconded Belgians and foreign mercenaries who were regarded as the backbone of Tshombe's regime. The generally undifferentiated term "mercenaries" included three categories of Europeans assisting Katanga. First, there were the 114 Belgian Army officers and 117 other ranks officially lent to Tshombe by Brussels to train and command his gendarmerie. There were also 58 Belgian officers in the service of the Katanga police.<sup>6</sup>

Anticipating the departure of the seconded Belgians, Tshombe started, in January 1961, to recruit European mercenaries. By June, some 300 men from Belgium, France, South Africa, and the Rhodesias had voluntarily enlisted in Katanga's service. They fell into two categories. About one-third of them had training and command assignments in the gendarmerie. The larger group was organized into an all-white "International Company" under the command of a Britisher, Captain Richard William Prowne. Its strength was reported to be about 200 officers and men, most of whom came from South Africa.<sup>7</sup>

The function of the mercenaries, who varied widely in competence and political orientation,<sup>8</sup> was to lead and assist the Katanga gendarmerie, which was actually an army of 8,000 to 10,000 men. The objectives of the gendarmerie were to "pacify" the anti-Tshombe Baluba in north Katanga, to defend Katanga's frontier against ANC attacks, and to guard against internal

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6. These figures as of October 3, 1960, were reported in Dayal's Second Progress Report. U.N., SCOR, Supplement for Oct., Nov., and Dec., 1960, S/4557 (October 3, 1960), Part B, pp. 44-45.

7. CRISP, Congo: 1961, prepared by Benoit Verhaegen (Les Dossiers du CRISP, n.d.), p. 233.

8. Chapters 9, 10, and 11 discuss the role of the French, British and Belgian volunteers in Katanga.

uprisings in south Katanga.

Two events in 1961 had an important bearing on the mercenary problem--first, the February 21 resolution, and second, the designation of Adoula as Prime Minister.

The February Security Council resolution urged the "immediate withdrawal and evacuation from the Congo of all Belgian and other foreign military and paramilitary personnel and political advisers. . . and mercenaries," and called upon "all States to take immediate and energetic measures to prevent the departure of such personnel for the Congo." The resolution did not specify what role the UNF should play in the "evacuation" of prohibited persons nor give the UNF authority to use force to arrest or expel such persons.

On the domestic political front, Parliament endorsed Adoula as Prime Minister on August 2. This solved the Congo constitutional problem as far as Hammarskjold was concerned. Writing to Adoula, he welcomed the new "constitutional government," and said that all U.N. aid "should be rendered exclusively to your Government." The UNF "has only one goal," he added, "to aid your Government in the maintenance of public order."<sup>9</sup>

The Adoula Government had one overriding objective: to end the secession of Katanga; and the first step, it believed, was to eliminate the mercenaries. The many secondary problems had to await the resolution of the most dangerous challenge to Leopoldville's sovereignty and pride.

Katanga was also the chief preoccupation of the U.N. headquarters in Leopoldville during the first eighteen months of the new Central Government. The widespread consensus among U.N. members that the Congo should be united was reflected in Security Council and General Assembly resolutions. There was virtually no support anywhere for an independent sovereign state of Katanga. No government ever extended diplomatic recognition to Tshombe's regime.

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9. U.N., SCOR, Supplement for July, Aug., Sept., 1961, S/4923, (August 13, 1961), p. 76.

Hammaraskjold and the new Adoula Government were divided on how Katangan secession should be ended. The foreign governments that also favored Congolese unity were in even more serious disagreement on the question of appropriate means. The Soviet Union, the militant African states, Leopoldville, and probably some second-level U.N. civilian and military representatives in the Congo, supported the use of military force, though they differed on the timing and the kind of force to be used. Given the sad state of the ANC, any forcible integration would have required the commitment of the UNF. Hammaraskjold and his chief aides, the United States, other Western governments, India, and the moderate African states favored negotiation, persuasion, and other less-than-military means, at least until it became evident that these methods were not effective. Britain, France, and Belgium opposed any use of force to solve the Katanga problem or any other "internal" question.

Hammaraskjold was eager to move against the Belgian officers and mercenaries in Katanga, but he wanted the strongest possible legal basis for any U.N. action. Consequently, he took the initiative in persuading the Adoula Government to adopt Ordinance No. 70 which called for the expulsion of "all non-Congolese officers and mercenaries serving in the Katanga forces." This Ordinance, adopted on August 24, was based in part on the April 17, 1961, agreement between Hammaraskjold and Kasavubu which explicitly exempted foreign advisers hired by the Central Government. In a cable to Mahmoud Khiary, the Chief of U.N. Civilian Operations in the Congo, on August 23, Hammaraskjold said:

It seems to me, then, that the Adoula Government should immediately issue an order, the terms of which should declare as "undesirable" all the non-Congolese officers and mercenaries serving in the Katangese forces. . . . The Government should then inform us of this order. 10

The Government issued the order the following day, using almost exactly the same language as the Secretary-General's cable. Thereupon, U.N.

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10. The full cable is reproduced as Appendix R.

officials cited the ordinance as giving the United Nations "legal rights within the Congo" to implement the February 21 resolution.<sup>11</sup> In the view of Sture Linner, the Swedish U.N. Officer-in-Charge in Leopoldville, Ordinance No. 70 did not justify the expulsion of mercenaries by military force, though if the UNF used force in self-defense in the process, such coercion would be justifiable. He reserved the use of military force for self-defense and, as a last resort, to prevent or stop civil war.

With this background, the UNF made plans to arrest and evacuate prohibited persons in Katanga. "Operation Rumpunch," as it was designated, began at five o'clock on the morning of August 28, 1961. It was directed by Brigadier K. A. S. Raja, the Indian UNF Commander in Katanga. Twelve hours later the dragnet had caught 338 men in Elisabethville and north Katanga. Further arrests were then suspended by Conor Cruise O'Brien, the U.N. Representative in Katanga, under pressure from the Belgian Consul who promised to repatriate promptly all mercenaries--the 338 under arrest and the 104 who were still at large according to the U.N. list.<sup>12</sup>

The Elisabethville post office and radio station were occupied by the UNF and a guard was placed around the villa of Interior Minister, Godefroid Munongo, as a precaution. The U.N. guards were withdrawn when Tshombe promised to announce over the radio that he was cooperating with the United Nations in the dismissal of all mercenaries. Tshombe was as good as his word.

The Belgian Consul, however, did not fulfill his part of the bargain, explaining that he could exercise legal authority only over the Belgian regular officers; the other Belgian nationals recruited directly by Tshombe he could merely advise to go home. The French and British Consuls were in a similar predicament in regard to their nationals who had

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11. U.N., SCOR, Supplement for July, Aug., Sept., 1961, S/4940 (September 14, 1961), p. 100

12. U.N., SCOR, Supplement for July, Aug., Sept., 1961, S/4940, Add. 1 (September 14, 1961), p. 106.

volunteered to assist Tshombe. By September 8, some 273 mercenaries were reported to have been sent home (some of whom later returned); another sixty-five awaited repatriation. A considerable number of mercenaries still remained at large in Katanga.

Supporters of the peacekeeping effort were generally pleased with the efficient and bloodless roundup of a large proportion of the mercenaries. Hammarskjold congratulated O'Brien. Among Europeans in Katanga and their outside partisans, however, Rumpunch evoked a wave of hostility against the U.N. presence. Tshombe and his advisers had been taken by surprise. He was now forced hastily to Africanize his gendarmerie. This angered Munongo, and the so-called ultras (extremists) among the European advisers.<sup>13</sup> The U.N. Command claimed to have evidence that the ultras were taking measures to nullify the effects of Rumpunch and to prevent any similar operation in the future. Tension ran high in Elisabethville and Leopoldville.

In evaluating Rumpunch in terms of the three rules governing United Nations-host state relations noted in the beginning of Chapter 5, it can be said that the UNF acted independently but with the consent of Leopoldville. It was not taking orders from the Adoula Government. On the contrary, the origin of Ordinance No. 70 suggests that Hammarskjold was giving very specific advice to Adoula, although U.N. initiative in this matter could be described as technical assistance.

The roundup of mercenaries verged on violating the nonintervention rule. While it was true that U.N. troops arrested only foreign personnel prohibited by the February 21 resolution, they did occupy the Elisabethville post office and radio station and threw a guard around Munongo's home. The net effect of the total operation clearly was to aid the fortunes of the Adoula regime at the expense of the Tshombe regime, though the results fell far short of Leopoldville's ultimate objective of ending Katangan secession.

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13. The role of the ultras is discussed in Chapter 11.

In any event, Rumpunch set off anti-United Nations demonstrations in Elisabethville, probably staged by the Tshombe Government. The windows of the U.S. consulate were smashed, presumably because of American support for the U.N. effort. On September 3, Tshombe alleged that a U.N. plot was in the making to arrest him and Munongo, seize the Elisabethville radio, and disarm the Katanga gendarmerie. The plot, he said, had been planned by the United Nations at the request of the Central Government. He repeated these charges on September 9.<sup>14</sup> Tshombe's allegations were based on some fairly solid information. In an eleventh-hour bid for a settlement, O'Brien issued an ultimatum on September 11, demanding that Tshombe expel the mercenaries and come to terms with Leopoldville. This effort failed. The same day, the U.N. company of 150 Irish troops sent to protect Europeans at Jadotville was surrounded by a larger force of gendarmerie commanded by white officers. The Irish refused to surrender and on the following day were attacked twice from the air. The company was supplied with food and ammunition by UNF helicopters. This provided the political-military backdrop for Round One--an eight-day clash between the UNF and Katangan forces.

Round One: September 13-21, 1961

From the U.N. side Round One was an attempt to duplicate, build upon, and go beyond, the partially successful August 28, 1961, roundup of mercenaries. This eight-day clash between the UNF and Katangan forces was probably the most controversial development of the entire peacekeeping operation.<sup>15</sup>

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14. CRISP, Congo: 1961, prepared by Benoit Verhaegen (Les Dossiers du CRISP, n.d.), p. 521

15. The political and military control aspects of Round One and the problem of the use of force are discussed elsewhere in this Report. A brief summary of Round One is found in Appendix P. For fuller accounts and interpretations of Round One, see the official U.N. documents; A.L. Burns and Nina Heathcote, Peace-Keeping by U.N. Forces: From Suez Through the Congo (New York: Praeger, 1963), pp. 100-31; King Gordon, The United Nations in the Congo: A Quest for Peace (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1962), pp. 122-32; Conor Cruise O'Brien, To Katanga and Back, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1962), pp. 68-330; Hoskyns, op.cit.,

The immediate prelude to Round One involved military plans in Katanga and political plans in Leopoldville. Conor Cruise O'Brien, the U.N. Civilian Representative in Elisabethville, and his staff were responsible for the planning in Katanga. On September 8, the Leopoldville Parliament held a secret session of the Chamber and in all probability decided on these measures: 1) the arrest of the remaining mercenaries in Katanga; 2) the arrest of Tshombe and his ministers; 3) the disarming of the Katanga gendarmerie; and 4) concurrently with these actions, the dispatch of a Central Government commissioner to take control of Katanga. U.N. officials were asked to assist in implementing these measures.

The Government, probably with the cooperation of U.N. authorities, prepared warrants for the arrest of Tshombe, Munongo, and three other Katangan ministers. Vladimir Fabry, an American who served as the U.N. legal adviser in Leopoldville, gave the warrants to O'Brien in Elisabethville on September 11, 1960. They were handed over in the presence of Mahmoud Khiary, a Tunisian who was Chief of Civilian Operations in the Congo and who had accompanied Fabry to Katanga.

In the meantime, O'Brien and his staff had been making plans for a follow-up to Rumpunch. These plans were given the code name, "Operation Morthor," the Hindi word for "smash." The objectives of Morthor were almost identical to the measures agreed upon by the Congolese political leaders at the secret Chamber meeting. Evidence suggests that the Congolese and O'Brien's staff worked closely together, with Khiary serving as the chief intermediary. The planning on both sides got underway while Linner, the Officer-in-Charge, was in Brussels, from September 8 to 10. Though Linner sent Khiary and Fabry to Elisabethville on September 11, he may not have been aware of the detailed planning for Morthor. It is not known whether he knew that Fabry was carrying warrants for the arrest of the Katangan ministers, or whether he was aware of the plans to send the

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pp. 413-35; and Ernest W. Lefever, Crisis in the Congo, (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1965), pp. 79-88.

Government delegation to Elisabethville on a U.N. plane.

During his visit with O'Brien and Brigadier K. A. S. Raja, the Katanga UNF Commander, Khiary acted as though he had full authority from Linner and Hammarskjold. He helped to formulate final plans for Morthor and ordered O'Brien to move ahead on September 13, the very day Hammarskjold was scheduled to arrive in Leopoldville on a mission to reconcile Tshombe and Adoula. Khiary and Fabry returned to Leopoldville on the afternoon of September 12.

Operation Morthor was launched by the UNF at four o'clock on the morning of September 13. O'Brien was optimistic about the outcome. Since Rumpunch, the U.N. position in Elisabethville had been strengthened by the arrival of a Gurkha battalion from north Katanga. By mid-afternoon of the 13th, O'Brien hoped to accomplish several military and political objectives, including the arrest (or house detention) of the five ministers, using the Government warrants as his legal authority; the securing of the post office, the radio studios, and the radio transmitters; raiding the Sûreté offices and the Information Ministry; and, most important, an agreement from Tshombe to end secession.

Rapidly unfolding events did not conform to O'Brien's expectations. Unlike Rumpunch, Morthor did not take Tshombe by surprise and was not bloodless. Tshombe had been informed of the secret September 8 meeting and was expecting the UNF to take action similar to Rumpunch. The Katanga gendarmerie, now led by the mercenaries rather than the regular Belgian officers, had taken precautionary measures. By September 12, for example, Katangan paracommandos trained by the French mercenary, René Faulques, were guarding the Elisabethville post office.

Within twenty minutes after Morthor got under way, there was an exchange of fire in the vicinity of the post office. It is still not certain whether the Indians or a Katangan sniper fired first. A fight followed:

. . . the Katangans fought fiercely but were inexorably driven out of their positions by Indian soldiers using hand-grenades and bayonets. Once the Indians were inside [the post office] they had to repulse a counterattack by Katangan troops and



mercenaries who drove into the square in armoured cars. As a result of this incident, the Indians were in a highly nervous state and seem to have shot at any vehicle moving past, including a Katanga police jeep and an ambulance. 16

The Indians captured the radio station in hand-to-hand fighting in which twenty gendarmes and policemen were killed. Eyewitness reports suggest that the Indians, possibly because of panic, were brutal and shot a number of gendarmes and policemen in cold blood.<sup>17</sup>

By eight o'clock that evening the post office and radio station were in the hands of the UNF. Swedish troops had occupied the Sureté offices. Only one minister, Vice President Jean-Baptiste Kibwe, had been captured. Tshombe, with the aid of the British Consul, had escaped to Northern Rhodesia. The official Central Government party which had flown to Elisabethville in a U.N. plane, was waiting impatiently at the airport under UNF protection.

In spite of these setbacks, and particularly the failure to arrest Munongo, O'Brien announced at 8:00 p.m. to startled reporters that the "secession of Katanga is ended," that the province was now under the authority of Leopoldville, and that a special commissioner would be

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16. Hoskyns, op.cit., p. 419

17. Hoskyns, op.cit., pp. 419-20. Miss Hoskyns notes "that public opinion in Britain was considerably influenced by the fact that Richard Williams of the BBC" stated "he personally had seen Indian troops acting with 'brutal savagery' and firing on Red Cross vehicles, and that this story was backed up by Gavin Young of the Observer." pp. 427-28. See also Katanga Government White Paper (Elisabethville, 1962), pp. 47-51. In an interview in Elisabethville, February 10, 1965, a British resident of Elisabethville during Round One, said that of the gendarmes and police killed in the taking of the radio station, 18 were found face-down in the grass with their hands over their heads, having been shot in the back by the Indians. He referred to Brigadier Raja as an "inefficient swine." In an interview in New Delhi, February 23, 1965, Brigadier Raja denied any brutality on the part of his troops on September 13, 1961. He said the UNF did not violate the Red Cross symbol at any time, though we shot at one "Red Cross" truck on which a bazooka had been mounted. Our men were civilized, he said. "Our conscience is clear. My conscience is very clear."

coming from Leopoldville to take over.<sup>18</sup> He said the purpose of his action was to prevent civil war between Katanga and the ANC and that he acted under the authority of paragraph A-1 of the February 21 resolution which authorized the use of force to prevent civil war.

The U.N. operation went somewhat better in north Katanga. The UNF captured gendarmerie posts in Albertville, Manono, and Nyunzu, and held on to the vital Kamina base.

September 13 was the first and most fateful day of the eight-day clash in which eleven U.N. soldiers, about 50 gendarmes and a handful of civilians were killed. The UNF captured about 250 prisoners.

On September 20 a provisional cease-fire was signed between Tshombe and Khiary in Ndola, Northern Rhodesia.<sup>19</sup> The agreement provided for prisoner exchange; the return of the radio facilities, post office, and other public buildings held by the UNF; and a joint commission of four members to supervise the agreement, including the inspection of all military centers in Katanga. Before the cease-fire was approved by the Secretariat on September 24, U.N. officials made it clear that it did not imply a recognition of the Elisabethville regime and that its provisions applied only to Tshombe's forces and the UNF in Katanga.<sup>20</sup>

In legal, political, and military terms, Round One was a great embarrassment to Hammarskjold who arrived in Leopoldville in the afternoon of September 13, when O'Brien had hoped the action would be over. Hammarskjold was embarrassed because the UNF had used force, because the effort failed, and because O'Brien had announced that its purpose was to end

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18. New York Times, September 14, 1961.

19. Khiary was substituting for Hammarskjold who was killed in the crash of a U.N. plane on September 17, 1961, on his way to Ndola.

20. U.N. SCOR, Supplement for Oct., Nov., Dec., 1961, S/4940, Add.11 (October 13, 1961), pp. 9-10.

secession and that he said his legal authority to use force was derived from the civil war paragraph (A-1) of the February 21 resolution. Hammarskjold was also chagrined because he had not been fully informed and because O'Brien and Khiary apparently had tried to present him with a fait accompli. O'Brien frankly stated that the Secretary-General would doubtless have suffered embarrassment "if fighting were actually going on in Katanga while he was in Leopoldville," and recalled Khiary's warning as he left Elisabethville on September 12: "Above all, no half measures."<sup>21</sup>

Hammarskjold was further upset by the criticism of the world press which accused the United Nations of launching a war to settle an essentially internal problem in the Congo. He was also under great diplomatic pressure to explain what had happened and what he was going to do about it. The displeasure of the British Government was expressed fully and directly to the Secretary-General by Lord Lansdowne who had just arrived in Leopoldville to assess the situation in the wake of Rumpunch.

Hammarskjold had no easy way out. No simple explanation would serve the various interests he felt compelled to serve. If he had fired O'Brien for exceeding the authority of the UNF to use force, or for declaring that the end of secession was his purpose, or for plain ineptitude, this might have injured the entire U.N. operation and alienated the Afro-Asians and the Central Government.<sup>22</sup> If he condoned both O'Brien's action and O'Brien's legal interpretation, he would have lost the support of the British, the Belgians, and others who insisted on the restrained use of force and on a stricter definition of the noninterference rule. His own position up to this point made it impossible for him to support O'Brien in every respect.

The Secretary-General moved quickly to repair the damage to his reputation as a scrupulous observer of legal constraints. After consulting

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21. O'Brien, op.cit., pp. 246 and 251.

22. O'Brien resigned from U.N. service on December 1, 1961, after he had been called to New York for consultations. He was never publicly reprimanded.

with his advisers in Leopoldville and New York, but not with O'Brien, he issued a public statement on September 14, the relevant portion of which was summarized in the Annual Report of the Secretary-General:

At dawn of 13 September, the United Nations forces began once again to apprehend and evacuate foreign military and para-military personnel, for this purpose taking security precautions similar to those adopted on 28 August. At that juncture, the United Nations garage was set on fire, and troops proceeding to the garage to extinguish the blaze were fired on from the building in which the Belgian Consulate was located and from houses occupied by non-African residents in which a number of Belgian military personnel were known to be staying. 23

Hammaraskjold's explanation said nothing about ending secession, emphasized that Morthor was simply the continuation of Rumpunch, and portrayed the use of force by the UNF as purely defensive. O'Brien said the reference to a fire in a U.N. garage was a fabrication designed to appease the critics by obscuring the real purpose of Morthor--ending secession.

The Secretary-General's public explanation was certainly less than accurate, though it must be said it was issued before the details were fully known. Morthor was not simply a continuation of Rumpunch. The use of force was not simply in self-defense. The sending of well-armed troops to capture strategic points in a city and to apprehend cabinet ministers at four o'clock in the morning is hardly a use of force in self-defense. The U.N. statement made no reference to what appear to be well-authenticated cases of UNF brutality. Hammaraskjold also knew that O'Brien acted to end secession, an objective the United Nations had no authority to pursue by force. In fact, the UNF was not specifically authorized to use force to arrest mercenaries until the subsequent Security Council resolution of November 24, 1961.

Hammaraskjold did not explain how the warrants for the arrest of the Katangan ministers were written or why O'Brien used them as his legal

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23. U.N., GAOR, Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, 16 June, 1961, to 15 June, 1962, A/5201, p. 4. (The full statement is found in U.N. Document S/4940 [September 14, 1961], p. 103.)

authority. Nor did the Secretary-General attempt to justify the use of a U.N. plane to carry an official Central Government delegation to Elisabethville, even though he had explicitly told Gizenga on an earlier occasion that it would be illegal for a Government party to be transported to Elisabethville on a U.N. plane.

Some of Hammarskjold's evasiveness was due to the fact that there was a breakdown in the U.N. command and control structure, or at least a breakdown in communication.

Hammarskjold's relation to Leopoldville had clearly shifted in the direction of greater cooperation since the days of Lumumba, though probably not enough to condone the degree of cooperation which actually took place in the preparation for Morthor. It may be recalled that the Secretary-General not only welcomed the Adoula regime as legitimate, but promised to assist it "exclusively." The closer identification between the U.N. operation and Leopoldville was also underlined by Linner on August 3, 1961, when he said that "if the Government used military force to impose its control on the entire national territory, and if resistance by local authorities led to bloodshed, the 'United Nations would not regard this as a civil war' and would do nothing to prevent it."<sup>24</sup> Presumably these remarks referred to Katanga. Further, Hammarskjold had suggested the adoption of Ordinance No. 70, and then used it to justify Rumpunch. Given the authoritative statements by Hammarskjold and Linner, it was not difficult for lesser U.N. officials in the Congo to confuse a strongly expressed objective of the Central Government with a mandate of the United Nations, especially if the objective seemed to be in substantial harmony with the Council resolutions.

Turning specifically to the U.N. rules governing its relations with Leopoldville, Round One did not violate the principle of consent. In Morthor, as in Rumpunch,<sup>25</sup> the UNF was acting in close cooperation with

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24. Report by Henry Tanner, New York Times, August 4, 1961, p. 6.

25. See Chapter 5, pp. 81-83.



the Central Government. In fact, Morthor was so closely coordinated with the wishes and plans of the Government that the U.N. operation probably surrendered some of its essential independence. At the same time, the UNF and U.N. authorities definitely took sides in the internal political struggle. It is perhaps too strong to say that the UNF had become an instrument of Leopoldville, but it is not too strong to assert that the UNF acted as an ally of Adoula and as an adversary of Tshombe. The use of the U.N. plane to carry the Leopoldville delegation and the attempted arrest of Katangan ministers were the two most direct violations of the prohibition against taking sides. Recognizing, but not openly admitting that O'Brien had violated the constraints against taking sides and against the use of force, U.N. officials acknowledged the practical utility of Hammarskjold's evasive September 14 statement. In order not to shake the boat with Leopoldville, U.N. officials went to considerable pains to insist that the cease-fire signed by Tshombe and Khiary did not recognize the legitimacy of Tshombe's regime.

For the United Nations, Round One was militarily and politically a setback. Had it succeeded, the Congo's most serious internal struggle would have been settled by the exercise of external force.

#### Round Two: December 5-19, 1961

An uneasy truce prevailed from the provisional cease-fire of September 20, 1961, until the resumption of hostilities on December 5. The period was characterized by rising tensions between U.N. officials and Tshombe, continuing disorder and lawlessness in Katanga and other areas of the Congo, resurgent separatism in Stanleyville, and greater efforts by the Spaak Government in Belgium to eliminate mercenaries from Katanga. During October and November the U.N. Command and the Katanga regime repeatedly accused one another of breaking the cease-fire provisions.

On November 24, 1961, after twelve days of heated debate, the Security Council passed a compromise resolution reaffirming previous Security Council actions, deploring Katanga's secession and Tshombe's armed action against the UNF, and authorizing the UNF to use "requisite

measures of force, if necessary" to apprehend and detain ("pending legal action and/or deportation") prohibited mercenaries and political advisers. The resolution authorized the Secretary-General to "take all necessary measures to prevent the entry or return" of mercenaries as well as "arms, equipment or any other material in support of such activities." The vote was nine to zero; France and the United Kingdom abstained.

Tshombe's propaganda campaign against the UNF was sharpened after the adoption of the November 24 resolution. The next day in a radio speech, he said that "U Thant will launch a war on our territory. . . . Not one road must remain passable, not one U.N. mercenary must feel himself safe in any place whatever."<sup>26</sup>

In this atmosphere, inflamed by incidents between Katangan gendarmes and U.N. personnel, all efforts to discuss differences between Tshombe and the United Nations and between Tshombe and Leopoldville failed. The discipline of the Katangan forces continued to deteriorate. On December 2, Katanga gendarmes fired on UNF troops at the Elisabethville airport and set up two roadblocks in the town to impede U.N. communications. This was in direct violation of the protocol which prohibited troop movement "to reinforce a garrison or position." The next day, several Swedish medical personnel were abducted by the gendarmerie and a new barricade was set up on the road leading to the airport. Commanded by mercenaries, the gendarmerie had virtually become an instrument of the ultras. Tshombe was out of the country. There was some evidence that a coordinated attack against the UNF was about to be launched. Just before Round Two started, U.N. officials claim to have discovered a "battle plan," drawn up by Colonel Faulques, the mercenary leader, to "strangle" the UNF in the Elisabethville area.<sup>27</sup> The Indian officers, who had the largest national contingent in Katanga, were becoming restive under the politically imposed

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26. United Nations Review, Vol. 9 (January 1962), pp. 45-47.

27. New York Times, December 22, 1961.

restraints on the Force. The Indian Government was also concerned about the failure to settle the Katanga problem.<sup>28</sup>

On December 5, the UNF undertook military action to defend its position in Elisabethville. Thant authorized "all counter-action--ground and aerial--deemed necessary" to restore complete freedom of movement in the area. The State Department supported him. After an Indian unit removed the roadblock between the airport and U.N. headquarters, the Katangan forces opened fire with heavy mortars, machine guns, and rifles against UNF positions. This was the beginning of the second clash in which some 206 Katanga troops, 21 U.N. soldiers, and 50 civilians were killed.<sup>29</sup>

On December 9, U.N. headquarters in Leopoldville announced that the restoration of order and the "arrest of foreign mercenaries" were the sole objectives of U.N. military action in Katanga.

When Tshombe was on his way to Kitona to meet Adoula on December 19, 1961, Thant ordered a temporary cease-fire. On the same day, U.N. armored columns patrolled the streets of Elisabethville to reestablish order. The UNF also helped to arrange for a train to take 382 European women and children to Northern Rhodesia.

At its peak the December operation involved 6,000 UNF troops, compared with 1,400 in September. Some fifteen jet and other U.N. planes were used.<sup>30</sup> Offensive tactics were employed in the air and on the ground, and U.N. troops were not under orders to shoot only in self-defense.

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28. See remarks of Krishna Menon in the Security Council debate, November 17, 1961. U.N., SCOR, S/PV 976, November 17, 1961, pp. 36-37.

29. On January 20, 1962, the United Nations announced that in the December fighting there were 21 U.N. soldiers killed and 84 wounded; 206 Katangan troops, including 6 non-Congolese, killed; 50 civilians killed and wounded. There were two substantiated cases of rape by U.N. soldiers. Washington Post and Times Herald, January 21, 1962.

30. New York Times, December 24, 1961, Section IV, and December 7, 1961.



Brigadier Raja, UNF Commander of the Katanga area, was given greater latitude in exercising military initiative than any former commander. This permitted him to employ offensive tactics and to move his troops into previously unoccupied positions.

During the operation, U.N. troops killed fifty civilians. Reportedly U.N. soldiers committed some atrocities.<sup>31</sup> This loss of civilian life was due in part to the fact that the UNF was taking a defended town from which civilians had not been evacuated.

The new U.N. initiative was bound to arouse criticism. The removal of roadblocks and the air strikes of December 6, 1961, drew a barrage of criticism from the world press. A number of Western European states accused the UNF of going beyond self-defense, carrying on warlike operations, and violating the Geneva Conventions. Thant said he regretted civilian casualties, but denied other charges, citing "the campaigns of violence, abduction of hostages, assault and battery, murders, the setting up of roadblocks, etc.," carried out by Tshombe's gendarmerie. He insisted that the UNF had shown "great self-restraint," and would have never used military action at all had not the roadblocks prevented "freedom of movement." Thant noted that officials of Union Minière had proudly admitted the manufacture of gendarmerie armored cars and of bombs, and that the mining firm had made it possible for mercenaries to go underground by putting them nominally on its payroll. He denied that the aim of the United Nations was "to force a political solution to the Katanga problem."<sup>32</sup> Thant's assertion was hardly the whole story, because he was obviously eager to have Tshombe acknowledge the authority of the Central Government. He also believed that the exercise of "freedom of movement" by the UNF in Katanga would contribute to this political objective.

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31. This is the judgment of representatives from several Western governments in Elisabethville. See The Katangese Government's White Paper on the Events of September and December 1961 (Elisabethville, 1962), pp. 53-84.

32. U.N., SCOR, Supplement for Oct., Nov., Dec., 1961, S/5025 (December 15, 1961), pp. 195-199 and The Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, June 16, 1961-June 15, 1962, U.N. Document A/5201, p. 16.

Washington shared Thant's views and went even further, openly declaring its support for Leopoldville.<sup>33</sup>

Fully cognizant of the UNF military success in the December Round, and responding to U.N. and U.S. pressures, Tshombe agreed to talk with Adoula. The result was the Kitona Accord of December 21, 1961, in which the two men recognized the Fundamental Law (the Congo's provisional constitution), the "indissoluble unity" of the Congo, the authority of the Central Government over all parts of the Republic, and President Kasavubu as Chief of State. Tshombe also agreed to return Katanga's representatives to Parliament, to place the Katanga gendarmerie under the Chief of State, and to respect the U.N. resolutions on the Congo. When he returned to Elisabethville, Tshombe said that the Kitona Accord was imposed upon him and would not be valid until it was "ratified" by the Katanga Assembly. As matters developed, the Accord was but a prelude to a long political stalemate between Tshombe and Adoula which was not broken until Round Three a year later.

In Round Two the U.N. Command carefully avoided certain pitfalls of Round One. Militarily the UNF was much better prepared. Legally, U.N. authorities sought to avoid the close identification with Leopoldville which had compromised its independence in September.

Politically the United Nations could not avoid taking sides. Though it operated independently of the Adoula Government, it attempted to create a situation in which the Government could exercise its authority over Katanga. Taking sides was not necessarily contrary to either the letter or spirit of the resolutions which repeatedly called for the end of Katangan secession. In fact, the Secretary-General had a clear mandate to work for this political objective. It was primarily a problem of means. The November 24 Assembly resolution extended the force-if-necessary authority to the apprehension of mercenaries, but not to the ending of secession. The Secretary-General may have believed that the liquidation of the mercenary problem was tantamount to the liquidation of secession, in which

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33. See Chapter 7.

case the former objective for which force was authorized would lead to the ending of secession which was called for by the Security Council, but for which force was not authorized.

On the other hand, there was some justification for Western European fears that this action overstepped the bounds of the permissible use of force and became an effort to "impose a political solution by force." Round Three which resulted in the end of Katanga's secession throws this problem into sharper focus.

Round Three: December 28, 1962-January 21, 1963

During the long stalemate between the Kitona Accord and Round Three there were three significant developments which tended to make a final clash between the UNF and Katanga inevitable and at the same time less controversial than the two previous rounds. These were the Thant Plan for National Reconciliation, a shift in the position of the Belgian Government, and the U.S. Military Mission to Congo headed by Lt. General Louis W. Truman. These developments both reflected and helped to reinforce a general international climate of greater hostility toward Tshombe's secession and of fewer reservations about the use of the U.N. Force to restore the unity of the Congo.

On August 20, 1962, Thant published a Plan for National Reconciliation which was based on proposals prepared by the State Department in cooperation with Brussels and London and submitted to the Secretary-General.<sup>34</sup> Directed toward ending Katangan secession, the Thant Plan called for the adoption of a federal constitution within thirty days, a fifty-fifty sharing of tax revenues and mining royalties between the Central Government and Katanga, unification of the currency, integration of Katanga forces into the ANC in ninety days, a reorganization of the Central Government to represent all major factions and regions, and a gen-

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<sup>34</sup>. New York Times, August 21, 1962. For text of the Plan, see U.N. SCOR, Supplement for July, Aug., Sept., 1962, S/5053, Add. 11 (August 20, 1962), pp. 16-17.

eral amnesty for political prisoners. It also provided for economic sanctions if the objectives were not met within the specified periods.

Though the Plan received wide political support outside the Congo, little progress was made inside the country in getting Tshombe and Adoula to cooperate. The Adoula Government grew increasingly weaker primarily because of its incapacity, alone or with the UNF, to eliminate the Katangan challenge.

On the military side there was a gradual buildup of the UNF, especially in Katanga, in anticipation of Round Three. During Round Two there were some 8,400 troops in Katanga; one year later there were 13,500, or 70 percent of the total UNF strength in the Congo.<sup>35</sup> In August the UNF developed a three-phase military plan for extending freedom of movement throughout Katanga. This plan was continually revised in light of changing circumstances.

On October 9, the U.N. Headquarters in New York announced that Katanga was buying new military planes, constructing airstrips, and employing 300 to 500 mercenaries. By mid-December, Tshombe was reported to have "40,000 troops and gendarmerie, at least 400 mercenaries and at least 20 planes."<sup>36</sup> These figures were somewhat exaggerated, but the important fact was that there was a military buildup on both sides.

After consultations with Washington, Brussels, London, and other interested governments, Thant, on December 10, notified Tshombe that he had failed to carry out the provisions of the Plan and that economic sanctions would be invoked. The next day Adoula asked seventeen governments to embargo imports of Katanga copper and cobalt, a request later approved by Thant.

On December 11, Foreign Minister Spaak described Tshombe as a "rebel" and declared that Belgium was prepared to support the UNF and the

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35. See Appendix H, Charts D and G.

36. Observer (London), December 23, 1962.

Central Government if they resorted to armed force to end Katanga's secession.<sup>37</sup>

On December 21 an eight-man U.S. military mission, headed by Lt. General Louis Truman, arrived in Leopoldville for a five-day survey of the needs of the UNF. This official State Department trip caused some apprehension in official circles in both Leopoldville and Elisabethville. But it was warmly welcomed by the U.N. Command in Katanga. After assessing the situation, General Truman prepared a list of needed supplies, including a temporary bridge, trucks, armored personnel carriers, mine-clearing gear, and transport and tanker planes, for immediate delivery to Elisabethville by air. This equipment arrived in early January, too late to make a military difference. Major General Prem Chand, the new Indian commander in Elisabethville, who replaced Brigadier Raja in May 1962, was convinced that the mission meant not only increased American logistical assistance, but also signaled Washington's determination to support a UNF military solution if persuasion, negotiation, and economic measures failed. Prem Chand's interpretation of the mission was substantially correct. After a reappraisal of U.S. Congo policy in November, President Kennedy came to the conclusion that more direct action was required.

The Truman mission, and Spaak's endorsement of military force, plus growing neutralist pressures for more forceful measures, the disposition of the Indian officers to finish what in their view was the unfinished task of Rounds One and Two, the expected withdrawal of the large Indian brigade in early 1963 because of Red China's attack on India's northern border, and the financial plight of the United Nations--all these factors pointed toward the final solution of the Katanga problem by force.

Considerable evidence suggests that the U.N. Command was prepared to initiate the use of military force to end Tshombe's secession, doubtless citing as its legal justification its authority to apprehend mercenaries

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37. Cited in "Chronologie des Evénements," Etudes Congolaises, (Brussels), Vol. 4, No. 2 (February 1963), p. 48.

or to exercise freedom of movement. But as matters developed, Round Three was actually ignited with the one-sided harassment of U.N. troops by Katangan gendarmes. After four days of intermittent firing, which Tshombe seemed powerless to control, the UNF on December 28 started to move against the gendarmerie strong points in Elisabethville. They were literally moving in self-defense.

What fortuitously started as a defense of existing positions in Elisabethville, soon became "Operation Grandslam," the code word given by the Indian officers to the plan to establish freedom of movement throughout Katanga. All three phases of the operation were finally completed on January 21, 1963, when the U.N. troops entered Kolwezi without resistance and were received by Tshombe personally. This marked the end of the military phase of bringing Katanga under the control of the United Nations and the Central Government.

Round Three, in contrast to the two previous clashes, was conducted with discipline and restraint. Major General Prem Chand was a competent and respected commander. Throughout the operation the UNF encountered little resistance. The mercenaries, now largely French and South African, were considerably more disorganized than in the earlier rounds. During or shortly after Round Three, most of the remaining mercenaries left Katanga by the way of Angola. Tshombe's appeals for a "scorched earth" policy went largely ignored. For these reasons casualties on both sides were light. Noting this fact, Thant said: "For a peace force, even a little fighting is too much, and only a few casualties are too many."<sup>38</sup>

This successful use of U.N. military force which ended secession was applauded on almost all sides; Moscow and Washington were pleased. In Leopoldville there was joy, and in Brussels and London a sigh of relief.

In all three rounds the UNF military action was independent from

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38. U.N., SCOR, Supplement for Jan., Feb., March, 1963, S/5240 (February 4, 1963), p. 95.

the Leopoldville Government. At no point were ANC troops used in support of the UNF. On the political level, however, there was a degree of co-operation with the Adoula regime, though less with each operation. It is doubtful that the Adoula Government or even General Mobutu knew about the U.N. planning for Operation Grandslam. While it is perfectly true that Leopoldville was eager to use force to end secession, there was always the hope that the ANC could be involved and thus earn part of the political credit for an important achievement. This credit was denied Adoula, though he certainly benefited politically by the success of Round Three.

While force was used with commendable restraint--this is attested by all observers, notwithstanding the Jadotville<sup>39</sup> and Lufira River incidents<sup>40</sup>--it was used by the UNF for purposes other than self-defense narrowly defined, and arresting mercenaries. In the official U.N. white book, the Secretariat declared that force was used in Round Three in self-defense and "to establish complete freedom of movement."<sup>41</sup> Any reasonable definition of "freedom of movement,"<sup>42</sup> sufficient to accomplish its objective of maintaining order throughout the Congo, gave the UNF the legal authority to establish a military presence in all the key points in Katanga. Having failed to achieve this objective by two and a half years of negotiation, the UNF finally used limited force to exercise this admittedly vaguely defined right.

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39. After the UNF peacefully took Jadotville, two Belgian women in a civilian car were shot and killed by Indian soldiers at a U.N. checkpoint on the edge of the city when the male driver suddenly accelerated the car rather than slowing it down or stopping it. This unauthorized shooting greatly embarrassed U.N. officials.

40. See Chapter 4, p.77 and Appendix P.

41. The United Nations and the Congo: Some Salient Facts, (United Nations, February 1963), p. 9. One hundred thousand copies of this nineteen-page booklet were printed in English and 25,000 in French.

42. Chapter 3, pp. 48-51.

### Relations Between the UNF and the ANC

The disunity and irresponsibility of the Congolese National Army (ANC) were symptoms as well as causes of the political fragmentation of the Congo. The 1960 mutiny of the ANC was the proximate cause of the crisis which invited U.N. intervention. Since then, the lawlessness, indiscipline, and factionalism have been major disruptive factors. The ANC has never been a united national army. Even as late as 1964 only a portion of Congolese troops were under effective Central Government control.

Incidents of ANC indiscipline include extortion, wanton murder, and rape, attacks on UNF units, mutiny, and the arrest and attempted assassination of the ANC's Commander in Chief, Mobutu. In a four-month period, from May through August 1963, one unpublished U.S. tabulation (admittedly incomplete) of events "traceable to the instability of Congolese security forces" lists sixty unlawful incidents, excluding "ordinary" crimes. Thant summarized the situation with diplomatic understatement in his final Congo report:

. . . the ANC is still insufficiently trained and officered to cope with any major crisis. Most of the Congolese troops still show, in emergency situations, inadequate discipline and devotion to duty or country. Good officers, who are competent and earnest, would seem to be the exception rather than the rule. The result is that there is little authority at the top and little soldierly spirit in the ranks. The lack of adequate leadership and of an organic chain of command is perhaps the main cause for the present ineffectiveness of the ANC. The lack of logistical organization and sound staff work is also a major obstacle to more effective operation. <sup>43</sup>

This situation confronted the Secretary-General and the UNF with three difficult and interrelated problems. The most immediate problem was caused by incidents in which Congolese soldiers took hostile action against UNF personnel.<sup>44</sup> The second question had to do with the United Nations'

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<sup>43</sup> U.N., SCOR, "Report by the Secretary-General on the Withdrawal of the United Nations in the Congo and on Other Aspects of the United Nations Operation There," Document S/5784 (mimeographed June 29, 1964), p. 30.

<sup>44</sup> A number of such incidents are briefly described in Appendix P.



responsibility for training and reorganizing the ANC. The third, underlying the first two problems, concerned the basic relation of an invited foreign military presence to the domestic military establishment of a legally sovereign state. This root problem was greatly complicated during the first three months of the U.N. operation when there were three separate and independent military forces in the Congo--the mutinous ANC with 25,000 men in the process of throwing out its Belgian officers, Belgian forces numbering about 10,000 men, and the quickly improvised UNF of 16,000 men. In a sense, the UNF was intended to replace both Belgian and Congolese troops, but it lacked authority to expel the Belgians or to disarm the Congolese. Under diplomatic pressure Belgian forces were speedily withdrawn, except for the small number of seconded officers and men who remained in Katanga. But the tense and undefined relationship between the UNF and the ANC continued to be one of the most perplexing problems confronting the Secretary-General.

The Ndjili Airport (Leopoldville) incident,<sup>45</sup> and Major General F. T. Alexander's subsequent disarmament of ANC troops,<sup>46</sup> illustrate most legal and political facets of the UNF-ANC problem. On August 18, 1960, Congolese soldiers surrounded a U.N. plane, interrogated the crew, and manhandled four Canadian members of the UNF, whom the Congolese accused of being Belgian paratroopers. After some delay, the U.N. Ghanaian unit guarding the airport succeeded in releasing the Canadians.<sup>47</sup> Hammarskjold protested to the Leopoldville Government. At the same time he criticized the Ghanaian unit for passive behavior in the face of the assault.

General Alexander, the British commander of the Ghanaian contingent, acknowledged the facts of the unfortunate airport incident, but strongly repudiated "any criticisms of Ghanaian officers and men." Noting

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45. See Appendix P-2.

46. See Chapter 4, p. 75.

47. CRISP, Congo: 1960, Vol. II prepared by J. Gérard-Libois and Benoit Verhaegen (Les Dossiers du CRISP, 1961), p. 620.

this was but one of many cases of ANC atrocities and indiscipline, Alexander said the "immediate and also long-term possibility of getting the country back to normal hinges on the retraining and disciplining" of the Congolese Army. The first task, he added, was to disarm the ANC, implying that force should be used if persuasion failed. He pointed out, however, that he together with two Ghanaian officers had completely and peacefully disarmed the ANC units in Leopoldville, suggesting that a general policy of disarming Congolese would probably meet with little or no resistance. Alexander also criticized Major General von Horn, the UNF Commander, for failing to issue specific orders on how to deal with such situations, and for his unwillingness to "exercise any military authority at all, thus putting Ghanaian and other U.N. troops in an impossible position." He added: "The situation is not irretrievable, but it will certainly be hopeless unless something drastic is done" to deal with the ANC.<sup>48</sup>

Under-Secretary Bunche, who was the acting Officer-in-Charge in Leopoldville, took strong exception to Alexander's interpretation of U.N. authority. He admitted there was "much room for valid criticism" of the UNF, but insisted that the General's criticisms were unjustified because he did not understand that the UNF was a "peace force, not a fighting force," that it could use arms only in self-defense, and that U.N. troops should avoid getting into the "extreme position of having to shoot Congolese."<sup>49</sup> The early restrictions on the permissible use of force were subsequently relaxed in the February 21 and November 24, 1961, resolutions.

On the difficult problem of disarming and training the unruly ANC, Bunche insisted that nothing could be done without the active cooperation of the Central Government. He acknowledged that "a reorganized and disciplined Congolese National Army is a most, perhaps the most, vital problem," but the "way of force offers no possibility for an international

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<sup>48</sup> U.N., SCOR, Supplement for July, Aug., Sept., 1960, S/4445 (August 19, 1960), pp. 101-02.

<sup>49</sup> U.N., SCOR, Supplement for July, Aug., Sept., 1960, S/4451 (August 21, 1960), pp. 113-15.

body operating in a sovereign country at the invitation of that country." Bunche added:

The United Nations in the Congo has neither sought to replace the Congo Government nor to make it a captive. The UNF is in the Congo as a friend and partner, not as an army of occupation. It has studiously avoided any suggestion of replacing in any way the former colonial administration. 50

Bunche's legally correct and authoritative view was supported by Hammarskjold. There was no systematic effort by the UNF to disarm ANC units, but Bunche's words did not dispel the suspicions of certain Congolese leaders who tended to look upon the UNF as an occupying army bent on disarming the ANC on the slightest pretext. The passive disarmament which had occurred during July and early August 1960 was short-lived and the process was actually reversed in mid-August when the U.N. Command gave in to Lumumba's demand that certain disarmed units be permitted to recover their weapons.

The persistent fear of ANC disarmament among Congolese leaders was dramatically illustrated by President Kasavubu's reaction to some incidents involving U.N. personnel in February, 1961. According to U.N. headquarters in Leopoldville, there had been a number of assaults by Congolese soldiers against U.N. personnel, including the rape of a civilian woman and the beating with rifle butts of two Canadian officers and two Canadian enlisted men. In a public statement a U.N. spokesman said an investigation was under way to determine whether "the sudden outburst of outrages" had any connection with "certain threats" made by leaders of the Ileo regime. The statement referred to "bestial behavior" and "brutal assaults" by ANC soldiers.<sup>51</sup>

In reply, Kasavubu angrily warned that the ANC "will open fire if need be against anyone who opposes its mission" and announced that his government had decided to organize a battalion of reservists "in face of a United Nations threat to place the Congo under its tutelage." He

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50. Ibid.

51. New York Times, February 28, 1961, and Washington Post and Times Herald, February 28, 1961.

added: "We must act. The U.N. is betraying us."<sup>52</sup>

Nearly all competent observers, including Bunche and Alexander, agreed on the desirability of disarming the ANC, but they differed on the feasibility of doing so, given the necessity for Government consent. In retrospect, however, it appears that disarmament without coercion might have been possible in the first hectic weeks if the Secretary-General had given the highest priority to this objective, if it had been vigorously pursued at the diplomatic level in New York and the political level in Leopoldville, and if all U.N. commanders had been instructed to engage in active persuasion toward this end. Evidence suggests that the physical presence of a competent military unit commanded by white officers might well have been sufficient in the great majority of cases to achieve pacific disarmament.

Laying aside speculation, the cold fact is that neither Lumumba nor any of his successors consented even to the temporary disarmament of the ANC and the UNF had to live with the problem.

From the beginning it was assumed that one of the major tasks of the UNF was to assist the Government in reorganizing and retraining the ANC. A request for such assistance was explicit in the first informal communication from Lumumba to Hammarskjold, transmitted by Bunche on July 11, 1960. The indiscipline of the ANC, however, was not mentioned in the two formal requests on the following day which focused on Belgian "aggression." No Security Council resolution ever specifically authorized the Secretary-General to reorganize or restrain the ANC, but the Congo Advisory Committee, the Secretariat, the United States, and other supporting states assumed the U.N. mission should assist the Government to do precisely this.

The first Security Council resolution mentioned assistance until the "national security forces may be able, in the opinion of the Government, to meet fully their tasks." The February 21 resolution said ANC units

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52. Ibid.

"should be reorganized and brought under discipline and control" so they would not interfere in the "political life of the Congo," but it did not indicate what role the United Nations should play.

The fundamental need, of course, was to secure a competent officer corps to replace the departed Belgian officers, but this basic problem was usually referred to by the euphemism, "training and reorganizing" the ANC. The polite language did not lead to cordiality or mutual confidence between U.N. and Congolese officials, and General Mobutu's sensitivity on this matter, which developed during the Dayal period, continued until the end.

Again the crucial issue was host state consent. A U.N. training program for Congolese troops was begun in late August 1960, under General Hammou Kettani of Morocco, the deputy UNF Commander. It was brought to an abrupt halt by the Mobutu coup the following month. In October 1961 at the request of Leopoldville, Major General Iyassu Mengesha of Ethiopia made preparations for a U.N. officer training school with a multinational staff. General Mobutu never sent any cadets because he preferred direct assistance from non-African and non-Asian governments. He particularly wanted training officers from Belgium. From the outset, he retained a small group of Belgian advisers on his staff and in the Defense Ministry, and he was anxious to get additional officers from Brussels. On the wall of his office in 1962 hung the pictures of all but one of the past commanders of the Belgian Force publique; the exception was the last one, the blunt General Janssens. When Mobutu was asked why the pictures were there, he replied that even though there was political discontinuity in the Congo, there should be military continuity.<sup>53</sup>

Incidental training was provided for some six to eight hundred Congolese when the 13th ANC Battalion was attached to the UNF at Kamina Base, from September 1962 until it withdrew in February 1964, but some observers believed they were "integrated" mainly to keep them out of trouble.

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53. Interview, Leopoldville, September 1962.

The failure of the U.N. effort to make any significant provision for the maintenance of internal security after the departure of the UNF was a serious one. There is disagreement as to where the fault lies. Most U.N. officials place the blame on the Government. Many observers, including U.S. officials and some U.N. officials, believe that the United Nations was also at fault.

Since any effective training program rested on consent and cooperation, and since cooperation is difficult to achieve in a climate of suspicion and hostility, it appears that there was little the UNF could have done after the Dayal period. Further, in operational terms, the Secretary-General did not give as high a priority to retraining as he did to the Katanga question. In this he reflected the sentiment of the resolutions. Nevertheless, since both Hammarskjold and Thant knew the retraining problem was a central one, they might have undertaken more diligent and diplomatic efforts to this end, without violating the principle of consent.

#### The Greene Plan

Recognizing that the United Nations was making little progress in reorganizing the ANC or providing a reliable officer corps for it, the United States and other interested governments were eager to find an alternative plan which would yield some positive results before the inevitable withdrawal of the UNF from the Congo. To this end Washington in July 1962 sent a military advisory team to the Congo to appraise the situation. The Greene Plan, named after Colonel Michael J. L. Greene, USA, who led the team eventually emerged as a result of this appraisal.

The purpose of the Greene Plan was to assist the Congo to modernize and train officers for the ANC and the provincial gendarmerie through a series of bilateral assistance programs. The Plan included measures to eliminate unnecessary and unreliable elements from the ANC. These bilateral programs were to be channeled through and coordinated by the United Nations in accordance with Security Council resolutions. The U.N. Command was to serve as an umbrella for this multinational aid effort in the area

of technical assistance in the security field.

After considerable debate within the U.S. Government, discussion in Leopoldville, and confidential consultation with U.N. officials, the United States approached five governments interested in assisting the Congo: Belgium, Canada, Israel, Italy, and Norway. Privately, Thant encouraged the Greene Plan and on February 4, 1963, he said it had become "advisable and desirable" to increase "bilateral aid."<sup>54</sup>

On February 26, 1963, Adoula's office informed Robert A. K. Gardiner, the U.N. Officer-in-Charge in Leopoldville, that his Government had decided to request the following states "for assistance in modernizing the ANC: 1. Canada, for technical schools (communications); 2. Italy for the Air Force; 3. Norway, for the Navy; 4. Israel, for the training of paratroopers; 5. Belgium, for technicians for ANC Headquarters and the various units. Belgium will also assist us in the matter of our bases, the Gendarmerie, and our various military schools." The letter added that the United States "will do no more than provide the equipment necessary to ensure the success of these technical assistance measures."<sup>55</sup>

This was a controversial communication because it introduced the prospect of direct military assistance which ran counter to Hammarskjold's original rule against external aid to the Congo not channeled through the United Nations. The prohibition was accepted by the Council and made explicit in the Assembly resolution of September 20, 1960, which called upon "all States to refrain from direct and indirect provision of arms and other material of war and military personnel" while the UNF remained in the Congo, "except upon the request of the United Nations." This view was reaffirmed in paragraph six of the November 24, 1961, Council resolution. While these resolutions were directed primarily toward states assisting Katanga, their legal implications were broader. Further, U.S. participa-

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54. U.N., SCOR, Supplement for Jan., Feb., March, 1963, S/5240 (February 4, 1963), p. 101.

55. S/5240/Add. 2, May 21, 1963, p.2. The official U.N. version of this whole question is summarized in the Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization: 16 June, 1962 to 15 June, 1963 A/5501, pp. 14-15.

tion, though only through the provision of equipment, raised the question of direct big-power involvement, but perhaps no more so than the U.S. logistical support of the U.N. operation from the beginning.

The public announcement of the Greene Plan for military assistance from Belgium, Canada, Italy, Norway, Israel, and the United States under a U.N. umbrella drew criticism from several quarters. The Soviet Union challenged the Plan as a NATO scheme to impose colonial shackles upon the Congo. The United Arab Republic attacked the plan because of Israel's involvement. Some African leaders were distressed at Belgium's participation. All of this caused Thant to have second thoughts about the matter. On March 20, 1963, he discussed the Greene Plan with the Congo Advisory Committee which concluded that the urgently needed training of the ANC "could be most appropriately given" by the states which had contributed troops to the UNF. This advice ruled out the United States, Belgium, and Israel, and was probably meant to rule out Canada and Norway as well, both of which had sent only specialized personnel to the Congo. None of the neutralist states with troop contingents in the UNF offered such assistance. On April 29, 1963, Thant informed Adoula that he could not support the Greene Plan. Adoula replied that the Congo as a sovereign state had the right to negotiate bilateral agreements and would do so. The Plan as such was dead. Subsequent efforts to resuscitate it proved fruitless.

Adoula went ahead with bilateral military aid programs to train, modernize, and streamline the 35,000-man ANC. They were very slow in getting underway. By June 30, 1964, Israel had trained 220 paratroopers, including General Mobutu himself. By January 1965, a six-man Israeli military mission in Leopoldville was in the process of training the First Paracommando Battalion, already considered one of the Congolese Army's best units. Since Mobutu regards the battalion as something of a personal security force, it was not expected to be deployed at any great distance from Leopoldville. By June 30, 1964, Italy had just begun pilot training with twelve Congolese cadets. For all practical purposes, Norway and Canada did not participate.



The most significant program is the officer training effort conducted by Belgium. As of June 30, 1964, some seventy-five Belgian officers and advisers were in the Congo. Since independence day, about 300 Congolese have gone to Belgium for military training. The United States provided vehicles, communications gear, and other supporting equipment.

#### Concluding Observations

Returning to the three rules that governed United Nations-host state relations, to what extent did each party observe them?<sup>56</sup> To be sure there was always a degree of tension and sometimes hostility between the two actors. That this tension never resulted in a complete break is a tribute to the skill of Hammarskjold and Thant, the quiet supporting diplomacy of the United States and several other countries, and a recognition on the part of Congolese leaders that, in spite of embarrassment and tension, they needed the U.N. presence. As a practical matter, after the UNF arrived, Leopoldville had little choice but to accept it and make the most of it. Hammarskjold summed up the relationship accurately on March 8, 1961, when he said it was:

. . . not merely a contractual relationship in which the Republic can impose its conditions as a host State and thereby determine the circumstances under which the United Nations operates. It is rather a relationship governed by mandatory decisions of the Security Council . . . no Government, including the host Government, can by unilateral action determine how measures taken by the Security Council . . . should be carried out. Such a determination can be made only by the Security Council itself or on the basis of its explicit delegation of authority. 57

The first rule, that the entry and continued presence of a U.N. Force required the consent of the host state (given the interpretation of Hammarskjold which went unchallenged) caused little trouble for U.N. authorities. Though Lumumba demanded that the UNF, or at least the white

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56. See Chapter 5, pp. 81-83. These conclusions cover both Chapters 5 and 6.

57. Message of March 8, 1961, U.N., SCOR, Supplement for Jan., Feb., March, 1961, S/4775 (March 30, 1961), pp. 261-65.

U.N. troops, leave the Congo, and other Congolese leaders occasionally criticized the behavior of U.N. personnel, these criticisms had little or no effect on the operations of the Force or its duration. Such protests were never formally presented to the Security Council.

As far as explicit consent from Leopoldville for specific actions or operations of the UNF was concerned, the record indicates that such consent was neither sought nor given for the great bulk of its activities. Nor was it required, since consent refers fundamentally to the question of initial entry. Thereafter there was bilateral negotiation on significant issues. There was occasional cooperation, but the instances were few. There was no direct cooperation between the troops of the ANC and the UNF, except for the incorporation of the 13th ANC Battalion into the UNF for eighteen months, and the transfer of responsibility from U.N. units to ANC units during the phase-out of the UNF after Round Three. This is understandable since the ANC was frequently a source of actual or potential disorder and thus, in the U.N. view, an element to be policed rather than to police.

There was one sensitive area where the absence of government consent made a significant difference--the disarmament and training of the ANC. The Secretary-General felt free from government restraint in acting against the mercenaries and the Katanga gendarmerie. He was prepared to take some initiative in calming down local unrest. But when it came to disarming, training, or reorganizing the ANC, the Government balked. Leopoldville's reluctance was natural and understandable. History suggests that states needing military assistance and advice turn to a close ally or friendly state, and not to an internationally authorized multinational staff. Collaboration in the vital matters of national security implies a degree of mutual trust and shared political objectives which would be virtually impossible to expect between any government and a multinational U.N. military mission. Even at best, relations between two close allies tend to be strained when it comes to dealing with sensitive national security problems. The Congo experience suggests that an international instrumentality is probably not psychologically and politically competent

to assist effectively in a task as sensitive as the building of the military establishment of a sovereign state.

According to the second rule, the UNF should cooperate with the Central Government without becoming its instrument. Hammarskjold successfully resisted Lumumba's attempt to use the UNF for his purposes. When the UNF, at the request of Adoula, assisted the Government in consolidating its position in Stanleyville and in arresting Gizenga, the UNF in a literal sense was acting as an instrument of the host government. But given the mandate to help maintain territorial integrity and order, the modest U.N. police assistance in this case could hardly have compromised the essential integrity of the U.N. mission.

If U.N. integrity and independence was ever compromised by collaboration with Leopoldville it was during Round One when O'Brien used the Government's arrest warrants as his legal basis for attempting to arrest Katangan ministers and when a U.N. plane was used to transport a Government party to Elisabethville to take control of the province. Tacitly acknowledging this was a violation of U.N. independence, U.N. authorities in Rounds Two and Three--undertaken for the shared objective of ending Katanga's secession--carefully avoided the appearance of collaboration with Leopoldville. It is doubtful that the Government was aware of the general plans which underlay either of these two operations.

The third and most difficult rule governing the U.N. operation was the prohibition against taking of sides in the internal political struggle. It was impossible for the U.N. mission to observe this rule in the Congo where internal and external factors were inextricably intertwined. The net impact of the U.N. peacekeeping mission over the four years was clearly to support the fortunes of the Central Government over the rival centers in Stanleyville, Katanga, and South Kasai which challenged its authority. The U.N. effort tipped the scales in favor of the moderates over the extremists and in favor of those seeking a unified state over those supporting a loose confederation. This was hardly surprising because the coalition of states supporting the U.N. effort also sought these same objectives. And to a considerable extent these very objectives for the Congo

found expression, implicitly or explicitly, in the Security Council resolutions.

To say that the UNF had a profound impact on the internal affairs of the Congo is not to say that U.N. authorities quickly and easily chose sides. This was not the case. Hammarskjold attempted to be impartial. He regarded the directives of the resolutions as his basic guide. But the resolutions themselves were not impartial as far as the domestic struggle was concerned; they were strongly anti-Tshombe. Hammarskjold, in fact, was more impartial than the resolutions. (It must be said, however, that the inconsistencies or contradictory implications of the resolutions make it difficult to consider them as a unified whole, and hence any comparison may be misleading.)

United Nations-host state relations during the four years demonstrate the efforts of the Secretariat to be impartial. The controversial closing of the Leopoldville radio station and airports by Cordier could be justified on the law-and-order mandate; his action was no fundamental violation of the noninterference rule. Hammarskjold was unusually circumspect in the manner and interpretation of his initial entry into Katanga. His impartiality was attested to by the fact that he was strongly criticized by both sides. The UNF also had a clean bill of health as far as the peaceable roundup of prohibited foreigners was concerned; there were repeated resolutions authorizing this, though not until November 24, 1961, was the use of force for this purpose authorized.

In the three clashes with Katangan forces, the UNF was undoubtedly assisting the cause of the Central Government, but by the time of Round One, the end of secession was an objective repeatedly called for by the Security Council. The problem was that the Council never gave the UNF explicit authority to use force for this purpose. U.N. authorities wanted to end secession. They also wanted to observe the Council constraints on the use of force, constraints strongly reinforced by Britain, Belgium, and other states that opposed the imposition of a political solution by the use of U.N. military force. There was a legal way out--the right to use force in self-defense, to prevent civil war, and to exercise freedom of movement.

Laying aside the question of the political wisdom of the three rounds in Katanga or the merits of the dispute between Elisabethville and Leopoldville, there were ample legal grounds for the three U.N. operations, with certain exceptions. The use of the arrest warrants and the U.N. plane for Government officials in Round One was questionable. The overuse of force by the UNF in Rounds One and Two was obviously indefensible.

As a whole, the U.N. peacekeeping mission maintained its integrity as far as its relations with the host government were concerned. It was not captured, subverted, used, or even misled by Leopoldville.

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## CHAPTER 7

### ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES

American endorsement of U.N. intervention in the Congo was a key factor in launching the peacekeeping effort. Washington's continued diplomatic and material support of the U.N. mission sustained the operation during the ensuing four years. This active assistance of the United States was possible because its interests corresponded closely to the Secretary-General's interpretation and implementation of the U.N. mandate. Washington sought to restore stability in the Congo and to prevent it from falling under Communist influence or domination. The Secretary-General wanted to reestablish order and protect the Congo against becoming an arena for East-West rivalries. The United States became, in fact, the leader of a coalition of governments that worked through and operated under the mandate of successive Security Council resolutions.

#### American Interests in the Congo

From the beginning of Congolese independence, the United States sought a unified nation with a moderate and viable government in Leopoldville. Washington also wanted to ensure continued Western access to the vast economic resources of the Congo.

American interests placed a high priority on stability in all of Africa. Developments in the huge former Belgian colony, located at the geographic and strategic core of Africa, naturally had a major impact on the rest of the continent. It was also important for the United States to

keep the Congo free from Communist domination, and if possible, without inviting a direct confrontation between the super-powers. Washington did not seek to back out of a political contest with the Communist bloc in the Congo, but it wanted the contest to be conducted by acceptable rules and with a minimum risk. This excluded unilateral military intervention by either side. Equally important, the United States wanted to share the responsibility for African security with other states. American leaders tried to pursue a policy of limited liability in Africa.

With its commitment to decolonization and its increasing interests in the Third World, the U.S. Government did not wish to alienate the leaders of the emerging nations in Africa and Asia. U.N. intervention as opposed to U.S. bilateral assistance or continued intervention by America's Belgian ally, was expected to blunt the charges of neocolonialism.

In dealings with the newly independent states, the United States often deferred to the judgments and initiative of the former metropolises. American leaders recognized that the former colonies would continue to depend on the metropolises. Washington attempted to avoid, therefore, any action that would offend its NATO allies.

The situation in the Congo in July 1960, moreover, was extremely confused. Neither Washington, nor its diplomats on the spot, could fully evaluate the developments.

These considerations help to explain why on July 10, 1960, the U.S. Ambassador-designate to the Congo, Clare H. Timberlake, who was in Leopoldville, recommended that President Kasavubu and Prime Minister Lumumba appeal to the United Nations for aid. Two mornings later a group of Congolese cabinet members formally requested the assistance of American troops in restoring order and ensuring the departure of Belgian forces. But the matter was already before the Secretary-General and Washington declined to act unilaterally on the invitation. Two and a half years later Harlan Cleveland, as Assistant Secretary of State, summarized the initial U.S. position in the form of a question: "Should the Congo's chaos be tackled by a hastily assembled international peace force; or should we send in a division of United States Marines; or should we just

sit on our hands and wait for our adversaries to exploit the situation?" We wisely decided, he continued, "not to risk a confrontation of nuclear powers in the center of Africa." We believed, he added, that a U.N. force would serve "the national interest" of the United States and the majority of other U.N. members.<sup>1</sup>

#### United States Policies

##### Danger of Communist Penetration

The United States recognized that Belgium had a constructive role to play in the Congo. In the debate that preceded the first three U.N. resolutions Washington sought to prevent Belgium from being branded an aggressor. In the Security Council the U.S. delegate, Henry Cabot Lodge quickly dismissed any charges of Belgian aggression and insisted that the withdrawal of Belgian troops had to be contingent upon the ability of the U.N. forces to restore order.<sup>2</sup>

This emphasis on internal order was based on the premise that chaos in the Congo would be exploited by the Communists. America's repeated warnings that the introduction of military force in the Congo or other unilateral action not under U.N. Command would be "in defiance of the United Nations" and would "seriously jeopardize any effort to bring stability and order to the Congo," reflected this overriding concern with Soviet penetration.<sup>3</sup> Consequently, the United States informed Prime Minister Lumumba, when he asked for technical and financial aid during his visit to Washington on July 27, 1960, that all U.S. assistance would be channeled through the United Nations.<sup>4</sup>

Lumumba's sharpening attacks against Belgium and the United Nations, his unwillingness to cooperate with the U.N. mission, and his

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1. Speech by Harlan Cleveland, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, (U.S. Department of State Press Release 34), January 17, 1963, p. 34.

2. U.N., SCOR, S/PV 873, July 13, 1960, pp. 15 and 42-43.

3. U.N., SCOR, S/PV 877, July 20, 1960, p. 38.

4. New York Times, July 28, 1960.

willingness to accept Soviet aid made Washington increasingly apprehensive about his capacity to govern responsibly. When Kasavubu dismissed Lumumba on September 5, Washington made no official comment, but its private reaction was, according to the New York Times, "It's about time."<sup>5</sup>

The Council of Commissioners installed by the September 14 coup of Colonel Joseph Mobutu received U.S. support. Commenting on this event, Francis Monheim, a Belgian journalist and close friend of Mobutu, suggests that Mobutu acted on his own initiative.<sup>6</sup> Other sources claim, however, that Mobutu was "discovered" by the CIA and imply that the army chief had its full support.<sup>7</sup> The exact role of Washington is less important than the fact that the Council of Commissioners received U.S. support from the beginning. U.N. officials, on the other hand, were reluctant to work with the de facto regime. The American Ambassador sought to encourage the Commissioners and urged the Secretary-General to back them officially.<sup>8</sup> Certain U.N. officials apparently continued to regard Lumumba as the legal Prime Minister, even though they no longer dealt with him as such. On this point the American views came in conflict with those of the Secretary-General and his Special Representative in the Congo, Rajeshwar Dayal.

In his second progress report, published on November 2, 1960, Dayal strongly attacked the Belgian advisers in Leopoldville and Elisabethville and denounced the ANC for its lack of discipline and inability to maintain order. He all but ignored the Council of Commissioners and asserted that the only institutions "whose foundations still stand" were the Chief of State and Parliament through which a peaceful political

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5. Ibid., September 6, 1960.

6. Francis Monheim, Mobutu, l'homme seul. (Brussels: Editions Actuelles, 1962), p. 132 ff.

7. Catherine Hoskyns, The Congo Since Independence: January 1960-December 1961. (London: Oxford University Press for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1965), p. 201. See also Andrew Tully, CIA The Inside Story. (New York: W. Morrow, 1962), pp. 220-22.

8. Hoskyns, op.cit., p. 242.



solution should be sought.<sup>9</sup> The Parliament to which Dayal referred was the same one which Kasavubu had suspended when it continued to back Lumumba. In an official release on November 4, the State Department rejected Dayal's criticism of Belgium and pointed out that the Congolese Parliament was unable to act normally "because of existing conditions."<sup>10</sup> Washington also implied that Lumumba's reinstatement was unacceptable.<sup>10</sup> This official view reflected the widely held suspicion that the U.N. presence in the Congo might be used to effect Lumumba's return to office.

Washington's misgivings about the impartiality of Dayal strained its relations with the U.N. Secretariat. In Leopoldville there was frequent friction between Dayal and Timberlake and Western diplomats generally. Eventually, it also became evident that Dayal's continued presence in the Congo prevented an effective collaboration between the UNF and the Leopoldville authorities. The latter repeatedly insisted that Dayal be replaced. On March 10, 1961, Hammarskjold recalled Dayal to New York for consultations. About two months later Dayal's resignation was finally announced. According to some sources, his withdrawal had been obtained on the condition that the American Ambassador in the Congo would also be transferred.<sup>11</sup> The State Department never confirmed this allegation, but the fact remains that Timberlake left the Congo in June 1961. In any event, it is clear that the widespread criticism of Dayal's role contributed to his resignation.

#### The "American Plan" and the February 21 Resolution

The Kennedy Administration came into office during the Dayal period. One of Kennedy's first decisions in the area of African affairs was to order a reassessment of the Government's Congo policy. The outcome

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9. U.N., SCOR, Supplement for Oct., Nov., Dec., 1960, S/4557 (November 2, 1960), pp. 7-34 passim.

10. New York Times, November 5, 1960.

11. Hoskyns, op.cit., p. 365. O'Brien discusses U.S. efforts to oust Dayal in his book, see Conor Cruise O'Brien, To Katanga and Back. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1962), pp. 63-64.

of this was influenced by several interrelated developments.

The continued dissatisfaction among some of the more militant African states over the ouster of Lumumba led to the Casablanca Conference in early January, 1961. Its final communique demanded the disarmament of Mobutu's troops, the release of political opponents arrested by the Leopoldville regime, the reconvening of Parliament, and the expulsion of all foreign advisers from the Congo.

At the same time, Hammarskjold, pressured by various parties, became convinced that U.N. authority had to be strengthened if the UNF was to be effective. On February 1, he requested the Security Council for permission to undertake "more far-reaching measures" which would insulate the Congo from outside interference and which would take all Congolese army factions out of political life.<sup>12</sup>

Against this background the U.S. State Department developed a series of tentative proposals which the European allies called the "American Plan." The Plan included four major elements:<sup>13</sup>

1. That all Congolese troops be neutralized by the UNF. This disarmament--or limitation of arms--should be accomplished by negotiation if possible, but by force if necessary.
2. That all foreign interference in the Congo outside the framework of the United Nations be halted.
3. That if the neutralization proved to be effective, all political prisoners, including Lumumba, be released and be allowed to participate in domestic politics.
4. That subsequently a broadly based government under the

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12. U.N., SCOR, S/PV 928, February 1, 1961, pp. 11-18, passim.

13. See London Times, February 4, 1961. New York Times, February 4, 1961. Washington Post and Times Herald, February 3 and 8, 1961. CRISP, Congo: 1961, (Brussels: Les Dossiers du CRISP, n.d.), p. 320. See also Adlai E. Stevenson's statement, U.N., SCOR, S/PV 934, February 15, 1961, pp. 12-13.

authority of Kasavubu and representing all major factions in the Congo be established.

This new approach reflected Washington's effort to strengthen the moral stature of the Secretary-General and to increase his authority in the Congo. It is important to remember that Hammarskjold was under constant Soviet attack at that time. The incoming Kennedy administration also sought to demonstrate, with its new Congo proposals, the desire to improve relations with the Afro-Asian bloc. The "American Plan" protected U.S. objectives by making the formation of a national government contingent upon the neutralization of the ANC and the restoration of internal stability.

The death of Lumumba produced an atmosphere in which Washington found it necessary to lean closer to the position of the more militant Afro-Asian states, which insisted on "energetic measures" to expel the Belgians and on reconvening the Congo Parliament. It was generally believed that Parliament would probably support the Stanleyville forces. On February 17, 1961, the Afro-Asians introduced a draft resolution in the Security Council. This draft neither referred to President Kasavubu, nor associated Hammarskjold with its implementation. It put the emphasis on the withdrawal of foreign advisers rather than on the disarmament of the contending ANC groups as the best way to restore order. Moreover, neutralization of Army units and internal order were no longer made a condition for national reconciliation. The U.S. Representative, Adlai E. Stevenson, argued for the consolidation of the Ileo Government. He also objected to the phrasing of the draft which seemed to exclude deliberately a prohibition against the foreign arms which Stanleyville continued to receive. Although the draft differed from the original American proposals, under pressure of the Afro-Asian nations, the U.S. delegate finally endorsed their resolution.<sup>14</sup> At the same time the United States accepted the paragraph authorizing the UNF to use force to prevent civil war.

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14. U.N., SCOR, S/PV 941, February 20, 1961, pp. 16-17.

### Interference in Domestic Affairs

In the early phases of the U.N. mission, Washington insisted that the UNF should not become involved in the Congo's domestic affairs. In the Security Council debate on August 8, 1960, U.S. Representative Henry Cabot Lodge, warned that the United Nations should not be drawn into the political struggle between Lumumba and Tshombe, which he held was essentially an internal dispute.<sup>15</sup>

After Lumumba's ouster, Washington began to fear that U.N. policy in the Congo tended to favor the Lumumba cause. This was one reason for Washington's criticism of Dayal. But as far as the secession of Katanga was concerned, the Eisenhower regime was on the whole satisfied with Hammarskjold's policy of moving cautiously.

The new administration, like its predecessor, wanted the Congolese to settle their internal differences, but unlike its predecessor, it supported more vigorous measures designed to create an environment in which the Congolese factions could reach an accord. This inclination to encourage a more active U.N. role influenced U.S. policy towards the Congo, and towards Katanga in particular.

On the fundamental question of Katanga's secession, there were several factors that argued strongly against the continuation of Katanga's independence. First, under Belgian rule Katanga had always been an integral part of the Congo. The Brussels Round Table Conference in 1960 had accepted this. Second, if Katanga were allowed to secede, other regions might follow suit. The result would inevitably be fragmentation bordering on chaos which would invite Communist penetration. Third, if the problem of Katangan secession were solved, it would, as George W. Ball maintained, "contribute decisively to the ability of the Leopoldville Government to cope with the diversionary activities of Antoine Gizenga."<sup>16</sup>

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15. U.N., SCOR, S/PV 885, August 8, 1960, p. 8.

16. George W. Ball, Undersecretary of State, The Elements in our Congo Policy. (U.S. Department of State Publication 7326, December 1961), p. 19.

Fourth, secession would disrupt the Congo's economic fabric and destroy its potential for economic viability. Fifth, though Tshombe was anti-Communist, a number of moderate leaders in Leopoldville, especially Cyrille Adoula, met this description equally well in Washington's view. Finally, in order to enhance America's stature in the eyes of the emerging nations, Washington had to oppose Tshombe's secession effort which most Afro-Asian states believed to be a simple expression of Western "neocolonialism."<sup>17</sup> For all these reasons, Washington sought to encourage the development of a moderate regime in Leopoldville.

Cyrille Adoula was installed as Prime Minister on August 2, 1961. "Adoula had been the Americans' choice for this job from the start," G. Mennen Williams, Assistant Secretary of State, reportedly admitted.<sup>18</sup> Secretary of State Dean Rusk publicly praised Adoula's "intelligence, moderation, and nationwide stature."<sup>19</sup>

Washington's objectives for the Congo now called for the ending of the secessionist movements, in Elisabethville as well as in Stanleyville. Sir Roy Welensky, Prime Minister of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, met Assistant Secretary Williams in August 1961; he apparently told Welensky that Leopoldville or the UNF could be expected to use force unless Tshombe came to terms:

He [Williams] told me that if the Katanga did not come to an accommodation with the Central Government soon, it was to be expected that that Government would seek to impose its will by force of arms and that the U.N. forces would be justified in intervening on the side of the Central Government on the grounds that it was the only legal government.<sup>20</sup>

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17. These factors are recalled in a speech by G. Mennen Williams Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, April 25, 1965 (U.S. Department of State Press Release 84), pp. 1 and 6.

18. Sir Roy Welensky, Welensky's 4000 Days. (London: Collins, 1964), p. 220.

19. New York Times, December 9, 1961.

20. Welensky, op.cit., p. 222.

When Round One broke out Washington refrained from making any official comment, but according to the New York Times, State Department spokesmen regarded the U.N. action as coming within its mandate.<sup>21</sup> While not implying approval for everything U.N. troops may have done in Round One, Washington clearly supported firmer action by the UNF. As a manifestation of its continued commitment, on September 21, the United States placed four transport planes at the disposal of the UNF for airlifts inside the Congo.<sup>22</sup>

Washington's desire to back a U.N. effort to end the secessionist threats of both Tshombe and Gizenga were evident in the debates on the November 24, 1961, resolution. Although Stevenson tried to amend the resolution to authorize action against all secessionist movements, and not solely those in Katanga, he voted for the more limited resolution. Another American draft amendment, which requested Thant to use negotiations and conciliation to settle the Congo problems, was withdrawn under the threat of a Soviet veto. This amendment was aimed partly at allaying the fears of the Western allies. Since the November 24 resolution affirmed all previous resolutions, including those providing for U.N. conciliation efforts, Stevenson said: "This new resolution can in no way be a diminution of, but only an addition to, authority previously granted."<sup>23</sup>

Round Two began on December 5, 1961. The next day, in compliance with a U.N. request, Washington disclosed that it would provide some twenty additional transport planes to fly troops and equipment to Katanga. "It was this internal airlift that permitted the rapid U.N. buildup in Katanga," an official U.S. report said.<sup>24</sup> This decision also associated

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21. New York Times, September 14, 1961.

22. A Globemaster C 124 and a Hercules C 130 arrived on September 21, a few hours after the cease fire went into effect. Two more C 130's followed shortly afterwards. Heretofore the United States had provided airlift facilities for the UNF only from abroad into the Congo. (New York Times, September 22, 1961.)

23. U.S. Participation in the U.N.: 1961 (U.S. Department of State Publication 7413, August 1962), p. 83.

24. Ibid., p. 87.

the United States with the U.N. action from the start of Round Two.

London, Paris, and Brussels reacted strongly against the December 1961 military operations of the UNF. At the Western Foreign Ministers Conference then meeting in Paris, and at the subsequent NATO Council session, the Western allies tried to persuade the United States to join them in a call for an immediate cease-fire. Washington's response, however, was that it opposed a cease-fire until the UNF had attained its "minimum objectives." These were defined as the need and right of the UNF "to protect itself, to maintain its freedom of movement and communications in order to discharge the mission given it by the Security Council and the General Assembly."<sup>25</sup> This unequivocal demonstration of American approval of the U.N. action helped Thant to resist the pressures from Britain and other West European members who demanded an immediate cease-fire. As a result, the UNF was able to continue its military operation in Katanga until December 19. Round Two had lasted fourteen days.

In the meantime, faced with the threat of a military defeat and at the persistent urgings of the American and several European Consuls, Tshombe agreed to meet with Adoula. On December 14, Tshombe requested the intervention of President Kennedy, who designated the U.S. Ambassador in Leopoldville, Edmund A. Gullion, as his personal representative to arrange a meeting between Adoula and Tshombe. After preliminary discussions in Leopoldville, Gullion met Tshombe in Ndola, Northern Rhodesia. The next day, December 19, he escorted the Katanga leader in a U.S. plane to Kitona, for the Adoula-Tshombe meeting. At Kitona, Gullion and the U.N. Representatives tried to convince the two parties of the need for agreement; and Thant ordered the UNF to cease firing to promote greater harmony at the conference table.

The Kitona Accord led to long and fruitless negotiations between Leopoldville and Elisabethville. By mid-1962 the United States decided that more effective methods were called for. After discussions with

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25. Statement by George W. Ball, New York Times, December 14, 1961.

Brussels and London, Washington drafted a plan for integrating Katanga. Contrary to the position of its allies, the United States was prepared to consider the imposition of economic sanctions against Katanga if Tshombe refused to accept peaceful integration and recognize Leopoldville's national authority. In early August, Washington submitted its proposals to the Secretary-General and on August 20, Thant officially presented them as a U.N. Plan for National Reconciliation. The Thant Plan, as it was called, was in fact a slightly modified version of the American draft. Five days later the United States pledged its full support of the Plan.

Although both Adoula and Tshombe endorsed the Thant Plan, they still could not come to terms. Failing to solve the Katanga problem, Adoula's position had become highly precarious and the fall of his Government, which would open the door for a left-wing regime, was a distinct possibility.<sup>26</sup> These developments moved Washington to further action. In October George C. McGhee, Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs, went on a three-week mission to the Congo to encourage a rapprochement between Leopoldville and Elisabethville and to convince Tshombe that the United States did not seek his downfall. By the end of November Washington obtained Belgian acquiescence to institute more coercive measures under the Thant Plan. At the conclusion of the talks between President Kennedy and Foreign Minister Paul-Henri Spaak in Washington on November 27, the Belgian leader agreed that unless "substantial progress within a very short period" were made, it would be necessary "to execute further phases under the United Nations Plan, which include severe economic measures."<sup>27</sup> About the same time, Washington also finally managed to obtain a promise from Britain that London would not prevent the imposition of sanctions against Katanga if these were considered necessary.

Before moving ahead, the Kennedy Administration once again

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26. See speech by G. Mennen Williams, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, November 9, 1962 (U.S. Department of State Press Release 670), p. 5.

27. New York Times, November 28, 1962.



assessed the Congo situation. On December 9, 1962, the State Department was ordered to analyze the various alternatives confronting the United States. The outcome of an intensive exploration was a recommendation to reintegrate Katanga into the Congo through economic sanctions and UNF military action if the last attempts at a peaceful solution failed. The State Department announced on December 20, the dispatch of an eight-man military mission to the Congo headed by Lt. General Louis W. Truman "in cooperation with the United Nations to determine what additional forms of assistance the United States could provide to ensure the ability of the United Nations to maintain peace in the Congo."<sup>28</sup>

The Indian commanders of the UNF in the Congo interpreted the Truman mission, which arrived in the Congo on December 21, as a sign of Washington's determination to support military action to end secession. After recurrent provocations, the UNF launched Round Three on December 28. As a direct outgrowth of the Truman mission 30 trucks, 6 armed personnel carriers, mine-clearing equipment, transport aircraft, and other U.S. military materiel began arriving early in January, but not in time to affect the outcome of Round Three. With the entry of U.N. troops in Kolwezi on January 21, 1963, the secession of Katanga was finally ended.

The U.S. initial position that the Leopoldville-Elisabethville conflict constituted a domestic dispute on which the UNF should not impose a solution by force, had undergone substantial changes. In the larger interests of international peace and stability, and justified by the principles of "self-defense" and "freedom of movement" on the part of the UNF, Washington supported the effort to ouse the secessionist regime in Katanga. The reintegration of Katanga into the Congo served American interests. In a later assessment Assistant Secretary Williams commented:

Perhaps the less said about the Congo as a cause of differences among friends the better . . . such differences have existed between our friends and us. . . . What the Congo has done to U.S. relations with African countries is more

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28. Ibid., December 21, 1962.

dramatic. Our generally good image in Africa reached a remarkable apogee when we fully supported the U.N. in ending the secessionist movement in Katanga. That effort at secession was regarded by other Africans as counter-revolutionary and a return to colonialism.<sup>29</sup>

#### U.S. Bilateral Military Assistance

A major contributing factor to the Congo crisis was the weakness of the Congolese Army. The United States initially expected that the United Nations would take the responsibility for disciplining and retraining the Congolese forces. When various ANC units became more deeply involved in the factional struggles, Washington explored the possibility of disarming all Congolese troops. This idea was a part of the "American Plan" in February 1961. In the debate on the November 24, 1961, resolution, Adlai Stevenson argued in vain for the adoption of an amendment which would have encouraged the United Nations to train and reorganize the ANC. At that time he also told the Security Council that the Organization should assist the Congo by providing a small air force.<sup>30</sup>

To meet the problem of streamlining and reorganizing the ANC, Washington developed the Greene Plan which provided for a series of bilateral aid programs channeled through and coordinated by the United Nations.<sup>31</sup> After considerable discussion within the U.S. Government, negotiations with Leopoldville, and consultation with U.N. officials, Washington approached Belgium, Canada, Italy, Norway, and Israel, each of whom agreed to participate. After an extended debate the Plan was abandoned in April 1963, primarily because of objections from the more militant Afro-Asian states. As a result, Belgium, Italy, and Israel eventually entered into conventional bilateral military aid agreements with Leopoldville.

Even before the failure of the Greene Plan, the United States

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29. Speech by G. Mennen Williams, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, April 25, 1965 (U.S. Department of State Release 84), p. 1.

30. U.N., SCOR, S/PV 975, November 16, 1961, p. 10.

31. The origin, character, and ultimate failure of the Greene Plan is discussed in Chapter 6, pp. 132-34.

had informally and quietly started its own bilateral aid effort in October 1962, and concluded in July 1963 a bilateral military aid agreement with the Adoula Government. The next month a U.S. military aid mission was established in the Congo.

The U.S. aid program received a boost at the end of March 1964, when Under-Secretary of State W. Averell Harriman recommended, after a six-day mission in the Congo, that more ground vehicles, transport aircraft, and communications equipment should be sent.<sup>32</sup> By June 1964, the United States had contributed \$6.1 million in bilateral assistance compared to \$168.2 million in military assistance through the United Nations.<sup>33</sup> By that date Washington had sent almost 100 military technicians to the Congo to train ANC personnel in the use and maintenance of the equipment furnished.<sup>34</sup> American bilateral efforts, initiated long before the UNF withdrew, were motivated by the same objective of internal stability that underlay its support of the U.N. mission.

#### U.S. Financial and Logistical Support

One of the more tangible forms of U.S. endorsement of the Congo undertaking was its financial and logistical support. The total cost of the military operation from July 1960 through June 1964, was some \$411 million, of which the United States provided slightly less than 42 percent, or about \$170 million. American support included both assessments and voluntary contributions. The United States also became the largest purchaser of U.N. bonds, issued to meet the peacekeeping debts. It bought \$100 million in bonds on a matching basis with other states on the condition that annual payments of the interest and principal for the next fifteen years would be included in the regular U.N. budget.<sup>35</sup>

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32. New York Times, April 1, 1964.

33. Ibid., June 22, 1964.

34. Washington Post and Times Herald, June 17, 1964.

35. Further details of U.S. financial support are found in Chapter 19 and in Appendix Z.

The United States continued its logistical support of the UNF to the end. As of June 30, 1964, the Defense Department had transported 118,091 troops and 18,596 tons of cargo into or out of the Congo, and airlifted 1,991 troops and 3,642 tons of cargo within the Congo.<sup>36</sup>

#### U.S. Impact on the Peacekeeping Mission

Parallel objectives between the American Government and the U.N. peacekeeping mission provided the foundation for the consistent U.S. support throughout the entire period. Without U.S. political, financial, and logistical support, the U.N. operation would probably not have been authorized. It certainly could neither have been mounted at such short notice, nor sustained over the ensuing four years without continued American assistance.

American backing helped the Secretary-General to withstand pressures from other U.N. members which either opposed the mission or sought to subvert the operation. As a result of American support the UNF was able to be more effective and responsible in Rounds Two and Three than it was in Round One.

By virtue of its power and active involvement, the United States had more influence over the operation than any other country. In the interpretation and execution of his mandate, the Secretary-General had to take U.S. views seriously into account. This did not mean that the U.N. Secretariat was an appendage of the State Department. There was almost complete concurrence between Washington's objectives of stability in Central Africa and prevention of Communist interference and the U.N. resolutions calling for law and order in the Congo and warning states to refrain from unilateral intervention.

For the United States, which had the options of noninvolvement or bilateral assistance, the United Nations proved to be a reasonably effective instrument to achieve its foreign policy goals. The U.N.

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36. These statistics were provided by Captain William Alexander, USN, J-3, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense, September 16, 1964.

mission contributed to stability in Central Africa. It helped to impose ground rules that made it difficult for the Soviet Union to capture the Lumumba-Gizenga movement and thus establish a base for Communist subversion in Africa. The peacekeeping operation may have served to blunt some charges of Western neocolonialism against Washington, and, in general, it enhanced American prestige among the more militant as well as moderate Afro-Asian countries.

## CHAPTER 8

### ROLE OF THE SOVIET UNION

The Soviet Union, like the United States, supported the U.N. peacekeeping mission when the Secretary-General first opened up the Congo question in the Security Council in July 1960. But, unlike Washington, Moscow soon withdrew its support and became a persistent and harsh critic of the operation and of Hammarskjold's policies in the Congo.

It was this initial concurrence of the two super-powers that made the authorizing resolution possible. But apparent agreement soon gave way under the impact of the divergent political objectives of the Soviet Union and the United States in the Congo and in Africa generally. In the beginning the Soviet leaders saw the Congo crisis as an opportunity to pursue their general foreign policy goals in the underdeveloped world. Moscow sought to undermine Western political and economic influence in Africa and to court and manipulate the more militant nationalist leaders.

The Kremlin hoped the U.N. operation would curb Western "neo-colonialism" and provide the Soviet bloc with a foothold in the center of Africa. When their expectations were frustrated, the Russians withdrew their support. Their mounting opposition seriously complicated, but did not vitiate, the effort of the Secretary-General to implement the Security Council mandate.

#### Soviet Interests in the Congo

In the late 1950's Moscow began to focus more attention on Africa,

which hitherto had been an area of secondary importance in Soviet strategy towards the underdeveloped world. Confronted with the many discords and rivalries and a succession of divisions among the new African states, Moscow could no longer champion, as it had done earlier, the concept of Afro-Asian solidarity, or even of pan-African solidarity. It was forced to follow different policies in the various African states. Soviet diplomacy tended to support increasingly the more militant African countries, particularly those of the Casablanca bloc. Moscow tried, at the same time, to avoid alienating other nonaligned states. The Congo crisis forced the Soviets to choose between Lumumba and Kasavubu, and between the Casablanca powers and the moderate African countries; this intensified their dilemma.

In tune with its overall foreign policy objectives, Moscow wanted to eliminate Belgian economic and political influence from the Congo. Aware of its own limited capabilities to intervene militarily and seeking to prevent direct Western intervention, the Soviet Union endorsed the intrusion of U.N. military power into the Congo.

The Congo represented for Moscow the classical example of a colony exploited by Western imperialists and ripe for a nationalist revolution. In order to strengthen its image as the champion of anti-colonialism in the Afro-Asian world and to propitiate the leaders of the Congo, Moscow had to identify itself with Congolese nationalism. As an immediate objective, Moscow hoped to find in the Congo a base for launching a continent-wide propaganda campaign and for inciting revolts against the remaining white regimes to the south.

As a longer-range goal, Moscow sought to encourage a regime in the Congo compatible with major Soviet policies in Africa. Lumumba, who had been cultivated by the Communists, seemed to the Soviet Union the perfect candidate to lead such a regime.

#### Soviet Policies in the Lumumba Era

When the Security Council first considered the Congo crisis, the Soviet Union welcomed the debate. It did so perhaps not so much because it expected the Council to act, but rather because it sought to expose to

the world the "colonial plot" of the Western powers against the independence of the new African state. As Khrushchev said on July 12, 1960, the appeal to the United Nations was

. . . the right thing to do. . . . [But] the Security Council can hardly be expected to give sympathetic consideration to the justified demand of the people of the Congo. This body should be known for what it is, so that the peoples can see that the Security Council has been turned by the U.S.A. into an instrument for suppressing the freedom-loving peoples and keeping the peoples in colonial bondage. <sup>1</sup>

But the Security Council adopted the July 14 resolution which authorized U.N. military assistance and was strongly endorsed by the Afro-Asian bloc. The affirmative vote of the Soviet Union mirrored its policy of courting the African states. With its widely heralded commitment to decolonialization and to the defense of the former colonies against the West, Moscow could not fail to support a resolution backed by the Afro-Asians. The Soviet delegate in the preceding Security Council debate promptly charged the NATO powers with "treacherous aggression" and warned his audience against the "machinations" and new-style "colonialism" of the United States and its allies.<sup>2</sup>

With its policy of supporting the Lumumba regime and reducing Belgian influence in the Congo, Moscow decided that endorsement of the U.N. mission was preferable to direct Soviet assistance. Such aid would have entailed the immediate introduction of substantial Soviet military equipment and troops posing an almost insurmountable logistical problem. The lines of communication would have been long and vulnerable. There was no assurance that the necessary overflight and refueling rights would be granted by the intervening countries. On the other hand, Kasavubu and Lumumba invited Soviet aid on July 14 if Western "aggression" continued. With this request on file, Moscow was in a better position to respond on

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1. Cited by Richard Lowenthal, "China," in Zbigniew Brzezinski (ed.), Africa and the Communist World. (Stanford, Cal.: Stanford University Press, 1963), p. 179.

2. U.N., SCOR, S/PV 873, July 13, 1960, pp. 16-21, passim.



a bilateral basis, even though it had backed the U.N. mission.

The withdrawal of Belgian troops through a U.N. effort would be a desirable achievement that would make no demands on Moscow. The Soviet delegate made clear that his Government understood the resolution to mean that Belgian forces were to be withdrawn "immediately" and "unconditionally."<sup>3</sup> Moreover, Moscow could later claim major credit for this accomplishment.

In the debate the Soviet Union also took a strong stand against Katanga's secession. Moscow's castigation of Katangan separatism was a concomitant of its attack against the West. It knew that most African states would look with great disfavor upon the "efforts of the colonialists . . . to dismember the young Republic."<sup>4</sup>

Moscow's initial position on the U.N. peacekeeping mission embraced three intertwined strands which characterized its subsequent policy: multilateral and unilateral support for the Lumumbist forces; opposition to Katangan secession; and a mounting mistrust of the U.N. system which reached its height in the vituperative attack on the Secretary-General. Closely interwoven was Moscow's desire to avoid a split with those Afro-Asian states which advocated a more moderate policy.

#### Support for the Lumumbist Forces

Once the Soviet Union had decided not to commit its own troops to the Congo to oust the Belgians, it felt obligated to endorse, at least for the time being, the Security Council decisions.<sup>5</sup> To demonstrate its cooperation, Moscow informed the Secretary-General, on July 23, that it had authorized the use of five IL-18 planes, assigned to the Ghana Government, for the transport of Ghanaian troops and equipment to the Congo. Since the planes remained under complete national control, they could be employed only with Soviet approval. The Soviets could also, at any

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3. Ibid., p. 44.

4. Ibid., p. 20.

5. The Soviet Union voted for the first three Security Council resolutions. See Appendix B.

moment, use the craft unilaterally for purposes other than those of the UNF.

At the same time, Moscow continued to expound the thesis that Belgian "aggression" in the Congo was part of a larger Western plot: "The bayonet was Belgian, but the bosses were the United States, Belgian, British, and West German big monopolies," Krushchev asserted in a July 15, 1960, message to the Congolese leaders.<sup>6</sup> Afraid of being outmaneuvered by the Western allies and the U.N. mission, the logical solution for the Soviet Union was to support the Lumumba regime outside the U.N. framework.

On July 22, Moscow announced that it would ship 100 trucks, complete with spare parts, a repair shop, and supporting technicians to the Congo. In the following weeks the Soviet Union made this shipment, plus additional equipment and personnel, including interpreters, medical teams and supplies, and reportedly also arms.<sup>7</sup> By the end of August ten twin-engined IL-14 planes had arrived in the Congo, fully manned by Soviet crews. (Earlier one such plane had been presented to Lumumba for his personal use.) Ostensibly, these actions were under the aegis of the United Nations. In fact, they constituted unilateral assistance. When Hammarskjold reminded the Soviet Union that its actions were in contradiction to the U.N. resolutions, Moscow first kept silent. On September 10, the Soviet Union finally replied to a second protest of the Secretary-General and accused him of exceeding his mandate by attempting to control the relations between the "sovereign" Government of the Congo and other states. Moscow asserted:

The Security Council resolutions do not contain any provisions restricting in any way the right of the Congolese Government to request assistance directly from the Governments of

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6. New York Times, July 16, 1960.

7. Pierre Houart, La pénétration communiste au Congo. (Brussels: Centre de documentation internationale, 1960), p. 64. See also Michel Borri, Nous . . . ces affreux. (Paris: Editions Galic, 1962), p. 48. [Borri is the pseudonym of a French intelligence agent, whose book is generally supposed to be accurate.]

other countries and to receive such assistance, just as they do not and cannot restrict the rights of States to render assistance to the Republic of the Congo.

Soviet Assistance to the Congolese Government . . . is fully consistent with them. 8

It should be noted, that on August 15, Lumumba had specifically requested the Soviets for transport planes and crews, transport trucks, various weapons "of high quality," and other equipment.<sup>9</sup> Lumumba used the planes and trucks to bring troops to Kasai in preparation for his attack on Bakwanga and, from there, for his attack against Katanga.<sup>10</sup> The closing of the airports in the Congo to all except U.N. traffic by Andrew W. Cordier on September 5, resulted in halting any further Soviet support for Lumumba's military action.<sup>11</sup>

On September 14, the Soviet Union reacted sharply in the Security Council to Cordier's measures. It charged Hammarskjold and the U.N. Command with violating the Security Council resolutions by this "flagrant interference" in the Congo's internal affairs and with undermining the position of the "lawful" Lumumba Government.<sup>12</sup> The Soviet attack boomeranged. Ceylon and Tunisia disturbed by Moscow's attack on the Secretary-General, and more interested in eliminating all Great Power intervention in the Congo, submitted a draft resolution which in essence reaffirmed the previous ones and which "decided" that "no assistance for military purposes be sent to the Congo" outside U.N. channels.<sup>13</sup> When the Security Council refused

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8. U.N., SCOR, Supplement for July, Aug., Sept., 1960, S/4503 (September 10, 1960), p. 156.

9. A reproduction of Lumumba's letter requesting Soviet aid can be found in Houart, op.cit., app. VI.

10. The Soviets flew most of their planes out of the Congo when Mobutu expelled all Russians and broke diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union on September 14.

11. This incident is discussed in Chapter 5, pp. 84-86.

12. U.N., SCOR, S/PV 901, September 14, 1960, pp. 2-16, passim.

13. U.N., SCOR, Supplement for July, Aug., Sept., 1960, S/4523 (September 16, 1960), pp. 172-73.

to accept the proposed Soviet amendments, the Russians felt forced for the first time to use their veto in the Congo question.

With this deadlock in the Security Council and at the request of the United States, the General Assembly met in a special emergency session. Here, too, the Afro-Asian states, in spite of their disturbance over Lumumba's ouster and other recent developments in the Congo, were more concerned about U.N. action to insure effective decolonization. On September 20, 1960, an Afro-Asian draft, which excluded all military assistance to the Congo except through the United Nations, was adopted by 70 votes to zero. The Soviet bloc, France, and the Union of South Africa abstained.

The Soviet veto of the Ceylon-Tunisia draft in the Security Council and the adoption of the Afro-Asian resolution in the General Assembly were clear defeats for Moscow. Although the Soviet Union had abstained in the General Assembly vote, it had maneuvered itself into an open split with the Afro-Asian members. Moscow had plainly been isolated, even by Yugoslavia which otherwise followed the Soviet lead in the Congo question, but which decided to cast its lot with the prevailing mood in the General Assembly.

The Soviet abstention in the General Assembly indicated, nevertheless, that Moscow was not prepared to break completely with the U.N. effort. The Russians now sought to repair their relations with the Afro-Asians. In his September 23 speech before the General Assembly, Khrushchev advocated that only African and Asian forces were to remain in the Congo and that they "should only be used at the discretion of the [Lumumba] Government." He did not elaborate what role, if any, the UNF was to play. Khrushchev also threw his weight behind the Lumumba regime as the only "lawful" government that "enjoys the confidence of the Congolese people." But he clearly avoided any specific commitment that would imply direct Soviet involvement in the Congo conflict, because "the Congolese people themselves will be able to deal with the difficulties . . . in restoring

order."<sup>14</sup>

What Khrushchev's speech indicated was that Soviet support for Lumumba would remain largely diplomatic and not military. Soviet advisers remained active in Stanleyville; some Soviet bloc weapons, including shipments from the United Arab Republic, were delivered to the Stanleyville forces;<sup>15</sup> and some financial aid was given to the Stanleyville regime by the Soviet bloc.<sup>16</sup> But on the whole, Moscow concentrated on a political campaign in which it afforded Lumumba and his movement verbal backing, tried to embarrass the West, and sought to identify itself with the Afro-Asian states and to turn them against the West over the Congo issue.

When Lumumba was arrested on December 1, 1960, the Russians blamed the NATO powers and the U.N. Command, and called for Lumumba's release, the disarmament of Mobutu's troops, and the creation of a special Afro-Asian committee to investigate "the sources of financing and supplying arms to the Mobutu gang."<sup>17</sup> Soviet diplomatic efforts at U.N. Headquarters, where several Afro-Asians again lined up with Moscow, failed to secure Lumumba's release.

The announcement of Lumumba's death provided Moscow with the opportunity to bring its anti-West and anti-U.N. campaign to a climax. In a violent statement on February 14, 1961, the Soviet Union demanded that the UNF immediately arrest Tshombe and Mobutu, "the henchmen of the

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14. U.N., GAOR, A/PV 869, September 23, 1960, pp. 71-72.

15. New York Times, February 2, 1961. New York Herald Tribune, February 17, 1961.

16. At one point a Soviet officer in Cairo presented \$3 million in European currency to a Congolese representative of the Stanleyville regime. American agents, however, were able to snatch the briefcase containing the funds from the Congolese when he was in Khartoum on his way to Stanleyville to deliver the money to Gizenga. The Soviet officer responsible for the transfer of the funds was reportedly shot by his government. [Interview with an American spokesman.]

17. New York Times, December 7, 1960.

colonialists," disarm all their troops, and expel all Belgians from the Congo. At the same time, Moscow insisted that the U.N. operation be terminated within one month.<sup>18</sup> The Russians did not explain why or how they expected the UNF, portrayed as the instrument of the colonialists, to take action against the colonialists. Nor did they submit plans for withdrawing the UNF or for maintaining law and order in its absence. Instead, Moscow abstained, rather than vetoed, the February 21, 1961, resolution, through which the majority of the Afro-Asian powers, with the exception of the Brazzaville bloc, expressed their support for continuing and strengthening the UNF. Moscow's efforts to rally the Afro-Asians had failed once more. Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru's negative response to Khrushchev's letter of February 22, in which he sought to obtain Indian support, also illustrated Moscow's miscalculations.

In their February 14 declaration, the Russians pledged to "give all possible help" to the "lawful" government of the Congo, headed by Antoine Gizenga.<sup>19</sup> This statement was widely interpreted as constituting Moscow's recognition of the Stanleyville regime. It also provoked the fear among Western powers that Gizenga would receive substantial material Soviet assistance. This fear did not materialize. Not until July 1961 did the Soviet Union establish a diplomatic mission in Stanleyville.<sup>20</sup>

When the Adoula Government was established on August 5, 1961 (which subsequently included Gizenga as Deputy Prime Minister), Moscow did not hesitate to recognize the new Central regime. This occurred on August 31. Moscow took this step even though its diplomatic relations with the Republic of the Congo, broken by Mobutu in September 1960, had not been restored. It is important to note, however, that the Adoula Government

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18. U.N., SCOR, Supplement for Jan., Feb., March, 1961, S/4704 (February 14, 1961), p. 115.

19. Ibid.

20. The Soviets, however, did not accord Gizenga formal recognition. The dispatch of the mission in July was not even formally announced in Moscow. See Alexander Dallin, "The Soviet Union: Political Activity," in Brzezinski, op.cit., p. 240, n. 46.

was promptly recognized by the Afro-Asian states, including the Casablanca group. The new Soviet Chargé d'Affaires arrived on September 19, 1961, in Leopoldville, even though the formal presentation of credentials did not occur till December 2, 1961.

By that time, however, Gizenga had again left the Leopoldville Government and shifted his base to Stanleyville. In January 1962, with the help of the UNF, Leopoldville ended Stanleyville's rival regime.<sup>21</sup> Although during the debate on November 24, 1961, resolution, the Soviet Union had voted against an American amendment condemning all secessionist movements, including that of Stanleyville, the Russians now merely complained about Thant's "hasty" order to U.N. forces to help restore order in Stanleyville.<sup>22</sup> Moreover, while the Soviet press forecast another "Lumumba-style" murder when Gizenga was arrested by Adoula, Moscow carefully restrained its comments on Adoula to avoid jeopardizing its relations with Leopoldville. It did not even withdraw its invitation to Adoula to visit the Soviet Union.

Thus, once the balance in the Congo swung towards the more moderate Adoula regime, Moscow was not prepared to intervene effectively on behalf of Gizenga, even though the latter was politically closer to the Soviets than Adoula.

The only period of spectacular Russian intervention in the Congo was during the last few weeks of Lumumba's tenure as Prime Minister. After Lumumba's fall and his subsequent death, Soviet support of Stanleyville was largely confined to declarations. For Soviet propaganda purposes, a dead Lumumba was perhaps more useful than a live Lumumba.

#### Soviet Opposition to Katanga

A second major aspect of Soviet policy in the Congo crisis was an unremitting opposition to the Katangan secessionist movement from its inception. In the Security Council on August 8, 1960, the Russians backed

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21. See Chapter 5, pp. 97-99.

22. Washington Post and Times Herald, January 16, 1962.

Lumumba's request to use the UNF against Katanga. Contrary to their usual concern for the Congo's sovereignty, the Soviets insisted that the Secretary-General could use "any means" and the UNF had full powers to proceed "unconditionally" in clearing Katanga of Belgian troops, arresting Tshombe and his followers, and suppressing all Katangan resistance.<sup>23</sup> Paradoxically, the Russians finally endorsed the much weaker August 9, 1960, resolution, largely because it had been introduced by the Afro-Asian states.

Moscow's fulminations against Tshombe and his followers held pace with its attacks against the West. Soviet charges that Katangan leaders were the instruments of the colonialist powers corresponded with the interpretation of most Afro-Asian regimes.

When Moscow recognized the new Adoula government in August 1961, it sought to justify its switch in support from Stanleyville to Leopoldville by attempting to identify the new Central Government with Lumumba's heritage. They quickly called upon Adoula to act vigorously against Katanga and backed his requests for U.N. assistance to this end.<sup>24</sup> As could be expected, the Soviet Union deplored the failure of Rounds One and Two to eliminate all mercenaries from Katanga and to end the secession effort. Both the cease-fire agreement of October 1961 and the Kitona Accord of December 1961 were denounced by the Soviets for allegedly recognizing the "legality" of the "mercenary and separatist bands" and for being an attempt of the "colonial powers to rescue Tshombe, the protégé of the foreign monopolies in Katanga."<sup>25</sup> The Soviets contended that the Thant Plan for National Reconciliation of August 1962, was designed to strengthen Tshombe's position and weaken the Leopoldville Government. The Russians submitted a substitute plan which called upon the UNF immediately to

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23. U.N., SCOR, S/PV 885, August 8, 1960, pp. 19-22.

24. Lowenthal, op.cit., p. 181.

25. U.N., SCOR, Supplement for Oct., Nov., Dec., 1961, S/4962 (October 16, 1961), p. 62. U.N., SCOR, Supplement for Jan., Feb., March, 1962, S/5064 (January 25, 1962), p. 53.



arrest and expel all mercenaries. The Soviet plan demanded that Katanga be reintegrated into the Congo within one month, after which the U.N. troops should be withdrawn.<sup>26</sup> Little interest was shown in the Soviet counter proposal, even by the Afro-Asian states. In the end, the Soviets went along with the more gradual approach of the Thant Plan.

On the whole, the Soviet Union was frustrated in its repeated efforts to pressure the UNF into crushing Katanga secession with military power. Moscow was forced to accept the more moderate interpretation of the U.N. mandate as interpreted by Hammarskjold and Thant.

#### Moscow's Attack on the Secretary-General

The Soviet Union's resentment over its failure to save the Lumumba regime and to use the UNF for its own purposes was expressed in a bitter attack against U.N. officials, especially the Secretary-General.

Although the Soviet Union initially endorsed the U.N. mission, it never believed that the UNF and U.N. personnel could be politically impartial. This view had its roots in the Soviet assumption that there are no neutral men. More important than the ideological factor was Moscow's realization that the Secretary-General could implement the mandate in a manner that would adversely affect Soviet interests. As Khrushchev explained to an American journalist: "You would not accept a Communist administrator and I cannot accept a non-Communist administrator."<sup>27</sup>

On July 13, 1960, Moscow had accused Ralph J. Bunche, the American U.N. Under-Secretary, of being a tool of Western intervention under the cloak of the U.N. flag.<sup>28</sup> The first serious conflict between Moscow and Hammarskjold occurred when the latter criticized Soviet unilateral assistance to the Lumumba regime. When the U.N. Representative closed the Congo airports on September 5, 1960, Moscow bitterly attacked both the Secretary-General and the U.N. Command for playing the colonialist game and insisted

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26. New York Times, September 7, 1962.

27. New York Herald Tribune, April 17, 1961.

28. U.N., SCOR, S/PV 873, July 13, 1960, p. 19.

that the entire U.N. Command be removed.<sup>29</sup> Soviet efforts to censure Hammarskjold and to dismiss the U.N. Command were defeated when the General Assembly adopted the September 20, 1960, resolution of the Afro-Asian states who had no desire to see U.N. authority in the Congo thus destroyed.

Failing to gain political support in the United Nations, the Soviet Union, from then on, blamed Hammarskjold personally for the "disgraceful state of affairs" in the Congo. On September 23, 1960, Khrushchev submitted his famous troika plan to the General Assembly. He proposed that the Secretary-General's post be abolished and replaced by a "collective executive organ" consisting of three persons who would represent the Western, the Socialist, and the neutralist blocs.<sup>30</sup>

The tripartite formula would have extended the Security Council veto to the Secretariat. The implementation of all Security Council and General Assembly resolutions would henceforth be subject to a veto. Specifically, no further orders for action could be given to the UNF or any future peacekeeping mission against Soviet objections. The practical result would be a paralysis of the United Nations in all questions where there was serious disagreement among its members. The troika plan applied to the sixteenth century, Adlai Stevenson once observed, would have created an organization "in which the administration of international affairs was entrusted to a triumvirate consisting of the Pope, the Sultan, and Martin Luther."<sup>31</sup>

The scheme for a tripartite organization was partly motivated by Moscow's insistence on protecting its national sovereignty. The troika concept was also a logical extension of the conviction that the organization and its structure should mirror the world alignment of forces. In

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29. U.N., SCOR, S/PV 901, September 14, 1960, pp. 14-15.

30. U.N., GAOR, A/PV 869, September 23, 1960, pp. 82-83.

31. Address, May 17, 1961 (U.S. Mission to the United Nations, Press Release 3724).

Soviet ideology there were the Western and Socialist camps with a neutralist bloc gravitating towards the Communist world. No single person, according to Communist doctrine, 'could be independent of or impartial toward all three different groups of states. Khrushchev explained this notion in his own way: "It is said that God alone was able to combine three persons in one. But then, no one has ever seen him, and so let him remain in the imagination of the people who invented him. But we can see the Secretary-General."<sup>32</sup>

In addition to these factors, Khrushchev's anger against Hammarskjold was in part a response to external political factors. In May 1960, the U-2 incident had adversely affected Moscow's prestige in the world, and in Communist China in particular. The Geneva disarmament negotiations were broken off in June, which indicated Moscow's failure to impose its disarmament proposals on the West. By September 1960, the split between the Soviet Union and Communist China had visibly deepened. Compounding Soviet setbacks was the fall of Lumumba and the persistence of Katangan secession. Congo developments, moreover, appeared to vindicate Communist China's consistent opposition to the U.N. operation. Moscow needed something dramatic to restore its position as leader of the Communist world and as the chief adversary of the West. These considerations undoubtedly influenced Khrushchev's outburst against Hammarskjold.

Moscow probably realized that its troika proposal would not be acceptable to the majority of the U.N. members. Khrushchev presented no time limit for its adoption. In fact, his proposal was not even placed on the General Assembly's agenda.

The Soviet vendetta against the Secretary-General continued. It culminated in Moscow's demands for Hammarskjold's dismissal immediately after the news of Lumumba's death. On February 14, 1961, the Soviet Union held Hammarskjold responsible for Lumumba's murder and declared that it would no longer maintain any relations with him or recognize him as a U.N.

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32. New York Times, October 4, 1960.

official.<sup>33</sup> Again Moscow miscalculated the mood of the Africans, whose support it coveted. The "overwhelming opinion" of the African states, said the Liberian sponsor of the February 21 resolution, was that Hammarskjold should remain in office.<sup>34</sup> The dilemma of the Soviet Union was illustrated in the General Assembly's vote on the sixteen-power resolution of April 15, 1961. This resolution associated the Secretary-General with its implementation and implied, therefore, a continued confidence in Hammarskjold. Moscow found itself voting with members of the more conservative Brazzaville bloc against the resolution which was endorsed by the majority of the Afro-Asian states, including the more militant Casablanca group. By this time, however, the Soviet Union had come to realize that its attack against Hammarskjold was alienating the Afro-Asians. Compared to earlier speeches, the Soviet delegate spoke in more moderate terms in the April debate. Although he continued to refuse to recognize Hammarskjold, he no longer urged the Secretary-General's dismissal.

To evaluate the Soviet attack on Hammarskjold and the U.N. system, it is important to remember that the Russians regarded Hammarskjold as the spokesman of the "colonialists" who were trying to arrest the tide of history. In fact, Hammarskjold sought to restore stability in the Congo which would permit constructive evolutionary change. It was inevitable that he came to favor the moderate forces represented by Kasavubu and his supporters. This in itself made Hammarskjold, in Moscow's opinion, guilty of thwarting the process of change which the Soviets championed. The entire U.N. organization, with Hammarskjold as the interpreter and implementer of its resolutions, became, in Soviet eyes, an instrument of the West. The Soviets saw the United Nations as a barrier to the successful emancipation of the Congo from Western "colonialism" and its eventual movement into the Communist bloc. The culprits, Khrushchev's letter to Prime Minister Nehru on February 22, 1961, read, were "those who would like

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33. U.N., SCOR, Supplement for Jan., Feb., March, 1961, (February 14, 1961), pp. 113-15.

34. U.N., SCOR, S/PV 938, February 17, 1961, p. 5.

to hold back the march of history."<sup>35</sup>

Moscow's resentment over the U.N. mission was also expressed in its refusal to contribute its share of the expenses of the Congo operation. The Soviets contended that the "colonial powers and their accomplices" should bear the full burden.<sup>36</sup> The unwillingness of the U.S.S.R. and France to pay their assessment precipitated the U.N. financial crisis.

#### The Minimal Role of Communist China

Communist China was not a member of the United Nations and had a small impact on the peacekeeping operation. In general, Peking had a diplomatic posture toward unfolding events in the Congo similar to that of the U.S.S.R. But China's support of the Lumumba faction had even less substance than Russia's. In September 1960, during the struggle for power between Kasavubu and Lumumba, and after U.N. officials had deprived Lumumba of the use of the radio station and the airfields, Gizenga appealed to Peking for volunteers and equipment "to defend the territorial integrity of the Republic of the Congo."<sup>37</sup> Communist China did not attempt to send men to fight the U.N. forces. After Lumumba's death, Peking recognized the Stanleyville Government on February 20, 1961. But the Chinese Chargé d'Affaires did not arrive until July 31, 1961, which was even later than the arrival of the Soviet mission in Stanleyville.<sup>38</sup> Moreover, the following month when Gizenga accepted an invitation to join the Leopoldville Government, the Chinese withdrew their mission from Stanleyville with the explanation that the legal government of Gizenga had "terminated its existence" and the Leopoldville Government was maintaining diplomatic relations with "the Chiang Kai-shek clique."<sup>39</sup> Moscow, on the other hand,

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35. Cited in Alexander Dallin, The Soviet Union at the United Nations. (New York: Praeger, 1962), p. 150.

36. New York Times, April 9, 1963. The financial problem is discussed in Chapter 19.

37. Cited in Richard Lowenthal, "China," in Brzezinski, op.cit., p. 180.

38. The Soviet mission arrived in Stanleyville "about July 6," according to the Elisabethville radio. [Ibid., p. 260, n. 66.]

39. New China News Agency, September 18, 1961.

accepted the formation of the new Adoula-Gizenga regime and moved its diplomatic mission from Stanleyville back to Leopoldville.

A few Congolese continued to have relations with Communist China, among others Pierre Mulele, who had served as Gizenga's representative in Cairo in 1961. After Gizenga's fall, Mulele went to Peking, where he studied modern guerrilla warfare. In the summer of 1963, Mulele returned to the Congo and subsequently headed the insurgent movement in Kwilu province which led to the January 1964 uprising. By that time the Chinese were again becoming involved in the Congo, this time more deeply. In December 1963, the Kingdom of Burundi recognized Communist China; the former French Congo followed suit two months later. Through their embassies in Burundi and Congo-Brazzaville the Chinese assisted Congolese rebel groups, partly with political and technical advice, partly with money and equipment. In June 1964 Peking's Jenmin Jih Pao publicly welcomed the "excellent revolutionary situation" in the Congo.<sup>40</sup> These developments, however, had no significant effect on the U.N. peacekeeping mission which withdrew on June 30, 1964.

#### The Soviet Impact on the Peacekeeping Mission

Although the Soviet Union was one of the two super powers, the effect of its opposition on the U.N. peacekeeping mission was, on the whole, remarkably small. Like any other state, the Soviet Union had to take into account the broader ramifications of its possible courses of action. Considerations which transcended their objectives in the Congo deterred the Russians from carrying their opposition to its logical conclusion. In the face of adverse consequences, the Soviet Union was simply unwilling to continue its unilateral aid to the Congo, to withdraw from the United Nations, or even, on most occasions, to veto Security Council resolutions.

Moscow undergirded its political nonsupport of the Congo effort with a consistent refusal to pay any of its assessed share of the costs.

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40. Cited in the New York Times, June 25, 1964.

It has even refused to pay the interest on the U.N. bonds issued to underwrite the peacekeeping deficit. At the same time it is interesting to note that the Soviet Union did provide some initial airlift for U.N. troops and supplies, amounting, according to its own testimony, to \$1.5 million. Moscow never made a claim for this amount against the United Nations. While it is impossible to determine how much of this airlift actually assisted the U.N. effort and how much was designed to enhance the political cause of Lumumba, the fact remains that the Russians claim it was undertaken in behalf of the United Nations. Consequently, the Soviets claim to have supported the effort to the extent of \$1.5 million. This may be taken as a symbol of their ambiguity on the operation, especially in the early days.

In the Security Council, the Soviet position forced the adoption of compromise resolutions which did not contravene Moscow's interests to the extent of inviting its veto. The Russians, however, never succeeded in imposing on the Security Council their particular solutions for the Congo crisis or their demands to dismiss the U.N. Command or terminate the entire U.N. operation.

Soviet hostility inevitably influenced the Secretary-General in his interpretation and execution of the mandate. But the Soviet Union failed in forcing its own interpretation of the mandate on the Secretary-General and it had to accept reluctantly his more gradual and moderate policies.

Moscow's strident calls for Hammarskjold's resignation and for the replacement of his office with the troika arrangement were bound to erode the authority of the U.N. chief executive. They tended to weaken the position of Hammarskjold's successor, who also had to pay heed to the Soviets if he wished to avoid a demand for his dismissal. Though Thant's style was different from that of Hammarskjold, he pursued the general policy set by his predecessor in the Congo.

At the same time, the Soviet assault on the Secretary-General caused the Afro-Asians to rally to Hammarskjold's banner. This development offset to some degree the damage of the Soviet attack. In spite of

Russian pressures, the Secretary-General was never censured by the Security Council or the General Assembly for his Congo policies.

In the Congo itself, Soviet unilateral measures to bolster the Lumumba regime and its successor jeopardized the U.N. objectives of re-establishing order and stability. These actions were a direct violation of the U.N. resolutions. Soviet diplomatic support of the Stanleyville leaders contravened the intent of the resolutions by encouraging disloyalty to the Central Government and impeding the restoration of law and order.

By and large, Moscow's policies did not substantially alter the course of the U.N. operation, though its hostility to the UNF and its refusal to pay its assessments contributed to the withdrawal of the peacekeeping mission before the ANC was able to maintain internal security. More important, however, the Soviet experience in the Congo hardened Moscow's determination to limit the U.N. role in future conflict situations.

The Congo crisis had caught Moscow by surprise. The Soviets responded with a highly opportunistic policy. In the end Moscow achieved very little in the Congo or in Africa. The UNF frustrated Soviet attempts to insure the continuation of a Lumumba regime; instead a more moderate leadership developed. True, Moscow derived some propaganda mileage out of the Congo affair; it capitalized particularly on Lumumba's death. The Soviet Union courted the Afro-Asian states; yet in the United Nations it did not succeed in enlisting their necessary support. On the contrary, Moscow had to make concessions to avoid antagonizing the underdeveloped world. In terms of propaganda and diplomacy, the U.S.S.R. may have lost more than it gained in its policies toward the four-year U.N. operation.



## CHAPTER 9

### ROLE OF FRANCE

Reflecting her general international outlook, France developed a position on the Congo crisis which fell between the positions of the United States and the Soviet Union. France subscribed to the broad objectives of the peacekeeping mission, but opposed the use of the United Nations as an instrument to attain these goals. As a result, she adopted a more aloof and reserved attitude towards the U.N. operation than any other Western power.

Among the five permanent members of the Security Council, only Washington provided consistent support, while Moscow largely opposed the U.N. effort, so it was especially important for the Secretary-General to take into account any dissenting views of the other three, particularly France and Great Britain. He could ill afford to incur the strong opposition of either Paris or London.

#### French Interests in the Congo

From the beginning France displayed an attitude of abstention toward the entire U.N. operation, but this reservation did not reflect disinterest in the fate of the Congo. As early as February 1960, during the Brussels Round Table Conference, Couve de Murville, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, informed the Belgian Ambassador in Paris that France still considered the Ferry-Leopold II Accord of 1884 to be in force.<sup>1</sup>

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1. CRISP, Congo: 1960, Vol. I, prepared by J. Gérard-Libois and Benoit Verhaegen (Brussels: Les Dossiers du CRISP, n.d.), p. 235.

The Accord gave France the right of first option if Belgium were to withdraw from the Congo. It is doubtful that France seriously contemplated replacing Belgian authority with her own in the blatant and atavistic manner suggested by the nineteenth century agreement. But Couve de Murville's reminder did indicate that France would watch the developments in the Congo with more than passing interest.

Sub-Saharan Africa has by tradition been a field of French influence, an influence which France does not intend to surrender. When France terminated the imperial ties with her African territories, she sought as a minimum to prevent her former colonies from slipping into an anti-Western bloc; as a more ambitious goal France hoped to retain a significant measure of influence in Africa. It was vital, therefore, that these former French colonies in Africa make the transition into statehood in an orderly and evolutionary fashion. A condition for the promotion of French interests was the preservation of stability in the area. The failure of the former Belgian colony to develop into a viable state would present a threat to its neighbors. This would particularly affect Congo-Brazzaville, which shares a common geographic frontier, though tribal lines do not coincide with the boundary.

A basic tenet of French policy in 1960 was the protection of the strategic axis which runs from Paris through Algiers to Brazzaville. For all these reasons France sought a regime in the former Belgian Congo that would be able to develop a mutually satisfactory relationship with the Youlou Government in Brazzaville.

#### France's Attitude Toward U.N. Intervention

When the Congo crisis erupted, the French Government was immediately and profoundly concerned. The broad objectives of France's Western allies--the reestablishment of order, the preservation of the unity and territorial integrity of the Congo, and the prevention of Communist intervention--were endorsed in Paris. But the instrumentality strongly proposed by the United States to deal with the Congo problem was not. France did not veto nor support the July 14, 1960, Security Council resolu-

tion. Despite her affirmative vote for the second resolution of July 22, it may be said that France's position remained in essence one of abstention from the entire U.N. peacekeeping effort in the Congo.

France's general position on U.N. intervention in the Congo was rooted in her fundamental approach to the Organization. For Gaullist France, the single most important political entity is the nation-state. Paris has little use for any international organization. Furthermore, General de Gaulle differentiates between long established states and "improvised" states. The former have "been in existence for a long time . . . endowed with cohesion and unity . . . used to international relations and to the traditions, obligations, and responsibilities which these relations entail."<sup>2</sup> The latter do not yet have the maturity and experience necessary for responsible international intercourse. In matters of peace and order, General de Gaulle tends to think in terms of a concert of the great powers. This means that the United Nations can deal with a threat to or breach of the peace only if, as a minimum, none of the permanent members of the Security Council veto such action. The General Assembly can debate, but not act on basic security questions. Although the realities of the Cold War have precluded collaboration between the Big Five within the Security Council, the substitution of the General Assembly to deal with enforcement measures is regarded by Paris as contrary to the U.N. Charter.

At the same time, France sees the United Nations increasingly dominated by small and irresponsible African and Asian states which can band together against the larger more mature powers. This, she believes, can only serve the Communist states and those allied with them against the West. As a result, there is a priori little inclination in Paris to use U.N. machinery to handle conflict situations.

France's view toward nonintervention in the internal affairs of a country also affected her Congo policy. U.N. intervention in 1960, the French reasoned, endangered the sovereignty of a state. Armed intervention

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2. André Passeron, De Gaulle parle. (Paris: Plon, 1962), pp. 406-07.

in an internal struggle served to encourage conflict and to prevent the state from settling its own future in its own way and in its own time. French spokesmen in the Security Council justified their abstention, in part, because the U.N. mission might lead to interference in the Congo's domestic affairs. Equally important, the French held that U.N. intervention would increase, rather than decrease, the possibility of a confrontation between the major opposing powers. The French wanted to avert a civil war in the Congo in which the United States would support one camp and the Soviet Union the other. French officials maintained that U.N. intervention would insure the introduction of the Cold War into the Congo.<sup>3</sup>

Within this general framework of nonintervention, Paris advocated that the Western powers respect the views of the most directly concerned ally, Belgium. France felt that the Belgians were justified in their efforts to reestablish order in the Congo and defended them on this point. France's attitude was undoubtedly also influenced by her own experience in the United Nations. It is important to remember that since 1952 France had been increasingly attacked in the United Nations for her colonial policies. The Suez affair in 1956 deepened France's estrangement from the United Nations. In 1960 the French-Algerian war was in its sixth year and each year France had been bitterly denounced in U.N. debates on the Algerian issue. France had consistently argued that the Algerian question was a matter of French domestic jurisdiction and, thus, outside the purview of the United Nations. There was some concern in Paris that U.N. intervention in the Congo would create a precedent for interference in Algeria or in other parts of French Africa.

Against this background, France's preference for dealing with international crises within a framework of Western consultation and action rather than through the United Nations followed logically. In September 1958, General de Gaulle submitted a memorandum to President Dwight Eisen-

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3. Interviews with a member of the French delegation to the United Nations, New York, April 28, 1965, and French officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Paris, May 31, 1965.

hower and Prime Minister Harold Macmillan in which he suggested that the policies of the three major Western powers be coordinated on a worldwide scale, and particularly in Africa.<sup>4</sup> General de Gaulle's overture had not met with a positive response, and in the Congo crisis he renewed the proposal.

#### The Initial Position

In the debate preceding the July 14, 1960, resolution, Armand Bérard, the French Representative, declared that his Government welcomed the idea of U.N. technical aid to the Congo. France also favored military assistance which, as Bérard admitted, had been requested by both the Congolese and Belgian Governments. According to his understanding, U.N. forces would be in the Congo only for a "limited" time and once they had restored order, Belgian troops could be withdrawn. At the same time, France fully endorsed the intervention of the Belgian paratroops to restore order in key population centers. The Tunisian demand for a withdrawal of Belgian forces from the Congo, Bérard contended, appeared to be primarily a condemnation of Belgium. Since he could not associate himself with such a censure, the French delegation abstained.<sup>5</sup>

Scarcely a week later, France voted in favor of the July 22 resolution, which called upon Belgium to implement the original July 14 resolution and to pull its troops out of the Congo. Bérard again rejected any charges of Belgian aggression which had been "implicitly or explicitly" made in the foregoing debate, and again vigorously defended the Belgian position. Nevertheless, he supported the new resolution because it could "not be interpreted to imply the slightest criticism" of the Belgian Government.<sup>6</sup>

Ostensibly, France's endorsement of the second resolution contra-

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4. Le Monde, November 11 and December 19, 1958.

5. U.N. SCOR, S/PV 873, July 13, 1960, pp. 27-28 and 42 passim.

6. U.N. SCOR, S/PV 879, July 21, 1960, pp. 14-15.

dicted her abstention of the first. In fact, however, on both occasions her posture was largely determined by her inclination to mistrust U.N. intervention and her support of the Belgian position. It is important to note here that Brussels specifically requested Paris to vote in favor of the July 22 resolution in order to facilitate the acceptance of U.N. actions in Belgium.<sup>7</sup> This was the only time that France cast an affirmative vote for the Congo peacekeeping operation. Thereafter, France abstained from voting for any Security Council or General Assembly resolution and she was consistently reserved about the operation itself.

There is some truth in the charge that France went beyond aloofness and actively opposed the U.N. mission. There were times when French actions did have an adverse, if slight, effect on the effort. But on the whole, these opposition activities were carried out by certain factions within the French administration or by private interest groups rather than by the French Government itself. At no time did such actions receive the official sanction of President de Gaulle's office.

#### Policies of the French Government

##### Support for Belgium

In the first year of the Congo crisis, one of the most obvious aspects of France's policy was the complete endorsement of Belgian actions. Early in the Congo crisis, General de Gaulle personally assured the Belgian Ambassador in Paris of his total support for the defense of Belgian interests.<sup>8</sup> He made clear that the presence of Belgian troops remained indispensable as long as U.N. forces were unable to maintain order.<sup>9</sup> On July 25, 1960, Prime Minister Michel Debré publicly reaffirmed in the National Assembly Belgium's right to protect her citizens.<sup>10</sup> In

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7. Interview with a member of the French delegation to the United Nations, New York, April 25, 1965.

8. The Times (London), July 21, 1960.

9. Le Monde, July 21, 1960.

10. Ibid., July 27, 1960.

the Congo, Paris demonstrated her sympathy with Belgium's problems by representing Belgian interests when Leopoldville broke its diplomatic ties with Brussels.

In the Security Council debate on the August 9 resolution, France espoused the Belgian cause. Berard asked bluntly: "Which of our Governments would have acted differently if it had been placed in the same position?" <sup>11</sup>

#### Demands for a "Western" Solution

When the Congo crisis began to assume serious proportions, General de Gaulle suggested that the United States, Britain, and France act in concert to prevent further deterioration and to block Communist intervention in the Congo. De Gaulle apparently recommended that the three Western powers exert pressure on Brussels and Leopoldville to come to terms under the Treaty of Friendship. This meant that a sufficient cadre of Belgian administrators would remain to insure the functions of the state until enough Congolese had been trained to take over. Only Belgium, in his view, was in a position to provide experts familiar enough with the local problems. If they were replaced by others--Congolese or foreigners--anarchy would ensue. The three Western allies would guarantee that Belgium would respect the independence and freedom of the Congo. <sup>12</sup> General de Gaulle stated his position frankly at his September 5, 1960, press conference:

If the United States, Great Britain, and France had concerted their positions in this matter from the beginning of the crisis; if these three powers had first encouraged the Belgians and the Congolese to establish their mutual relations on a practical and reasonable basis; and if these three powers had also taken steps to help the young state of the Congo get started and finally to make it understood that once the emancipation of the Congo had been assured and guaranteed by the

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11. U.N., SCOR, S/PV 886, August 8, 1960, p. 37.

12. New York Times, February 20, 1961. Interviews with Catherine Hoskyns, London, May 28, 1965, and French officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Paris, May 31, 1965.

West, no intervention from elsewhere would be permitted--I feel that the result would have been preferable to the bloody anarchy that now exists in this new state. I believe, furthermore, that the prestige and cohesion of the West would have been better assured in this way than by playing second fiddle to the so-called "United Nations", whose action is inadequate and very costly. 13

In NATO councils, France urged increased consultation among the Western allies for a joint strategy toward the Congo. French pressures mounted when the situation in the Congo deteriorated and a civil war threatened to break out among the Leopoldville, Stanleyville, and Elisabethville factions. At a NATO meeting in January 1961, France argued along with Belgium for the adoption of a common Western line of action and for a firmer pro-Western policy against the Afro-Asian nations that favored the Lumumba forces.<sup>14</sup> In spite of the urgent appeals of France and Belgium for concerted action, the United States apparently felt forced to move ahead on its own.

As a result of a reappraisal of U.S. policy toward the Congo in early 1961, the new Kennedy Administration developed what the European allies called the "American Plan."<sup>15</sup> The United States put forward its

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13. Passeron, *op.cit.*, p. 475. Five months later when King Baudoin expressed his gratitude to General de Gaulle for France's support to Belgium, the General affirmed once more these basic lines of French thinking [*Le Monde*, February 23, 1961]. A few days after de Gaulle had made his original overture, Prime Minister Debré repeated the idea of concerted Western action in public when he discussed the Congo question in the National Assembly on July 25, 1960 [*Ibid.*, July 27, 1960].

14. Interview with J. Gérard-Libois, Brussels, June 18, 1965.

15. For a discussion of the "American Plan," see Chapter 7. The "Plan" called for the disarmament and neutralization of all Congolese troops; an embargo on all external aid to any of the opposing Congo factions; and, if neutralization proved to be effective, for the release of political prisoners, the reopening of Parliament, and the formation of a national government representing all major Congolese groupings, including the Lumumba forces.



proposals in a series of bilateral diplomatic exchanges with certain U.N. members. France opposed the "American Plan" on several counts. One of the principal reasons for dissatisfaction, however, was her belief that the United States had not sufficiently consulted its major Western allies before approaching the Afro-Asian nations and the Soviet Union. At a NATO session in Paris in early February 1961, the representatives of Belgium and France, joined by spokesmen for other members, severely reproached the United States on this point.<sup>16</sup>

As late as August 1962, the correspondent of Le Monde summed up the French position with respect to the Congo question:

In the final analysis, Gaullist diplomacy, ever distrustful of the United Nations, maintains that the crisis should be resolved by group action, jointly planned and implemented by the Western powers.<sup>17</sup>

#### Interpretation of the U.N. Mandate

A logical corollary of France's view of the limited role of the United Nations was her restricted interpretation of the U.N. mandate. Commenting on the July 14, 1960, resolution, Bérard stressed that troops should be sent for a "limited" time and only to restore order.<sup>18</sup> In the second debate he emphasized the principle of noninterference in the Congo's internal affairs.<sup>19</sup> This emphasis on noninterference persisted throughout the entire life of the UNF. France invoked this principle to explain her abstention on the August 9, 1960, resolution.<sup>20</sup> She raised strenuous objections to the General Assembly resolution of September 20, 1960,

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16. Interview with a Belgian journalist, Brussels, June 18, 1965.

17. Le Monde, August 24, 1962.

18. U.N., SCOR, S/PV 873, July 13, 1960, p. 28.

19. U.N., SCOR, S/PV 878, July 21, 1960, p. 15.

20. U.N., SCOR, S/PV 886, August 8, 1960, p. 36.

because it provided for the appointment of Afro-Asian representatives to help the Congolese people resolve their internal conflicts.<sup>21</sup>

There was an additional and deeper reason for France's disapproval. In early February 1961, the majority of the Afro-Asian powers, including the Casablanca powers whose sympathies were plainly with Lumumba and his heirs, had been pressing both inside and outside the United Nations for the disarmament of the ANC, and of the Mobutu troops in particular. About this time Washington had put forward its controversial "American Plan" which also called for the disarming and neutralizing of all Congolese troops. In this context the February 21 resolution, which urged that the Congolese armed forces be reorganized and withdrawn from political life, could be interpreted as giving the United Nations the authority to disarm temporarily the ANC. The hallmark of national sovereignty, in French thinking, is a government's control over its military forces. The French believed that if the troops loyal to the Kasavubu-Mobutu regime were disarmed along with other ANC units, whatever national authority the Leopoldville Government could command would be destroyed. The Central Government would be placed on the same level as its internal adversaries, which, in turn, would greatly enhance the capacity of the Stanleyville faction to seize power. Hence, France's refusal to be associated with the February 21 resolution and her bitter opposition to the "American Plan."

France's interest in defeating the Lumumba forces was equally reflected in her insistence on respect for the sovereignty of the legitimate government of the Congo. At a session of the Political Committee of NATO in January 1961, France urged the Atlantic allies to exert their influence in New York to force the United Nations into a greater support of the Congo's legal authorities, i.e., the Kasavubu regime.<sup>22</sup> From the time of the Kasavubu-Lumumba rupture, Paris consistently upheld Kasavubu as the Congo's lawful Chief of State whose constitutional authority should

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21. U.N., GAOR, A/PV 861, September 19, 1960, p. 62.

22. Interview with Belgian officials, Brussels, June 21, 1965.

be accepted, not only by Stanleyville, but also by Elisabethville. Although the French were by no means hostile to the Tshombe regime, in essence, they were in favor of an entente between Kasavubu and Tshombe, but with the accent on support for Kasavubu as the national president.

French objections to U.N. appeals to the Leopoldville Government for the release of imprisoned Stanleyville politicians were based on the principle of noninterference. In fact, however, France's desire to prevent the Stanleyville regime from consolidating its power transcended her scrupulous observance of nonintervention. At the Security Council session on February 7, 1961, Bérard referred to the fact that some of the brutality inflicted upon Congolese inhabitants of Kivu and Orientale provinces by Stanleyville troops had occurred in the presence of U.N. soldiers. The French delegate conceded that in light of the domestic jurisdiction limitation, the UNF should not have intervened. He then continued:

But, as Mr. Dayal writes in his second progress report: "The United Nations assumed the obligation to maintain law and order as part of its general mandate in the Congo to render assistance to the Congolese authorities in the discharge of the basic responsibility." (S/4557, paragraph 56). Is persuasion alone sufficient to maintain law and order? Are not the U.N. contingents duty bound to resort to coercion, if there is no other way to prevent degrading violations of the law of nations? 23

This was the one time France was willing to advocate openly the interjection of armed force in the internal rivalries of the Congo. With the exception of this incident, France applied the nonintervention formula most rigorously where it involved the use of force to impose a political settlement on the contending factions in the Congo. When Round One occurred in September 1961, for example, the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs immediately expressed its apprehensions about the U.N. action in Katanga and maintained that the Secretary-General had exceeded his mandate.<sup>24</sup> In the debate on the November 24, 1961, resolution, France's spokesman

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23. U.N., SCOR, S/PV 932, February 7, 1961, p. 17.

24. Le Monde, September 16, 1961.

assiduously held to the same principle of nonintervention. In Bérard's contention, the reintegration of Katanga into the Congo had to be achieved by persuasion, and not by force as the resolution implied.<sup>25</sup>

The official reaction of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Round Two in December 1961 was to censure the United Nations and to insist that it should not go beyond protecting persons and providing technical assistance.<sup>26</sup> Behind the scenes, at the Western Foreign Ministers conference in Paris, December 1961, France sought, together with Britain, to obtain American support for a tri-partite call for an immediate cease-fire in Katanga. The French held that direct negotiations between Leopoldville and Elisabethville offered the best avenue for a possible solution. Such a settlement would become increasingly remote if the fighting were to continue. The pressures of the two European allies on the United States produced an agreement only on the broad objectives to be sought in the Congo. On December 11, the three foreign ministers issued a statement calling for a "united and peaceful Congo" and expressed the hope that the United Nations would contribute toward this goal.<sup>27</sup> In the NATO Council, following the ministerial talks, the disparity in views among the Western allies persisted.

The French Government then decided to resort to other means. On December 15, France prohibited planes carrying U.N. supplies to the Congo from flying over her territory. This decision affected primarily American transport planes which were based in France and which provided logistical support for U.N. troops in Katanga. It also obliged planes from Europe en route to the Congo to circumvent Algeria and thus to obtain overflight rights from neighboring countries. France's denial of overflight rights did not measurably affect U.N. military capability in Katanga. It amounted to little more than mild harrassment. But the political impact of this

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25. United Nations Review, Vol. 8, (December 1961), p. 7.

26. Le Monde, December 9, 1961.

27. New York Times, December 12, 1961.

step, combined with the political pressures of other West European states against U.N. military action in Katanga, contributed toward bringing the operations to a halt two days later.

By this time U.N. policies had become increasingly identified with those of the United States in French eyes. During the December 1961 operation, Prime Minister Debré delivered a severe attack on Washington's Congo policy. During 1962, Paris became more and more convinced that the United States exercised a decisive and unwarranted influence over U.N. policies in the Congo. The Plan for National Reconciliation, promulgated by Thant in August 1962, was regarded as an instrument of U.S. foreign policy. France opposed the Thant Plan because it involved undue interference in domestic affairs and she questioned the practicability of an economic boycott of Katanga exports. But in December 1962, when Thant appealed for economic sanctions, Paris directed its criticism primarily to Washington. The French disapproved of the embargo appeal and the plans for increased American military support to the United Nations which was indicated by the mission of Lt. General Louis W. Truman in December 1962.<sup>28</sup> Since Tshombe appeared to be more inclined to compromise at this stage, the French argued, it would be singularly ill-timed to push him now. Paris also regarded with a great deal of skepticism American suggestions of intensified pro-Russian activities in the Congo.<sup>29</sup> The Paris daily, le Figaro, reflected these views:

The United Nations was literally pushed bodily into the use of force in Katanga by the United States. For the last year, the Americans have taken charge of the Congo, which had entered into their sphere of influence. Not that they are particularly interested in it, but because they want to prevent the Communist bloc from getting hold of it. . . . This is the way things started in Laos and we remember how that worked out. 30

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28. For a discussion of Lt. General Truman's mission, see Chapter 6, p. 124, and Chapter 7, p. 152.

29. The Times (London), December 21, 1962.

30. Cited in the Washington Post and Times Herald, January 6, 1963.

### The Financing Question

As a tangible manifestation of her opposition to the U.N. effort, France refused to pay her assessed share of the expenditures.

When the General Assembly voted to create a special Congo account on December 20, 1960, France's position rested on little more than the charge that the Assembly was "unable to produce a just and equitable method of financing the costs." France's abstention "should be interpreted as a formal reservation regarding the share the French Government might have to carry in the expenditure covered by this resolution."<sup>31</sup> At subsequent debates France presented the legal grounds for her rejection of the Congo assessment. Her position as of June 1964 was summarized a year later:

1. Peacekeeping operations are the exclusive responsibility of the Security Council. It is also the province of that Council to lay down the mode of financing any operation that it orders or recommends.

2. On financing problems, except where it concerns the U.N. regular budget, i.e., administrative expenses, the General Assembly can only make recommendations which are not legally binding.

3. The Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice of July 20, 1962, which held that expenses incurred in operations to maintain the peace constitute expenditures of the Organization in accordance with Article 17, Paragraph 2, of the Charter, and, therefore, could be assessed against the members, is advisory only and not compulsory. Although the General Assembly accepted the Court's Opinion in December 1962, the Charter does not confer on the Assembly the right to give obligatory force to an advisory opinion of another U.N. organ.<sup>32</sup>

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31. U.N., GAOR, A/PV 960, December 20, 1960, p. 1499.

32. Ambassade de France, Service de Presse et d'Information, France and the United Nations, French Affairs, No. 178 (New York: June 1965), pp. 6-7. The full French position as it was developed over the years is not discussed here, as it is not relevant to France's impact on the U.N. operation.

### France and the Peacekeeping Effort

In retrospect, France's official position towards the Congo peacekeeping mission remained essentially the same throughout the four years. The pattern of considerations that determined France's aloofness changed somewhat as the Congo story unfolded. In the early months of the operation France's policy was marked by her strong support for Belgium; in later stages it took on an anti-American coloring. France's traditional distrust of the United Nations and her preference for working through Western channels endured. Except where the Stanleyville regime was concerned, France adhered to the principle of nonintervention, insisted upon respect for the Congo's legal government as represented by the Chief of State, and opposed the use of force to effect a political settlement in the Congo.

### Support for Tshombe from French Quarters

France's sympathy for President Tshombe was unquestionably an element in her government's hostility to a military solution of the Katanga problem. But this partiality did not mean that the Gaullist regime supported Katangan secession. Within the French administration, however, there were factions which did encourage Katanga's independence aspirations. Unofficial published evidence, corroborated privately by French journalists and officials with an intimate and often first-hand knowledge of these developments, suggests the following sources and forms of support.

### Military Equipment and Mercenaries

Certain officials in the Ministry of the Armed Forces cooperated with Tshombe by facilitating the acquisition of military equipment for the Katangan gendarmerie and by permitting the recruitment of mercenaries in France.

The purchase of arms for Katanga through French channels occurred primarily in the early stages of the Congo crisis and was probably completely halted by the summer of 1961.

In February 1961, three Fouga-Magisters (French jet trainers)

were delivered to the Katanga Government. When this fact leaked to the press, the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs denied having authorized the delivery of the craft to Katanga. The Ministry acknowledged that it was aware of an order for Fougas which Belgium had placed before June 1960 for its forces in the Congo. The Ministry promised that it would ask the Belgian Government to explain why these planes had been shipped to Elisabethville.<sup>33</sup>

According to one scholar, the Katangan Secretary of Defense had arranged, in the fall of 1960, to purchase the Fougas for Katanga as part of the original Belgian order for the Force publique.<sup>34</sup> The sellers of the Fougas probably received export licenses from officials in the French Ministry of the Armed Forces. The planes were sent via Belgium or, more likely, through Luxembourg, because they arrived in Katanga by strato-cruiser operated by the Seven Seas Airlines, a private American company which flew from Luxembourg via Brazzaville to Elisabethville.

In addition to the Fougas, some weapons from France and elsewhere reached Katanga and South Kasai via Pointe Noire in Congo-Brazzaville. In the summer of 1961, however, the French Government appears to have decided to block further shipments through the former French Congo. A French intelligence agent explained that in the spring of 1961, the Brazzaville Government ordered arms in Rome on behalf of the secessionist regime of South Kasai. Part of the shipment was stopped by the Italian Government before it left Genoa; the part which reached the former French Congo was eventually confiscated by French officials and stored in French arsenals at Pointe Noire.<sup>35</sup>

The enlistment of French mercenaries for the Congo started in

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33. Le Monde, February 18, 1961.

34. J. Gérard-Libois, Sécession au Katanga. (Brussels: CRISP, 1963), p. 188.

35. Michel Borri, Nous . . . ces Affreux. (Paris: Editions Gallis, 1962), pp. 326-27 and 349-55. Borri is the pseudonym of a French intelligence agent. His book is generally regarded as reliable.



the autumn of 1960. The case of Colonel Roger Trinquier, which was widely discussed in the press, illustrates the support as well as the opposition Katanga found in France.

Trinquier, a French paratroop officer, well known for his theories on guerrilla warfare and counterinsurgency, had fought in Indochina and later in Algeria. As a result of his opposition to General de Gaulle's Algerian policies, he was transferred from Algeria to metropolitan France. On January 5, 1961, still on active service in Nice, Trinquier received an invitation from the Katanga regime to take command of its armed forces. He went to Paris to discuss President Tshombe's proposal with Pierre Messmer, the Minister of the Armed Forces, who had also served in French Africa. According to Trinquier, he never would have gone to Katanga if he had encountered any resistance from the French Government.<sup>36</sup> In any event, the Colonel received permission from Messmer to go on a fact-finding mission to Katanga. Apparently, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs raised objections to this mission. On orders from President de Gaulle's office, Trinquier was told that if he decided to enter Tshombe's service, he would have to resign his commission from the French Army.

On January 25, 1961, Trinquier left Paris for Katanga to investigate the situation. In Elisabethville he met with intense hostility from Belgian officers who resented the appointment of a Frenchman to the senior post. However, after Tshombe assured Trinquier of his complete support, the French officer agreed to become Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of Katanga. His stay in Elisabethville lasted only a few days. Upon return to Paris he gave Messmer a personal account of his findings. Trinquier argued that Katanga was the last bastion of the West against Communist infiltration in Central Africa. This passionate identification of Katanga's cause with the defense of the West was later made by the majority of French mercenaries. Trinquier submitted his resignation

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36. Colonel Roger Trinquier and others, Notre Guerre au Katanga. (Paris: Editions de la pensée moderne, 1963), pp. 53-54.

which was immediately accepted and made retroactive to January 24, 1961. About the same time he opened an office in Paris to recruit mercenaries for Katanga.

Perhaps as a result of the publicity which these developments received in France and abroad, Paris took steps against Trinquier's activities. Early in February, the Government decreed that French soldiers who served a foreign power could lose their citizenship.<sup>37</sup> Approximately a week later the Prime Minister's office issued a press release which said that in the light of Article 85 of the Penal Code, which forbids the recruitment of soldiers in France for a foreign regime, the recently opened enlistment office for volunteers for Katanga had to be closed.<sup>38</sup> The office in question was indeed closed, but recruiting reportedly continued at another address by Katangan officials with the assistance of a retired French officer.<sup>39</sup>

In spite of the government ordinance against serving in a foreign army, Trinquier left with Commandant René Faulques and two other officers for Katanga at the end of February. His three companions, who had all made their reputation in the Algerian war, had also resigned from the French Army to join the Katangan gendarmerie. As a result of Belgian pressures, however, President Tshombe broke his agreement with Trinquier. He was forced to leave Katanga again on March 9. To expect the veteran of the Indochinese and Algerian wars to abandon his new cause in Katanga was unrealistic. Trinquier went to Greece where he wrote his recommendations for the organization of Katanga's military establishment. Realizing he could accomplish little without the support of his own government or the cooperation of the Katanga regime, Trinquier returned to France in April 1961.

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37. Le Monde, February 7, 1961.

38. Ibid., February 14, 1961.

39. Interviews with French journalists, Paris, June 3, 1965. See also Justin Bomboko's statement in the Security Council on November 17, 1961 [U.N., SCOR, S/PV 976, November 17, 1961, pp. 40-41.]

Commandant Faulques and the other two officers remained in Katanga. Faulques took charge of the training center in Shinkolobwe. Gradually, other mercenaries from France joined Tshombe's volunteer forces. After the putsch of April 1961 in Algeria, some disillusioned officers left Algeria for Katanga. The total number of Frenchmen serving in the Katangan gendarmerie has never been revealed. Pierre Davister, the Belgian reporter, maintains that at least twelve French officers were attached to Tshombe's staff.<sup>40</sup> Conor Cruise O'Brien gives one of the highest estimates and suggests that there were about thirty French mercenaries in Katanga.<sup>41</sup>

The effectiveness of the French officers compensated for their small numbers. Their experience in Algeria had trained them well in the techniques of subversive and guerrilla warfare. They were much better equipped to fight in Katanga's political and geographical environment than the other mercenaries. The failure of the U.N. military operation, in September 1961, was largely the result of the opposition organized by the French officers. Colonel Muke, the illiterate former sergeant-major was the official commander of the Katangan gendarmerie; Faulques was "in theory his Chief of Staff, but in fact, the real commander," reports the French journalist Jacques le Bailly who was in close touch with the French mercenaries.<sup>42</sup>

Faulques and his team continued to play a key role in Katanga's resistance until the end of 1961. After Round Two, several French mercenaries, including Faulques, left Katanga. The French component of the mercenary force had never been very large; now an even smaller group remained, but it consisted of the most extreme OAS types, the "ultras" as they were called.

In the course of 1962, the mercenaries became increasingly dis-

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40. Pierre Davister and Philippe Toussaint, Croisettes et casques blues. (Brussels: Editions actuelles, 1962), p. 153.

41. Conor Cruise O'Brien, To Katanga and Back. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1962), p. 201.

42. Trinquier, op.cit., p. 112.

organized. When Round Three began, on December 28, 1962, mercenary resistance was no longer effective against the U.N. troops. When the fighting was over, most remaining mercenaries fled to Angola and Rhodesia.

The French Government had long ceased to view with equanimity the mercenary enrollment activities in France. In January 1962, Article 85 of the Penal Code was applied for the first time. A French paratroop captain, Paul Ropagnol, who had fought with Faulques in Katanga and who had been sent to France to enlist additional volunteers, was arrested in Toulouse. He was later sentenced to six months in prison.<sup>43</sup> In February 1962, an order for the arrest of Commandant Faulques was issued. The following June, however, the proceedings against Faulques were dropped because there were insufficient grounds for prosecution.<sup>44</sup>

#### Political Support

French support for Tshombe came also from circles around Jacques Foccart, a faithful Gaullist. Foccart had been a member of de Gaulle's office from the days of his return to power. Originally charged with the coordination of internal security and intelligence activities, Foccart received, in 1960, his present official title: Secretary-General for African and Malagasy Affairs at the Office of the President. Foccart belonged to the informal nerve center of the Gaullist regime. He was one of de Gaulle's principal advisers on African matters, albeit the extent of his influence varied. He gathered all information on African questions and controlled a network of intelligence agents in Africa. It is not certain that Foccart himself was in favor of Tshombe, but several of his agents, particularly those who were attached to the Youlou regime in Brazzaville were.<sup>45</sup> Foccart was a staunch supporter of President Youlou, who, in turn, was one of Tshombe's closest allies.

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<sup>43</sup> The actual sentence read six months in prison with benefit of the First Offenders Act.

<sup>44</sup> Le Monde, June 9, 1962.

<sup>45</sup> Michel Borri, reportedly one of Foccart's agents, testified in his Nous . . . ces Affreux of the strong pro-Tshombe sentiment among the French agents in Brazzaville.

The nature of encouragement for Katangan secession that came from Foccart's office is most difficult to determine. The support was clandestine. It consisted of political advice, generally through Brazzaville channels; of assistance with the enrollment of mercenaries in France; and probably of cooperation with some of the weapons shipments to Katanga.

Finally, certain French foreign service officers in the Congo collaborated with President Tshombe in his secessionist ambitions. The French Consul in Elisabethville, Joseph Lambroschini, was one of these officers. O'Brien accuses him of being a "dangerous adversary" of the United Nations and of supporting the Katanga regime.<sup>46</sup> The whole demeanor of the French Consul suggests that O'Brien's charge was basically true. Like his West European counterparts, the French Consul gave political advice to the Katanga Government to strengthen its position. He also sought to obstruct the apprehension of mercenaries by the UNF. Lambroschini probably knew all the mercenaries, but refused to reveal their identity or whereabouts to U.N. officials in Katanga. On August 28, 1961, Lambroschini and the other European consuls pressured the U.N. Representative in Elisabethville into halting the arrest of the mercenaries and pledged to take the responsibility for their repatriation themselves. This promise amounted, in effect, to a play for time, which enabled the mercenaries to take off their uniforms and reappear as civilians. Of the twenty-one French officers who were on the list to be expelled, only ten were awaiting repatriation or had left Katanga by September 8, and some of them soon returned.

Was there a collusion between the French Consul and his superiors in Paris? Not necessarily. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs adhered to France's official position. It is well to remember that French diplomats in the Congo found themselves in a rapidly changing and chaotic situation. Communications between Leopoldville and Elisabethville were not always good. Moreover, particularly in Elisabethville, France's official repre-

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<sup>46</sup>. O'Brien, op.cit., pp. 108 and 128.

sentatives worked in an atmosphere where the European population, including their own compatriots, were vehemently against the United Nations and strongly in favor of Tshombe.

#### The Impact of France on the Peacekeeping Mission

France's policies as a whole placed a restraint on the U.N. peacekeeping mission, but they did not seriously alter the course of the operations. Lacking the endorsement of Paris, the United Nations suffered some loss in the prestige that broader diplomatic support would have brought. France's refusal to pay her share of the Congo undertaking contributed to the financial strains under which the United Nations worked and to the resulting financial crisis in the Organization. The political consequences of this refusal were far more significant than the material effect on the Congo effort itself.

The U.N. Secretary-General was never free from France's restraining influence in either the interpretation or execution of his mandate. The absence of positive unanimous consent from the permanent members of the Security Council caused Hammarskjold and Thant to move with greater caution in the exercise of their authority. The Secretary-General could never escape French pressure and disapproval.

In a strict legal sense, the official policies and actions of the French Government were not contrary to the U.N. mandate.<sup>47</sup> The attitude of extreme reservation, General de Gaulle's calling the United Nations "petit machin," France's unwillingness to pay her assessment of the operation, its limited interpretation of the U.N. mandate where it concerned Katanga, its order prohibiting U.N. planes from flying over French territory, the tacitly permitted pro-Tshombe activities of certain French officials at home and in the Congo--these taken together created the impression in Katanga that France was favorable to its cause. The effect was to encourage the proponents of Katangan secession in their opposition to the U.N. mission. From this perspective, the political impact of France's policies was

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47. For a discussion of legal aspects, see Chapter 3.

contrary to the U.N. mandate.

The covert political and military support to the Katanga regime which came from certain French Government quarters was a distinct breach of the U.N. mandate. The French mercenaries, in particular, greatly strengthened Tshombe's military capability, especially in Rounds One and Two. The result of their efforts was to delay the integration of Katanga into the Congo. Their presence and activities were in direct violation of the U.N. resolutions.

The French Government, by reacting passively to mercenary recruitment and other activities in support of Tshombe, assumed a posture against the spirit and intention of the U.N. resolution.

Ironically, France's own interests were served by the U.N. mission to the extent that it succeeded in frustrating Soviet ambitions and in reestablishing order and stability in the Congo.

## CHAPTER 10

### ROLE OF GREAT BRITAIN

From the beginning Britain supported the U.N. Congo operation in principle and financially, but objected to the use of military means to impose a political settlement. The British Representative abstained on the first Security Council vote in July 1960. In London the Prime Minister, nevertheless, welcomed U.N. intervention. Although in agreement with the general objectives of the peacekeeping mission, Great Britain did not fully support the U.N. effort.

As a result the Secretary-General had to proceed cautiously if he wished to retain a reasonable measure of British support. He was well aware of the implications of non-cooperation, if not active antagonism, of such an influential power.

#### British Interests in the Congo

When the fabric of the orderly Belgian Congo dissolved, Britain was engaged in developing new relationships with the British areas of Africa. London feared that the Communists would exploit the chaotic situation and succeed in turning the Congo into a base for subversion throughout the continent. It was of crucial importance for Britain--as it was for France--to avoid an armed conflict between the major powers in Central Africa.

The Congo crisis also had a direct impact on British policies



toward the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Northern Rhodesia adjoined Katanga along a frontier of nearly 2,000 miles. For the most part the same tribes lived on both sides of the border. There were also close economic links between the Federation and Katanga. The British were concerned that the disorders in the Congo would spill over into the already tense situation in Northern Rhodesia.

It was the secession of Katanga, however, which placed Britain in a unique dilemma. From the perspective of the Federation leaders including Prime Minister Sir Roy Welensky, the existence of a stable westward-looking regime in Elisabethville was vital to the survival of the Federation. Welensky's interests called for the strengthening of the Tshombe Government. He sought, therefore, to force London to adopt a more favorable attitude towards Tshombe. But from a strictly British point of view, there were two factors that argued against support for Katanga's independence. First, in so far as there was still an effort in London to preserve the Federation, Britain could not very well endorse a secessionist movement in the neighboring state. More important, British support for Tshombe would jeopardize London's carefully established relationships with the nationalist leaders in British Africa.

Compounding the predicament of the British Government was the fact that there was a distinct pro-Tshombe sentiment in official and private circles at home, based on economic and political factors. Britain had industrial and financial interests in the Congo of which only about 45 percent were in Katanga. But, the spokesmen for British economic interests in Katanga were particularly vociferous. On the whole, their outlook leaned towards the more conservative pro-white regimes in Africa. Their views were expressed by the right wing of the Conservative party. As a result, the Conservative government in London found itself torn by internal pressures. It was also assailed by outside proponents of the Rhodesian Federation. Much of the ambivalence in Britain's Congo policies stems from this situation.

### The Initial Position

When the Security Council passed the July 14, 1960, resolution, Britain along with France abstained. Britain also defended the Belgian action and argued that the recall of Belgian troops should be a consequence of their replacement by U.N. forces.<sup>1</sup> But, unlike France, Britain's abstention was not inspired by its apprehensions about the United Nations as such.

London felt that the intrusion of U.N. military force would forestall Communist intervention in the Congo. Furthermore, on July 10, Tshombe had requested the help of British and Rhodesian troops to restore order. Prime Minister Harold Macmillan as well as Sir Roy Welensky--the latter on urging by the British Government,<sup>2</sup>--had immediately rejected Tshombe's appeal. But London feared that if the situation in the Congo continued to deteriorate, Welensky's regime would feel forced to intervene. Such a development would have had grave repercussions for British relations throughout Africa. Finally, support of the United Nations, though by no means an overriding factor for Britain, was fundamental to its foreign policy.

For all these reasons, the peacekeeping mission itself was welcomed in London. As Macmillan informed the House of Commons, Britain would give full support to the U.N. action authorized by the July 14 resolution.<sup>3</sup>

### The Interpretation of the Mandate

As events in the Congo developed, Britain faithfully continued to present the Belgian viewpoint to its allies and in the United Nations. But at the same time, London became increasingly convinced that U.N. intervention offered the best solution for keeping the Congo free from

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1. U.N., SCOR, S/PV 873, July 13, 1960, p. 20.

2. Sir Roy Welensky, Welensky's 4000 Days. (London: Collins, 1964), p. 211.

3. The Times (London), July 15, 1960.

the direct Cold War struggle. In consequence, Britain endorsed the second and third Security Council resolutions as well as the more far-reaching fourth resolution on February 21, 1961.

Despite this basic support, London had serious reservations about the interpretation of the U.N. mandate from the outset. On July 15, 1960, in a personal message to Welensky, Macmillan maintained that the function of the UNF was to restore order without taking sides in any internal conflicts.<sup>4</sup> In the debate on the second Security Council resolution the British delegate cautioned that the UNF could neither be a party to, nor intervene, in a domestic dispute. The aim of the UNF was to preserve the unity of the Congo, but the relationship between the Central Government and the provincial administrations had to be settled by the Congolese themselves and could not be resolved "either by the intervention of outside states or by this organization."<sup>5</sup> Thus, Britain joined France in subscribing to a limited interpretation of the U.N. mandate. The proposals made in the United Nations or under the "American Plan"<sup>6</sup> to the effect that the United Nations disarm Congolese troops or secure the release of opposition members imprisoned by the Central Government were consistently opposed by British spokesmen.<sup>7</sup>

Outside the United Nations, the British held to the nonintervention principle by refusing to recognize Katanga as an independent state in spite of Welensky's pleadings to accord at least de facto recognition to the Tshombe Government.<sup>8</sup> When it became evident that officers of British origin were enrolling in the Katangan gendarmerie, London announced, on April 12, 1961, that "any United Kingdom national who takes up a military engagement in the Congo, other than under U.N. command," would have

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4. Welensky, op.cit., p. 213.

5. U.N., SCOR, S/PV 878, July 21, 1960, p. 8.

6. For a discussion of the "American Plan," see Chapter 7, pp. 144-47.

7. U.N., GAOR, A/PV 952, December 17, 1960, p. 1349. U.N., GAOR, A/PV 980, April 7, 1961, p. 258.

8. Welensky, op.cit., p. 210

his passport invalidated.<sup>9</sup> It is important to note that the majority of the English-speaking mercenaries in Katanga were South Africans; some came from Rhodesia; the mercenaries from Britain constituted only a very small number, probably less than a dozen. Moreover, no recruitment of mercenaries took place in the United Kingdom. The recruitment centers for English-speaking volunteers were primarily in South Africa. Rhodesia permitted the passage of mercenaries across its territory.

Britain's insistence on avoiding the use of the UNF to influence the internal balance of forces in the Congo was partly inspired by a concern that this would create a dangerous precedent which might apply elsewhere, and not least in British Africa. Otherwise, as the British delegate stressed in the Security Council, the Organization "would be at the beck and call of any state with the problem of a dissident minority within its own borders."<sup>10</sup>

London applied the nonintervention formula most rigidly with respect to the reincorporation of Katanga into the Congo. The pragmatic argument, widely accepted throughout Britain, centered on the fact that there was already a reasonable semblance of order and a functioning government in Katanga. The liquidation of Tshombe's regime would force Katanga into the chaos that had submerged the rest of the Congo. The United Nations would do well to leave Katanga alone and concentrate its resources on restoring stability where the need was greater.<sup>11</sup>

In addition, the British Government was under constant pressure from Welensky and members of the Conservative party who sought to prevent the United Nations from taking action that would prejudice Tshombe's position.

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9. U.N., SCOR, S/PV 976, November 17, 1961, p. 30.

10. Ibid., p. 34.

11. Interviews with British journalists and officials of the Foreign Office, London, May 27, 1965. See also Lord Alport, The Sudden Assignment. (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1965), p. 105.

Equally significant, the British Government itself did not wish to weaken the Katanga regime, particularly in view of the rivalry between Leopoldville and Stanleyville. The position of Kasavubu and his collaborators continued to be highly precarious. The accession to power by the Stanleyville forces remained a possibility. Such a development would augur ill for Britain's economic interests in the Copperbelt and its security interests throughout Central and Southern Africa. If Tshombe could come to terms with Leopoldville, the moderates in the Central Government would be considerably strengthened and Stanleyville could be kept effectively in check. From time to time, London requested Welensky to use his influence with Tshombe to persuade him to reach an accord with Kasavubu.<sup>12</sup> With this in mind the British also pressed for the recall of Dayal, the U.N. Representative in Leopoldville, whose attitude they believed conveyed irreconcilable hostility toward Elisabethville, contempt for Leopoldville, and sympathy for Stanleyville.<sup>13</sup>

#### Britain's Opposition to the U.N. Operations

Britain sought diligently to restrain the United Nations from employing force to secure its objectives in Katanga. After Operation Run-punch, the round-up of mercenaries, had taken place on August 28, 1961, the British Representative in New York was immediately instructed "to find out whether force had been used . . . and to express the opinion of Her Majesty's Government that there was no mandate for the removal of essential foreign civilians which might lead to a breakdown of the administration of the Katanga."<sup>14</sup>

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12. Alport, op.cit., p. 107. Welensky, op.cit., pp. 220 and 229.

13. Hoskyns, op.cit., p. 349. In a House of Commons debate Labour members charged that the then British Ambassador in the Congo, Ian Scott, had worked for the removal of Dayal. The Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, J. B. Godber, justified this by making a distinction between "interference" and "representations" and explained: "Of course it is proper for our Ambassador to make representations, but certainly not to indulge in propaganda such as the honorable Member suggests." Mr. Driberg: "What is the difference?" Mr. Godber: "There is a very big difference." [Hansard, H.C. Debates, Vol. 534, October 18, 1961, col. 197].

14. Hansard, H.L. Debates, Vol. 234, October 18, 1961, col. 445.

In the two weeks that followed, there was a further rise in tension in Elisabethville and on September 13, Round One began. The British Government, partly to silence the protests of its right wing faction and to allay the fears of Welensky who had promptly ordered Rhodesian troops to the Katanga border, used "all their influence to urge a cease-fire."<sup>15</sup> According to one account, the British Ambassador in Leopoldville warned Hammarskjold, who had arrived that same day in the Congo, that unless he could offer an acceptable explanation of the events in Katanga and promise to halt the fighting, Britain would withdraw its support from the U.N. operation.<sup>16</sup> The testimony of the British Under-Secretary of State, Lord Lansdowne, whom London had dispatched on a fact-finding mission to the Congo, reveals some of Britain's efforts behind the scenes:

On September 14 I left for Leopoldville with instructions to acquaint myself with the facts at first hand . . . and to impress upon Mr. Hammarskjold that Her Majesty's Government were shocked at the outbreak of fighting in the Katanga and to urge upon him the necessity of bringing the fighting to a close. . . . I spoke with absolute frankness . . . I said that I had reluctantly formed the impression that there was an insufficient desire among certain of his officers to bring about a cease-fire. They seemed to me to be carrying out a punitive war. . . . Much that I had to say to Mr. Hammarskjold was highly critical of the United Nations' action.<sup>17</sup>

The pending request of the United Nations to Britain for overflying rights for Ethiopian jets for use by the UNF in Katanga was also discussed with Hammarskjold. The rights were not granted but London never officially admitted that it refused to grant them. According to its own explanation to the House of Commons some three months later, Britain had actually given its consent, but the fact was that the jets were grounded in Ethiopia. In the same debate, however, the government spokesman said that if these planes had reached Katanga there would have been the danger

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15. Hansard, H.C. Debates, Vol. 534, October 17, 1961, col. 22.

16. Arthur L. Gavshon, The Mysterious Death of Dag Hammarskjold. (New York: Walker & Co., 1962), pp. 129-31.

17. Hansard, H.L., Debates, Vol. 234, October 18, 1961, Cols. 445-54 passim.

of an escalation of the fighting at the very time that Hammarskjold was seeking to arrange a cease-fire.<sup>18</sup>

It was largely through the efforts of the British High Commissioner in the Rhodesian Federation and the British diplomats in the Congo that cease-fire negotiations took place at all between Tshombe and Mahmoud Khiary, Chief of U.N. Civilian Operations, who took over the negotiations when Hammarskjold died.<sup>19</sup>

It was also partly through the pressures of the British Government on the U.N. Secretariat that Conor Cruise O'Brien was forced to resign in December 1961.<sup>20</sup>

On November 24, 1961, the Security Council passed its fifth Congo resolution from which Britain, together with France, abstained because it went "dangerously far in encouraging the local command [in Katanga] to use an added measure of force." The British delegate proceeded with the warning that continued British support for the Congo operation would depend on the "skill and wisdom and the conciliatory manner with which the United Nations carries out its mandate."<sup>21</sup> Some two weeks later the December 1961 fighting, Round Two, started.

Meanwhile, on October 21, the Secretary-General had requested London for a supply of 1,000-pound bombs, presumably 24, for the Indian Canberra bombers in the UNF. On December 7, the request was repeated. This caught the Macmillan Government in a cross fire. India, whose troops

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18. Hansard, H.C., Debates, Vol. 542, December 14, 1961, col. 657.

19. Lord Alport, the British High Commissioner to the Federation, presents a detailed account of the efforts of the British representatives in Elisabethville and himself to arrange first the meeting between Tshombe and Hammarskjold and subsequently between Tshombe and Khiary. Alport, *op.cit.*, pp. 108-33.

20. Interviews with British journalists, London, May 27, 1965. See also Conor Cruise O'Brien, To Katanga and Back. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1962), *passim*.

21. U.N., SCOR, S/PV 979, November 21, 1961, pp. 5 and 6.

were heavily committed in the UNF, would have regarded a negative response as one more irritant to Anglo-Indian relations. If the British refused, they would have drawn still further opprobrium from other Commonwealth and U.N. members who accused Britain of encouraging Katangan secession. On December 8, the Foreign Office announced that Britain would provide the bombs. In Rhodesia, Welensky issued an impassioned denouncement of London's decision and declared that the bombs would not be permitted to cross "one inch of Federal soil."<sup>22</sup> In the House of Commons, Viscount Hinchinbrooke, a Conservative, filed a motion of censure of the Government. Not just those Tories who were identified with the "Katanga lobby," but many who had stood loyally by the Government were now deeply disturbed lest Britain should find itself in a position of supporting open war against Katanga. The Conservative Government naturally had to take a right wing revolt very seriously. On December 11, London disclosed that the bombs would not be released until U.N. policy had been further clarified. In the House the Government tabled its own motion asking to support a formal request to the United Nations for an immediate cease-fire. These steps broke the backbench revolt and served to close the Conservative ranks in time for the Commons debate on a motion of confidence. The initial decision to supply the bombs had been made with obvious reluctance; its reversal and the cease-fire call were the direct consequence of the pressures brought to bear on the Government by the right wing sector at home and the Rhodesian Federation. But these acts of non-cooperation with the U.N. effort also reflected a less ephemeral belief held by British officials. The conviction that the United Nations should not use force to settle internal conflicts inspired Lord Home's assertion of December 28, 1961, that there was a "crisis of confidence in the United Nations."<sup>23</sup> On various occasions in 1962, the British Government repeated this theme.

The long stalemate in the Congo and the procrastinating strategems of Elisabethville and Leopoldville finally persuaded London that it

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22. Welensky, op.cit., p. 248.

23. The Times (London), December 29, 1961.



could not forestall coercive measures if the United Nations decided to resort to them. In August 1962, Britain publicly gave its endorsement to the Thant Plan for National Reconciliation, although it still shied away from the proposed economic boycott. By the end of November 1962, however, London informed Tshombe that if he rejected a settlement the United Nations would move to exercise sanctions against Katanga which Britain would be unable to oppose or prevent.<sup>24</sup> Britain's official reaction to Round Three was much more restrained than it has been to the previous Round. A Foreign Office statement simply mentioned the futility of trying to impose a political pattern on the Congo by force and appealed for an immediate cessation of the fighting. In Katanga, British actions were confined to attempts to force Tshombe to return to the conference table and to dissuade him from pursuing his threatened scorched earth policy. It was primarily due to the efforts of the British and Belgian consuls at Elisabethville that most of Katanga's industrial complex was spared.

#### British Support of the U.N. Operation

In spite of the misgivings about the use of force to attain U.N. objectives, Britain did not withhold its financial support of the U.N. operation. In addition to paying its full assessment for the cost of the peacekeeping mission, Britain voluntarily contributed to the expenses of the U.N. civilian operation and waived the cost of the airlift of personnel and equipment which it had undertaken in the beginning. In December 1961, the General Assembly authorized the issue of U.N. bonds in order to raise funds to meet its immediate difficulties. Britain helped the United Nations overcome part of its financial problems by becoming the second largest buyer, after the United States, of U.N. bonds.<sup>25</sup>

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24. Welensky, op.cit., p. 264.

25. For a discussion of the financial aspects, see Chapter 19.

### The Impact of Great Britain on the Peacekeeping Mission

The policies of Great Britain had both a positive and a negative effect on the U.N. peacekeeping operation. Britain's continued financial and diplomatic support helped to sustain the authority of the United Nations as an organization. In a general sense, this backing enhanced the prestige of the Congo mission.

But Britain also exercised a restraining influence on the Secretary-General in his interpretation and application of the mandate. In this respect, Britain was much more effective than France. London's support and more active involvement in what the UNF did in the Congo accorded it a greater measure of leverage than France enjoyed. Hammarskjöld and Thant were always conscious of the possibility that Britain could cut off its financial assistance and diplomatic support which would have aggravated the financial difficulties of the Congo undertaking and gravely undermined the authority and stature of the entire organization as well. Britain's representations to the Secretary-General contributed more towards terminating the military operations of Rounds One and Two than those of France.

The British diplomats in the Congo, as well as Sir Roy Welensky, had a moderating influence on Tshombe. They frequently persuaded him to continue or, when the dialogue was broken, to resume the negotiations with Leopoldville. These activities created a more conducive climate for the achievement of U.N. objectives.

London's hostility to the use of force and the efforts to preserve Tshombe's power position also nurtured Katanga's illusion that the British endorsed its secession. In this context, Britain's policy was similar to that of France and had the result of delaying the reintegration of Katanga into the Congo.

To the extent that the U.N. mission forestalled a direct clash between the big powers in Central Africa and protected the Congo against Communist penetration, the peacekeeping expedition served British interests

in stability and peaceful change. Although the U.N. undertaking complicated the Rhodesian situation for the British, it also helped to prevent Rhodesian intervention in the Congo. Such intervention would have adversely affected the British position in Africa as well as the U.N. operation.

## CHAPTER 11

### ROLE OF BELGIUM

#### Belgian Interests

Except for the Congolese themselves, the Belgians were more intensely involved in the Congo crisis than any other people.<sup>1</sup> As the former metropolitan power, Belgium had a profound political, economic, and emotional stake in the restoration of order and in successful decolonization. It had an immediate vital interest in protecting the lives of some 87,000 Belgian citizens who were living in the Congo on Independence Day, June 30, 1960. Of these, some 10,000 were administrators in the Congolese Government and some 17,000 were employed in the private sector.<sup>2</sup>

Brussels had a deep political and moral commitment to assist the new government to achieve viable statehood. The Belgian Government wanted to prove to itself and to the world that it was not irresponsible in abruptly granting independence, although it felt that this fateful decision was forced upon it. During the colonial era the Belgian thesis had called for a step-by-step preparation of the Congolese for full participation in

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1. The material in this chapter was drawn primarily from J. Gérard-Libois, "Belgium's Role in the U.N. Operation" (1965), a background study especially prepared for this Report.

2. CRISP, Congo: 1960, Vol. II, prepared by J. Gérard-Libois and Benoit Verhaegen (Brussels: Les Dossiers du CRISP, n.d.), p. 518.

modern civilization. Belgium had emphasized mass elementary education rather than the creation of a highly educated elite. Secondary and university training was to be stressed at a later stage of the Congo's development. Economically, the Belgian administration had provided the Congo with a standard of living which compared favorably with most other black African countries. In terms of political developments elsewhere in Africa, the pace in the Congo was too slow. Brussels' plans for an effective transition of its colony to a functioning state were prematurely cut off by the fast-moving events of 1959 and 1960.

Belgian Government and private investments in the Congo were substantial. The official colonial policy encouraged the development of the country's rich resources by granting exclusive concessions to private corporations, mainly Belgian. The Belgian holdings, known as the "Congo portfolio," amounted to some \$750 million in 1960. The largest Belgian financial grouping was the Société Générale de Belgique, which controlled either directly or indirectly, about 70 percent of the Congolese economy.<sup>3</sup> The Société Générale's mining activities were concentrated in Katanga and Kasai. Through an intricate system of interlocking shareholdings and directorates, the Société Générale had a controlling interest in the Union Minière du Haut-Katanga, virtually the sole extracting company in Katanga. The control of the Société Générale over the Union Minière was not complete; another large shareholder was Tanganyika Concessions, the British-African giant company which held 20 percent of the voting rights in the Union Minière. German and French interests were also represented in the Katangan mining concern.

In contrast to Great Britain and France, Belgium lacked a tradition of empire. Only rarely did a controversy over colonial policy become a matter of public debate in Belgium. The general public and the political parties were content to leave the management of Congolese affairs to the officials responsible. The nationalist riots of January 1959 in Leopold-

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3. CRISP, Structures économiques de la Belgique: Morphologie des groupes financiers, (Brussels: CRISP, 1962), p. 150.

ville came as a shock and caused deep concern throughout Belgium. The general attitude in private and governmental circles was to avoid more conflict and being drawn into an Algerian-type war in the Congo. The Socialist opposition, in particular, conducted during 1959 an intensive campaign against the use of force in the Congo and against the dispatch of metropolitan troops, which presumably would have been necessary to control further colonial disorders. Under these circumstances, and concerned lest international opinion would turn against Belgium, the Liberal-Christian Democrat Coalition Government agreed to hold the Round Table Conference of January 1960, which resulted in the decision to grant full sovereignty to the Congo on June 30, 1960.

In accepting the principle and date of independence of the Congo, in providing it with a transitional Fundamental Law--embracing the goals of national unity and parliamentary democracy--Belgium had formulated an ideal picture of an emergent nation that would accede peacefully to independence without a serious rupture with the metropolitan power. The new state would have all the attributes of sovereignty, but because of the lack of trained Congolese, its civil administration and its army--the instruments of its unity--would necessarily depend for a long time on Belgian cadres serving as technical advisers.

The mutiny of the Force publique and its aftermath cruelly shattered this peaceful image. Belgium saw its prestige fall in the international arena, where it was accused by some of aggression, and by others of abandoning its colonial responsibility and inadequately preparing the Congo for statehood.

### Belgian Policies

#### The Initial Position

Belgium's fundamental objective from the beginning of independence was to maintain a sufficient presence in the Congo to protect Belgian interests. Its actions and policy there and in the broader international realm, including the United Nations, sought to give its nationals in the Congo a sense of security which would encourage them to remain at

their posts and thereby ensure the continued administrative and economic functioning of the new state. Brussels' initial position toward the U.N. mission reflected this over-riding concern.

The Belgian Government justified its military intervention in July 1960, because of the total inability of the Congolese authorities to ensure order and guarantee the safety of Belgian citizens and other Europeans.<sup>4</sup> Intervention from this standpoint was considered as a temporary emergency measure, and not as interference in the internal affairs of the new republic. In no way did Brussels regard its military action as illegal or as an act of aggression.<sup>5</sup> No Belgian official seriously suggested the reimposition of Belgian authority in the Congo.

From Belgium's point of view, a U.N. military presence was desirable, and in any event inevitable, but it was seen merely as a force to collaborate with the metropolitan troops to restore order. Since U.N. intervention did not constitute a sanction against Belgium, Brussels was prepared to endorse the original request of July 10, 1960, from Leopoldville for U.N. military aid and a similar request on July 12 from the Congolese Minister of Foreign Affairs. Brussels did not endorse the July 12 and 13 appeals of Kasavubu and Lumumba which placed the onus for the breakdown of order on Belgian intervention.

Encouraged by Hammarskjold's July 13 statement in the Security Council which did not condemn Brussels, but emphasized the need to restore

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4. By July 18, 1960, Belgian troops had intervened in twenty-three different places in the Congo. Belgian military strength in the Congo at its height consisted of 9,400 men: there were 3,800 Belgian metropolitan forces, including members of the auxiliary and supporting services, in the Congo before the mutiny started, and 5,600 men were flown in from Belgium to reinforce the metropolitan troops after the mutiny began. By August 7, 1960, 2,800 men had been withdrawn again. At that date there were 1,700 Belgian troops left in Katanga and 4,900 men at the bases in Kitona and Kamina and in Ruanda-Urundi. [W. J. Ganshof van der Meersch, Fin de la Souveraineté Belge au Congo (Brussels: Royal Institute of International Relations, 1963), p. 484.]

5. U.N., SCOR, S/PV 873, July 13, 1960, pp. 34-37.

order, the Belgian Representative, Walter Loridan, expressed his Government's willingness to cooperate fully with the United Nations and to withdraw its troops as soon as the UNF was able to take over.<sup>6</sup> The interpretation in Brussels of the July resolutions was, however, that it was incumbent on the Belgian Government to decide in each specific situation whether the UNF could adequately guarantee the maintenance of law and order. Belgium continued to insist upon the right to intervene in case of imminent danger to its citizens, but in such cases it would notify the UNF command immediately.<sup>7</sup>

On July 17 the first Belgian units left Leopoldville for Brussels, but the major withdrawal from the capital did not start until July 20; it was completed on July 23. Since the Secretary-General did not at that time request Brussels to expedite its troop recall and did not formally object to Belgium's unilateral interventions after July 14, Belgium's plan for a gradual troop withdrawal and replacement by the UNF appeared to be accepted.

Brussels indicated its desire to cooperate with the U.N. mission by suggesting to Ralph Bunche, on July 16, that the United Nations should employ Belgian troops, particularly for the restoration of order at Stanleyville. On July 18, the Belgian Commander, General Gheysen, was informed that this proposal had been rejected. UNF officials agreed, however, that Belgian aircraft, painted with U.N. markings, would transport the Ethiopian troops from Stanleyville to other places in Equateur province.

In Katanga, where Tshombe had declared his secession and had appealed for Belgian aid, law and order was quickly reestablished. Belgian officials saw no need for U.N. intervention there. They felt, moreover, that the Secretary-General should not comply with Lumumba's

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6. *Ibid.*, pp. 36-37.

7. U.N., *SCOR*, Supplement for July, Aug., Sept., 1960, S/4398 (July 18, 1960), p. 24.



demands for the dispatch of U.N. troops to Elisabethville, which would amount to interference in a domestic conflict in favor of the Lumumba regime.

The Belgian Government was under strong pressure from its nationals in Katanga where the overwhelming majority supported the secessionist effort. At Brussels' urgings they had stayed, but they insisted upon the retention of Belgian troops to protect them. Europeans in Katanga warned that the entire economy and administration would collapse if U.N. forces were to enter and many threatened to leave if the UNF were to move into Katanga.<sup>8</sup> The Belgian authorities in Brussels and Elisabethville realized the political impossibility of granting recognition to an independent Katanga and they adopted a cautious attitude on this point. Count Harold d'Aspremont-Lynden, the Prime Minister's chef de cabinet, who had been sent to Elisabethville on July 12 to study Belgian aid to Katanga, was able to dissuade Tshombe from going to Belgium to argue his case. But the Belgians did want to isolate Katanga from the political influence of Lumumba and to rebuild Katanga's administrative structure and security forces. Starting with Katanga, Brussels hoped to reconstruct the Congo on a federal or confederal basis. On July 20, the Belgian Technical Mission (Mistebel), headed by d'Aspremont-Lynden, was established and became, in fact, the administrative organ in Katanga in the months that followed.

Under these uncertain conditions, Brussels adopted a policy of covering all bets--keeping Katanga a going concern (partly as a counterweight to Lumumba) and simultaneously supporting the Leopoldville Government. This broad approach accounted for certain ambiguities in specific Belgian policies and drew charges of duplicity from some critics.

All these considerations required the presence of an active Belgian military force in Katanga for a sufficient period to neutralize anti-Tshombe Congolese troops and tribal groups. Recognizing the impossibility of preventing the eventual entry of the UNF into Katanga, the

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8. Congo 1960, Vol. II, op.cit., pp. 746-47.

Belgian Government sought to postpone the arrival of U.N. contingents until Katanga could assume the responsibility for its own administration and resist any invasion of Lumumba troops. The hostility of the Katanga regime to the UNF presence helped to promote Belgium's objective. Brussels, however, was unwilling to go so far as to use the threat of force to resist militarily the entry of the UNF into Katanga. Belgian troops were under strict orders not to resist U.N. forces and not to collaborate in any operation against the United Nations.

Hammarskjold himself admitted in his August 6, 1960, report:

The difficulty which the Council faces in the case of Katanga does not have its root in the Belgian attitude. . . . The Belgian Government acquiesces in the Security Council decisions and therefore undoubtedly will instruct its military elements in the province to act in accordance with the resolutions. 9

After the August 8 resolution and after the establishment of a U.N. token presence in Katanga four days later, Belgian officials in Elisabethville sought to obtain U.N. guarantees of noninterference in Katangan affairs. In consultation with the UNF Commander, the evacuation of Belgian metropolitan forces in Katanga started on August 14.

Belgium's policy in July and August 1960 was marked by a determination to intervene where its nationals were threatened, to delay U.N. entrance into Katanga, and to ensure its own continued military presence there. This resulted, on the one hand, in deepening Lumumba's hostility to whatever efforts there were to disarm ANC troops in Leopoldville and elsewhere.<sup>10</sup> On the other hand, it reinforced Katanga's position and encouraged Tshombe's obstruction to U.N. intervention. As a corollary, the relations between the UNF and the Lumumba regime deteriorated.

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9. U.N., SCOR, Supplement for July, Aug., Sept., 1960, S/4417 (August 6, 1960), p. 53.

10. On July 15, Major General Alexander, Belgian General Gheysen, and acting ANC Chief of Staff Mpolo agreed to disarm ANC troops. On July 18 Mpolo appealed to Congolese troops to lay down their arms upon arrival of U.N. forces. Lumumba, however, strenuously objected to any disarmament. See Chapter 4, p. 75, and Chapter 6, pp. 128-29.

### Conflicting Belgian Policies

After Lumumba broke diplomatic relations with Belgium in July and as long as he dominated the scene, Belgian policy sought to support in Leopoldville the more moderate groups that opposed Lumumba. In addition to working through the Belgians who remained in Leopoldville, Brussels availed itself of the help of President Fulbert Youlou's French advisers in Brazzaville. Once Lumumba was ousted, Belgium tried to effect a rapprochement with Joseph Ileo, Kasavubu's appointee for Prime Minister, and subsequently with Colonel Joseph Mobutu and his Council of Commissioners. Belgians in Leopoldville and the Brussels Government believed that a Belgian presence in the Congo could be reestablished if a moderate regime were to come into power. Unofficial Belgian advisers, acting in concert with the Council of Commissioners, were alarmed to see that the UNF protected Lumumba and tried to encourage a reconciliation between Kasavubu and his former Prime Minister, particularly since the latter appeared to be supported by the Soviet Union. They sought to persuade Colonel Mobutu and his Commissioners to try to prevent such a reconciliation. Their efforts contributed to the deepening distrust of the U.N. Representatives by the Kasavubu-Mobutu regime.

The Bukavu incident<sup>11</sup> in late December further aggravated the relations between the UNF on the one hand and Brussels and Leopoldville on the other. On December 28, Justin Bomboko, President of the Council of Commissioners, requested the Belgian Ambassador at Brazzaville to allow ANC troops from Luluabourg to pass through the Belgian Trust Territory of Ruanda-Urundi and to make a transit landing at the Usumbura airfield in order to proceed to Bukavu, the capital of Kivu province, where Lumumba supporters had taken over. Bomboko also intimated that diplomatic ties with Belgium would be reestablished in Belgium would furnish technical aid for the operation against Bukavu and would clarify its position regarding Katanga. President Kasavubu confirmed the request the next day through the

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11. See Appendix F.

French Embassy at Leopoldville.

Belgium felt that this was an opportunity to identify itself more clearly with the Leopoldville authorities at a time when they resented Belgian support of Tshombe. Brussels hoped, thereby, to restore diplomatic relations with the Congo before the Belgian elections. Hence, the Belgian Government decided to cooperate.

Hammarskjold, who had learned of Leopoldville's plans, warned Belgium on December 30, to refuse Kasavubu's and Bomboko's request. On January 1, 1961, he accused Belgium of violating the prohibition against direct military aid of the September 20 resolution by assisting in the Bukavu operation. The Belgian Government replied that it had not been informed of the Congolese demand up to the moment of the landing of ANC troops at Usumbura. Faced with a fait accompli, Belgium explained, Mobutu's troops had been transported to the Congolese frontier. Brussels pointed out, however, that since it involved a request of the legitimate Congolese Head of State for what was in principle a relief operation, Belgium had not violated the September 20 resolution. Hammarskjold's demand that Belgian authorities disarm and arrest the ANC troops at Usumbura would have entailed, according to Brussels,

. . . a much more serious danger to international peace and security . . . [and] would have been contrary to the provisions of the Security Council's resolution of 22 July, 1960, which requested "all States to refrain from any action which might tend to impede the restoration of law and order and the exercise by the Government of the Congo of its authority." 12

The military operation itself, that took place on December 31 and was organized with the assistance of a Belgian military adviser to Colonel Mobutu, failed. But it helped to cement the relations between Brussels and the Kasavubu-Mobutu regime. On January 12, 1961, Belgium was

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12. U.N., SCOR, Supplement for Jan., Feb., March, 1961, S/4621 (January 11, 1961), p. 23. For the correspondence between Hammarskjold and the Belgian Representative on the Bukavu incident, see S/4606 and S/4606, Add. 1, pp. 1-15.

permitted to establish a mission in Leopoldville.

Brussels encouraged the moderate elements in Leopoldville simultaneously with its continued support of Katanga. On September 2, 1960, d'Aspremont-Lynden was appointed Minister of African Affairs and replaced by Robert Rothschild as head of Mistebel. This reinforced considerably the sympathy for Katanga within the Belgian Government where the Minister of Defense, Arthur Gilson, was one of Tshombe's strong advocates.<sup>13</sup> The pro-Katanga members of the Belgian Government, including Rothschild in Katanga, also endorsed the support of the Leopoldville moderates, but they wanted to move slowly and to give priority to the Katanga regime as the keystone of the future Congolese confederation.

Although Belgium shortly withdrew its troops from Katanga,<sup>14</sup> a number of Belgian officers and noncommissioned officers were placed at the disposal of the Katanga regime to serve as technical advisers and to rebuild the Katanga gendarmerie.<sup>15</sup> Belgium also furnished military equipment to the Katangan forces. On September 7, 1960, a Sabena plane flew some seven to nine tons of weapons into Elisabethville. Responding to Hammar-skjold's protest, Brussels explained the deliveries resulted from the misunderstanding of an "ill-informed" official.<sup>16</sup> It was evident, however,

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13. The Belgian Government was under heavy pressure of the conservative press and groups with financial interests in Katanga to support Tshombe. Policies to the contrary were not strongly advocated in public during this time. The Congo crisis and the accusations against Belgium by Communist and Afro-Asian states in the United Nations had aroused a feeling of national solidarity in Belgium. Socialist opposition leaders generally refrained, therefore, from attacking the Government on its Congo policies. Within the Socialist Party itself there was no consensus on a specific course for the Congo.

14. On September 9, 1960, the Belgian Representative confirmed to the Secretary-General that all Belgian "operational troops" had left Katanga. U.N., SCOR, Supplement for July, Aug., Sept., 1960, S/4475, Add. 3 (September 9, 1960), p. 133.

15. According to Rajeshwar Dayal's figures, at the end of October there were 231 Belgian officers and 117 of other ranks in the gendarmerie and 58 Belgian officers in the police. U.N., SCOR, Supplement for Oct., Nov., Dec., 1960, S/4557 (November 2, 1960), p. 15.

16. U.N., SCOR, Supplement for July, Aug., Sept., 1960, S/4482, Add. 2 (September 9, 1960), p. 140.

that the shipment occurred at the very time when the gendarmerie was faced with an ANC attack from the North just after the last Belgian troops had left Katangan territory.

Brussels' two parallel policies--support of the Leopoldville moderates and collaboration with the Tshombe regime--appeared to be in conflict with one another. Hence, they engendered bitter opposition in various Belgian circles. Belgian ultras in Katanga resented Brussels' aid to Leopoldville; the Belgian academicians who advised the Council of Commissioners condemned the assistance to Katanga; and within the Belgian Government there was disagreement on whether the primary emphasis of Belgian support should be on Elisabethville or Leopoldville. In any case, these policies were contrary to the U.N. resolutions, since they provided direct Belgian assistance to the secessionist province of Katanga, on the one hand, and to the Leopoldville regime in the Congo's constitutional conflict, on the other.

#### The Elimination of the Belgian Factor

Belgian collaboration with both the moderates of Leopoldville and the secessionists of Elisabethville was regarded by Hammarskjold and Dayal, his Representative in the Congo, as a disrupting factor likely to accentuate the factional struggles. Brussels' policy was seen as contrary to the intention of the U.N. resolutions. Moreover, Belgium had started in early September 1960 to provide military aid and cadres to the secessionist regime of South Kasai.

In this context Hammarskjold wrote to Loridan and Tshombe on October 8 and 19, insisting that all aid to the Congo should go through U.N. channels. The continued presence of "Belgian nationals--soldiers, paramilitary personnel and civilians," he said, was a factor of "crucial importance" in the Congo crisis. It was necessary to "fully circumscribe the Belgian factor and eliminate it." [emphasis added] He requested the Belgian Government, therefore, to "withdraw all military, paramilitary or civilian personnel which it had placed at the disposal of the authori-

ties in the Congo."<sup>17</sup>

Previous U.N. statements usually referred to military and paramilitary personnel, but Hammarskjold's letters added for the first time civilian personnel. The term embraced a wider group, ranging from a political adviser to a Congolese minister, to a technical engineer in the weather bureau. This reinforced the existing suspicion among Belgians that U.N. officials in the Congo discriminated against their civilian compatriots.

Hammarskjold's letters, parts of which were leaked to the Belgian press on October 20, created a profound consternation in Belgian official and private circles. The Belgian representative in Katanga warned that the Belgians were essential in maintaining order. Their withdrawal would cause the immediate disintegration of the gendarmerie and would result in the collapse of the Katanga Government.<sup>18</sup>

Brussels claimed that U.N. resolutions could not compel member states to channel all technical aid through the United Nations, especially if the Secretary-General refused to recruit or make use of available Belgian technicians. Hammarskjold's demands violated the rights of the authorities of a sovereign state to call upon foreign civilian aid as they deemed necessary. His prohibition, Brussels argued, constituted an effort to place the Congo under a U.N. trusteeship. To recall Belgian technicians would be to deprive the Congo of "the services of officials who are under the direct authority of the Congolese Government in order to replace them with international experts independent of that Government." Further, the withdrawal of the approximately 2,000 Belgians would "irreparably compromise the work being done in that country to re-establish order and restore prosperity." The 200 U.N. civilian experts who were in the Congo

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17. The letters were published as a supplement to Dayal's second report, U.N., SCOR, Supplement for Oct., Nov., Dec., 1960, S/4557 (November 2, 1960), pp. 44 and 48.

18. Congo 1960, Vol. II, op.cit., p. 787.

would be unable to take over this task.<sup>19</sup>

The official Belgian thesis, which was repeated during the entire period of differences with the Secretary-General, was that the presence of the United Nations in the Congo was of recent date. Its major preoccupation was the maintenance of international peace and security. Belgium, on the other hand, felt obligated to act because its responsibilities in the Congo resulted from eighty years of colonial rule; it still had substantial interests there; and it held that the West should retain whatever influence it had as a counterweight to Communist infiltration. This view acknowledged that Hammarskjold had to consider the future of his organization and his own position, but held that his rigid attitude on the role of the Belgians benefited no one, except perhaps Lumumba and his supporters. According to the Belgian thesis, he probably adopted what amounted to an anti-Belgian posture in part because of pressures from the Communist and the more militant African states; but, in so doing, he did not take into account the welfare and future of the Congo.<sup>20</sup>

At a special NATO meeting on October 22, 1960, Belgium tried to convince its Atlantic partners of the correctness of its views and to enlist their support against Hammarskjold. Belgium hoped in particular to show the solidarity of the European allies to the United States which was anxious not to weaken Hammarskjold's position at a time when he was under Soviet attack. London and Paris were in accord with Brussels. A subsequent statement by the U.S. Department of State on November 4, which expressed opposition to the demands for an indiscriminate withdrawal of Belgian technical aid to the Congo, suggested that Washington was not unsympathetic to the Belgian position.<sup>21</sup>

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19. U.N., SCOR, Supplement for Oct., Nov., Dec., 1960, S/4557 (November 2, 1960), pp. 46-47.

20. Institut royal des relations internationales, "Evolution de la crise congolaise," Chronique de politique étrangère, Vol XIV, September-November 1961, pp. 821-22 and 981-99, passim.

21. New York Times, November 5, 1960.



Other U.N. officials joined in the attack against Belgium. Andrew Cordier severely reproached Brussels in a television broadcast on October 29. Ralph Bunche published a few days later an article equally critical of Belgium.<sup>22</sup> Dayal's second report of November 2, 1960, in which he condemned the return of Belgian administrators and advisers to the Congo and accused them of sabotaging U.N. actions, inflamed Belgian feelings even more. Belgian officials felt that Dayal and Hammarskjold, who supported his Indian Representative, sought to blame the Belgians for their own lack of success in the Congo, and, therefore, insisted upon the eviction of the Europeans with whom the Congolese most wished to collaborate. In an official communique to the Secretary-General, Brussels said that it had been "shocked by tendentious judgements based upon a series of purely subjective allegations and interpretations, ambiguous innuendoes, unfounded insinuations." Rejecting Dayal's accusations, the Belgian Government repeated its earlier position on the withdrawal of Belgian technicians and listed the numerous incidents of its cooperation with the UNF.<sup>23</sup>

While there were incidents of Belgian obstruction, there is no evidence that this obstruction was widespread or officially condoned. In spite of the bitter indignation aroused by Hammarskjold's notes and the Dayal report, Foreign Minister Pierre Wigny concluded that the only reasonable course for the UNF and Belgium, since both were in the Congo, was to seek an understanding. On November 14, 1960, he proposed to conduct tripartite negotiations among Brussels, Leopoldville, and New York on the question of Belgian aid. He warned at the same time that Belgium would be forced to withdraw from the United Nations if the latter's chief officials continued to discriminate against Belgians in an "insulting and stupid fashion."<sup>24</sup>

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22. "Evolution de la crise congolaise," op.cit., p. 579.

23. U.N., SCOR, Supplement for Oct., Nov., Dec., 1960, S/4585 (December 7, 1960), pp. 84-92.

24. "Evolution de la crise congolaise," op.cit., p. 842.

Belgian opinion at home and in the Congo was vehemently against Hammarskjold's Congo policies during this period. The conservative and liberal press in Brussels accused him of appeasing Moscow and trying to make Belgium a "scapegoat" for his own failures.<sup>25</sup>

Hammarskjold's and Dayal's insistence on the expulsion of Belgian technicians and advisers intensified the problems of abrupt decolonization which had brought the United Nations to the Congo in the first place. In fact, during this period the Belgians who stayed on or returned were an indispensable element in the three-way cooperation among U.N., Congolese, and Belgian authorities which maintained the administrative machinery and related services.

#### The Leopoldville-Elisabethville-Bakwanga Axis

The Kasavubu-Mobutu regime and the ruling circles in Katanga and South Kasai shared Belgium's indignation over U.N. demands to recall all Belgian personnel. Leopoldville officials felt that U.N. authorities had no right to prohibit them from recruiting Belgian administrative and technical officers. On October 22, Kasavubu's representative in New York expressed his Government's opposition to Hammarskjold's policy and argued that "the Congolese need the Belgians because they are the only ones who know the country and its customs."<sup>26</sup> Tshombe wrote the Secretary-General on October 27 that the Belgians were "indispensable," and a factor "making for peace and not disorder." Katanga intended "to recruit technicians from wherever it sees fit."<sup>27</sup> The Kalonji regime was equally reluctant to let its Belgian advisers and cadres go. Hammarskjold's and Dayal's efforts "to eliminate the Belgian factor" deepened the opposition of the regimes in Leopoldville, Elisabethville, and Bakwanga to the UNF.

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25. La Libre Belgique, October 20, 1960. Le Soir, October 21, 1961.

26. "Evolution de la crise congolaise," op.cit., p. 578.

27. U.N., SCOR, Supplement for Oct., Nov., Dec., 1960, S/4557 (November 2, 1960), p. 51.

These regimes also had a common hostility to Lumumba and his followers. Recognizing the intense anti-United Nations and anti-Lumumba sentiments, certain Belgians close to the leaders of the three regimes explored the possibility of creating a common front which would prevent the establishment of a U.N. "trusteeship" or a Lumumba-controlled Congo and which would be prepared to cooperate with Belgium. Contrary to U.N. policy which gave priority to a reconciliation between the Lumumbists and other factions, the Belgians sought a rapprochement among the moderates in the various provinces who were against Lumumba. During October-November 1960, the concept of a Leopoldville-Elisabethville-Bakwanga axis took shape.

It should not be assumed that a coherent and carefully planned Belgian policy existed on this point. But it would be equally false to assume there was no concerting of policies among officers and advisers in Leopoldville, Elisabethville, and Bakwanga. These Belgian officials who had served in the Force publique, the colonial service, or in Brussels had a similar understanding of what was required in the Congo. The Belgian Government never officially sanctioned an axis, but certain members, particularly the Minister of African Affairs, realized the value of an anti-United Nations, anti-Lumumba front in the reconstruction of a federal and moderate administration in the Congo.

Developments in January and February 1961 made the establishment of a Leopoldville-Elisabethville-Bakwanga military alliance a necessity for the Congolese as well as the Belgians. First of all, the Stanleyville regime was expanding its power; its forces occupied on January 2, Kivu's capital, Bukavu; on January 9, they took North Katanga's capital, Manono; and on February 23, they entered Luluabourg, thereby threatening Katanga, South Kasai, and Leopoldville.

Secondly, the relations between the UNF and both the Congolese and the Belgians were deteriorating. The Belgian Government believed that Dayal's policy favored the Lumumba faction to the detriment of the pro-Western moderates. At a NATO meeting on January 24, 1961, the Belgian Representative argued for concerted Western action to try to change the

present U.N. course in the Congo. In early February, however, rumors began to circulate about a new "American Plan," from which Belgian and Congolese opinion gathered little more than that this was a proposal to disarm all Congolese troops, including those of the politically moderate Kasavubu-Mobutu regime.<sup>28</sup>

Brussels' reaction against the "American Plan" was doubly severe. First of all, the common Western front which Belgium had urged had not materialized. At a NATO meeting on February 9, 1961, called at Brussels' request, the Belgian spokesman strongly reproached the United States for discussing the Plan with the Soviet Union and certain Afro-Asian states without adequate consultation with its European allies. Secondly, the American proposal, as Brussels understood it, called for the disarmament of the troops loyal to the Kasavubu regime along with those of other factions. Kasavubu was placed on the same footing as his opponents. This, Brussels believed, would destroy his national authority. There was no guarantee, moreover, that the neutralization of Kasavubu's opponents would be effected. The "American Plan," the Belgian Representative maintained, would force the UNF to interfere drastically in the internal affairs of a sovereign state. This interference could not help but favor the militant elements.

Had the "American Plan" been implemented, it would have contravened the Belgian policy of providing direct aid to the pro-Western factions in the Congo. It would also have impaired Belgian efforts to strengthen the moderate Leopoldville regime. Brussels had just concluded in January a military assistance accord with the Leopoldville authorities in the hope of facilitating the restoration of normal diplomatic relations.

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28. For a discussion of the "American Plan," see Chapter 7, pp. 144-47. This Plan called for the disarmament and neutralization of Congolese troops; an embargo on all external aid to any of the opposing Congolese factions; and, if neutralization proved to be effective, for the release of political prisoners, the reopening of Parliament, and the formation of a national government representing all major Congolese groups, including the Lumumba forces.

The Ministry of African Affairs instructed the Belgian Representatives in the Congo to oppose the "American Plan" and to encourage the creation of the Leopoldville-Elisabethville-Bakwanga axis. By this time, without necessarily any formal agreements, a unity of purpose was apparent among the Belgian advisers and Congolese leaders in Leopoldville, Elisabethville, and Bakwanga. Preliminary discussions among the Congolese had already occurred in January. The adoption of the February 21, 1961, resolution--which, the Congolese assumed, gave the UNF the authority to disarm their troops--and the occupation of Luluabourg by Stanleyville forces on February 23, finally precipitated the military accord among the three regimes. This agreement which was signed on February 28, by Ileo, Tshombe, and Kalonji, called for the pooling of military forces and the establishment of a common military organization.<sup>29</sup> It was followed by the March 12 agreement at the Tananarive Conference which accepted the creation of a confederate structure under the presidency of Kasavubu. The Tananarive Conference also rejected the February 21 resolution, because it was regarded as an infringement of the Congo's national sovereignty.<sup>30</sup>

The military accord of February 28 and the Tananarive formula corresponded with Belgian political thinking. They had not been dictated by Brussels, but rather by circumstances in the Congo. Likewise the Belgian Government could not prevent the understanding between Leopoldville and Elisabethville from eroding shortly thereafter. The military agreement between the UNF and Kasavubu on April 17, 1961, on the implementation of the February 21 resolution spelled the end of the tripartite axis.

#### The Implementation of the February 21, 1961, Resolution

When the Security Council adopted the February 21, 1961, resolution calling for the evacuation of "all Belgian and other foreign military and para-military personnel and political advisors" not under U.N. command, the Belgian Government informed the Secretary-General that it would

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29. CRISP, Congo: 1961, (Brussels: Les Dossiers du CRISP, n.d.), p. 23.

30. Ibid., p. 39.

"loyally collaborate in implementing the resolution."

At the same time, Brussels pointed out that, contrary to Hammarskjold's and Dayal's assumption, the Belgians covered by the February 21 resolution were a small group. As for the "political advisors," they had been chosen and employed by the Congolese authorities themselves without the initiation or intervention of the Belgian Government. Hammarskjold should negotiate, therefore, with the Congolese for the withdrawal of such personnel.

With respect to the military cadres, Brussels explained that only a very small number under the authority of the Ministry of National Defense was still, "by agreement with the United Nations, at the Kamina and Kitona bases." This group would leave by March 15, 1961. Other Belgian forces consisted of:

1. Officers of the former Force publique placed at the disposal of the Congolese authorities under Article 250 of the Fundamental Law. They were charged with the task of reorganizing security forces. Brussels would ask the Congolese authorities to release them as soon as the UNF could take over their task "with equal effectiveness."

2. Former members of the Belgian Army, some of whom had arrived after July 1, 1960, and who had been made available to the Congolese to officer and train their forces. Brussels promised to recall men in this category; 31 officers and noncommissioned officers received orders to leave forthwith.

3. Belgian mercenaries individually recruited by various Congolese officials. The Belgian Government was not responsible for these mercenaries, but it would take steps to prevent further recruitment, while those who still had military obligations would be asked to return to their country.

With regard to the export of military equipment from Belgium,

Brussels planned to reinforce "the control it already exercises."<sup>31</sup>

The Belgian Government sought to avoid a precipitous withdrawal of its cadres which, it believed, would endanger public order and trigger the exodus of Belgian technicians whose presence ensured the continuation of the Congo's economic life. Such a development would impair Belgian economic interests and adversely affect the employment of thousands of Congolese as well. It would also jeopardize the present understanding between Leopoldville and Elisabethville. Moreover, with general elections soon to be held in Belgium, the Government did not want to take any action that would start a vigorous press campaign and upset the electorate. The expulsion of Belgian military men and advisers from the Congo, and from Katanga in particular, would inevitably produce such a campaign.

The Leopoldville regime protested to Hammarskjold against the "over-simplified and completely utopian form of simply ejecting the Belgian military personnel," and insisted on retaining the services of the fourteen Belgian officers under General Mobutu's command.<sup>32</sup> The position of the Leopoldville authorities on this point helped Brussels in its efforts to prevent the abrupt eviction of Belgian advisers and cadres.

The situation in Katanga presented greater complications for the Belgians. Brussels feared that an immediate recall of Belgian cadres would seriously affect the campaign against the Baluba rebels in the North and that, moreover, the Katanga regime would replace the Belgians with right wing French officers. This last concern was not unfounded. In January the Elisabethville Government had offered the French colonel Roger Trinquier the command of the gendarmerie. At Brussels' insistence Tshombe was forced to cancel the appointment in March.<sup>33</sup>

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31. U.N., SCOR, Supplement for Jan., Feb., March, 1961, S/4752, Annex 2, (February 27, 1961), pp. 180-81. Ibid., S/4752, Add. 2, (March 6, 1961), pp. 197-98.

32. U.N., SCOR, Supplement for Jan., Feb., March, 1961, S/4752, Add. 3 (March 6, 1961), pp. 199-201.

33. J. Gérard-Libois, Sécession au Katanga, op.cit., p. 189.

These considerations explained to a great extent the contradiction between Brussels' promise to Hammarskjold to implement the February 21 resolution, on the one hand, and the revived recruitment of mercenaries in Belgium by the Marissal mission to replace the cadres expelled from Katanga, on the other. This private mission, named after the colonel who headed it, worked closely with the Belgian military Sûreté, and succeeded in keeping some 250 Belgian forces in Katanga during the first six months of 1961.

Brussels' assertion that the former Force publique and Belgian Army officers and noncommissioned officers were under Congolese authority was contradicted by Major Guy Weber, Belgian adviser to Tshombe, who declared that the officers serving in Katanga between July 1960 and September 1961 were under special orders of the Ministry of African Affairs and "were all paid by the Belgian Government. Like military men everywhere, they took orders from their government."<sup>34</sup> As far as mercenaries were concerned, no action was taken under Article 135 of the Belgian penal code, which forbade service in a foreign army.

On March 20, 1961, Hammarskjold's special envoy, Taieb Sahbani of Tunisia, arrived in Brussels to discuss the application of the February 21 resolution, but no understanding was reached.

In early May a certain flexibility developed in the Belgian and U.N. positions. In Brussels, first of all, a new administration had come into power with Theo Lefevre as Prime Minister and Paul-Henri Spaak as Minister of Foreign Affairs. The new government was inclined to favor the Leopoldville regime in its conflict with the Katangan secessionists. Secondly, Hammarskjold had finally recalled Dayal, much to the relief of the Belgian Representatives in the Congo; thereafter their relations with the UNF improved. Robert Gardiner, Chief of U.N. Civilian Operations, concluded the April 17, 1961, agreement with Kasavubu which, by permitting Kasavubu to decide whether or not he wished to retain his Belgian advisers,

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34. Cited in La dernière heure (Brussels), April 20, 1963.



represented a retreat from the rigid U.N. position. Thirdly, the rapprochement between Leopoldville and Elisabethville had broken down; Tshombe had been arrested on April 26 at Coquilhatville; the anti-Katangan sentiment in Leopoldville had deepened; and the chances for a successful Katangan secession had considerably diminished.

For all these reasons, Brussels decided that a gradual disengagement from Katanga was in order. By July 1961, seventeen military and nineteen political advisers had been recalled from Katanga, including Major Guy Weber, widely regarded as one of the most influential military advisers.

The discussions between Spaak and Sahbani, in May 1961, led to the Spaak-Hammarskjold meeting on July 12, in Geneva. Spaak agreed to compile an all-inclusive list of political advisers who were to be expelled from Leopoldville, and Hammarskjold agreed to seek Kasavubu's consent to their release. A similar list would be drawn up for Katanga. Spaak hoped that the publication of this list would reassure those who were not involved, including the 10,000 Europeans in Elisabethville who would then be free of the fear of expulsion.

As far as the military advisers in Leopoldville were concerned, according to the agreement, General Mobutu would be permitted to retain the fourteen military advisers already in his service. Six of the nine Belgian military advisers in South Kasai had already been withdrawn; the others would presumably follow.

Spaak also agreed to collaborate in the recall of Belgian military forces from Katanga, but on the condition that this would be accomplished in stages. Like his predecessor Wigny, Spaak wanted to avoid a profound disturbance in Katanga which would open the door to chaos and extremism. He feared that the ultras, including some Belgians, would start an open war against the UNF. Hammarskjold and Spaak discussed the so-called Egge Plan<sup>35</sup> which projected the withdrawal of 208 Belgian officers

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35. The Egge Plan had been formulated by Lt. Colonel Björn Egge, a Swedish U.N. intelligence officer, after discussion with the Katangan

and other ranks and 304 mercenaries of various nationalities<sup>36</sup> on a gradual basis with intervals of eight to ninety days. No specific accord was reached on the matter at Geneva, but on August 1, Hammarskjold informed Spaak that he had decided to accept the Egge Plan, which was forwarded nine days later to Brussels.

In the meantime, Tshombe and General Mobutu concluded, on July 18, an agreement for the integration of the gendarmerie into the ANC under the supreme command of General Mobutu. The latter stated, on July 20, that he alone was competent to decide the fate of the European officers.<sup>37</sup> The convening of the Lovanium Parliament, at the end of July, stirred hopes in Congolese and Belgian circles that an effective reconciliation between Leopoldville and Elisabethville could be achieved. The question of advisers and mercenaries in Katanga would then doubtless be couched in different terms. Under these circumstances, the Belgian authorities pleaded to the UNF to move slowly in implementing the February 21 resolution.

Hammarskjold had agreed in principle at the Geneva talks, according to Spaak, to a gradual and planned recall of the Belgian military cadres from Katanga.<sup>38</sup> In Elisabethville, the Belgian consul, Henri Créner,

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authorities and the Belgian Colonel B. E. M. Crèvecoeur. Egge intended to replace the Belgian and European cadres with European officers recruited by the UNF and serving under the UNF. Col. Crèvecoeur apparently sought the adoption of his report which called for the establishment of a Katangan armed force over a period of five to ten years. Part of the Egge Plan is published in the Katangan Government's White Paper on the Events of September and December 1961, pp. 105-08. Col. Egge later said that Belgian nationals would not categorically be excluded from the U.N. recruited officers if they were "politically acceptable." Interview, Oslo, Norway, June 5, 1965. See Appendix P-19.

36. Of the 304 mercenaries, 210 were Belgians, according to Institut Royal des Relations Internationales, "L'ONU et le Congo," Chronique de politique étrangère, Vol. XV, July-November 1962, p. 357.

37. J. Gérard-Libois, Sécession au Katanga, op.cit., p. 236.

38. "L'ONU et le Congo," op.cit., p. 719.

had accepted the Egge report as the basis for withdrawal.<sup>39</sup> On August 26, however, Spaak learned of the plans of the U.N. officials in Katanga to expel immediately all foreign military personnel. In a wire to New York, Spaak demanded an explanation and insisted that the operation be canceled forthwith.<sup>40</sup> Apparently, Conor Cruise O'Brien, the U.N. Representative in Katanga, had ordered all foreign military personnel to report to a U.N. camp by August 30, or be subject to arrest. The Belgian officers in Katanga, who were under strict orders from Brussels not to engage in armed conflict with the UNF, protested against this ultimatum and announced that they would go underground instead. In order to retrieve the situation, Henri Créner asked Brussels for permission to allow the troops concerned to report to the Belgian consulate before August 30, and repatriate them from there.

In the morning of August 28 (Operation Rumpunch), the UNF started to arrest the Belgian officers and mercenaries. The operation was halted in the afternoon after Créner promised, on behalf of the European consuls in Elisabethville, to be responsible for the "surrender and repatriation and travel of all personnel to be evacuated, irrespective of their nationality."<sup>41</sup> By September 9, the deadline for the roundup of foreign military personnel, practically all regular Belgian cadres--the former Force publique and Belgian Army members, whom the Ministry of African Affairs had placed at the disposal of the Katangan authorities--had been repatriated or had reported to the Belgian consulate. Only ten of the 187 regulars were missing.<sup>42</sup> When the Belgian forces left, the Belgian consul

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39. Pierre Davister and Philippe Toussaint, Croisettes et Casques Bleus. (Brussels: Editions Actuelles, 1962), p. 151.

40. "L'ONU et le Congo," op.cit., p. 650.

41. U.N., SCOR, Supplement for July, Aug., Sept., 1961, S/4940 (September 14, 1961), p. 100. Créner actually spoke in the name of the European consuls; the American consul did not attend the meeting in the afternoon of August 28 and was not associated with the decisions taken at the meeting.

42. Ibid., p. 106.

honored them publicly: "You have fought for a just cause with an ideal of peace."<sup>43</sup> Upon arrival in Brussels, in contrast, they were loaded unceremoniously into an army truck driven by a corporal.

On the mercenary question, Brussels informed the Belgian consul that he could only advise, and not order, Belgian mercenaries to depart. For mercenaries of other nationalities, the consul could accept no responsibility at all. As a result, by September 9, 121 of the 175 Belgian mercenaries and 41 of the 81 volunteers of other nationalities had been rounded up.<sup>44</sup> A number of mercenaries and settlers who had joined the gendarmerie, disguised themselves in civilian clothes and continued to assist the Katangan forces.

Operation Morthor, the first armed clash between the UNF and the gendarmerie started on September 13.<sup>45</sup> This aroused intense protest in official and private circles in Belgium and Katanga. Spaak believed that the manner of the August 28 operation contained the germ of future conflict. The September 13 operation, he declared, was "politically poorly executed and useless. As to its military aspects, it would be more charitable to say nothing."<sup>46</sup>

Because of Hammarskjold's death, Spaak urged in the name of decency to temper the recriminations against Hammarskjold for his actions in implementing the February 21 resolution.<sup>47</sup> But the Belgian leader, like the press in Brussels and Elisabethville, singled out O'Brien, the local U.N. Representative, for criticism. O'Brien had weakened Belgium's position in the eyes of the Central Government by attributing to the Belgians an insidious role in Katanga. Rejecting O'Brien's accusations, particularly the charge that the first shots came from the building in

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43. J. Gérard-Libois, Sécession au Katanga, op.cit., p. 259.

44. Ibid.

45. See Appendix P-20.

46. "L'ONU et le Congo," op.cit., p. 721.

47. Ibid., p. 649.

which the Belgian consulate was located, Spaak maintained that O'Brien sought to blame the Belgians for his own errors.<sup>48</sup>

In the Autumn of 1961, the Belgian Senate reflected the sentiments of the people and the press on O'Brien and the UNF action when it unanimously voted to express "its profound emotion at the painful events which had afflicted Katanga and for which the Belgians had fallen victim." The Senate resolution further called for an international commission of inquiry to determine who were responsible for the developments.<sup>49</sup>

Brussels held to its pledge to fulfill its obligations under the February 21 resolution. The Government announced on October 30, 1961, that it would withdraw the passports of Belgian nationals who continued to serve in the Katangan forces.<sup>50</sup> On November 15, Spaak was able to say that all Belgian regular forces had been withdrawn from Katanga.<sup>51</sup>

In retrospect, the issue of Belgian advisers, troops, and mercenaries was at the core of the problem for the UNF. It was also a major problem for Brussels which sought to reassure the Europeans in Katanga without antagonizing the Leopoldville regime. By July 1961, the Belgian Government had come to accept the withdrawal of its cadres from Katanga, but the issue now centered on how it should be accomplished. Spaak was under the impression that his demands in this respect had been met at the Geneva talks. Belgium regarded Operations Rumpunch and Morthor as a violation of the Geneva understanding. Hence, the strong opposition of Belgian officials in Brussels and Elisabethville to O'Brien's actions.

#### Reconciliation Efforts Between Leopoldville and Elisabethville

The Lefèvre-Spaak regime, like its predecessor, wanted to reunify the Congo on the basis of a reconciliation between Leopoldville and

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48. Ibid., pp. 721-22.

49. Ibid., p. 723.

50. U.N., SCOR, Supplement for Oct., Nov., Dec., 1961, S/4975 (November 8, 1961), p. 67.

51. "L'ONU et le Congo," op.cit., p. 720.

Elisabethville. The two Governments also had in common their opposition to the use of force by the UNF to effect the reintegration of Katanga. This consideration was fundamental to Spaak's criticism of the February 21, 1961, resolution, which authorized force as a last resort to prevent civil war, and the September 1961 operation which, according to O'Brien, was undertaken to end Katangan secession. In both cases, Spaak said, the United Nations departed "from its mission which should essentially be the settlement of conflict by peaceful means."<sup>52</sup> Spaak was also convinced that a serious mistake had been made by allocating to the UNF an important role in a basically internal Congolese problem.<sup>53</sup> After Round One, moreover, the Katanga regime was imbued with a sense of victory and the Leopoldville powers were on the defensive, and Brussels doubted that any initiative towards reconciliation would come from one of the contending parties.

When the November 24, 1961, resolution was under consideration, Spaak warned against the U.N. determination to evict some 200 to 250 mercenaries who obviously enjoyed the support of virtually the entire white and black population of south Katanga.<sup>54</sup> Fearing a new armed conflict in Katanga, Spaak met Lord Home, the British Foreign Secretary, on November 30 to try to define the possible terms for an accord between Leopoldville and Elisabethville. They hoped then to request an influential African Chief of State--Leopold Senghor was the intermediary in mind--to accept the role of mediator between Adoula and Tshombe.<sup>55</sup> Spaak and Home quickly came to an agreement, but the possibility of support from U.N. officials was remote.

Before anything was accomplished, Round Two began on December 5, 1961.<sup>56</sup> The European population in Katanga bitterly accused the UNF of

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52. Ibid., p. 649.

53. Ibid., p. 744.

54. Ibid., p. 745.

55. J. Gérard-Libois, Sécession au Katanga, op.cit., p. 245.

56. See Appendix N-25.

bombing civilian targets and hospitals. In a wire to the Secretary-General on December 8, Spaak charged the UNF with violating the Geneva Convention on the laws of war. Thant, in turn, protested to Spaak against the assistance which European civilians and the Union Minière afforded the Katangan secessionists. Expressing the "total disapproval" of the Belgian Government with the "operations of war," Spaak maintained that the U.N. mandate had been violated. Spaak rejected Thant's claim that the UNF had acted in self defense, because, as he said, the operation was out of proportion to the resistance it expected to encounter.<sup>57</sup>

The Belgian statesman requested the British, American, and French Foreign Ministers, who were meeting in Paris at that time, to persuade Thant to arrange immediately a cease-fire and also to take the initiative, on their own, to settle the Adoula-Tshombe conflict.<sup>58</sup> Only Paris and London were prepared to go along with issuing a call for an immediate cease-fire. Brussels and London also tried, through their representatives in Elisabethville, to persuade Tshombe to start negotiations with Adoula.

The Belgian Chamber almost unanimously supported Spaak's policy of condemning UNF actions and urging a cease-fire and conciliation. Even the Belgian Communist Party's spokesman accepted the efforts to bring about a cessation of the fighting.

As a result of the September and December 1961 events in Katanga, Brussels felt that the UNF had discredited itself by resorting to "war" instead of seeking conciliation. By this time Belgium's position in U.N. circles, however, had been considerably modified. Since the expulsion of the Belgian political advisers and military cadres in the summer of 1961, the Security Council no longer singled out Belgium in its recommendations and the Secretary-General's reports no longer described the Belgian pre-

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57. U.N., SCOR, Supplement for Oct., Nov., Dec., 1961, S/5025 (December 15, 1961), pp. 190-99, passim.

58. "L'ONU et le Congo," op.cit., p. 750.

sence as an obstacle to the success of the U.N. mission.

No doubt, a number of Belgian mercenaries remained active in Katanga; some private Belgian citizens continued to be involved in the delivery of military materiel to Katanga; certain private companies still protected foreign mercenaries and supplied them with equipment; and some Belgian residents exercised a personal and important influence over Katangan officials. Belgian authorities could perhaps be reproached for not more effectively preventing these actions, but they could not be accused of violating U.N. resolutions.

This development suited the Belgian Government because it had to be concerned about its position vis-à-vis the Central Government with which it had resumed formal diplomatic relations on December 27, 1961. The new situation, moreover, permitted Brussels to support U.N. policy.

Brussels approved U.N. efforts in early 1962 to organize a meeting between Adoula and Tshombe and the later attempts to find a compromise whenever the negotiations threatened to break down. By the end of June 1962, however, the Adoula-Tshombe talks reached a deadlock.

During this time there were occasional discussions between the Western allies which took place in cooperation with or at least with the knowledge of the Secretary-General. Washington favored strong pressure, including economic sanctions, to persuade Tshombe to come to terms. Thant felt that without the Union Minière's support, the Tshombe regime would lack the means to sustain its secession effort. He asked Spaak to urge Union Minière to desist from paying revenue--estimated at some \$30 million a year--to Elisabethville.<sup>59</sup> London and Brussels wanted to exert pressure on both sides, but had no confidence that economic sanctions would be effective. They also rejected the idea of dictating a specific policy to the Union Minière without being able to guarantee the protection of its installations and its future juridical status.

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59. U.N., SCOR, Supplement for July, Aug., Sept., 1962, S/5053, Add. 11, Annex XXVIII (August 2, 1962), p. 39.



The reconciliation proposal which Washington drew up in July 1962, after consultations with Brussels and London was still based on the idea of progressive pressures, including economic sanctions, against the Katanga regime. Thant endorsed the proposal and in August he presented it as the U.N. Plan for National Reconciliation (soon known as the Thant Plan) to Leopoldville and Elisabethville. If Katanga did not accept and implement the Thant Plan in its entirety, the alternative would be to resort to sanctions, according to an associated "Course of Actions."

Belgium did not reject in principle the use of economic sanctions against Katanga, but was prepared to proceed in this manner only under certain conditions. The Central Government should first present its draft for a federal constitution and define the principles of constitutional rule, fiscal legislation, and export policies. If Tshombe persisted in refusing a settlement, then Belgium might consider imposing an embargo on copper exports or perhaps giving financial help to Leopoldville, provided that such measures were decided upon by the United Nations at the formal request of the Central Government.

At the end of November 1962, after the talks between Leopoldville and Elisabethville had once more broken down, Spaak flew to New York. While he agreed with U.N. and U.S. officials that more coercive action was necessary, he persuaded them to make one last effort to obtain a negotiated solution.

On December 4, the Belgian Representative, acting within the framework of the New York decisions, proposed that Adoula meet in New York with Thant, Tshombe, and the representatives of the states that had supported the Thant Plan. Adoula, however, felt that the Congolese Prime Minister should not go to New York merely to permit the Belgian leader to prove to his pro-Katanga lobby and Union Minière that every effort for conciliation had been made.

As a last resort Brussels sent to Katanga M. Dubuisson, the Rector of the University of Liège, who had close ties with the University of Elisabethville. Dubuisson met Tshombe on December 12, 1962, and sought

in vain to persuade him to cooperate with the Thant Plan.

Spaak kept his commitment to the Secretary-General. On December 15, he advised the Union Miniere to send its representatives to Leopoldville to discuss the question of payment of taxes and other obligations. Union Miniere refused on the ground that Tshombe would not allow the company to negotiate on its own with the Central Government. This spelled the end of Spaak's hopes to implement the Thant Plan without recourse to an economic boycott and other sanctions, the effectiveness of which he doubted.

When Round Three broke out on December 28, 1962, Belgium's official response was limited to restrained comments on the UNF's military action and to a recommendation for a cease-fire and a resumption of negotiations between Tshombe and the UNF. Through its representatives in Katanga, Brussels sought to pressure Tshombe into renouncing his announced intention to pursue a scorched earth policy. The Belgian consul in Elisabethville did everything possible to ensure that Tshombe retained his personal freedom so that he would be available for future discussions for a peaceful settlement.

Thanks to special financial contributions, which amounted to bribes, to foreign mercenaries by Belgian companies and the efforts of the European consuls and certain Belgian advisers close to Tshombe, serious destruction of Katanga's industrial infrastructure was avoided. When secession was ended in January 1963, Belgian authorities regretted that it had to come about by military action. Nevertheless, the military operation affected Belgium less adversely than the implementation of the scorched earth threat would have done. The latter course, depending on how fully it had been carried out, would have set back Belgian efforts very seriously.

In retrospect, the Thant Plan had associated Belgium with UNF actions from August to December 1962. This was the first actual collaboration between Brussels and the UNF and suggested the substantial change in relations between the two since Hammarskjold's and Dayal's rigid insistence on the elimination of the "Belgian factor." From January 1963, Belgium had

to depend heavily on the UNF for the security of its citizens in the Congo. The relatively good understanding and cooperation among Belgian, U.S., and U.N. officials did not prevent the development in later 1963 of disorder and the threat of new rebellions in several provinces. Brussels endorsed Kasavubu's request to keep the UNF in the Congo during the first six months of 1964. If this was an unexpected phenomenon for those who had lived through the events of 1960 and 1961, it also indicated the new deterioration of internal security in the Congo.

#### Belgian Bilateral Military Aid Efforts

From the start of the Congo crisis Belgium was particularly concerned with the establishment of an effective indigenous security force. In the first few months Belgian military assistance was provided mainly to Katanga in the form of administrative and staff cadres. Because Belgian military aid was going to Katanga, what could be offered and accepted by the Leopoldville regime was extremely limited. Nonetheless, a small group of Belgian officers never left Leopoldville. After the ouster of Lumumba, Mobutu recalled some military advisers. Belgian aid included assistance with military operations, such as in the Bukavu incident in January 1961, and some financial and material assistance.

Up to the end of Katangan secession, the political and military climate prevented a reorganization of the ANC. The question came into the limelight again in late 1962, when the Western powers had come to the conclusion that the UNF would not really succeed in retraining the Congolese forces.

Brussels went along with the concept of the Greene Plan of the United States,<sup>60</sup> which entrusted the UNF with the role of coordinator of bilateral aid programs. Brussels would furnish military advisers and technicians; Washington would provide the equipment. Although the Leopoldville regime was reluctant to accept U.N. involvement, Adoula was finally

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<sup>60</sup>. For a discussion of the Greene Plan, see Chapter 6, pp. 132-35, and Chapter 7, p. 153.

persuaded to accept U.N. sponsorship. In this light Adoula presented his request for such military aid to the Secretary-General in December 1962 and February 1963.

In compliance with Congolese wishes, the Greene Plan allocated to Belgium the responsibility for organizing ANC headquarters, the bases, the gendarmerie, and the military schools. At a meeting in Brussels on February 27, 1963, Spaak promised Adoula that he would participate in the Greene Plan and would send a hundred officers to the Congo on the condition that the request for this would come from the Secretary-General himself.<sup>61</sup> Brussels wanted to be officially released from the obligation of the September 20, 1960, resolution to refrain from providing direct military assistance.

Although Thant had endorsed the general tenor of the request, he was confronted with the opposition of some Afro-Asian members of the Congo Advisory Committee to bilateral aid under the aegis of the United Nations. In April 1963, Thant informed Adoula that he could not support the request.

With the Greene Plan dead, the Belgian Government initiated a bilateral military assistance program for the Congo on May 20, 1963. Spaak told Adoula that he had informed Thant of the decision, but he urged Adoula to continue to search for a formula that would permit U.N. participation in the reorganization of the ANC. In a reply to Spaak at the end of May, Thant took "due note of the contents" of his communication.<sup>62</sup> At no time did the Secretary-General protest Belgium's bilateral military aid, and in private conversations he indicated his approval.<sup>63</sup> In turn, Spaak continued to keep Thant up to date on the status of the Belgian military assistance program.

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61. CRISP, Congo: 1963, prepared by Benoit Verhaegen, et al. (Les Dossiers du CRISP, 1964), p. 116.

62. Documents parlementaires du Senate belge. No. 143, February 25, 1965, 1964-65 Session, pp. 107-09.

63. Interview with Belgian official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Brussels, June 22, 1965.

### Financial Contributions

In protest against U.N. policy during the first years, Belgium refused to pay its assessed share of the costs of the peacekeeping mission. Brussels also opposed proposals that it pay in excess of its normal quota, which were made on the pretext of Belgian responsibility for the Congo crisis, because UNF actions were of special interest to Belgium, or because of the substantial Belgian investments in the Congo. This, Brussels felt, gave such demands a punitive character. Belgium did not vote for the U.N. budgets for 1961 and 1962, and it abstained when the General Assembly asked the International Court of Justice in December 1961, for an advisory opinion on financing the peacekeeping operation.

Foreign Minister Wigny raised the question of UNF contributions in the Senate in January 1961. Belgian opinion was particularly hostile at that time because of Hammarskjold's and Dayal's policy toward the "Belgian factor." "A firm attitude is necessary at a time when the Secretary-General tells us that we must evidently pay our contribution, but that he will eliminate us from the Congo," Wigny argued.<sup>64</sup> As long as U.N. officials pursued a discriminatory policy in refusing to recruit Belgians and in reiterating their unjustified accusations against Belgium, Wigny felt that his Government should not make any payments for the U.N. operation.

The Foreign Affairs budget for 1961 provided for two Belgian contributions to UNF expenses, one for the second half of 1960 and one for 1961, but Parliament refused to authorize their payment. Subsequently, items for UNF support did not appear in the budget.

Spaak presented his position on this point to the Senate on October 12, 1961:

The former government as well as the present government have decided not to pay. It is therefore an estimate which appears in

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<sup>64</sup>. Compte-rendu analytique (C.R.A.), Proceedings of the Belgian Senate, January 26, 1961.

the budget, but no more than that. . . . As to the Belgian quota for the Congo operation, you know they demand much more. . . . At the United Nations they ask us to pay not only a proportion of the costs, but, they tell us, since you are in part responsible for the operation, will you not make a more generous gesture? . . . They do not know you at all, otherwise they would never have made this request. 65

Spaak promised that in any event no payments would be made until U.N. discrimination against Belgian nationals ceased and a Belgian commission of inquiry on the U.N. operation in Katanga had been created. The Senate cancelled the budget item and proposed instead to place an equivalent sum into a National Indemnity Fund for the victims of the UNF.<sup>66</sup> Taking into account Belgian public opinion at that time, Spaak gave in. He resolutely refused, however to defer payment of the regular Belgian quota for general U.N. activities despite pressures of right-wing factions to do so. The Minister of Finance was also inclined to delay payment in order to increase his leverage in settling the compensation claims for Belgian victims of UNF actions in Katanga.

After the General Assembly accepted the Advisory Opinion of the International Court in December 1962, and especially after Brussels requested an extension of the U.N. military mission beyond December 1963, the deadlock was finally broken. In May 1965 Belgium made a settlement with Secretary-General Thant which involved both Belgian claims against the United Nations and Belgium's assessed portion of the Congo peacekeeping costs. The Organization paid Brussels \$1.5 million to settle all claims, and in turn the Belgian Government promised to pay its full share for the four-year operation.<sup>67</sup> As of December 31, 1965, the Belgians had paid their assessment in full.

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65. C.R.A., Proceedings of the Belgian Senate, October 12, 1961.

66. La libre Belgique, December 11, 1961.

67. See Chapter 3, p. 53.

### The Impact of Belgium on the Peacekeeping Mission

Belgium had a major impact on the course of the U.N. mission. During the four years of the Congo operation its policy changed from passive cooperation to opposition, and subsequently to collaboration with the UNF.

During July and August 1960, Brussels did not legally violate the U.N. resolutions, although there was a decided lack of zeal in quickly implementing the resolutions. Little could be done at that time to eliminate the delay between the Security Council's demands for withdrawal and the actual recall of metropolitan troops from the Congo.

Belgian actions in Leopoldville and the assistance to Katanga did not impede the exercise of the Central Government's authority, nor did this undermine the territorial integrity and political independence of the Congo, which the July 22, 1960, resolution requested all states to respect

Belgium's policy, however, was contrary to the intention of the July and August, 1960, resolutions. Its aid to Katanga strengthened Tshombe's secession effort and his opposition to the UNF. The presence of Belgian troops in the Congo outside of Katanga until September 1960 strengthened the Leopoldville Government in its determination to oppose any disarmament of ANC troops by the UNF. These two developments also contributed to the deterioration in the relations between the UNF and the Lumumba regime.

The adoption of the September 20, 1960, General Assembly resolution brought Belgian policy in direct conflict with the U.N. mandate and the Secretary-General's policy, even though Belgium had voted for the resolution. Brussels' continued assistance to Katanga and its political and military support to the moderates in Leopoldville and South Kasai constituted a legal violation of the resolution. In political terms, Belgian efforts to effect a rapprochement among the moderate factions against Lumumba was contrary to U.N. policy which sought a reconciliation between the Kasavubu-Mobutu regime and the Lumumba faction. Furthermore, by encouraging the establishment of an anti-Lumumba, anti-U.N. front among



Leopoldville, Elisabethville, and Bakwanga, Brussels deepened the existing hostility of these three political factions to the U.N. mission. In consequence, the effectiveness of the UNF was undermined.

It is important to remember that these actions occurred in a climate created by Hammarskjold's and Dayal's "obsession," to use Brussels' word,<sup>68</sup> with the Belgian factor. In spite of its resentment, Brussels remained prepared to cooperate with the UNF, provided the Secretary-General recognized the need for continued Belgian influence and personnel in the Congo. Belgium could not understand why the United Nations sought --in a country as dependent as the Congo--to assure for itself the monopoly of civil and military assistance to the exclusion of those who had the experience, the means, and a genuine interest to provide such assistance, especially since Congolese leaders repeatedly insisted on using Belgian specialists and advisers. Hammarskjold's policy against the use of Belgians had the unfortunate effect of denying the Congo desperately needed assistance in every sector of economic, civil, and military life. As a corollary, Belgian interests in the Congo were adversely affected.

The adoption of the February 21, 1961, resolution did not really change Belgium's basic position. Brussels' declaratory policy was to collaborate in implementing the February resolution. In fact, Brussels persisted in its procrastination and sought U.N. guarantees to avoid a precipitous withdrawal of its political and military advisers. Brussels also encouraged the recruitment of mercenaries for Katanga. As long as U.N. officials looked for the elimination of the Belgian presence and as long as U.N. actions constituted a threat to the pro-Western regime at Elisabethville and, to a lesser degree, at Leopoldville, Belgian interests were in serious jeopardy. The effect was to intensify the problems for the UNF in carrying out its mandate and to impair the stature of U.N. officials in Congolese eyes. Brussels' refusal to pay its assessments for the Congo operation complicated the U.N. budgetary situation.

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68. Interviews with Belgian journalists and officials, Brussels, June 17 and 22, 1965.



The withdrawal of the Belgian advisers and cadres from Katanga and the establishment of a Central Government in Leopoldville with United Nations help paved the way for an improvement in Belgian-United Nations relations. The actual change from conflict to collaboration finally came in 1962, when U.N. officials tried to effect a reconciliation between Adoula and Tshombe. The maintenance of a pro-European regime in Katanga had always been identified by Belgian leaders as a minimum safeguard of Belgian investments in Katanga. Brussels also knew that without at least a measure of economic prosperity in Katanga--which continued Belgian investments insured--the possibility to rebuild the Congo would be remote. With U.N. efforts to reach a peaceful settlement, there was no need for Brussels to act to prevent the fall of Tshombe.

In the long run, the U.N. mission did not unduly compromise Belgium's fundamental objective of retaining its presence and safeguarding its interests in the Congo. In the short run, the U.N. effort, during the months of eliminating the "Belgian factor," impaired Belgian interests. Both the UNF and Belgium wanted to ensure a viable and moderate regime in a reunified Congo. To the extent that this objective had been realized by June 1964, the U.N. mission had served Belgian interests.

## CHAPTER 12

### ROLE OF CANADA

The manpower of the U.N. Force in the Congo was provided largely by the Afro-Asian states, but five Western Governments, at the request of the Secretary-General, sent specialized military units--Canada, Ireland, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden. Three of these were members of NATO; Ireland and Sweden were nonaligned.

As a donor state Canada faced problems common to all Western states that contributed troops. But its contribution was unique because of its special interest and experience in international peacekeeping. Ottawa's prompt affirmative response to the Secretary-General's appeal for military assistance was to be expected.<sup>1</sup>

Though Hammarskjold wanted to rely primarily on African and Asian states for troop support, he had to turn to more developed states for specialized military units and for competent headquarters staff officers. The number of such states he could approach was limited for political reasons.<sup>2</sup> Canada was one of the few politically acceptable states that could make qualified military personnel available on short

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1. The material for this chapter was drawn in part from Donald R. Gordon, The Canadian Contribution to the U.N. Peacekeeping Operation in the Congo, 1965, a background study prepared especially for this Report.

2. See Chapter 14.

notice. Even though a member of NATO, Canada's image in the Afro-Asian world had remained virtually free from the stigma of Western colonialism. Moreover, Canada could supply troops who were proficient in both English and French, the two official working languages of the UNF. For these reasons Canada provided the signals, or communications unit, consisting of approximately 250 officers and men for the entire four years of the U.N. operation. It also sent a Provost Corps and a generous quota of headquarters officers to the Congo. In all these areas the Canadian military contribution has been of a high quality.

#### Canadian Interests

With its tradition of political and economic orientation towards the United States, Great Britain, and Western Europe, Canada's foreign policy as of 1960 had been only peripherally concerned with Africa. The first African desk officer in the Department of External Affairs was not appointed until 1957, and by 1960 there were still only three officers dealing with African affairs. Canada's links with the Commonwealth sector of Africa were somewhat stronger than with the rest of the continent, mainly because it had established diplomatic missions in recently independent Ghana and soon-to-be-independent Nigeria. Its major interest in Africa, however, was the general one of seeking a modest level of order and stability.

Canada had a consistent commitment to U.N. peacekeeping operations. It had participated in every one of the major U.N. peacekeeping efforts and in most of the minor ones. Basic Canadian policy favored the creation of a permanent U.N. peacekeeping force. Pending the establishment of such a force--which Canada did not foresee in the near future--successive Canadian administrations supported the use of ad hoc U.N. forces and contributed to them.

The quality of Canada's support has been demonstrated by its policy of earmarking the Canadian Army Special Service Force for U.N. service. Certain other army units have been also listed as available for such an assignment. In addition, all units of the Canadian armed forces

have been given regular lectures and instruction on problems and procedures for U.N. peacekeeping.

Active Canadian participation is based on broad political support. Leaders of the major political parties repeatedly expressed their commitment to international peacekeeping.

There were, however, certain limitations to Canada's involvement. Contributions to the United Nations, it was widely felt, should not diminish Canada's NATO and other defense commitments. Domestic political considerations suggested that men sent on U.N. assignments be volunteers rather than conscripts. Contributions had to be specifically authorized by Parliament, which also determined force ceilings and other details of participation. Canada's growing awareness of international sensitivities prompted the informal policy of not permitting the use of substantial numbers of Canadian troops in any combat capacity in predominantly non-white areas of the world. This policy received its first real test in the Congo.

#### Support of the U.N. Mission

Even before the first Security Council meeting on July 13, 1960, U.N. officials, Canadian representatives, and other diplomatic representatives in New York were engaged in informal consultations on contingency planning for the Congo. On July 14, immediately after the adoption of the first U.N. resolution, the Canadian Prime Minister announced in Ottawa that he had received a request from the Secretary-General for the seconding of six Canadian officers to help receive U.N. troops in the Congo. The Secretary-General was also considering the use of Canadian aircraft on duty with UNEF for flying in emergency supplies and personnel. In the same statement the Prime Minister declared that his Government's policy was to respond positively to such requests.<sup>3</sup>

Intensive negotiations between Ottawa and New York and through

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3. Canadian House of Commons Debates, July 14, 1960, p. 6237.

Ottawa-Washington military channels during the following two weeks resulted in an agreement that provided for a Canadian contribution of a signals squadron and for assistance in the airlift to and inside the Congo. On July 30, Parliament approved the decisions<sup>4</sup> and subsequently also established a force ceiling of 500 officers and men on Canada's contribution.<sup>5</sup>

Canadian leaders, like their U.S. counterparts, were concerned that the Congo situation should not develop into a major international conflict. Accordingly, they were in favor of measures aimed at reducing East-West frictions. The U.N. intervention was regarded as a way to achieve this objective. In general, Canada's policy closely paralleled its American ally in supporting the actions and policies of the Secretary-General during the four years of the U.N. operation.

Canada repeatedly emphasized that the main purpose of the UNF was to restore order in the Congo and to prevent outside intervention. The UNF should not seek to impose solutions on the Congo's domestic problems. Because of their participation in the UNF, the Canadians felt it incumbent upon themselves to preserve as much as possible an impartial attitude towards internal Congolese disputes. Hence, on especially contentious issues, Canada, unlike the United States, abstained from voting in the General Assembly. The seating of the Kasavubu delegation in the General Assembly on November 22, 1960, is a case in point.<sup>6</sup>

Canada usually refrained from making public professions of policy or preference. Ottawa wanted to avoid offending its allies, who frequently disagreed among themselves on various U.N. policies. The Canadian Government also believed that its support of the mission and the

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4. Ibid., July 30, 1960, p. 7263.

5. Ibid., August 6, 1960, p. 7675.

6. Of the three NATO allies that contributed to the UNF, Canada remained more consistently aloof from internal Congolese controversies. Both Denmark and Norway voted in favor of seating the Kasavubu delegation. On the other hand, nonaligned Ireland and Sweden, the other two Western donor states, abstained along with Canada.

Secretary-General would be more effective if it maintained a discreet silence in the public debates that raged about the Congo between 1960 and 1964.

Even in the Congo Advisory Committee, in which Canada held membership by virtue of its contribution to the UNF, Canada's initiatives were somewhat muted. Recognizing the political function of the Advisory Committee the Canadians felt that its polyglot composition prevented it from performing a very useful advisory function. The committee meetings did indicate the practical limits which the Secretary-General had to take into account. But when Ottawa wanted to express its views to the Secretary-General, it used private and direct channels.

The commitment of Canadian leaders to the U.N. mission and the Organization itself was also reflected in their attitude towards the financial problems of the UNF. In addition to its assessed share of the peacekeeping costs, Canada made one of the largest voluntary contributions to the costs of the operation, second only to the United States and Great Britain.<sup>7</sup>

#### Canadian Forces in the Congo

Canada's initial contribution consisted of the signals unit, which at its height included some 40 officers and 250 other ranks. Its participation in the UNF was based on several conditions acceptable to the Secretary-General. They included the following points. The Canadian unit was to accept fully U.N. operational command, but it remained under the administrative control of Canadian Army Headquarters in Ottawa. As was customary with other national contingents, Canadian detachments and subunits were to be commanded by Canadian officers. Any violation of this principle was to be immediately reported to Ottawa. The Canadian Govern-

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7. For a tabulation of voluntary contributions see Appendix Z-1.

ment had to be consulted before its troops could be sent to Katanga.<sup>8</sup> Canada's forces had a purely noncombatant role; this point was particularly stressed in the extensive briefings for all its troops.

The deployment of Canadian forces during August 1960 did not occur without untoward incidents. On August 18, at Ndjili airport at Leopoldville, Congolese troops disarmed and manhandled fourteen Canadians who were about to take off for Coquilhatville in a U.N. plane. They were eventually rescued by members of a Ghanaian unit. On August 27, eight U.S. crewmen and two Canadians were arrested and beaten by Congolese soldiers when their plane with supplies landed in Stanleyville. Later that same day, eight other Canadians attached to U.N. headquarters in Stanleyville underwent similar treatment at the hands of Congolese troops. Forces of the Ethiopian detachment in Stanleyville managed to secure the release of the Canadians. On both occasions the Canadians were accused of being Belgian paratroopers.<sup>9</sup>

In each case, the Canadians kept their heads in the face of considerable provocation, thereby preventing more serious injury to themselves and a setback to the U.N. operation at the crucial initial stage. These incidents illustrated the value for U.N. operations of professionally trained troops with prior peacekeeping experience and instruction.

On each occasion the Canadians were rescued by Africans. This fact can be taken as vindication of Canada's decision not to send combat units to a predominantly non-white area. In all likelihood, Canadian combat units would have been assigned to work with the Canadian support units. In a racially tense atmosphere it was better for African U.N. troops to rescue white U.N. troops assaulted by Congolese than for whites to rescue

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8. As part of the entire UNF communications network, Canadians established and operated signals units in Elisabethville and at Kamina base. At both places members of the Canadian Provost Corps served for limited periods. The Provost Corps is discussed below.

9. For a brief description of these incidents, see Appendix P, 2 and 4.



whites. Otherwise, there would have been a risk of escalation into more serious clashes.

In addition to the communications commitment, Canadian Army participation was expanded to include a Provost Corps attached to U.N. headquarters in Leopoldville. The Canadian provost unit worked especially closely with Indian and Danish provost detachments. The major U.N. provost activity was in Leopoldville and was similar to that of any ordinary military police establishment. The Canadian unit consisted of one officer and about fifteen other ranks. They were all professional soldiers with an average of six years provost experience, frequently including other U.N. assignments. All the men spoke English and French. They did a considerable amount of on-the-job instruction to M.P.'s from other contingents and occasionally rendered assistance to their Congolese counterparts.

The lack of a uniform U.N. military code posed several difficulties for the Provost Corps. Different national contingents had different customs and concepts of private property; buildings used as temporary headquarters for U.N. soldiers were sometimes stripped of their furnishings. Officers of some contingents could not, under their national code, be arrested by persons of lower rank. This complicated the task of the Canadian M.P.'s, who were mostly lance corporals (privates first class), but their familiarity with the immunities and status of U.N. personnel helped to prevent frictions. Since disciplinary action against any U.N. soldier or officer remained the responsibility of his national contingent commander, the authority and effectiveness of the Provost Corps was limited accordingly. On the whole, however, the Canadians conducted an efficient operation and contributed significantly to the maintenance of law and order within the UNF.

The Canadians also played an important role in manning the U.N. headquarters. During the period July-October 1960, 31 of the 171 officers attached to the U.N. military staff at Leopoldville were Canadians. Although Canada ranked twelfth in its total manpower contribution to the



UNF, it ranked first in the average number of officers represented at Leopoldville.<sup>10</sup> Canada's disproportionately heavy share of officers can be explained in part by their ready availability from UNEF and UNTSO and the prompt action by Ottawa to meet U.N. requests. It was also the result of their high professional quality and extensive experience in peacekeeping operations. Canadian officers in the Congo had an average of sixteen years' service in the armed forces. Another factor was that many were bilingual. They were also familiar with the Commonwealth military procedures which served as the general pattern for the UNF.

The Canadians did not fill the policy-making slots or the upper echelon posts, but their presence at the middle level, where most of the daily work was done, provided for the necessary continuity of the operation. For these reasons the Canadians contributed to the efficiency of the operation, though there were limits to their influence on policy.

Canada's limited influence was particularly apparent in 1960 when, under General Carl von Horn's tenure as Force Commander, Brigadier General I. J. Rikhye, Military Adviser to the Secretary-General, succeeded in arranging for the replacement of Canadian Chief of Staff, Lt. Col. Berthiaume. Rikhye did this partly because he felt it politically unwise to have a Canadian in that position. Canada did not protest and Col. Berthiaume was replaced by an African officer. Thereafter no other Canadian became Chief of Staff, but the Force Commander thought enough of the Canadian colonel's abilities to retain him as his Military Adviser. Col. Berthiaume remained in his advisory post until April 1961 when the position was assigned to an Irish officer at the request of the current Force Commander Lt. Gen. Sean McKeown of Ireland.

Canada's participation had little effect on UNF military policies in another respect. According to the Canadians, the U.N. staff for various reasons did not make any practical use of intelligence gathered by French-

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10. For tabulations of total manpower contributions by state and national officer representation at U.N. headquarters, see Appendix H, Charts B and D.

speaking members of the Canadian signals unit. These men collected information from U.N. field stations and from informal monitoring of non-U.N. communications in the Congo. The Canadian complaint was that U.N. military leaders, and perhaps more so, U.N. political officers, tended to believe their hopes rather than unpleasant realities. In any case, information from the Canadians seldom seemed to be taken into account in planning operations.

In spite of what Canadian officers regarded as inefficiency and bad management in the UNF, they and their political leaders in New York and Ottawa continued to adhere strictly to U.N. policies and procedures. Canada's loyalty to the U.N. mission was well illustrated by its attitude toward national communications links. UNF contingents in the Congo were formally enjoined to submit all their complaints, comments, and suggestions through U.N. channels. Otherwise, U.N. officials feared, they would be exposed to increased pressures from home governments, or more seriously, information detrimental to the operation would fall into hostile hands. Furthermore, direct communications between the contingents and their home governments tended to interfere with the U.N. chain of command and to dilute U.N. authority. Several national radio links were, nevertheless, established between the contingents in the Congo and their home governments. This was true of India, Nigeria, Ghana, and others. Canada established an "administrative" communications link with the Congo by connecting into an existing military network in which the Canadian Army was a member. According to Canadian reports, the Canadian contingent used its link purely "for administrative traffic of low priority and high volume which otherwise would crowd U.N. channels."

Canadian forces in the Congo were also subject to a particular political stress which did not apply as much or as often to other contingents. By virtue of traditional alliances with the United States and Great Britain, Canada found itself frequently in a delicate situation when differences between British and U.S. policies deepened. Canadian field officers and diplomatic representatives had to exercise more than usual care in the association and cooperation with American and British repre-

sensitivities. The lack of controversy with Washington and London suggests that the Canadian policy of loyal adherence to the U.N. Command was generally successful.

#### The Impact of Canada on the Peacekeeping Mission

As a state supporting the U.N. effort Canada was in many ways ideal. Loyal backing from middle powers, like Canada, afforded the Secretary-General a much greater degree of insulation from the pressures of the major powers and the militant small states than otherwise would have been the case.

Canada's continued participation in the UNF contributed to the integrity and stability of the enterprise. Its presence had a much greater influence on the professional quality of the operation than on the political and military course of the UNF.

Canada's political and material support of the peacekeeping mission enhanced its international status and prestige. The Congo operation had certain important consequences for Canadian policies and practices. As a result of the lessons learned from the enterprise, there have been changes in the organization and types of forces earmarked for U.N. duties. The Congo experience also gave the impetus to Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson's proposal in May 1964 that a number of middle powers establish a standby force outside the United Nations, ready to be used at its request.<sup>11</sup> At Prime Minister Pearson's invitation, representatives of governments which had provided troops for peacekeeping efforts and other interested states met from November 2 to 6, 1964, at the Ottawa Peacekeeping Conference to share their experience and help draw guidelines for future U.N. military operations.

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11. His Dag Hammarskjold lecture at Carleton University, Ottawa. Office of the Prime Minister, Press Release (unnumbered), May 7, 1964.

## CHAPTER 13

### ROLE OF THE AFRO-ASIAN DONOR STATES

From the beginning of the United Nations' involvement in the Congo crisis, Secretary-General Hammarskjöld sought to rely primarily on African and Asian governments for troop contributions to the peacekeeping Force. Political considerations suggested that military personnel from the great powers and large units from states aligned with the Soviet Union or the United States should be excluded.<sup>1</sup> Under this policy, endorsed by the Security Council, nineteen different governments in Asia and Africa sent troop contingents or specialized military units to the Congo. Their contribution in terms of man-months was as follows:<sup>2</sup>

1. India . . .	142,704	11. Guinea . . . .	4,475
2. Ethiopia .	119,226	12. Sudan . . . .	3,652
3. Nigeria . .	63,617	13. U.A.R. . . .	3,059
4. Tunisia . .	48,368	14. Mali . . . .	2,292
5. Ghana . . .	39,203	15. Sierra Leone	1,610
6. Malaya . .	37,044	16. Philippines .	278
7. Indonesia .	28,460	17. Ceylon . . . .	206
8. Pakistan .	27,904	18. Iran . . . .	198
9. Morocco . .	23,668	19. Burma . . . .	54
10. Liberia . .	9,558		

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1. The material for this chapter was drawn in part from Thomas Hovet, Jr., The Role of the Afro-Asian Donor States in the United Nations Peacekeeping Operation in the Congo: 1960-1964, 1965, a background study prepared especially for this Report.

2. See Manpower Contribution Chart, Appendix H, Charts B and E.

## Interests of the Afro-Asian States

Most of the Afro-Asian donor states had achieved their independence after 1945, and some of them after the Congo had become independent. As newly sovereign states, they were preoccupied at home with the quest for national consciousness and identity. In foreign affairs they associated themselves with the aspirations of other new states and found themselves opposing political and economic policies of the major powers that appeared to threaten the integrity of any fledgling state. Their overriding objective was to oppose every form of "neo-colonialism" and to eliminate the last vestiges of European colonial control.

The newly formed foreign offices in these emergent nations were small and usually staffed with specialists for large political regions, rather than for separate countries. This meant that their general interest in decolonization was not expressed in specific policies for particular countries. Hence, before July 1960 the majority of the Afro-Asian donor states had shown little interest in the Congo. Once the Congo crisis erupted and was interpreted as a threat of the reimposition of Belgian colonial rule, they identified their national interests with the fate of the Congo. From then on these states were intent upon securing what they regarded as effective decolonization for the Congo. To most of them the United Nations was primarily an instrument to achieve and insure successful decolonization, though a number of them were also interested in the development of the United Nations as an institution. But even in the latter case, the Organization was looked upon as a protector of the weak against the ambitions of the strong.

While these states had varying degrees of relationships with one side or the other in the East-West conflict, none of them was primarily concerned with issues of the Cold War as such. They were not adverse to exploiting the Cold War for their own purposes, but they wanted to maintain a maximum degree of freedom of action from East-West rivalries. In the Congo crisis they sought to prevent the new state from becoming an arena for big power competition and interference.



The Afro-Asian states further shared the objective of developing a strong central government in the Congo. Almost all of these states had experienced their own problems of tribal separatism and they felt, therefore, that a strong national government was essential for the stability in the Congo. Some also believed that the existence of such a government would contribute to the elimination of the remaining white regimes in southern Africa.

Although the Afro-Asian donor states pursued similar broad objectives, they were by no means a unified or monolithic bloc. With respect to the Congo issue, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Morocco, the United Arab Republic, and Ceylon formed the more militant wing, they were more militantly anti-colonialist than the others. This cluster of states--of which Ghana and Guinea were typical--was not necessarily pro-Communist in the Cold War, but was more anti-West in so far as they identified the Western nations with colonialism. These states were generally ruled by men who believed in strong national governments and who themselves sought to exert leadership in the Pan-African movement. Their aspirations for African leadership triggered their active concern with the Congo crisis. Moroccan leaders became increasingly a part of the militant faction as they saw a dangerous parallel between separatist Mauritania and secessionist Katanga. By joining the militants, Morocco hoped to enlist their support for its claim to the territory of Mauritania.

The other Afro-Asian states exhibited a more moderate behavior towards the Congo affair. Ethiopia, Nigeria, Liberia, Malaya, Iran, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Sierra Leone did not regard economic ties with the West as a threat of neo-colonialism the militant members did. These states generally tended to have a pro-Western bias. Some of them received direct military aid from Western powers. Tunisia, India, Indonesia, Sudan, and Burma appeared to be the most impartial group with respect to the Congo issue; their apprehensions, or lack of them, regarding Congolese problems were focused upon both the East and the West.

Obviously some of these states--such as Indonesia, for example--<sup>3</sup> would not be included in the more moderate group on other international issues or at different times, but they could be classed as moderates on the Congo affair during the UNF period. Their attitude stemmed to a great extent from a lack of any direct and immediate interest in the Congo. With some variations the behavior of Ethiopia, Nigeria, India, and Tunisia was fairly representative of the moderate group.

#### Their Initial Position

As members of the Security Council, Tunisia and Ceylon were the only Afro-Asians who could express their opinions directly in that forum in July 1960. Primarily through the efforts of the Tunisian Representative, Mongi Slim, the African caucusing group<sup>4</sup> at the United Nations was consulted at every stage of negotiations in the Security Council to ensure that when the Tunisian delegate spoke, he spoke with the general support of all the African members. From the beginning Slim also sought to enlist the backing of the Asian members. By the second meeting of the Security Council on July 20, Ceylon worked with Tunisia in order to sponsor resolutions known to have the endorsement of the Afro-Asian states. The united Afro-Asian front continued to function until late August and early September, when the more militant states became disturbed by the Secretary-General's reluctance to use U.N. troops against Katanga and over his failure to support the ousted Lumumba.

When the Congo crisis broke, most Afro-Asian states held that the subsequent Belgian intervention endangered the Congo's newly estab-

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3. Indonesia's moderate attitude and support of the U.N. operation stemmed partly from the fact that it wanted to enlist U.N. support for its claim on Western New Guinea in the Indo-Dutch dispute.

4. The concept of the caucusing group has been elaborated by Thomas Hovet, Jr. See his Bloc Politics in the United Nations (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960) and Africa in the United Nations (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1963).

lished independence. It was also apparent from the various cables sent by President Kasavubu and Prime Minister Lumumba that they would turn anywhere for emergency aid. From the outset the Afro-Asians recognized that such a situation could easily lead to major power interference. Even before the first U.N. resolution was passed, Ghana, Guinea, Morocco, and Tunisia offered troops for a U.N. force to aid the Congo.

At the first meeting of the Security Council on July 13, Tunisia's official position was approved by the majority of the Afro-Asian states. Tunisia argued that the mutiny in the Congo did not pose sufficient danger to the European population to justify the dispatch of Belgian troops to the Congo. On the contrary, Belgium's action had increased the disorder and constituted aggression. Slim then introduced a draft resolution which called upon Belgium to withdraw its troops and authorized the Secretary-General to take the necessary steps to provide military assistance to the Congolese Government. Slim also declared that the independent African countries were prepared to make available whatever assistance was necessary.<sup>5</sup> The Tunisian proposal became the July 14, 1960, resolution.

When the Security Council considered Hammarskjold's first report on the Congo on July 21, Tunisia commended his actions and stressed that the continued presence of Belgian forces aggravated the Congo crisis. Arguing for an "immediate" withdrawal of metropolitan troops, Tunisia, together with Ceylon, submitted a draft resolution which called upon Belgium to "implement speedily" the July 14 resolution.<sup>6</sup> Ceylon later explained that the word "speedily" had been deliberately used to avoid controversy and to permit "some connection" between the Belgian withdrawal and the buildup of the UNF.<sup>7</sup>

By this time the Katanga issue had more clearly emerged. Ref-

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5. U.N., SCOR, S/PV 873, July 13, 1960, pp. 12-14.

6. U.N., SCOR, S/PV 878, July 21, 1960, pp. 1-8.

7. Ibid., p. 16.



lecting the widely held view among the Afro-Asian states, Tunisia maintained that the object of Belgium's intervention was to enable Katanga to secede and was an interference in the Congo's domestic affairs. Hence, the Tunisian-Ceylonese draft resolution included a request to all states to refrain from action that would undermine the Congo's unity and territorial integrity.<sup>8</sup> At subsequent Security Council meetings Tunisia and Ceylon repeated the charge that Belgium was actively encouraging Katangan secession and thereby threatening not only the peace and security of the Congo, but also of Africa, and consequently of the world.<sup>9</sup>

Although a number of Afro-Asian donor states refrained from making any major official Congo statement, the majority apparently agreed with Ghana that "the United Nations had a decisive role to play in assisting the Government and people of the Congo to safeguard their independence, unity, and territorial integrity."<sup>10</sup> The U.N. mission appeared to them the most effective way to rescue the Congo from Belgian imperialism evidenced by the presence of Belgian troops and the secession of Katanga. The UNF was expected at the same time to prevent intervention by the major powers. Several Afro-Asian countries responded favorably to Hammarskjöld's appeals for contributions to the UNF. Their leaders also believed they would gain a certain amount of prestige by serving in a U.N. force. Furthermore, the military establishments wanted their troops to have the training and experience of serving abroad. By September 1960, Tunisia, India, Sudan, Burma, Ethiopia, Liberia, Pakistan, and the six militant states had made troops or specialized military personnel available to the UNF.

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8. Ibid., pp. 6-8.

9. U.N., SCOR, S/PV 885, August 8, 1960, pp. 9-15.

10. U.N., SCOR, S/PV 905, September 16, 1960, p. 12.

### Support for Lumumba and his Heirs

As could be expected, the African donor states had a great interest in the Congo, and within this group the militant cluster had the most direct interests. Whereas the moderate states were prepared to find a compromise when they disagreed with Hammarskjold's interpretation of the U.N. mandate, the militant members tried to force their interpretation on the Secretary-General either through U.N. channels or through their diplomatic representatives and agents in the Congo.

To Hammarskjold the U.N. mandate called for the reestablishment of internal order which would enable the Belgian troops to withdraw. Hammarskjold also stressed that the UNF could not use force except in self-defense, and could not be used to influence internal Congolese conflicts. On all significant matters U.N. officials sought the cooperation of the Congolese authorities who were in control. In Katanga, U.N. Representatives dealt with the provincial authorities and tried to negotiate the entry of the UNF without influencing the Leopoldville-Elisabethville dispute, which they regarded as a domestic issue.

To most Afro-Asian states the Security Council mandate implied support for the Lumumba Government as the only lawfully constituted government against all domestic and external opponents. Particularly the militants, led by Ghana and Guinea, strongly supported Lumumba who was expected to build the type of regime in the Congo they desired. Hammarskjold's policy of noninterference in the Katanga question, and subsequently in the constitutional crisis in Leopoldville, represented in their thinking an undermining of the Lumumba Government. This difference in the interpretation of the mandate became increasingly a source of conflict between the militants and the Secretary-General.

Early in June 1960, Ghana had set up an office in Leopoldville headed by Andrew Djinn, who was instrumental in bringing about a compromise between Lumumba and Kasavubu just before independence day. Djinn served as an essential link between Lumumba and President Kwame Nkrumah. He kept Nkrumah constantly informed on Congolese developments, remained in close

touch with Lumumba, and even accompanied the latter on his trip to New York at the end of July 1960. Djin, N. A. Welbeck, the Minister in Charge of the Ghanaian Embassy and later Nkrumah's personal representative, and other Ghanaian diplomats and agents regularly advised Lumumba and his supporters during the summer of 1960.

When Katanga successfully resisted the efforts of the Central Government to control the province, Ghana warned Hammarskjold on August 11, that it would take "independent action" if U.N. officials continued to deal with persons, "who base their authority to negotiate on a repudiation of the authority of the Congolese Government. . . . It would be entirely contrary to the mandate" if the UNF permitted the Belgian "puppet" regime in Katanga to continue.<sup>11</sup> Ghana recognized at the same time that it was essential to its argument to maintain the Lumumba-Kasavubu alliance. Ghanaian agents in the Congo urged Lumumba to preserve the political balance between him and Kasavubu in order to consolidate Lumumba's position so he could eventually emerge as the dominating figure.

The task of U.N. officials in the first few months was complicated by having to deal both with the disorganized Congolese administration and with the Ghanaians who appeared to be a key influence.

The Guinean Representatives who usually acted behind the scenes, created even greater problems for the U.N. mission. Guinea became increasingly impatient with Hammarskjold's refusal to use U.N. troops against Katanga in July and August and regarded this as an indication that the U.N. operation was controlled by the colonial powers. Guinean diplomats and agents in the Congo apparently encouraged Lumumba to launch an attack on his own against the secessionist regimes of Katanga and South Kasai and to accept Soviet offers of planes and trucks to transport Lumumba's troops. The Ghanaian diplomats, on the other hand, expressed concern that this

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11. U.N., SCOR, Supplement for July, Aug., Sept., 1960, S/4427 (August 11, 1960), pp. 93-94.

action would invite Cold War rivalry in the Congo

The varying advice of the Guinean and Ghanaian diplomats had an effect on Lumumba's dissatisfaction with Hammarskjold and encouraged him to look for assistance outside U.N. channels. Early in August 1960, when Lumumba visited Tunisia, Morocco, Liberia, Guinea, Ghana, and Togo, he got the impression that these countries would give him unilateral aid if the UNF failed to move against Katanga. On August 6, Guinea had even threatened Hammarskjold that it would place its troops at the disposal of the Lumumba Government unless they were immediately used by the U.N. Command against Katanga.<sup>12</sup> But at the Pan-African Conference, held in Leopoldville, August 25 to August 30, 1960,<sup>13</sup> only Guinea endorsed Lumumba's position that action be taken against the secessionist regimes, action independent of the UNF and with Soviet aid. The other African states, almost without exception, advised against an independent attack against Katanga and insisted that the only way to save the Congo was to cooperate with the UNF. Ghana, Ethiopia, and Tunisia warned that their troops were already committed to the UNF and would not be withdrawn. The Africans hoped to bring about a reconciliation between U.N. officials and the Lumumba Government by convincing Hammarskjold of the seriousness of the Katanga situation, and persuading Lumumba to arrive at a negotiated settlement with Tshombe. The Africans feared that Lumumba's use of Russian planes and trucks would jeopardize the Congo's neutrality. Most Asian donor states also wanted to avoid unilateral intervention.<sup>14</sup> The ouster of Lumumba on September 5, 1960, and the Mobutu coup nine days later frus-

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12. *Ibid.*, S/4417, Add. 1, Rev. 1 (August 6, 1960), p. 54.

13. The Conference was attended by Cameroon, the two Congos, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Mali, Morocco, the Somali Republic, Sudan, Togo, Tunisia, and the United Arab Republic.

14. See for example Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru's speech on August 31, 1960, in Nehru and Africa -- Extracts from Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches on Africa, 1946-1963. (New Delhi: Indian Council for Africa, 1964), p. 58.



trated African efforts to effect an understanding between Lumumba and Hammarskjold.

The militant Afro-Asian members strongly opposed the actions and policy of the U.N. Representatives during the constitutional conflict between Kasavubu and Lumumba. They were particularly disturbed over the September 6 closing of the Leopoldville radio station by the U.N. Representative, thus denying Lumumba access to the radio, while Kasavubu was able to use Radio Brazzaville. They felt that by the seizure of the radio station, the UNF had deliberately sided with Kasavubu against Lumumba. African diplomats in the Congo sought in vain to persuade U.N. Representatives to reopen the station.<sup>15</sup> They also tried to bring Kasavubu and Lumumba together. Though they were agreed on this aim, the attitude of the various delegations varied. Nkrumah's private letters to Lumumba showed that the Ghanaians were solidly backing Lumumba, but that they considered at least a temporary reconciliation with Kasavubu and the U.N. officials necessary until Lumumba's position had been more firmly re-established.<sup>16</sup> The Guineans saw a "reconciliation" primarily as a way to bring Lumumba back to power. Others, typified by the Tunisians, regarded a reconciliation as necessary for Congolese stability. The Ghanaian and Guinean agents remained active in Leopoldville until Kasavubu felt strong enough to expel them from the Congo in October 1960.<sup>17</sup>

In New York, at the September Security Council and General Assembly meetings the militant states protested bitterly against the UNF's failure to intervene on behalf of Lumumba. Though they generally recog-

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15. The U.N. Representative returned the radio station to Congolese authorities on September 12, after negotiations with Congolese parliamentary leaders.

16. For Nkrumah's letters to Lumumba, see Centre de Recherche et d'Information Socio-Politiques, Congo: 1960, Vol. II, prepared by J. Gérard-Libois and Benoît Verhaegen (Brussels: Les Dossiers du CRISP, n.d.), pp. 909-13.

17. Although the Ghanaian Representatives were declared personae non gratae in early October, they did not leave the Congo until November 22, 1960.

nized Kasavubu as Head of State, they argued that his dismissal of Lumumba was illegal. They demanded that the UNF support the Lumumba Government as the only legitimate government and refuse any kind of recognition to Mobutu's Council of Commissioners. Ghana, Guinea, and the U.A.R. warned that if the U.N. Command did not change its attitude in favor of Lumumba, they would withdraw their contingents from the UNF and place them directly at Lumumba's service. Guinea insisted that UNF contingents from NATO members<sup>18</sup> be replaced by troops from African countries alone.<sup>19</sup> Ghana wanted to change the composition of the U.N. Command and the Force so that the U.N. mission would be entirely composed of troops from the independent African states.<sup>20</sup>

Among the more moderate states, India and Indonesia placed themselves squarely in the Lumumba camp. Other moderates, though critical of U.N. policy with respect to Katanga, were more reserved in their attitude towards Lumumba. More important, however, was the concern of all moderates with the sharp attack of the Soviet Union on Hammarskjold and the U.N. operation. They felt that it was essential for the future of the institution to uphold the Secretary-General's authority and his independent role. They also feared that the withdrawal of the UNF would open the door to a Spanish-type civil war in the Congo. Hence, they vigorously defended Hammarskjold and backed the U.N. effort. The moderate states, with Tunisia as spokesman, blamed the tensions between U.N. and Congolese officials, the increased dissension among Congolese factions, and the Congolese requests for aid outside the U.N. framework on the continued presence of the Belgian military personnel.

The Soviet campaign against Hammarskjold also forced the militants to rally to Hammarskjold's support. After the Security Council

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18. As of September 2, 1960, Canada, Norway, and Denmark had a total of 326 men serving with the UNF.

19. U.N., SCOR, S/PV 905, September 16, 1960, p. 28.

20. U.N., GAOR, A/PV 869, September 23, 1960, p. 68.

reached a deadlock as a result of the Soviet veto, the General Assembly met on September 17, 1960, in an emergency special session. At the informal African caucus the Ghanaian delegate, under instructions from Accra, argued that while his Government disagreed with several aspects of Hammar-skjold's Congo policy, it nonetheless felt that the issue was not the Congo, but the preservation of the integrity and independence of the Secretary-General's office. Ghana's spokesman pleaded for the support of Hammar-skjold for the sake of the United Nations as an institution. He even threatened to oppose his Guinean counterpart, who was inclined to endorse the Soviet position, on every subsequent issue in the United Nations, if Guinea voted with the Soviet bloc. Militant and moderate African members finally managed to agree on a joint draft resolution. Ceylon and Indonesia, along with several other states, joined the Africans in sponsoring the resolution, which the General Assembly adopted on September 20 and for which every African and Asian donor state voted.

In presenting this resolution, the Afro-Asian emphasized their support for the Secretary-General and the need for continued U.N. action in the Congo. By calling upon all states to refrain from extending direct aid, the Afro-Asians wanted to prevent the Congo from becoming enmeshed in major power rivalry. But by stating clearly that U.N. assistance should be given to the Central Government, the Afro-Asians indicated their support for the Lumumba faction and implied that U.N. officials should have no dealings with the Mobutu regime.

The common Afro-Asian front presented in the special General Assembly session was soon broken by the debate over the Congolese delegation to the United Nations. Since early September two rival delegations, one accredited by Kasavubu and the other by Lumumba, had been in New York. Each demanded recognition. On October 10, 1960, Guinea urged that the Lumumba representatives be seated. This action set in motion a chain of events that brought about the bitter credentials fight in November. The militant African members, Ceylon, India, and Indonesia argued the case for the Lumumba forces. Most moderates maintained that the seating of the

Lumumba delegation would be an insult to President Kasavubu, who all along had supported Mobutu's action in "neutralizing" Lumumba. A number of moderates also believed, as Ethiopia explained, that the real problem was not the credentials issue in New York, but the factional struggle in the Congo. To seat one of the contesting delegations would merely encourage intransigence of one leader against others.<sup>21</sup>

When the General Assembly finally voted to seat the Kasavubu delegation on November 22, the Afro-Asian bloc split. India, Indonesia, and the militants continued to support Lumumba; the other Afro-Asians either abstained or voted in favor of the Kasavubu delegation. Although there was a great deal of Western pressure to support Kasavubu, some of the Afro-Asians, including Tunisia, Sudan, Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Malaya, explained that they had abstained because they wished to remain neutral in the Kasavubu-Lumumba conflict.

The seating of the Kasavubu delegation and the subsequent failure of the UNF to prevent the arrest of Lumumba on December 1, 1960, deepened the disillusionment of the militant states with the role of the UNF. Guinea, the U.A.R., and Indonesia announced in December their intention to recall their troops from the Congo. Mali's forces had already left the Congo because they were needed at home as a result of the disintegration of the Mali Federation and the subsequent rising tensions between Mali and Senegal.

At the Casablanca Conference of the six militant donor states and Libya in early January 1961, Guinea, Mali, and the U.A.R. maintained that the U.N. operation was now too compromised for any of them to cooperate further. The final communique called for the disarmament of the Mobutu troops, the release of political prisoners, and the reconvening of Parliament. It was assumed that Parliament would support Lumumba. The communique also stated that the participants in the Casablanca Conference would withdraw their troops. At this time, however, Ghana still argued

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21. U.N., GAOR, A/PV 917, November 18, 1960, p. 873.



against the troop recall and pleaded for the sake of the United Nations to give the UNF another chance to prove itself.<sup>22</sup>

When it became apparent that the withdrawal of troops threatened the U.N. operation, India, though subscribing to the demands for the release of political prisoners and the reconvening of Parliament, decided that the main issue was not the Congo, but the survival of the Organization. Most other moderates seemed to endorse India's view that the demise of the UNF would adversely affect the entire U.N. system. Tunisia particularly was concerned with the future of the Organization and worked for a conciliation of the differing viewpoints of the Afro-Asian donor states in order to strengthen the U.N. system as well as the U.N. mission in the Congo.

The announcement of Lumumba's death on February 13, 1961, hardened the opposition of the Casablanca powers to Hammarskjold's policy and caused them to strengthen their ties with the Stanleyville regime, then headed by Antoine Gizenga. On February 14 and 15, the U.A.R. and Guinea recognized the Stanleyville Government. Ghana, Mali, Indonesia, and Morocco did not extend formal recognition, but had diplomatic agents assigned to the Gizenga regime. Guinea and Mali also joined the Soviet Union in calling for the resignation of the Secretary-General whom they held responsible for Lumumba's death.<sup>23</sup>

Most moderates, particularly India, Tunisia, Liberia, and Nigeria, recognized the dangers of unilateral action in the Congo. They also saw in the demands for Hammarskjold's resignation a threat to the United Nations as an institution. Negotiations behind the scenes among the militant and moderate Afro-Asians finally produced a draft resolution which had the approval of the majority of the Afro-Asian states. India placed its full

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22. The states which did recall their troops were: Indonesia (1,152 men), Morocco (3,259 men), Guinea (749 men), and the U.A.R. (519 men). Mali had already withdrawn its troops (577 men) in November 1960.

23. U.N., SCOR, S/PV 936, February 16, 1961, pp. 8 and 15.

prestige behind the resolution and pledged to make whatever further troop contributions were necessary if it were adopted.<sup>24</sup>

The resolution, passed by the Security Council on February 21, 1961, reflected a compromise between the different views. It strengthened the U.N. mandate by authorizing the use of force as a last resort to prevent civil war. The resolution strongly recommended the reconvening of Parliament. It called for the reorganization of Congolese armed forces, but did not single out Mobutu's troops. It also reaffirmed the previous resolutions, but it neither commended Hammarskjold's past actions nor associated him with the implementation of the present decisions. The resolution as a whole represented a defeat for the Soviet Union and those African states which sought to censure Hammarskjold. As the Liberian delegate made clear, the majority of the Africans wanted the office of the Secretary-General to remain as it was and to give Hammarskjold even more authority to bring peace and order to the Congo.<sup>25</sup> India fulfilled its commitment. It increased its troop contributions to the UNF from 776 in February 1961 to 5,400 the following June, and ensured thereby the continuation of the operation.

India's support of the U.N. mission gave New Delhi important leverage on Hammarskjold and some influence on the Western powers that backed the U.N. effort. The Dayal problem is a case in point. Rajeshwar Dayal, an Indian, was Hammarskjold's Officer-in-Charge in Leopoldville from September 1960 to May 1961. He was widely suspected of favoring the Lumumba camp over the Mobutu regime. For this and other reasons, Congolese officials and Western diplomats began to exert mounting pressures on Hammarskjold to remove Dayal. Dayal was finally recalled, but reportedly not until India was able to arrange a behind-the-scenes agreement calling for the withdrawal of the U.S. Ambassador in Leopoldville in exchange for Dayal's

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24. U.N., SCOR, S/PV 941, February 20, 1961, p. 11.

25. U.N., SCOR, S/PV 938, February 17, 1961, p. 5.

departure.<sup>25a</sup>

Lumumba's disappearance from the scene decreased the role of the militant African states in the Congo, though African agents continued for some time to advise the Gizenga regime. The U.A.R. gave some financial, technical, and military assistance to Stanleyville, but when the Sudan closed its territory to non-United Nations arms shipments to the Congo it became extremely difficult for the U.A.R. to give extensive aid to Stanleyville. With the advent of the Adoula Government in August 1961 and Gizenga's return to Leopoldville as deputy prime minister, the militant African states joined their moderate counterparts and switched their support to the Central Government.

#### The Katanga Issue

The disenchantment of the militant donor states with the U.N. operation stemmed primarily from their conviction that the UNF should protect the Lumumba regime against the factions which aimed at overthrowing it or undermining its national authority, including Katanga. Once the Lumumba question was no longer relevant, however, the interests of the militants in the continuing Congo crisis declined rapidly. For the moderates the Lumumba issue was less important; they were less critical of the U.N. mission and more inclined to support the Secretary-General.

From the beginning of the crisis there was a broad consensus among the Afro-Asian donor states that Katanga secession presented a threat to the political viability and territorial integrity of the Congo and was engineered by Belgian interests. In Afro-Asian speeches in New York "Belgian intervention" and the "Belgian puppet state" of Katanga were recurrent themes. Militants and moderates alike argued that Lumumba's acceptance of Soviet aid was understandable in the light of Belgium's assistance to Tshombe. Repeated Afro-Asian demands to refrain from direct military assistance were as much an appeal to Belgium as they were an

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<sup>25a</sup>. Catherine Hoskyns, The Congo Since Independence: January 1960-December 1961 (London: Oxford University Press for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1965), p. 365.

effort to insulate the Congo from East-West interference.

The widespread desire to eliminate the Belgian presence and to end thereby Katangan secession was reflected in the Afro-Asian resolution of February 21, 1961. The resolution emphasized the immediate withdrawal of "all Belgian and other foreign military and para-military personnel and political advisers," rather than the disarmament of the Congolese armed forces as a means of reestablishing order. The latter course had been advanced by some Western governments.

The general dissatisfaction among the Afro-Asians with Belgium's failure to implement the February 21, 1961, resolution had deepened by April 1961. Thirteen Afro-Asian donor states, together with eight others, submitted in the General Assembly a draft resolution which was addressed directly to Belgium. The resolution made the continued Belgian presence the "central factor" in the crisis and called upon Belgium to comply "fully and promptly" by recalling its military and political personnel. All Afro-Asian donor states voted in favor when the resolution was adopted on April 15, 1961.

After Round One, the Afro-Asians decided once more to call for action to end Katangan secession and requested a Security Council meeting. This time the lead was taken by the moderate states, particularly Ethiopia, Nigeria, and India, each with large contingents in the UNF. At the opening session on November 13, 1961, the Ethiopian delegate presented the familiar Afro-Asian theme:

The secession of Katanga, in our opinion, was never the result of genuine internal dispute, as it was clear from the beginning that the Katanga secession was engineered and maintained by foreign mercenaries and financial interests. The secession of Katanga is indeed a clear and unequivocal manifestation of Belgian and other interference in the domestic affairs of the Republic of the Congo . . . and should have been brought to an end promptly through the mandate of law and order given by the Security Council. 26

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26. U.N., SCOR, S/PV 973, November 13, 1961, pp. 8-9.

If the Adoula Government collapsed, the Ethiopian Representative added, the U.N. system might well collapse with it.

Ceylon, Liberia, and the U.A.R., at that time Security Council members, subsequently introduced a draft which became the November 24, 1961, resolution. Through this resolution the Afro-Asians strengthened the U.N. mandate by authorizing the use of force, if necessary for the apprehension and expulsion of prohibited foreign military and political personnel.

After the November 1961 decision, the moderate Afro-Asian states occasionally urged that Tshombe's secessionist effort be ended. The militants rarely expressed in public any interest in this matter. In October 1962, Tunisia welcomed the U.N. Plan for National Reconciliation, but warned that military force would have to be used in addition to economic sanctions to reintegrate Katanga. Once Katangan secession was ended in January 1963, the Afro-Asians congratulated the Secretary-General for his role in the reunification of the Congo. By the end of 1963, Tunisia, Sudan, and Liberia suggested that the U.N. presence in the Congo be retained until law and order had been fully restored. But by that time most other Afro-Asians had turned their attention away from the Congo. They were more interested in "decolonization" than in peace and order as such.

#### Afro-Asian Support of the U.N. Operation

None of the Afro-Asian donor states completely opposed the U.N. operation. They disagreed with certain aspects of the U.N. role, but they all contributed troops. Even those states which withdrew their forces in early 1961 continued to use their influence in the United Nations to modify the operation, rather than to oppose it outright.

The Afro-Asian troop contributions to the UNF were essential to the success of the operation. India, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Tunisia, and Ghana contributed 61.2 percent of the manpower in the UNF, and overall, the

nineteen Afro-Asian states were responsible for 82.4 percent.<sup>27</sup> At the same time, the withdrawals of the contingents of Morocco, Indonesia, U.A.R., and Guinea in the beginning of 1961 presented serious problems. Had not India decided to make a major contribution, the whole character of the operation would probably have changed.

The importance the Afro-Asian donor states attached to the U.N. mission can be suggested by comparing the size of their troop contributions to their total army personnel. The approximate percentage of their armed forces that were sent to the Congo are as follows:<sup>28</sup>

1. Ghana . . . . .	32.7	
2. Nigeria . . . . .	26.7	
3. Mali . . . . .	18.6	
4. Tunisia . . . . .	15.8	
5. Guinea . . . . .	15.6	
6. Liberia . . . . .	12.8	
7. Malaya . . . . .	10.8	
8. Morocco . . . . .	9.6	
9. Ethiopia . . . . .	8.9	
10. Sierra Leone . . . . .	6.9	
11. Sudan . . . . .	4.4	
12. U.A.R. . . . .		
13. Ceylon . . . . .		} 1 or less
14. India . . . . .		
15. Indonesia . . . . .		
16. Burma . . . . .		
17. Pakistan . . . . .		
18. Iran . . . . .		
19. The Philippines . . . . .		

The above figures indicate that at least in the case of the

27. For manpower contributions to the UNF by states, see Appendix H, Chart B.

28. This is calculated by taking the maximum number of troops each state had at any one time in the Congo, and calculating it as a percentage of the total manpower in their army at that time. Quality and type of units are necessarily disregarded with this method. Sources for manpower of their armies are based on data in Africa Report, Vol. 9 (January 1964), Britannica Book of the Year, 1965, and the Statesman's Yearbook, 1965.

African donors, their contributions to the UNF constituted a considerable portion of their armies.

Once the forces were committed to the UNF, the home governments rarely, if ever, tried to dictate the actions of their contingents in the Congo. The militants threatened at times to issue direct instructions to their troop units, but there is no solid evidence that they carried out their threats. Nor is there evidence of deliberate disloyalty to the U.N. Command on the part of a national contingent or contingent commander. Ghanaian troops, for example, denied Lumumba access to the Leopoldville radio station under UNF instructions, even though their Government was clearly pro-Lumumba. When Lumumba protested to Nkrumah, Nkrumah wrote:

Dear Patrice:

Thanks for your letter, sent through Mr. Djin concerning the refusal of my troops to allow you to seize Radio Leopoldville yesterday. It was an unfortunate affair, but I think the troops behaved like that because they are for the moment under the orders of the United Nations. 29

To be sure, some of the Afro-Asian troops allowed their feelings about the Congo situation to be reflected in their actions. But the instances seem to have been limited to a few isolated individuals. Once the opposition of the more militant donor states to the U.N. operation intensified, the policy of these states was to withdraw their military units, rather than to attempt to use them independently.

As far as financial contributions were concerned, some of the Afro-Asians may have argued for a reduction in their share of the assessments. But all of them, including those that withdrew their units, paid their assessed portion for the U.N. mission.

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29. Cited in Congo 1960, Vol. II, op.cit., p. 909.

### The Impact on the U.N. Mission

The role of the Afro-Asian donor states was vital to the U.N. effort. Their contribution of 82.4 percent of the manpower for the operation attests to the significance of their role, but the political aspects of their participation were perhaps even more important.

The dispatch of the U.N. peace force to a country such as the Congo, which was emerging from colonial status, was possible without raising serious questions of neocolonialism because the Force was predominantly composed of troops from newly independent states. The willingness of the Afro-Asians, and the Africans in particular, to make initial commitments to the Force made the speedy establishment of such a force feasible.

More specifically, African pledges to contribute troops upon Hammarskjold's request prior to the first Security Council meeting on the Congo, enabled the Secretary-General to make his proposal to the Security Council. When he explained that he intended to enlist troops first of all from African countries, the adoption of the July 14, 1960, resolution was virtually ensured. The resolution itself was vague, but it had the united support of the Afro-Asian states. The Soviet Union could ill afford, therefore, to veto the resolution. Neither the Soviet Union, nor the Western powers, thought it politically expedient to veto subsequent resolutions in the Security Council when they carried the full endorsement of the Afro-Asian members.

The support of the Afro-Asian states afforded the Secretary-General a greater degree of insulation from big power pressures than might otherwise have been possible. On the other hand, in order to continue the mission, he was almost forced to comply with the united demands of the Afro-Asians. When he differed with them he was much more exposed to attacks from the major powers. He had correspondingly greater latitude in implementing the mandate when the Afro-Asians were divided over the Lumumba issue. Once they closed ranks after Lumumba's death, his range of options narrowed.



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complicated the U.N. task. As long as Lumumba was still in power, most of these activities did not violate the U.N. resolutions. At times, diplomats and agents from the African states engaged in activities contrary to the intent of the U.N. resolutions. For example, when Guinean representatives advised Lumumba to accept direct Soviet aid, or when the representatives of militant states supported the Stanleyville regime they were acting against the Security Council resolutions. It should be pointed out though, that the U.N. presence did not preclude normal diplomatic representation and intercourse in the Congo. All governments represented in the Congo exerted pressures in behalf of their interests.

On the whole, the U.N. operation served the interests of the Afro-Asian donor states by helping the young state to make the transition from dependence to independence and by limiting and deterring direct intervention from the major powers. Though Afro-Asian contingents constituted by far the largest portion of the Force, without U.N. sponsorship the Afro-Asians would not have been able to establish an effective force. No African or Asian government politically acceptable to Lumumba had the military, logistical, and financial resources to send the necessary troops to the Congo. No Afro-Asian organization existed capable of creating and dispatching a force. Even if a coalition of Afro-Asian states could have raised a force, their divergent interests would have made agreement on the purpose and tasks of the force highly unlikely.

The U.N. presence did not serve those Afro-Asian states that wanted a Congo controlled by Lumumba. The Secretary-General's commitment to the law-and-order mandate and his insistence on refraining from interference in domestic conflicts helped to consolidate Kasavubu's position against Lumumba. When the Lumumba question was no longer germane, the militant Afro-Asian powers lost their interest in the Congo operation. Even among the more moderate states there was a significant decline in interest.

A salient lesson of the Congo experience for the Afro-Asians was

that their effectiveness was a function of their unity. When the Afro-Asians were divided, their influence in New York declined. A united front was particularly necessary in the Security Council, where the major powers would be reluctant to veto a resolution which had the concerted backing of the Afro-Asians. The Security Council was, therefore, a very useful instrument for the Afro-Asians in the pursuit of their objectives.

## CHAPTER 14

### RECRUITING AND MAINTAINING THE FORCE

Committed to a "peaceful settlement" mission, the U.N. Force in the Congo was not a traditional military establishment. It operated under unusual political constraints. It did not have the authority to initiate military action. It even lacked the full powers of a normal police establishment.

Yet, in many respects, the UNF looked and acted like an army. It approximated a division in strength. It had combat battalions and specialized units. It had a small air force which included jet fighters. During its four years, more than 93,000 officers and men from 35 countries served in the Force. Each man wore his national military uniform along with a U.N. arm insignia and a blue beret.

Like a national army, the UNF was commanded by a general and was the instrument of political purposes, but unlike a national army, its political directives were based upon resolutions of the Security Council and its civilian chief was the Secretary-General.

#### Recruiting Principles and Their Application

In conventional military practice, force requirements are based on a thorough analysis of the operational mission, the environment, and enemy (or hostile) capabilities. Only after this estimate has been made, does the planner consider other, nonmilitary factors which might reduce

his freedom to place in the field a force of optimum size, armament, organization, and, where applicable, national structure. The events of July 1960 did not permit such orderly planning. More significantly, the size and character of the required military operation had probably not become evident by the time the initial force goals had been established and recruiting had begun.

Leopoldville's first informal request for military assistance, made to Under-Secretary Bunche on July 10, had actually been for military technical (i.e. advisory and training) assistance in the internal security field<sup>1</sup> to help the Congolese Government "bring its army under control, instill it with some sense of discipline, and train a corps of native officers."<sup>2</sup> A relatively small force of about 3,000, principally comprised of officers and noncommissioned officers, was all that was contemplated at that time.

In this context, Hammarskjold's decision to solicit help first, if not exclusively, from African countries was politically understandable, though militarily unsound. It should be noted, however, that his apparent decision to limit national representation in the main to Africa was made on July 12, before the nature of Belgian intervention, and the Congolese reaction to it, had been fully reported to him.<sup>3</sup>

By the night of July 13-14, not only had the mission of the proposed U.N. Force been changed, but the Secretary-General was already under pressure to impose a specific political coloration on the Force.<sup>4</sup>

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1. See Ruth B. Russell, United Nations Experience With Military Forces: Political and Legal Aspects. (Washington: The Brookings Institution, August 1964), pp. 88-91; Catherine Hoskyns, The Congo Since Independence: January 1960 - December 1961. (London: Oxford University Press for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1965), pp. 113-19.

2. Joseph P. Lash, Dag Hammarskjold. (New York: Doubleday, 1961), p. 226.

3. Ibid., p. 227.

4. Hoskyns, op.cit., pp. 114-19.

Kasavubu and Lumumba, in their July 13 cable, demanded that U.N. troops be drawn from neutralist nations. Ghana announced that support should come from the independent African states<sup>5</sup> and the Soviet Union attempted, in the Security Council meeting, to have the sources of military assistance limited to the African member states. There is no evidence to suggest that Hammarskjold was unduly influenced by these views. As a matter of fact, his recruiting policies were largely established before these views were pressed upon him. In the early months of the operation, it had already become apparent that the emphasis on using African units had a negative effect on the efficiency and reliability of the UNF.

Hammarskjold's recruiting philosophy was based largely on his UNEF experience,<sup>6</sup> but he did not elaborate on it in the Security Council discussion on the July 14 resolution. His only comment then was that "the need to avoid complications because of the nationalities used" would preclude the use of troops from the permanent members of the Security Council, but would not exclude units from the African states.<sup>7</sup> He gave the Council no arguments to support this estimate, nor did he defend his apparent belief that it would be feasible to create a politically reliable and technically competent force from predominantly African units.

Five days after the July 13-14 meeting, and after he had determined the initial composition of the Force, Hammarskjold spelled out his selection principles in his First Report to the Security Council.<sup>8</sup> No objection was voiced to these principles.

Given the special interests of several of the potential troop contributors in the Congo situation, the more direct pressures to which Hammarskjold had been subjected during the early hours of the crisis, as

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5. Ibid., p. 115.

6. U.N., GAOR, A/3943, October 9, 1958, pp. 8-33, Annexes to Agenda Item 65.

7. U.N., SCOR, S/PV 873, July 13, 1960, p. 5.

8. See Appendix K. See also above, pp. 39-41.

well as the UNEF precedent, the Secretary-General from the beginning insisted that he alone had the right to select the nationalities to be represented. While he promised to "take fully into account the viewpoint of the host government," he made it clear that Leopoldville had neither veto power over the initial selection, nor the right to demand expulsion at any later stage. Hammarskjold did not, in fact, limit the Force to "neutral" nations, as demanded by Lumumba and Kasavubu, nor did he give in to later, repeated demands from the Congolese Government that he withdraw the Ghanaian and Guinean contingents.<sup>9</sup> It was true, however, that no great power was ever represented in the Force, but few of the governments providing contingents were truly neutral in either the African or the Congolese context.

Hammarskjold hoped to demonstrate "African solidarity" by the preponderant use of African units, with representation from as many geographical regions as possible. By early October 1960, African contingents accounted for 16 of the 20 combat battalions of the Force and for 14,550 of its total of 18,500 personnel. "Universality"--considered a necessary condition for any U.N. effort--was to be achieved by the use of combat battalions from two European countries (Sweden and Ireland), two Asian countries (Indonesia and Malaya), and the inclusion of as many different countries as was feasible in the headquarters and service units.

The 1960 record contains no direct statements by the Secretary-General about the total strength requirement to implement the July Security Council resolutions. Hammarskjold was apparently satisfied with the 19,500 troops (including 20 combat battalions) provided by December.

In his early reports to the Security Council, Hammarskjold named the governments he had approached for troop contributions. Not all of the countries from which he requested combat units (as opposed to service troops and units) complied. Among those declining were Burma, Yugoslavia,

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9. Arnold Rivkin, Africa and the West. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), p. 119.

and Haiti,<sup>10</sup> although the former two did send a token number of staff and air personnel at the beginning of the operation. Despite these occasional failures, Hammarskjold expressed no dissatisfaction and reported no additional steps to increase the size of the Force until February 1961.

During the latter half of 1960, before the more serious controversies over the meaning of the mandate, African units continued to make up the bulk of the Force, both in the number of countries supplying major combat units, and in total manpower.<sup>11</sup> In December, 9 of the 13 major troop units were African, as were 14,700 of the 19,500 men in the Force.

Early 1961 saw changes in the national composition of the Force. At the same time, the trend toward larger and more self-sustaining contingents and greater participation by countries more geographically and politically removed from the African scene began. Ultimately, and contrary to Hammarskjold's hope, the African countries did not provide most of the manpower for the UNF. They actually supplied a little less than 50 percent, if the Congolese battalion placed under U.N. command during part of 1962 and 1963 is excluded.

#### Maintaining the Force Level

In the face of the vast expanse of the Congo, the poor communications and transportation facilities, and the unpredictable internal security problem, UNF strength requirements may have been underestimated, especially in the early months. Looking back on the September 1960 crisis in which Kasavubu and Lumumba dismissed one another, Andrew W. Cordier, Hammarskjold's Special Representative in Leopoldville, said that UNF troops of "less than 20,000 for the whole of the Congo seemed woefully inadequate

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10. Dail Eireann (Irish Parliamentary Debates, Dublin: July 20, 1960), p. 1879.

11. These changes in the national structure of the Force are graphically illustrated in Appendix H, Charts C and E.



to deal with the threat of a major blood bath."<sup>12</sup>

The full strength of the UNF fielded in 1960, however, was close to the size of the forces which had been considered adequate prior to and right after independence day. The UNF was approximately twice the size of the Belgian force which had successfully restored order in places where it intervened in July. It had only 4,500 fewer men than the 24,000-man ANC, but this is perhaps an unfortunate comparison. Deprived of their customary Belgian officer leadership, ANC units were frequently the cause of disorder rather than the means of quelling it.

In the first months of 1961, Hammarskjold faced his most severe problem in maintaining what he considered an adequate Force level. In light of the threat of civil war, a danger reflected in the strengthened mandate of the February 21 resolution, the Secretary-General insisted, on advice from the Force Commander, that the UNF should have "about 23,000 men or 25 battalions."<sup>13</sup> In spite of this expressed need to increase the January Force level of 19,300 to 23,000, there was a progressive decline of UNF strength in 1961, with the exception of June and July when new contingents from several moderate states helped to offset the losses occasioned by the Casablanca pullout. The pullout was a collective protest against Hammarskjold's Congo policies on the part of five militant governments (Yugoslavia, Indonesia, the United Arab Republic, Mali, and Guinea) who withdrew their units during the first three months of the year in accordance with a joint decision reached at the Casablanca Conference in January 1961.<sup>14</sup> Morocco, for somewhat different reasons, withdrew her contingent of 3,200 at the same time. Together the six-nation pullout totaled slightly more than 6,000 troops.

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12. Andrew W. Cordier, "Challenge in the Congo," Think, (New York) Vol. 31, No. 4, (July-August, 1965), p. 25.

13. This estimate was contained in Hammarskjold's letter "To Certain African States," February 24, 1961. This letter is reproduced as Appendix T.

14. See Chapter 13, pp. 261 and 271-72.

Commenting on this situation, Hammarskjold said it was "paradoxical and most inopportune" that the Force should be reduced at the very time that its responsibilities were being increased. It was ironical that the loss of strength was caused primarily by the withdrawal of units from states that had fought for the stronger mandate embraced in the February 21 resolution.<sup>15</sup>

The lowest point of the UNF in 1961 came in November and December when the total dropped from 19,500 to 15,500 and the number of participating states from the 1960 high of 28 to 17. This total fell 7,500 men short of Hammarskjold's 23,000-man goal. Losses totaled 10,000 for the year. The largest 1961 troop additions were the 5,000-man brigade from India, 800 Malayan troops, and 600 Ethiopians.<sup>16</sup>

The Indian troop contribution was important politically to Hammarskjold. He was at that time under sharp attack from the U.S.S.R. and some militant states which denounced the Congo operation as a tool of Western "colonialists." Support from a leading neutralist government helped to negate these charges. It should be recalled that on December 12, 1960, Prime Minister Nehru had demanded the release of Lumumba, attacked a "new kind of Belgian imperialism" in Katanga, and asserted that the UNF was too passive with respect to Katanga. When Prime Minister Ileo actively opposed the introduction of Indian combat units (because of his fear they would side with Ghana and Guinea in supporting Lumumbist Stanleyville) the charges that Hammarskjold was pro-Western were further discredited.

By December 11, 1961, only 7 countries (of which 3 were African) were providing major combat units.<sup>17</sup>

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15. See Appendix T.

16. The monthly strength of each national contribution to the UNF is tabulated in Appendix H, Chart E.

17. These were: India with 5,996; Ethiopia with 3,094; Nigeria with 1,709; Sweden with 920; Malaya with 1,461; Ireland with 981; and Liberia with 239. Approximately 700 men of the India contingent were service personnel who were not a part of the Indian Brigade.

The number of national contingents increased slightly during the following year, but at no time did it exceed the 20 countries represented in the Force in December 1962. The strength of the Force, however, was gradually built up during the year. There were modest increases in the strength of some of the contingents present in January; Tunisian and Ghanaian troops returned to the UNF in February; and a Congolese ANC battalion was transferred to the UNF in September 1962. This upward trend continued during the first three months of 1963.

Following the end of Katangan secession on January 29, 1963, Thant said that the principal U.N. effort in the Congo would be shifted to economic assistance and that a substantially reduced Force would be retained to maintain order. As a result of her border clash with China, India had already announced that its contingent of 5,000 men would be withdrawn by the end of March. Additional troops had been promised by Denmark, Norway, Indonesia, and the Philippines. On February 6, Thant warned that a rapid withdrawal of troops from Katanga might invite another secession attempt and that it would be necessary to maintain a military presence in the Congo for at least a year.

With the end of Katangan secession, however, the strength of the Force dropped sharply. The Indian, Tunisian, and Malayan ground combat units were withdrawn, and these losses were made up only in part by an increase in Indonesian strength. By the end of the year, the Force total had been reduced to one-third of the peak figure, and 14 countries were represented. The major troop contingents at that time were Ethiopian, Nigerian, Swedish, Irish, Indonesian, and Congolese.

The first six months of 1964 saw the gradual phasing out of the Force. Questions of national representation and the nature of the troop contributions became largely irrelevant. When the last U.N. soldier left the Congo on June 30, 1964, only one country, politically moderate Ethiopia, could boast that it had supplied combat troops from the first day of the operation to the last.

### Political Availability of Troops and National Constraints

The Secretary-General's capacity to recruit and maintain the UNF was a function of the political interests and practical capabilities of the states approached for troop contributions. Hammarskjold requested units only from governments which he and Leopoldville both found politically acceptable. To comply with the Secretary-General's request, the prospective donor state had to be convinced that the U.N. mission was in harmony with its political interests. It also had to have available the kind of unit required and be in a position to release its troops without jeopardizing its own national security.

Given these basic conditions, the motivations of different donor states varied widely. It may be said that the Western states--Canada, Ireland, the Scandinavian countries, Italy, and the others--were motivated primarily by the desire to assist the United Nations and to gain the international goodwill this would presumably bring. Many of the Afro-Asian states, on the other hand, were eager to assist a newly independent state to consolidate its position; their major political objective was to insure the expulsion of the Belgian "colonial" presence and end the secession of Katanga. This intense interest in decolonization on the part of the more militant governments (the United Arab Republic, Mali, and Guinea, which were under strong Soviet influence), suggested a disposition to transform the U.N. peacekeeping operation into an anticolonial war of "liberation."<sup>18</sup> (The new states also saw U.N. service in the Congo as an opportunity for their troops to gain experience and to show off their army as a symbol of sovereignty.)

To what extent did the different political motivations of donor states affect the Secretary-General's capacity to recruit, maintain, and effectively use the UNF? The immediate and enthusiastic response of the African states to Hammarskjold's first call for troops indicates that the anticolonialist sentiment was a major factor in the quick buildup of the

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18. See Chapter 13.

Force, but this is not the whole story. After Hammarskjold had clarified his noninterference position and refused to permit the UNF to be used directly against Katanga, he was condemned as pro-Belgian by the more militant states which subsequently staged the Casablanca pullout.

The Government of Morocco presented a unique problem by threatening to remove its brigade from U.N. control while still in the Congo. On December 12, 1960, Morocco announced that it intended to withdraw its 3,500 troops. The Secretary-General urged the Government to reconsider its decision.<sup>19</sup> While awaiting an answer, he learned that General Ben Hammou Kattani, the ranking Moroccan officer in the Congo, had received orders from Rabat to withdraw the Moroccan Brigade from the U.N. Command pending their departure. Hammarskjold protested and said the brigade would in that event have to be regarded as a foreign military contingent on Congolese soil without the consent of the Leopoldville Government. In response, Rabat agreed to leave its troops under U.N. control until they left the country, but reserved the right to refuse to obey U.N. orders which would make them "act against their conscience" and "apply any decisions contrary to the interests of the Congo and legality."<sup>20</sup>

Ethiopia, Sudan, and Tunisia, as a result of the confusion surrounding the death of Lumumba, the Casablanca pullout, and the February 21, 1961, Resolution, publicly expressed non-facto conditions on troops they already had in the Congo. In a message to Hammarskjold, Ethiopia stated: "The United Nations Force in the Congo must not be found third party to any dispute which might arise."<sup>21</sup> Sudan and Tunisia expressed the same view. This vague stipulation was hardly necessary since Hammarskjold had repeatedly made clear his intention of not taking sides in Congolese

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19. U.N. ICR. Supplement for Jan., Feb., March, 1961, S/4640 (January 26, 1961), p. 50.

20. U.N. ICR. Supplement for Jan., Feb., March, 1961, S/4668 (January 21, 1961 and February 1, 1961), Add. 1, pp. 80-81.

21. Quoted in Hammarskjold's Letter to "Certain African States." See appendix 1.

internal strife. (Apparently these moderate governments felt they had to state the conditions to calm the anxiety expressed in their respective capitals--fear that somehow their troops in the UNF would be deflected from what they regarded as the primary task--to guarantee effective "decolonization.")

Taking their reservations at face value, however, Hammarskjold said the February resolution did not change the basic nonintervention rule, but that the new authority to use force as a last resort to prevent civil war, might involve some defensive fighting by the UNF. In such a situation, he said, U.N. troops

. . . engaged in defensive action, when attacked while holding positions occupied to prevent a civil war risk, this would not, in my opinion mean that they became a party to a conflict . . . the possibility of becoming such a party would be open, were troops to take the initiative in an armed attack on an organized group in the Congo. 22

To take up the slack caused by the Casablanca pullout, Hammarskjold succeeded in persuading Prime Minister Nehru to provide an Indian Brigade. Because of the then current controversy on the use of the UNF, India stipulated three operational conditions before making its brigade available in April:<sup>23</sup>

1. Indian troops could not be used to fight troops or civilians of other U.N. members, except "Congolese armed units and Belgian and other military and para-military personnel and mercenaries in the Congo, if necessity arises and if so authorized by the United Nations."

2. Indian troops could not be used to suppress "popular movements" or to support "parties or factions that were challenging United Nations authority."

3. The Indian Brigade should remain under command of Indian

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22. Ibid.

23. "Implementation of Council Resolution and Further Exchanges of Messages," United Nations Review, Vol. 8 (April 1961), p. 13.

officers and should not be broken up and merged with other UNF contingents.

Hammaraskjold made India's conditions public and stated that they imposed no barrier to the effective utilization of New Delhi's substantial contribution of troops.

The Irish Government, on the other hand, specified no conditions for its troops in the UNF. Foreign Minister Frank Aiken told his Parliament that "we believe it wrong for us in any way to attempt to influence our troops directly," implying that the Irish contribution was provided under the conditions specified by the Secretary-General and without any additional reservations.<sup>24</sup> Earlier Aiken had said that "whatever the United Nations, through its proper organs, decides to do is prima facie right," but that the "extent and duration of our contribution" must "remain a matter for our decision."<sup>25</sup> In general, the Irish view was typical of the donor states. The explicit imposition of conditions was the exception.

Political factors had a more noticeable effect on the problem of recruiting troops and maintaining the desired force level than on the actual operations of the Force. How and where the UNF was employed was determined by a complex set of legal, political, and practical considerations, of which the political orientation and pressure of the donor states was only one. In the totality of pressures, the politically motivated insistence of conditions was a small factor, but not a wholly inconsequential one for particular donor states.

#### Observations and Conclusions

1. The initial recruitment of national contingents proved to be much less of a problem than the maintenance of adequate force levels. With remarkable success Hammaraskjold was able in July and August 1960 to

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<sup>24</sup>. Dail Eireann (Irish Parliamentary Debates, February 23, 1961), p. 886.

<sup>25</sup>. Ibid., (December 13, 1960), pp. 981-82.



secure troop contributions which not only met his force level target, but also his complementary political requirements for "African solidarity" and universality. Though the Force was predominantly African, there was significant representation from Europe and Asia.

2. Hammarskjold's recruiting success was due not to a clear political consensus on the part of the donor states, but rather to their shared belief that the United Nations should do something. As the necessarily vague mandate was clarified by the Secretary-General's interpretations in New York and his decisions in the Congo, political differences quickly came to the surface. By mid-1961 all donor governments having serious policy differences with the Secretary-General over the proper role of the UNF had voluntarily withdrawn their troops. While this pullout of major units confronted the Secretary-General with a replacement problem, it gave him a more numerically stable Force. The risk of a precipitous withdrawal of a large contingent became almost negligible.

3. The post-Casablanca UNF was more reliable politically than the earlier Force. The most militant African states with specific interests in the Congo's internal political struggle had been eliminated. The moderate African states such as Ethiopia, Tunisia, and Nigeria, which were less interested in the Congo's domestic affairs, played an increasingly important role. The European states and India, by virtue of their geographical and political distance from the Congo, were on the whole disinterested. They supported the objectives of the U.N. mandate--maintaining order, achieving national unity, and excluding direct foreign intervention.

4. There is no substantial evidence to suggest that the political interests of the states providing troops had more than a marginal impact on the actual operational policies of the U.N. peacekeeping mission, though some national contingents for other than political reasons at times had considerable influence on planning and operations.<sup>26</sup>

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26. This is particularly true of the Indian Brigade before and during Round Three in Katanga. See Chapter 17.



## CHAPTER 15

### COMMAND AND CONTROL OF THE FORCE

The command and control problems of a hastily created multinational force are in some respects more complex than those of a traditional national military establishment engaged in a similar mission. The thirty-four governments which contributed troop units or specialized military personnel for the U.N. operation were not wholly disinterested in the internal or external impact of the Congo crisis. Many of them tried to influence the interpretation of the Security Council mandate on the diplomatic level in New York, and some of them tried to influence the operation in the Congo directly. To what extent were national contingents, other military personnel, and the Force as a whole responsive to the control of the Secretary-General? To put it another way, to what extent did the multinational character of the UNF erode its responsiveness to control from the top?

#### The Secretary-General and Civilian Control

In overall command organization, the UNF adhered to the principle of ultimate civilian control over the military which is familiar to most Western democracies. At the U.N. Headquarters level, the Secretary-General retained full command over the Force under the authority granted

him by the Security Council and the General Assembly. Although the senior military officer in the Congo was initially designated as the "Supreme" Commander of the Force, the title was misleading. U.N. Regulations for the United Nations Force in the Congo severely limited his authority. After stating that command authority over the Force is vested in the Secretary-General, paragraph 11 of the Regulations states that the Force Commander is "operationally responsible to the Secretary-General through the [civilian] Officer-in-Charge for the performance of all functions assigned to the Force by the United Nations, and for the deployment and assignment of troops placed at the disposal of the Force." Paragraph 4 says that orders issued by the Commander are "subject to review by the Secretary-General, and by the Officer-in-Charge."<sup>1</sup>

The formal chain of command outlined in the Regulations was depicted in a chart form in Hammarskjold's First Report (see page 299).<sup>2</sup>

The supremacy of civilian control was never questioned at the New York Headquarters, but there was some confusion in Leopoldville at the beginning of the operation when Ralph J. Bunche was acting as Hammarskjold's Representative and before the arrival of Major General von Horn of Sweden, the first Force Commander. The absence of the Force Commander was complicated by the presence of Major General H. T. Alexander, a vigorous British officer who was the Chief of the Defense Staff in Ghana. He had arrived on July 14, 1960, with a small group of Ghanaian soldiers, in response to Lumumba's request for assistance from Ghana. The Ghanaian troops were shortly thereafter placed under U.N. command.

In this confused situation, Alexander filled the vacuum by exercising command authority in behalf of the United Nations. On July 15, he made an agreement with General Gheysen, commander of the Belgian forces in the Congo, and Maurice Mpolo, Acting Chief of Staff of the ANC, for the

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
1. The Regulations for the United Nations Force in the Congo are found in Appendix Q.

2. U.N., SCOR, Supplement for July, Aug., Sept., 1960, S/4417, Add. 5, (August 11, 1960), p. 66.

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peaceful disarmament of the ANC.<sup>3</sup> With this agreement and with Mpolo's assistance, he proceeded to disarm Leopoldville units of the ANC. These actions, coupled with persistent references in the press which identified him as commander of the U.N. Force, gave credence to his authority. Within a few days, Alexander's initiative, which would have been commendable under more normal circumstances, had a serious effect on the relations between U.N. authorities and Prime Minister Lumumba.<sup>4</sup> Alexander's perhaps justified, but not formally authorized, initiative contributed to a lasting impairment in the relations between the UNF and the ANC and made the complete disarmament of the ANC impracticable. It also had a negative effect upon subsequent efforts of the U.N. Command to reorganize the ANC or train officers for it. Through a combination of circumstances, including the delayed arrival of the Commander designate and Alexander's presence in Leopoldville when the U.N. effort began, civilian control over the military was lost for a short but crucial period at the very outset of the operation.

Alexander never was a member of the U.N. Command.<sup>5</sup> After this incident the question of Alexander's position was quickly resolved when Hammarskjold, pending the arrival of von Horn, named Bunche as the Acting Force Commander (at Bunche's own recommendation) in addition to his position as the Special Representative in the Congo.

#### The Multinational Headquarters Staff

The Congo operation was initially directed in a highly informal, ad hoc manner. After Bunche settled the Alexander problem, he assumed

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3. Centre de Recherche et d'Information Socio-Politiques, Congo: 1960, Vol. II, prepared by J. Gérard-Libois and Benoit Verhaegen (Brussels: Les Dossiers du CRISP, n.d.), p. 623.

4. The political aspects of this development are discussed in Chapter 4, pp. 75-77 and Chapter 6, pp. 128-30.

5. See Catherine Hoskyns, The Congo Since Independence: January 1960-December 1961 (London: Oxford University Press for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1965), p. 136.

personal control of the military operation until General von Horn's arrival. He directed his attention to the first and most important task of the UNF: establishing a visible U.N. presence at key points throughout the Congo, except for Katanga. There was no military headquarters staff during the first few days and Bunche issued orders orally.<sup>6</sup>

The first Leopoldville headquarters staff consisted of a group of twenty officers brought by General von Horn on a temporary basis from UNTSO (U.N. Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine). They arrived in the Congo with him on July 13, 1960. These officers lacked the requisite training and experience for directing and planning the complex Congo operation.<sup>7</sup> Toward the end of July, Brigadier General Indarjit Rikhye was sent to the Congo to examine the overall organization, make recommendations on the size and character of the UNF, and develop an appropriate headquarters organization. His recommendations were presented to the Secretary-General on August 11, 1960, and shortly thereafter, steps were taken to regularize the organization at the top. By September 21, a total of 162 officers, other ranks, and civilians, were assigned to the military headquarters in Leopoldville. This total was only twenty less than the permanent headquarters strength finally authorized on November 20, 1961.

The staff organization was a compromise between the United States and British staff systems. Some modifications were made to deal with special problems peculiar to the Congo effort. The most serious problem was to reconcile the demands of political necessity with the need for a competent staff. The Secretary-General insisted that all significant national contingents had to be represented at headquarters level. At the same time there was the practical requirement that the officers had to be

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6. Interview with General Iyassu Mengesha, Addis Ababa, February 15, 1965. General Iyassu was in command of the Ethiopian contingent in 1960.

7. Interviews with U.N. officials.

qualified and of an appropriate rank. The problem of selecting good officers was further intensified by the political unacceptability of officers from permanent members of the Security Council and certain other countries. As a result, in the beginning, Canada, Pakistan, and India were the only politically acceptable countries which could provide a sufficiently large number of officers who were properly trained for general staff duties and had sufficiently high rank for assignment.

In the first expansion of the Leopoldville headquarters the chief positions in the two key branches--intelligence<sup>8</sup> and operations--were given to the Scandinavian countries and India respectively. India retained the chief of operations position for the first two years, but in November 1962, it was turned over to an Ethiopian although an Indian retained the deputy position until mid-1963. At lower levels in this section, Pakistan was represented until the beginning of 1964, and Canada until mid-1963. Ireland, Liberia, and Denmark rotated officers through the lowest ranking officer position in operations until the end of 1963.

Sweden and Norway, whose armies had sent officers to intelligence staff schools in the United States and Britain for years, shared the top intelligence assignment throughout the operation. Other countries represented in the lower officer positions in the intelligence branch were (in descending order of numbers): India, Canada, Ireland, Ethiopia, Pakistan, and Nigeria.

Assignments to the other staff sections were apportioned to provide adequate headquarters representation for the donor states.<sup>9</sup> There

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8. The intelligence general staff section, which would correspond to G-2 in U.S. organization, was always designated as the "Information Branch" in the UNF headquarters because of U.N. sensitivity about intelligence operations. In practice, its responsibilities were those of any general staff intelligence section, although its capabilities were seriously limited.

9. Officer representation by country in the Leopoldville headquarters is shown in Appendix H, Chart D. The Chart excludes the air headquarters and the Leopoldville area command.

was no direct correlation between the size of the national contingent and the number of officer spaces allocated to that country in the Leopoldville headquarters.<sup>10</sup> Canada, for example, maintained the highest average officer representation in the headquarters, yet ranked twelfth in its total manpower contribution. India, whose total troop contribution was greater than any other country ranked second in headquarters representation with an average of between nine and ten officer positions on the staff. Ethiopia, whose total contribution was exceeded only by India and was almost twice that of third-ranking Nigeria, had only an average of three officers on the staff. These Ethiopians, however, held senior positions.<sup>11</sup>

The manning of the "Special Staff"<sup>12</sup> and the technical staff sections presented no particular difficulties. Personnel for these sections and branches (for example signals, provost, logistics, movement control, ordnance, electrical and mechanical engineers, transportation, and medical) were almost always drawn from the contingent which had supplied the associated technical unit. Thus, Pakistan and India were represented heavily in the supply and transportation fields, the Scandinavian countries in electrical and mechanical engineering and movement control and the Canadians in communications ("signals" in UNF parlance).<sup>13</sup> The disproportionately heavy Canadian representation in the headquarters is in part attributable to the professional qualifications of the Canadian officer

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10. This can be demonstrated by a comparison of Charts B and D in Appendix H.

11. On the November 1962 and January 1963 rosters, Ethiopia held both the position of Commander and that of the Chief of Operations Branch. Ethiopia also provided a Deputy Commander.

12. "Special Staff" is used in the same sense as it is used in the U.S. Army, to denote those staff sections which are specifically concerned with supporting operations as opposed to the so-called "General Staff" sections which are responsible for overall plans, policy, and operations.

13. Allegations that the Indians and the Pakistanis had monopolized supply posts in order to favor their own contingents and to support black market operations appear to be unfounded. Their representatives held these positions for administrative and military reasons indicated above.



corps, and in part to the linguistic requirements of the headquarters. A liberal sprinkling of officers who spoke both English and French were essential since these two languages were the linguae francae of the UNF operation. Of all the politically acceptable countries, Canada was best equipped to meet this need.

The "staff officer's nightmare"<sup>14</sup> of the early days in Leopoldville, occasioned by the multinational character of the headquarters, was brought to an end by filling the key staff positions in the headquarters with officers from countries that followed the British Commonwealth military traditions and who had a common procedural and operational training. There was considerable truth in the comment of one observer that "a whiskey and Sandhurst set" had emerged.<sup>15</sup> Without this unifying Commonwealth factor, it would have been far more difficult for the headquarters to function effectively.

Organizationally, the headquarters was set up along traditional lines with some minor exceptions.<sup>16</sup> The personnel branch, which corresponds to G-1 in U.S. organization, was principally concerned with personal matters in the headquarters itself rather than with the personnel aspects of the U.N. Force as a whole. Similarly the logistics branch, which in U.S. organization would have handled the broader logistical aspects of operational planning, became more directly involved in the mechanics of logistical operations and participated only to a small extent in operational planning.<sup>17</sup>

As a general observation, the formal headquarters organization was logical in terms of the functions performed. The organization or the

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14. This characterization was made by William Gutteridge, Armed Forces in New States (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 62.

15. Ibid., p. 65.

16. See Appendix H, Chart H.

17. Interview with Carey Seward, Deputy Director of U.N. General Services, New York, April 27, 1965.



allocation of roles to participating nations does not provide any evidence that any country or group of countries was able to capture the key policy-making positions. The informal organization which developed outside the formal structure of the headquarters, however, does suggest that such a danger existed.

#### Informal Organization of the Force Headquarters

There is probably no military headquarters or staff without an informal organization, or chain of command, which may, or may not, coincide with the formal structure. Most senior commanders attempt to run their headquarters with officers of their choosing. They exercise the greatest possible care in the selection of personnel to fill the critical policy positions on their staffs. When a senior commander's freedom of choice is limited by factors beyond his control, it is an exceptional officer, indeed, who does not occasionally bypass the formal hierarchy, or find some other means of dealing directly with the officers whom he knows and trusts.

The Leopoldville headquarters of the U.N. Command was no exception to this general rule. There is solid evidence that command lines were bypassed, especially in the early part of the operation. The first problem was that of the Secretary-General's Military Adviser, Brigadier General Rikhye, whose activities in Leopoldville in the fall of 1960 transcended the purely staff role to which he was formally assigned.<sup>18</sup> Having conducted an initial survey of the headquarters during his August 1960 trip to the Congo, Rikhye was sent back later to Leopoldville to establish a working headquarters staff. The basic problem was the inadequacy of the Force Commander and the twenty officers he had brought with him from UNTSO. Although of impressive personal memo, General von Horn did not have the experience or the training to handle the difficult problems facing him and neither did his staff. By mid-August, with the approval of the Secretary-General, and the governments concerned, the UNTSO group

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18. This account is based upon interviews with knowledgeable U.N. officials and military officers who served in the Leopoldville headquarters.

had been returned to Palestine and replaced by an equal number of qualified officers from the UNEF staff. It may be recalled that Rikhye had been Chief of Staff of UNEF from April 1958 to February 1960. These officers, selected by Rikhye, formed the nucleus for the reorganized staff.

In addition to dealing with the staff problem, Rikhye became involved in the line of command, which was outside his normal duty as an adviser. Rikhye's solution was to hold informal meetings with the Force Commander at which he would present his own plan to von Horn. Von Horn would, in most instances, indicate his concurrence, and Rikhye would later write up appropriate orders. These he would give to the operations branch with oral instructions to translate them into specific orders. When these orders were later submitted to the Force Commander he would be reminded of his prior approval and would, accordingly, authenticate them. This system worked for some four months.

The validity of this account of Rikhye's intrusion into the line of command is supported by the experience of von Horn's immediate successor, Major General Sean McKeown of Ireland, who became Force Commander in January 1961. During his tenure Dayal, Rikhye, and the Indian Operations Officer, a Colonel Mitra, made plans over General von Horn's head.<sup>19</sup> In fact, McKeown considered Rikhye's interference in command sufficiently serious that he reportedly made his acceptance of the position of Force Commander conditional upon the clarification of Rikhye's role.

Rikhye's involvement was complicated by the fact that from November 3 to 23, 1960, he was designated by Hammarskjold as the Officer-in-Charge in the Congo. Further, he made frequent troubleshooting trips to the Congo at the request of Hammarskjold. As Military Adviser, Rikhye was not authorized to run operations, or even to act as a military adviser to the Officer-in-Charge there. The Force Commander was supposed to take

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19. Interviews with U.N. officials and military officers of various nationalities who served in the Leopoldville headquarters.

his orders from the Secretary-General and to act as the military adviser to the Officer-in-Charge.<sup>20</sup>

Under General McKeown, there developed within the Leopoldville headquarters a staff within a staff. This was based upon a precedent which started under General von Horn, when Rikhye succeeded in effecting the dismissal of a capable but somewhat forceful Canadian Chief of Staff, the reasons for which are not wholly clear. Rikhye also arranged for his replacement by an officer from an African country with the approval of the Congo Club.<sup>21</sup> General von Horn accepted the change on condition that the Canadian officer be retained as his "Military Assistant." Following suit, succeeding commanders also demanded such an assistant. When General McKeown took over, he insisted on having Irish assistants.<sup>22</sup> The headquarters roster shows that a number of Irish officers were assigned during McKeown's tenure. Just as Rikhye earlier had encroached on the authority of the Force Commander, these staff assistants tended to encroach on the authority of the Chief of Staff.

It must be said, however, that none of the former U.N. officers who discussed the question of informal staff relationships were able to point to specific instances in which this problem seriously interfered with operations. These informal and irregular relationships did cause friction and some loss of efficiency. But while a potential compromise of the integrity of military control existed, no actual breakdown can be attributed to the separate existence of the informal staff in the Leopoldville headquarters.

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
20. Rikhye's role is further discussed in Chapter 4, pp. 69-71.

21. The Congo Club was an informal, but influential, advisory group to the Secretary-General within the Secretariat. Its function and "membership" are discussed in Chapter 4, pp. 66-67.

22. Interview with former members of the U.N. headquarters staff.

### Civilian-Military Relationships

The U.N. Command structure in Leopoldville comprised three co-equal elements under the authority of the Officer-in-Charge, as follows:<sup>23</sup>



Of the three positions, two were operational and one was supporting. The Chief Administrative Officer performed a support function for the Force Commander and the Chief of Civilian Operations. Under the circumstances in the Congo, one would expect the relationship between these three elements would have been close and continuing. This does not appear to have been the case. One military officer has unequivocally stated that there was very little, if any, liaison between the military and the other two branches of the headquarters as late as mid-1963.<sup>24</sup> One fundamental problem was that the Force Commander had no authority over the Administrative Officer who was his principal means of support.

The most serious questions concerning civilian-military relationships are those which bear on the command relations between the two. No one ever challenged the principle of civilian supremacy. Ralph Bunche's

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23. The official U.N. chart reproduced earlier in this chapter fails to indicate a solid line of command from the Officer-in-Charge to the Chief of Civilian Operations and the Force Commander.

24. Brig. Gen. Dextraze, Chief of Staff of the U.N. Force headquarters from December 1963 to June 1964, as quoted in Annex E, Minutes of the Ottawa Conference of Military Experts to Consider the Technical Aspects of U.N. Peacekeeping Operations.

report on the Lufira River incident supports this conclusion.<sup>25</sup>

There were, on occasion, sharp differences of opinion between the top level civilian and military officials. Personal friction between at least one Officer-in-Charge, Dayal, and one Force Commander, von Horn, did have detrimental results on staff coordination.<sup>26</sup> Surprisingly, however, none of the many interviews with former members of the U.N. Command and other observers of the Leopoldville scene yielded specific examples of serious operational problems or failures attributable to a breakdown in civilian-military relations.

Civilian supremacy in the context of the U.N. operation meant that the goals and constraints embodied in the Security Council resolutions took precedence over strictly military considerations. A major constraint was the necessity for the consent of the Congolese Government for any significant operation. And it was precisely this constraint that General Alexander violated when he disarmed ANC units in the Leopoldville area without the permission of Prime Minister Lumumba and without explicit U.N. authority. Bunche made this clear in his statement censuring Alexander.<sup>27</sup>

Another major problem was the relationship between the military command and the Field Operations Service.<sup>28</sup>

At the provincial or territorial level in the Congo, there appear to have been few serious problems in civilian-military relations, with the possible exception of Katanga which is examined in some detail at the end of this chapter. In each U.N. provincial or field headquarters,

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25. U.N., SCOR, Supplement for Jan., Feb., March, 1963, S/5053 Add. 14, Annex XXXIV, (January 10, 1963), p. 53.

26. See Chapter 4, pp. 69-71 and Chapter 5, pp. 89-92.

27. See Chapter 6, pp. 128-30, and Chapter 4, p. 75.

28. This relationship bears primarily on logistical and administrative matters and is covered in Chapter 16. See also, Chapter 4, pp. 71-73.



the Officer-in-Charge was represented by a civilian representative, a position similar to that of O'Brien in Katanga. The influence or authority these representatives were able to exercise over the military operation in their areas varied greatly according to conditions--personality factors, the nature of the problems faced, and the like. Usually the relationship between the ranking U.N. civilian and military officers was not clearly defined.

In some cases the civilian representative provided a channel of communication between Congolese authorities and the local U.N. commander, leaving the latter full freedom of military action. This was true, for example, in Kivu province in January 1961.<sup>29</sup> At the other extreme was the role O'Brien played in Katanga, where he appears to have issued orders to the U.N. sector commander that were not fully cleared with his superiors.<sup>30</sup>

Two other developments indicate the intrusion of the civilian authority into the military picture. One concerns the plan of Lt. Col. Bjørn Egge for the gradual Africanization of the Katanga gendarmerie by using European officers recruited by the United Nations.<sup>31</sup> The Secretary-General was understandably more concerned with expelling Tshombe's mercenaries than with improving the quality and performance of the Katanga security forces which were employed to defend Katanga's secession. Consequently, he rejected Egge's proposal which appeared to be the only practical way to assure responsible leadership for the Katanga gendarmerie for its long-range task of maintaining order in the province. Under the circumstances he may not have fully appreciated the likely adverse effects of the abrupt Africanization of the Katanga officer corps, effects similar to those outside of Katanga when the Belgian officer corps was dismissed in 1960.

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29. See Appendix P-13.

30. See Chapter 6, pp. 109-17, and Chapter 4, pp. 75-77.

31. A brief description of the Egge Plan is found in Appendix P-19.

The other example involves an unwise and potentially disastrous intrusion of civilian authority into military operations. It took place in connection with the Congolese attack on the U.N. Sudanese garrison in Matadi in March 1961. A civilian political adviser in the Leopoldville headquarters attempted to order a U.N. counterattack involving the use of the Matadi landing strip, which at the time was under Congolese control and obstructed by trucks, barrels, and other materials.<sup>32</sup> Fortunately, the Force Commander was briefed on the plan before it was implemented. He immediately cancelled it. Had it gone through, the UNF might have sustained losses greater than those of the three rounds in Katanga combined.

Perhaps the best civilian-military relationship was developed in Kasai province between the largely British-officered Nigerian contingent and the civilian representative there. "Operation Union," a coordinated civilian-military effort involving the Nigerian Brigade, under the command of an outstanding British officer, Brigadier Edward R. Lewis, succeeded in establishing an effective U.N. presence throughout the province. The operation involved helicopter lifts of small joint teams to outlying areas. The province was brought under control and civilian functions were reestablished without diverting combat troops from their essential security duties along the Port Francqui-Kamina railroad.<sup>33</sup>

#### Territorial Organization of the UNF

Generally the UNF was organized along provincial lines. In 1960 there were six provinces in the Congo. Occasionally a UNF Command embraced two provinces and in the case of Katanga the province was at times divided into two commands.

With the exception of Katanga, the territorial organization of the U.N. command structure was not internationalized. The provincial headquarters did not have multinational staffs. Each had at its core the

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32. Donald R. Gordon, The Canadian contribution to the U.N. Peacekeeping Operation in the Congo, 1965, p. 64. See also Appendix P-17.

33. See Appendix P-11.

headquarters staff of a major national contingent.

At the beginning of UNF in 1960, the Ethiopians were made responsible for Orientale province and the Ethiopian Brigade headquarters in Stanleyville doubled as the provincial headquarters. Similarly the Tunisian Brigade, headquartered in Luluabourg, was given initial command responsibility for Kasai province. The Moroccan Brigade, with its headquarters in Camp Hardy in Leopoldville, was in charge of Leopoldville province, except for the city of Leopoldville itself. Equateur province was assigned first to a Moroccan company which was later relieved by the U.A.R. parachute battalion and an Indonesian battalion. The city of Leopoldville was under the control of the Ghanaian Brigade, although some attempt was made to internationalize the Force in the capital city.

All of these assignments, except that of the Ethiopians in Stanleyville, changed during the course of the operation, the first changes having been necessitated by the withdrawal of some of the major contingents involved in the Casablanca pullout.<sup>34</sup>

Operationally this system for command at the provincial level was the only feasible solution. The national contingent brigades had sufficient resources to meet most of the basic needs for establishing a command and control system and an organizational framework to which some of the smaller contingents, for example, Liberia and Mali, could be attached.

The principal difficulty in this arrangement was that the implementation of U.N. policies in the provinces were subject to differing interpretation by the different national commands, each of which tended to see its task in terms of its own military tradition and experience. This permitted a considerable degree of initiative to the provincial commanders, especially in the early months when the instructions from Leopoldville were broad and vague.

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<sup>34</sup>. See Chapter 3, pp. 43-44.



When the first commander of the Ethiopian Brigade attempted, in July 1960, to get specific instructions from Ralph J. Bunche, then the Officer-in-Charge, Bunche simply told him his task was to maintain order in Orientale province. Our biggest problem, the commander later reported, was the "unclearness of our mission."<sup>35</sup> Under the circumstances he concluded that his Force was expected to act like a "substitute government," so it behaved like a military government. The Tunisians in lower Leopoldville province made a similar interpretation of their mission.<sup>36</sup>

The absence of precise instructions from Leopoldville and the relative autonomy of the provincial commanders created a situation in which a field commander could have pursued policies or undertaken operations contrary to the general mandate. As it turned out there were no serious problems of this sort. The Tunisians succeeded in accomplishing the voluntary disarmament of ANC units in the lower Congo. Though this went beyond the guidelines laid down by the Leopoldville headquarters, it was done in such a way that no serious harm resulted.

Reflecting the special character of the Katanga problem, the composition and command of the UNF in that province was unique. For political and psychological reasons the first U.N. troops to enter were white. Two Swedish companies, escorted by Hammarskjold, arrived in Katanga on August 12, 1960.<sup>37</sup> Shortly thereafter, combat units from Sweden, Ethiopia, Morocco, Mali, and Ireland were deployed in the province.

By mid-August 1960, a decision had been made to consolidate the Kivu and Katanga provincial commands. Ireland was asked to provide a brigade headquarters capable of coordinating the operations of its battalion in Katanga and its previously established battalion headquarters in

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35. Interview with General Iyassu Mengesha, Addis Ababa, February 15, 1965.

36. Lincoln P. Bloomfield, "Headquarters-Field Relations: Some Notes on the Beginning and End of ONUC," International Organization, Vol. XVII, no. 2, (Spring 1963), p. 381.

37. See Chapter 6, pp. 101-04.

the provincial capital of Bukavu. This combined headquarters, known as the Sub-Command, Eastern Provinces (SCOMEV), was designed to perform an enlarged mission in that area.<sup>38</sup>

The eastern command was further internationalized in late 1960 by the addition of logistical units from India and Pakistan and an infantry company from Indonesia.<sup>39</sup> In early 1961 the Irish Brigade headquarters unit was withdrawn as the Irish contribution, subject to a six-month rotation system, was reduced in size to a reinforced battalion.<sup>40</sup> There were no substantial changes in the eastern command headquarters until the Indian Brigade arrived in April 1961. By this time the responsibilities of the command had been split into three sub-commands--Kivu province with headquarters in Bukavu, North Katanga with headquarters in Albertville, and South Katanga with headquarters in Elisabethville. In Bukavu, a Nigerian battalion relieved the Irish. In Albertville, Brigadier General K. A. S. Raja, commander of the Indian Brigade, commanded both the Indian and Ethiopian troops in North Katanga. In Elisabethville, the command was shared by the Swedish and Irish.

As the situation in Katanga approached a climax in August 1961, the command structure was modified in anticipation of military action. Brigadier K.A.S. Raja of India was given command over the entire UNF in Katanga. He set up his headquarters in Elisabethville shortly before the August 28 roundup of mercenaries, known as Operation Rumpunch.<sup>41</sup> This operation was carried out by a brigade composed of the Swedish, the Irish,

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38. Comdt. E. D. Doyle, "Signals in Katanga and Kivu, 1960," An Consantoir (The Irish Defense Journal), Vol. XXI, No. 11, November 1961, p. 490, and Hoskyns, op.cit., p. 173.

39. The actual location and strength of all national units in the Congo, as of August 19, 1960, is indicated in Appendix O.

40. Major H. E. D. Harris, "Operation 'Sarsfield' the Irish Army in the Congo, 1960," An Consantoir, Vol. XXI, No. 8 (August 1961).

41. See Chapter 6, pp. 107-09.

and the Ghurka battalions under the command of Colonel Jonas Waern, the Swedish contingent commander.

This command structure remained virtually unchanged until preparations for Round Two got under way. This involved organizing the forces in Katanga into two operational brigades, one including the Swedish and Irish battalions and the other the Indian battalions and an Ethiopian battalion that arrived on December 6, 1961.

During 1962 the Katanga headquarters in Elisabethville evolved into a formally organized counterpart of the Leopoldville headquarters, though its staff was much less multinational.<sup>42</sup> The offices of commander and operations chief were filled by Indians. There was a Swedish chief of staff, an Ethiopian personnel officer, and an Irish intelligence ("information") chief. Pakistani officers predominated in supply and transportation.

The Elisabethville staff was small and as late as Round Three, not all the slots were filled. Partly for this reason and partly because the Indian Brigade headquarters was also located in Elisabethville, the Indians played the major role in Round Three. This predominance of Indians at the command level, plus the fact that there were as many Indian troops as all other contingents combined, resulted in a more unified and efficient operation in Round Three than in the two previous clashes in Katanga.

#### Unity of Command in a Multinational Force

Though all personnel in the Force were enjoined to conduct themselves "with the interests of the United Nations only in view,"<sup>44</sup> men and officers naturally did not forget their national loyalties. Their service in the UNF was temporary, but their relation to their own government was

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42. U.N. Staff List, Headquarters, Katanga Area (Elisabethville), November 1, 1962).

43. This point is discussed in Chapter 17.

44. See Appendix Q, Regulation 6.

permanent. Further, the men who were in the military service as a career may have been more concerned about their professional advancement back home than their brief service in the Congo, if there appeared to be a conflict between the two. While the problem of dual loyalty is inherent in a multinational operation, the question here is whether the national allegiance of any officer or unit ever compromised the integrity of the U.N. Command. Such compromises have been alleged.

The most celebrated case involved the contingent from Ghana which came to the Congo under a special arrangement between President Kwame Nkrumah and Prime Minister Lumumba. President Kasavubu, in September 1960, strongly castigated the Ghanaians, charging that they were supporting Lumumba to the detriment of the Central Government. There is no solid evidence to support this allegation. Ghanaian troops actually took part in the UNF action on September 12, 1960, to deny Lumumba entry into the Leopoldville radio station which was closed by U.N. authorities. Rajeshwar Dayal, the Officer-in-Charge at the time, insists that the Ghanaian contingent was loyal to the U.N. Command.<sup>45</sup> Major General Rikhye also supports this view. The Ghanaian contingent, he has said, should be especially commended because of their loyalty to the U.N. Command in view of the strong pressure its officers were under from Ghanaian diplomats in Leopoldville.<sup>46</sup> After waiting a respectable length of time so as not to appear to be taking orders from Kasavubu, the U.N. Command moved the Ghanaian unit out of Leopoldville to quiet down the controversy and to protect the unit from the political pressure of its own Government.

The most serious problems of dual loyalty were solved by the withdrawal of contingents by governments critical of Hammarskjold's Congo policy in early 1961--the Casablanca pullout.<sup>47</sup> Thereafter, there was

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45. Interview with Dayal in New Delhi, February 22, 1965.

46. Interview with General Rikhye in New York, April 27, 1965.

47. See Chapter 3, pp. 43-44.

sufficient agreement between the contributing states and the U.N. Command to operate without a serious conflict.

At the same time, it should be noted that contributing governments continued to criticize or offer advice on the operation at the political level in New York. In the Congo itself, most of the national contingents communicated directly and frequently with their home governments.<sup>48</sup> These reports from the Congo were used by diplomats in their dealings with the Secretariat and even in public debates. By January 1962, national radio links had been established between the contingents and home governments of India, Malaya, Ethiopia, Brazil, Nigeria, Ghana, and Canada.<sup>49</sup>

The function of the national liaison officers in the Leopoldville headquarters was to handle administrative matters connected with their units. They also helped serve the political purpose of having virtually all contributing states represented in the headquarters staff. These officers, according to some observers, usually acted as channels of communication to their governments, a function which compromised to some extent the integrity of the staff.<sup>50</sup>

In connection with the Matadi incident<sup>51</sup> a national liaison officer became involved in the chain of command between Leopoldville and a field unit. After the Sudanese U.N. unit had been withdrawn from Matadi, the U.N. movement control detachment located there attempted to resume

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48. Interview with Col. Knut H. Raudstein, USA, Washington, March 25, 1966. He was the U.S. Military Attache in Leopoldville from June 1962 to August 1965.

49. Donald R. Gordon, The Canadian Contribution to the U.N. Peace-keeping Operation in the Congo, a background paper prepared especially for this study, 1965, p. 76.

50. Interview with Lt. Colonel Ejoor, Acting Chief of Staff of the Nigerian Army, Lagos, February 3, 1965. He served in the Congo, November 1960 to July 1961. Also Raudstein, op.cit., March 25, 1966.

51. See Appendix P-17.

operations. The Danish movement control officer in charge of the detachment sent a report on the situation, dated March 7, 1961, not to the movement control section in Leopoldville, but to the Danish liaison officer in the headquarters there. Later the same day, the Danish liaison officer ordered the Matadi movement control officer to prepare to evacuate the post on short notice. On the following day, orders to move out of Matadi and back to Leopoldville were received, not through military channels, but from the Danish consul general in Matadi, J. Paludan, who relayed the order he had received from the Danish liaison officer in Leopoldville.<sup>52</sup>

This unusual case of a national liaison officer exceeding his terms of reference illustrates both the ambiguity of that office and the chaos which so often confused the situation in the Congo. Unexpected as it was, the Matadi incident placed a strain on U.N. communications. In fairness to the officers concerned, it may be noted that no one was criticized for acting improperly. In fact, there appears to have been a sense of relief that the messages got through, though transmitted by unorthodox channels, and that the endangered unit was successfully evacuated.

In the area of discipline, the national contingent commander played the key role. The UNF had no body of military law or code of discipline. Each soldier and officer was under the code of his own national military establishment. Cases of crimes, lesser misdeeds, or willful failure to obey orders could not be dealt with directly by the U.N. Command, but had to be handed over to the national contingent commander of the offender for appropriate disciplinary action.<sup>53</sup> Theoretically the U.N. Command's lack of authority to exercise discipline in serious matters was a great handicap, but in practice, according to the testimony of

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52. This information is based on two U.N. reports: "Ledger of Events at Hotel Metropole, Matadi, March 4, 1961," and "Events in Matadi, March 4-9, 1961."

53. See Appendix Q, Regulation 29.

several Force Commanders, discipline was handled reasonably well. General Rikhye has said, however, there were a "few cases, including major crimes, in which the governments concerned were not disposed to make the necessary investigations and to take suitable disciplinary action against the culprits. The impact of this attitude on the reputation, discipline, and morale" of the UNF and on the host government was a serious matter.<sup>54</sup>

### Intelligence

An essential component in any military command and control system is the element that provides information about the operational environment--the movements and activities of hostile or potentially hostile forces. The Congo operation was no exception to this rule. The UNF had the same requirement for intelligence as a conventional military force.

For political reasons the U.N. Command was sensitive about the word "intelligence," if not the necessity for it. Consequently, the UNF intelligence branch was euphemistically called "military information." In the Leopoldville headquarters military information had a larger staff and more commissioned officers than any other branch. All operating units at the brigade and battalion level also had intelligence elements.

A number of means were exploited to secure intelligence, especially in Katanga. They included radio interception, air reconnaissance, combat and other types of patrol (including helicopter), and a system of provincial or field liaison officers, as they were called, whose specific function was to keep Leopoldville informed of the situation in the province.

Many observers believe that the U.N. intelligence system in the Congo was considerably less than adequate. The UNF was hampered by too

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54. "Preparation and Training of United Nations Peace-Keeping Forces," prepared for delivery at a private conference on U.N. Security Forces, Oslo, Norway, February 21, 1964 (Adelphi Paper No. 9, Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 1964), p. 7.

few qualified specialists and too little equipment, especially for aerial photography and for recording Katanga broadcasts. A major problem was the lack of money to buy information. In spite of these limitations, the UNF was able to secure, mainly by aerial reconnaissance, sufficient information on the location of all Katangan aircraft which they were able to destroy on the ground at the beginning of Round Three. During that Round the UNF also secured valuable intelligence by improvised interception of radio traffic in Katanga.

### Communications

The absence of an effective UNF communications system in the Congo was very serious until the arrival and deployment of the 57th Signal Squadron of the Canadian Army, a bilingual unit organized especially for the Congo operation.<sup>55</sup> This squadron was in operation by August 28, 1960, and thereafter provided the backbone of the entire U.N. communications network.

Before the Canadian squadron arrived the communication between Leopoldville and the field was handled by an improvised mixture of Congolese and U.N. facilities, personnel, and equipment, including voice telephone, teletype, and hand-operated Morse code radios.<sup>56</sup>

The full U.N. communications system was not completed until the end of October 1960. By that time the Canadians had staffed the Leopoldville center and stations in Coquilhatville, Gemena, Luluabourg, Stanleyville, Kamina, and Elisabethville. These facilities were able to operate on a 24-hour-a-day and a seven-day-a-week basis. Within the various national contingents in the provinces, communication was facilitated by the use of compatible equipment. The multinational composition of the eastern command presented some difficulties on this score.

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55. This section draws heavily upon Gordon, op.cit.

56. Comdt. E. D. Doyle, "Signals in Katanga and Kivu, 1960," An Consantoir, Vol. XXI, No. 10 (October 1961), p. 489.



The efficiency of the Canadian signals unit was widely acknowledged and in general military communications were satisfactory. Some difficulties were caused by the fact that both the UNF and U.N. civilian operations used the same system. When the traffic was unusually heavy, important messages were sometimes delayed due to the failure to develop an adequate priority arrangement. During Round Three the system was overburdened by an unnecessary number of classified messages. Usually, however, all traffic was cleared within 24 hours after it originated.

#### Rounds One, Two, and Three

The U.N. command and control system was most severely tested during the three armed clashes between the UNF and Katangan forces:<sup>57</sup>

Round One -- September 13-21, 1961

Round Two -- December 5-19, 1961

Round Three -- December 28, 1961, to January 21, 1962.

The key military command questions about these operations are:

1. Did the Force Commander have cognizance of the plans for all operations and the opportunity to influence operations after they were under way?

2. Did field commanders disobey specific orders or established military policy, or otherwise act improperly?

3. Did U.N. civilian representatives in Katanga assume command responsibilities which properly belonged in Leopoldville or to the U.N. Katanga commander?

Rumpunch, the peaceful roundup of 338 mercenaries on August 28, 1960, which served as a prelude to Round One, appears to have been properly planned, directed, and executed until it was terminated by Conor Cruise

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57. See Chapter 6, pp. 109-26, and Chapter 4, pp. 75-77. See also Appendix P-20, 22, and 25.

O'Brien. All appropriate military echelons had knowledge of the plan and had taken the necessary preparatory measures prior to the actual start of the operation. Hammarskjold praised the efficiency and bloodless character of Rumpunch.<sup>58</sup>

As the chief U.N. Civilian Representative in Katanga, O'Brien decided to halt the operation before all mercenaries on the U.N. list had been apprehended. He did this under pressure from the European consuls in Elisabethville who promised to cooperate with his objective. Under the principle of civilian control, it appears that O'Brien had the necessary authority to make this decision, even if Brigadier Raja, who commanded the military forces involved, objected to it, which he did. The question is not whether O'Brien's decision was wise or unwise, but whether he was exceeding his terms of reference in halting a military operation. If this essentially political decision had been cleared with Sture Linner, the U.N. chief in Leopoldville, O'Brien had full authority to make it. The loss of military control was not an issue in Operation Rumpunch.

In Round One, the Secretary-General temporarily lost control of the UNF,<sup>59</sup> but there was no loss of military command and control as such. Perhaps the most serious military control problem in this operation was the alleged failure of the Swedish component of the Katanga command to seal off President Tshombe's palace, immobilize him, and permit his detention if a decision to detain him was made.<sup>60</sup> In O'Brien's account, he ascribed the alleged failure of the Swedish unit to prevent Tshombe's escape to inadequate communication, possibly because of a language problem between the Indians in the U.N. headquarters and the Swedes. The official orders for Round One, however, contain no reference to this mission, which O'Brien regarded as crucial. There certainly must have been a

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58. Conor Cruise O'Brien, To Katanga and Back: A U.N. Case History (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1962), pp. 207 and 216-20.

59. See Chapter 6, pp. 109-17, and Chapter 4, pp. 75-77.

60. O'Brien, op.cit., p. 249.

serious misunderstanding at some point if this as a key part of the plan was not included in the written orders. This could hardly have been a deliberate omission from the orders which were subject to later examination by superiors. Apparently control was lost through a staff error, probably attributable to a breakdown in communication between staff officers and the Katanga commander.

The primary command and control issue in Round Two was the undue use of force, principally by the Ethiopian contingent. The Ethiopian unit involved in this operation had moved into Elisabethville in December 1961 and was almost immediately assigned a key role in the operation, suffering five killed and about twenty wounded in its first encounter. Given the violence of the Katangan response to the U.N. action, the intensity of the firing, and the involvement of local civilians, a vigorous response by the Ethiopians is understandable. While questions of discipline may have been involved, there appears to have been no breakdown of the command and control system.

All accounts of Round Three, the final major operation in Katanga which resulted in the termination of Katangan secession, suggests that a highly effective and unified command structure had been achieved.<sup>61</sup> The only point at which some possible breakdown in the command and control system might have occurred was during the crossing of the Lufira River. All evidence suggests that the local commander, Brigadier General Reginald S. Norenha, did act on his own authority in going beyond a line (the Lufira River) that had been established to mark the conclusion of one phase of the operation. His decision to send troops across, however, was subsequently justified by Ralph Bunche<sup>62</sup> on the basis of a tactical

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61. This aspect of Force performance is evaluated in Chapter 17.

62. U.N., SCOR, Supplement for Jan., Feb., March, 1963, S/5053, Add. 14 (January 10, 1963), pp. 156 and 157. See above, Chapter 4, p. 77.

estimate that the security of his unit could not be insured without control of commanding ground across the river. Bunche upheld the propriety of this judgment as being within the prerogative of a local military commander. If control was actually lost in this instance, the results were fortuitous.

#### Concluding Observations

Just as the Congo operation as a whole did not escape the control of the Secretary-General, the military operation never really got out of control. The command structure developed for the operation, and the supporting communications and intelligence systems may have left a good deal to be desired when compared with that of a competent national army, but the essential fact is that the system worked.

The most significant aspect of the U.N. military command and control system was the potential for abuse or misuse that it offered, primarily because of its multinational character. The key aspects of this problem are: the development of small, informal groupings of staff officers who represented a single political viewpoint; the essentially single-nation character of the organization and command structure in the field; and, especially during the early critical stages, the extremely vague and general nature of the orders and assignments given. Taken together, these vulnerabilities could easily have been exploited by national contingents for purposes contrary to the U.N. mandate. That they were not speaks well for the loyalty of the various contingents and for their understanding of the political constraints under which they were operating. One factor was the disposition of military officers to obey orders of their military superiors, and the U.N. Force Commander was their supreme military authority while they were in the service of the United Nations. Further, the governments sending troops to the Congo were anxious to put their best foot forward. They knew the

behavior of their units was in the international spotlight. This desire to do a good job in an international operation probably did more to insure the control of the field contingents than explicit military orders from the U.N. Command.

## CHAPTER 16

### LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF THE FORCE

The vast difference between a competent military establishment of a single state and a hastily assembled multinational force was strikingly illustrated in the logistical problems of the U.N. Force in the Congo.<sup>1</sup>

National forces undertaking a military operation have past experience to fall back on and contingency plans for logistical support based on known reserve stocks. They can anticipate rates of ammunition expenditure, ration consumption, casualties, personnel replacement requirements, fuel consumption, and the hundreds of other basic needs of a military force, and thus have a minimum of unknowns when determining the material requirements of a projected national operation. But, even with standardized weapons and equipment, known needs, and a specific objective, the efficient transplantation and support of a national division on twenty-four hours notice is a complex task. To do this with a multinational force, as in the Congo, with virtually no planning, no stockpiling of arms, ammunition, or equipment, no knowledge of materiel requirements, and in

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1. Logistics refers to the buildup and support of a military force by providing supplies, equipment, transportation, maintenance, movement of personnel, etc.

first, the lack of knowledge about the area of operations,<sup>2</sup> required remarkable cooperation from the assisting nations and the absence of serious opposition in the field. Even then the results barely met minimum standards of efficiency.

Without the wholehearted cooperation of the United States and the United Kingdom in providing airlift and sealift, especially the former during the initial weeks of the operation, the Force could never have been moved within the required time. Without unopposed access to landing places in the Congo and seaports and an unimpeded movement from the disembarking points in M'Pili, Stanleyville, Dar es Salaam, and elsewhere, to the interior, the Force could not have been deployed. It simply did not have the logistical capability to establish and maintain itself under combat conditions.

This weakness was in part attributable to the type of unit requested of the contributing nations (light infantry battalions), and in part to the heterogeneous nature of the Force. The Secretary-General assumed, of course, that the UNF would not be engaged in offensive operations, and governments providing troops shared this assumption. Nevertheless, even defensive operations require the capacity for combat.

The presumed political need for broad national representation in the UNF and the practical requirement for logistical standardization were in obvious conflict. The major units first deployed in the Congo (Ethiopian, Canadian, Indian, Irish, Moroccan, Malian, Sudanese, Swedish, and Tunisian) used weapons and equipment manufactured and procured from the United States, the United Kingdom, France, the U.S.S.R., Czechoslovakia, and Sweden, to name only the major sources.

This problem is illustrated by the many types of ammunition which had to be kept in stock by the Force to match the variety in weapons.

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J. H. Bowman and J. E. Fanning, "The Logistics Problems of a U.N. Military Force," International Organization, Vol. XVII No. 2 (Spring 1963), p. 271.

### Organizational Basis of the Logistical System

The logistical system in the Congo comprised three major elements: 1) the civilian facilities and staff of the Chief Administrative Officer (one of the three major elements in the UNF headquarters establishment in Leopoldville); 2) the military, general support logistical units which were under the direct control of the Force headquarters in Leopoldville; and 3) the logistical elements of the tactical units in the field.

The general responsibility of the Chief Administrative Officer was to provide logistical support for the military elements of the operation and the civilian technical assistance agencies and personnel serving under the Chief of Civilian Operations.<sup>3</sup>

The scope of U.N. civilian activities in the Congo is indicated by the titles of the offices and activities under the control of the civilian Chief: 1) General Services office which controlled accommodation (billets), welfare, post exchange, and transportation (excluding purely military transportation); 2) Civilian Personnel office; 3) Finance office; 4) Procurement office; and 5) an office responsible for Internal Audit.

On the military side, the Force headquarters had a logistics staff section which had general responsibility--in behalf of the Force Commander--for overseeing the activities of a multinational group of operational logistical units. These units comprised (with some minor variations in national structure as the operation progressed); from India, a hospital unit, supply platoon, air dispatch unit, a signal detachment, and a field post office; from Pakistan, an ordnance company and a transport company; from Denmark and Norway, a composite electrical and mechanical engineering unit and several smaller specialized detachments,

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3. See Chapter 15 for a summary of the general organization of the headquarters and Appendix X for a chart of the Command structure.



including movement control, personnel, veterinary, and public health units. Within the territorial commands, which were staffed by the brigades of the major contributors (Ethiopia, Tunisia, Ghana, Morocco, Nigeria, Malaya, and Ireland), internal logistical support was the responsibility of the contingent which provided the brigade with its organic logistical elements. Some augmentation from the logistical units assigned to Force headquarters was provided. This was true of the Katanga area command which was responsible for the operation of the Kamina base and had, in general, a much larger number of troops to support than the other territorial commands.

The general organization of the logistical system, except for its multinational character, was similar in many respects to what might be found in an occupation force, or another relatively static type of military situation involving forces from only one state. The Chief Administrative Officer occupied a position comparable to that of the commander of a logistical command supporting a small theater of operations. The basic differences lay 1) in the civilian nature of the administrative organization, 2) in the fact that the support command was coequal in status to both of the operational organizations it was to support (civilian operations and the U.N. Force), and 3) the closeness of its operational relationship to the U.N. Field Operations Service in New York.

The organization charts of the Congo operation prepared by the U.N. Secretariat<sup>4</sup> very clearly show that the Chief Administration Officer was formally subordinate to the Officer-in-Charge in Leopoldville. In practice, however, the Chief Administrative Officer acted more as a local representative of the Office of General Services in New York, with which he maintained direct contact.<sup>5</sup> The office of the Chief Administrative Officer and the subordinate operation sections were staffed by permanent members of the Field Operations Service, or personnel recruited by the

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4. See Chapter 15.

5. Bowman and Fanning, op.cit., p. 356.

Field Operations Service for the Congo assignment.<sup>6</sup> It was apparent that this personal relationship between the civilian support personnel in the field and the parent organization, the Field Operations Service in New York, tended to strengthen the informal and direct communication. Formal command channels were ignored from time to time because of the existence of this "technical channel of communication"<sup>7</sup> which could bypass the formal chain of command.

The Chief Administrative Officer in the Congo, in addition to being the channel through which support requirements needing New York action were transmitted to the Field Operations Service, provided support at the local field level. Local procurement of goods and services to fill demands from operating elements of the UNF (both civilian and military) was effected by the Chief Administrative Officer in the Congo. But this local procurement authority extended only to single-order purchases of \$5,000 or less.<sup>8</sup>

The relationship between the military elements in the Congo and U.N. General Services in New York was similar in form to a national defense procurement and supply system.<sup>9</sup> The UNF generated requirements in the field and the Field Operations Service (a subdivision of General Services) was responsible for procurement and delivery. One principal difference was that the United Nations was free to procure from a wide international base. This financial advantage was sometimes offset by the inadequate performance of some of the less efficient governments and other sellers. As the situation unfolded, General Services turned to the U.S. Government for much of the more complex technical equipment.

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6. Interview with U.N. officials, New York, April 27 and 28, 1965.

7. Similar problems have been faced by the U.S. military services as a result of the right of technical service units (such as signal, ordnance, engineers, etc.) to communicate directly outside of command channels on technical matters with higher and lower echelons of their services.

8. Bowman and Fanning, op.cit., pp. 364 and 365.

9. The unique role of the Military Adviser to the Secretary-General is discussed in Chapter 15.

The economy derived from this wide international base can be illustrated by the procurement of tropical uniforms for the UNF. Initial purchase was made in New York City where the costs were high and delivery was very prompt. Thereafter, uniforms were purchased in Japan and Hong Kong at a considerable saving in cost, but the delivery time was long. The lead time between an order of uniforms and delivery was finally cut down to nine months.<sup>10</sup>

Tension and inefficiency frequently resulted from long procurement lead times which were not fully understood by the UNF staff who had had experience only with their national procurement systems. Eventually the average lead time in the international pipeline was reduced to six months for most supplies, but this was an abnormally long time for some critical items.

Further difficulties were caused by imprecise statements of requirements. These were due in part to UNF uncertainty about the nature of the mission and the future size of the Force and to the inexperience of some of its officers. An example is instructive. On January 7, 1963, the Field Operations Service requested the United States to provide 532,831 rounds of ammunition of various calibers. U.S. military officers familiar with the situation in the Congo questioned the size of this request because of the recent arrival of a substantial shipment of ammunition and because the period of active hostilities in Katanga appeared to have come to an end. At their suggestion the office of the Secretary-General's Military Adviser cabled the Force Commander in Leopoldville, asking that the ammunition order be reviewed. As a result, the order was reduced by 50 percent. Further inquiry from New York resulted in the original order being cancelled.

On the surface this incident appears to illustrate only poor planning and poor coordination between the field and Headquarters in New

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10. Interviews with U.N. officials, New York, April 28, 1965.

York, but an examination of the documents reveals that other factors were involved. The original requisition was processed through the UNF headquarters and submitted to the Chief Administrative Officer in Leopoldville on December 17, 1962.<sup>11</sup> This was two weeks before the beginning of Round Three in Katanga. At that time the UNF Command had every reason to expect its requirements for ammunition to increase. Reports of a sharp buildup of Katangan forces were current. The Truman mission had not yet arrived in the Congo. Rising tensions and the expectation of a prolonged military operation dominated the entire picture. Given these circumstances, the UNF would probably have been considered remiss had it not made adequate logistical arrangements for the anticipated action.

At operating levels below Leopoldville, logistical support was provided by the internal organization of the national contingents, backed up by general support units assigned to the Force headquarters. Smaller units, like the Mali battalion, or the Liberian Frontier Force, which were unequipped to support themselves, were attached to a larger unit (for example, the attachment of the Liberian Frontier Force to the Tunisian Brigade in Kasai in 1961).

The Malayan contingent provides a good example of the internal logistical support system operated by a territorial command of a contributing nation.<sup>12</sup> The brigade headquarters totalled 149 officers and men, of whom 12 were commissioned officers. Of these, 28 were assigned to the brigade headquarters staff (10 officers, 1 warrant officer, and 17 other ranks), 48 were assigned to the brigade signal squadron, and 24 to the headquarters defense platoon. No logistical units were included in the headquarters strength. Logistical support was provided by three Malayan units, Federation Signals, Armed Forces Maintenance Corps, and General

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11. Ibid.

12. The description of the Malayan contingents logistical support structure in the Malayan Special Force is based on material provided by Malayan military authorities.

Service Corps. In February 1962, when the Malayan contingent began to reach its peak strength, detachments of the Federation Ordnance Services, the Federation Supplies and Transport Services and the Federation Electrical and Mechanical Engineers were added. These brigade level support units were in addition to the logistical elements which were assigned to the line battalions in the brigade (the infantry battalions and the reconnaissance squadron), each of which had sufficient supply and maintenance personnel to operate independently.

#### Transportation Problems of the Force

Deployed in a theater almost the size of Western Europe in the heart of Africa, widely separated units of the UNF had a serious transportation problem. From the beginning primary reliance was placed upon airlift--the most expensive means of transport. The U.S. Air Force was the major source of airlift for the initial deployment, though the United Kingdom, Canada, Switzerland, Ethiopia, and the Soviet Union also participated. During the entire four years the United States transported 118,091 troops and 18,569 tons of cargo within the Congo. The breakdown of the external airlift and sealift follows:<sup>13</sup>

##### U.S. Airlift: 1960-64

Troops into the Congo .....	43,303
Troops out of the Congo .....	31,093
Cargo into the Congo (tons) ..	8,542
Cargo out of the Congo (tons).	1,904

##### U.S. Sealift: 1960-64

Troops into the Congo .....	20,352
Troops out of the Congo .....	23,343
Cargo into the Congo (tons) ..	5,322
Cargo out of the Congo (tons).	2,801

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13. The information was provided by J-3, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense, September 16, 1964.

This heavy dependence on external and internal air transport has been criticized as unnecessarily costly; but it was defended by U.N. Field Operations Service staff on several grounds. As far as internal transport was concerned, they maintained that surface transportation was either unsafe or seriously disrupted. The UNF did not have the manpower or facilities to protect and maintain long communications routes on the ground. Such a mammoth task would have diverted them from their primary mission of peacekeeping in population centers. At one point, according to a U.N. Force Commander, the average monthly internal air load was 7,000,000 pounds of cargo and 9,000 personnel.

In retrospect it appears clear that substantial savings in both internal and external transportation of troops and equipment could have been effected by better planning. There were, however, serious limitations to sea transport. The United Nations was obligated to bear the cost of every man and officer from the day he left his home country until he returned. In the case of some officers who received a large per diem, such as the Brazilians, it was a saving to take them to and from the Congo by air. In some cases the United Nations had a legal obligation to return personnel by a specific date which could not be changed. According to the laws of several donor states, notably Sweden, a national could not serve more than six months abroad without legal deprivations. On several occasions the Organization had to charter planes to return Swedish personnel even though surface transportation was available. In some cases, with a slight delay, unused military aircraft space could have been used.

As the operation progressed, the General Services contracted with civilian airline companies for transportation both within and outside the Congo. Some experiences with civilian firms were unhappy, and in general military air transport was more reliable and satisfactory.<sup>14</sup> In

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14. This judgment is based on several interviews with U.S. and U.N. officials. See also, Bowman and Fanning, op.cit., p. 363.



theory, it was cheaper to charter a civilian firm for a specific task than to reimburse a member government for the use of its air force for the same task. In practice, however, the saving was sometimes offset by serious operational disadvantages. The transportation of the Nigerian Army's First Battalion from Lagos to the Congo in November 1963 is a case in point. The United Nations had arranged for commercial DC-4 aircraft for the lift, rather than rely on the British Air Force Hastings which had been used in the earlier movement of Nigerian troops in November 1961. As it turned out, the DC-4s could not handle the large boxes containing the heavy supporting equipment for the battalion, so this essential gear arrived a full month after the arrival of the unit.<sup>15</sup> In another instance a private American air carrier was chartered to repatriate U.N. troops in 1964, but it performed so poorly that the contract was cancelled after a small portion of the job had been completed.

One major barrier to the efficient use of internal transportation facilities was directly attributable to political restrictions against the employment of military personnel from major powers, and the concomitant need for multinational representation in the UNF. The multinational Movement Control unit, established at an early stage, illustrates this problem. The unit was initially manned by officers from various branches of the Force (infantry, armor, and artillery), mainly Scandinavian, who were not really trained in transportation operations. According to one U.N. Commander, the Movement Control groups included men with different levels of specialized training, ranging from reasonable efficiency to total ignorance. Inadequate knowledge of the working language, English, further reduced their efficiency. Speaking of transportation ground personnel, Major General Indarjit Rikhye, the Military Adviser to the Secretary-General, has said many men "were found wanting in suitable qualifications. There were instances of erroneous recruitment, e.g., a

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15. "Unit Notes," Nigerian Army Magazine (Lagos: Nigerian National Press), Vol. 2 (October 1964), pp. 57 ff.

man recruited to fill a vacancy in a definite trade had no previous experience or training. Difficulties were also encountered in obtaining personnel in accounting, requisitioning, and issuance of spare parts. There was also a serious lack of suitable personnel who could supervise air loading to ensure that most economical use of aircraft was made.<sup>16</sup> In contrast, Major General Rikhye pointed to the efficiency of the Canadian air transport unit in UNEF which, he said, operated with "no organizational difficulties."

For two years the unsatisfactory Movement Control unit "just flopped along," to quote a knowledgeable U.N. official. Eventually an experienced civilian transportation expert was assigned to the Congo and appropriate civilian personnel were added to the Movement Control unit. The picture improved, but at no point did the efficiency match that of an effective movement control unit of a single government.

The multinational character of the operation also had an adverse effect upon the standardization of vehicles, equipment, and parts. At one point there were some 3,000 vehicles of nearly 90 different makes and types resulting from nonstandard procurement. The maintenance, repair, and provision of spare parts for this number and variety was an impossible task, so the Force Commander declared 1,300 of the nonstandard types obsolete. The problem was further exacerbated by the poor quality of maintenance personnel and facilities. "The general standard of mechanical transport maintenance and driving has been poor amongst most contingents" and the "accident rate in the U.N. forces has tended to be high," observed Rikhye.<sup>17</sup>

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16. "Preparation and Training of United Nations Peace-Keeping Forces," prepared for delivery at a private conference on U.N. Security Forces, Oslo, Norway, Feb. 21, 1964 (Adelphi Paper No. 9, Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 1964), p. 9.

17. Ibid., p. 6.



### Feeding the Living and Handling the Dead

The diversity of diets to provide for in the UNF presented a complex logistical problem. The Indian, the Ethiopian, the Swede, the Nigerian, and all the rest wanted familiar food, and the U.N. Command, recognising the obvious morale implications, attempted to meet this need, building on the UNEF experience. Under the circumstances the performance was good.

One incident illustrates the relationship between food and alleged discrimination between different nationality detachments. During Round One in Elisabethville in September 1961, some Swedish troops re-occupied a U.N. warehouse that had been temporarily lost to the Katangans. On entering the cold storage section, the Swedes found a supply of chickens marked for Indian consumption and beef marked for Europeans. They were tired of beef, so in keeping with the military tradition that "unofficial procurement" is morally defensible, they loaded fifteen trucks with chicken and other foodstuffs, dropped off a portion to the Irish battalion, and enjoyed a change in diet. The Swedish officer who recorded this incident<sup>18</sup> suggests that the Indians who ran the supply system discriminated against the Europeans in the allocation of rations, but it is not unreasonable to presume that the Hindu prohibition against certain foods and dietary customs played a significant role in the segregation of foods.

There is also great diversity in the ways people handle their dead. Anticipating fatalities in the Congo, Field Operations Service quickly asked the U.S. Army Quartermaster Corps to locate a mortician who had considerable intercultural experience. Such a man was found. He operated a mortician school in Chicago. He was given a one-year contract to operate a U.N. mortuary in Leopoldville. Bodies were evacuated to Leopoldville through medical channels rather than through quartermaster channels. There they were prepared for shipment home or otherwise taken care of in accordance with the request of the country concerned.

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18. See Edward Hymoff, Stig von Bayer: International Troubleshooter for Peace (New York: James H. Heineman, 1965), pp. 174-76.

### Concluding Observations

1. Most of the logistical problems of the Congo operation were largely attributable to the multinational character of the Force and the political constraints against the use of trained logistical support units from major powers. The smaller politically acceptable states simply did not have qualified specialists to handle logistics. Since national contingents often brought nonstandard supporting equipment with them, the UNF was saddled with a bewildering variety of vehicles which greatly exacerbated the spare parts problem. International procurement further complicated the picture.

2. The experience of the United Nations in contracting for airlift and sealift to and from the Congo suggests that it is inappropriate to apply rigorous cost-effectiveness standards to such an operation because of the number of noneconomic factors involved; but with trained and qualified personnel and a system of movement priorities and regulations, substantial savings could have been effected. The most efficient and reliable external and internal airlift appears to have been that provided by the U.S. Air Force. Without American logistical support the Congo operation would have been virtually impossible. It may be noted here that the initial U.S. airlift which cost \$10,317,662, was contributed voluntarily to the peacekeeping effort and not charged against the assessed portion for the United States.<sup>19</sup>

3. The many weaknesses of the U.N. logistical system in the Congo do not appear to have had a serious adverse effect upon the direction or character of the operation as a whole. Nor did these weaknesses contribute to the loss of military or political control of the operation. In some instances costs were excessive and there was considerable evidence of inefficiency, but it is not reasonable to expect a multinational operation to meet the standards appropriate to a similar military operation

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19. See Appendix Z-1.

by a competent government. It must be said, however, that there was a fortuitous element in the situation--the UNF was never really put to the test. It was never involved in serious and protracted combat operations.

## CHAPTER 17

### DEPLOYMENT AND OPERATIONS OF THE FORCE

The deliberate vagueness in the Security Council resolutions on the Congo peacekeeping mission was necessary and desirable politically, but in operational military terms this absence of clear directives was a serious problem. Though it was the responsibility of the Secretary-General to translate the broad mandate into specific objectives, a responsibility which he discharged well, such objectives were no substitute for clear operational instructions in the field. The absence of specific field instructions, especially in the first hectic weeks of mid-1960, led to a wide difference in the nature and conduct of U.N. military operations in different parts of the Congo. Significant differences, though not as pronounced, persisted among different national contingents throughout the four-year operation.

#### Operational Functions of the Force<sup>1</sup>

The operational problems of the Force fell into two broad categories: 1) those related directly to the implementation of the peacekeeping mandate, and 2) those inherent in the internal security situation as it existed in the Congo.

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1. The larger political context for events discussed in the present chapter is developed in Chapters 5 and 6. The one-page chronology found in Appendix D provides the general structure of the Congo story.

The objectives of the U.N. Force, according to the Security Council resolutions, were twofold. First, the Force was to restore and maintain law and order. This included pacifying of tribal conflict, dealing with disorder caused by units of the ANC, and preventing civil war. Second, the Force was to assist the Central Government in maintaining the territorial integrity and political independence of the country. This included the protection of the Congo from external interference and the elimination of prohibited foreign military and civilian personnel.<sup>2</sup>

During the four years the law-and-order mission was a primary responsibility of the UNF throughout the Congo, including secessionist Katanga where the United Nations was preoccupied with eliminating prohibited advisers and restoring territorial integrity, that is, bringing the province under the political control of Leopoldville.

At no time was the internal situation such that security of U.N. civilian or military personnel and facilities could be taken for granted. Varying degrees of ANC indiscipline and the mutual distrust between the U.N. Command and the Central Government created a situation of insecurity not entirely unlike that of an occupation army in an unfriendly country. This fact is demonstrated by the number of U.N. casualties suffered at the hands of troops nominally under the control of the Government that had invited the United Nations to assist it in keeping order. More UNF troops were killed by Leopoldville ANC soldiers, Stanleyville ANC soldiers, and anti-Tshombe tribal elements in Katanga, than in the three clashes between U.N. and Katanga forces.<sup>3</sup>

At one time or another, the UNF put a major effort into providing

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2. There was a third function of the peacekeeping mission, the re-training and reorganization of the ANC. Since this was not a function of the UNF as such it is not discussed here. See Chapter 6, pp. 127-32.

3. According to official U.N. casualty figures, 43 UNF personnel were killed in action against Katangan forces, compared with 75 in all other actions.

local security for such key installations as the Kitona and Kamina military bases, the port at Matadi, the rail and road links between Port Francqui-Kamina-Elisabethville and Albertville-Kamina-Elisabethville, airfields, and headquarters facilities. In spite of all efforts, at no time was surface communication wholly secure.

The political and physical environment of the Congo presented the UNF with some extremely difficult operational problems. On the physical side, the Force was dispersed over a vast area. The land transportation routes were rudimentary. The inherent vulnerability of single lines of communication and the destruction of facilities caused both by a breakdown in public transportation and by deliberate destruction of facilities (especially in northern and northeastern Katanga), constituted serious barriers to effective operations.

#### Operations to Maintain Law and Order

Except for the early days of the Congo crisis, when control of the ANC was the central issue, some of the most serious breakdowns of law and order were concurrent with, or followed in the wake of, Congolese civil war operations. This occurred in southern Kasai and north Katanga in August and September 1960, and contained strong elements of tribal conflict.<sup>4</sup> It is relevant, however, to point out that the UNF was not given the specific mission of preventing civil war until six months after its initial entry. In this period a number of civil war situations had developed and had largely run their course.<sup>5</sup> The requirement for the UNF to maintain a position of strict neutrality in internal conflict, in keeping with the Secretary-General's interpretation of the mandates, restrained it--even if it had had the capability--from intervening to prevent or curtail civil war and other forms of disorder.

Apart from the legal and political aspects of the situation in

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4. See Appendix P-3.

5. These situations are described in Appendix P -3, 5, 12, and 13.

July 1960,<sup>6</sup> the initial task of the UNF was to bring the ANC under control. This meant restraining uncontrolled elements of the ANC from committing acts of violence against the civilian population. The UNF succeeded in this task sufficiently to permit the withdrawal of Belgian troops.

Concurrently, there was the task of maintaining public order so that the civilian technical assistance tasks of the United Nations could be accomplished and the political and economic reconstruction of the Congo begun. The nature of these public order operations varied as much as the results achieved, ranging from complete ineffectiveness to surprising success. They included civil police-type functions (performed in part by the Nigerian and Ghanaian police contingents which were a part of the military force for the better part of the U.N. operation), apprehending and detaining persons who violated civil law, establishing and enforcing curfews, conducting short and long range patrols, operating refugee camps and evacuating refugees, protecting political leaders, and generally assuming all of the internal security responsibilities which the ANC was utterly incapable of discharging.

Operationally, the first task of the UNF was to establish itself in all of the most important political, communications, and economic centers of the Congo, especially at those places where the ANC had disrupted normal activity. Further deployment of Belgian troops would then be unnecessary.<sup>7</sup>

The initial deployment of U.N. units proceeded on the basis of priorities established by Ralph Bunche, then Acting Force Commander. The first troops to arrive on July 15 and 16 were sent immediately to key locations in Leopoldville and in the lower Congo where the most serious mutiny and the heaviest Belgian intervention had occurred--to Thysville,

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6. The Alexander-Bunche dispute is discussed in Chapter 4, p. 75, and Chapter 6, pp. 128-30.

7. Catherine Hoskyns, The Congo Since Independence: January 1960-December 1961 (London: Oxford University Press for Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1965), pp. 135-36.

Matadi, and Boma. U.N. troops fanned out as they arrived, meeting no significant resistance from the ANC, which, in most instances, submitted to voluntary disarming.<sup>8</sup> Ten days after the operation began the UNF had established itself firmly in Leopoldville, Leopoldville province, Kasai province, and Equateur province. During the closing days of the month, deployment continued throughout the rest of the Congo. By the end of the month, U.N. Irish troops had occupied three key cities in Kivu province (Goma, Kindu, and Kasongo); and the UNF occupied all places where Belgians had intervened in July, again with the exception of the secessionist province of Katanga. The initial and minimal objectives of this law-and-order deployment were achieved except in southern Kasai and north Katanga where Lumumba's ANC had moved against Kalonji and Tshombe. UNF movements were made possible in some instances by the active cooperation of the ANC which provided communications equipment and river boats.<sup>9</sup>

By the late fall of 1960 and the early part of 1961, the law-and-order mission of the UNF had become closely intertwined with the tasks of preventing tribal conflict and civil war. The major centers of unrest were 1) along the Stanleyville-Bukavu-Albertville axis, 2) the Stanleyville-Kindu-Kongolo axis, 3) southeastern Kasai province, 4) along the Orientale-Equateur border generally centered on the Bumba-Lisala area, and 5) in the Baluba country of northern Katanga from Manono to the west. U.N. forces had begun to approach their maximum strength of over 19,000 during October 1960. Troops equivalent to between five and six battalions of combat troops were generally deployed at all key locations in Katanga;<sup>10</sup> in Goma, Kindu, Bukavu, and Kasongo in Kivu province; along the Port Francqui-Kamina railway line in Kasai province; in Leopoldville province

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8. Ibid., p. 134.

9. Lincoln P. Bloomfield, "Headquarters-Field Relations: Some Notes on the Beginning and End of ONUC," International Organization, Vol. 17 (Spring 1963), pp. 377-89.

10. Based on an analysis of U.N., SCOR, Supplement for Oct., Nov., and Dec., 1960, S/4557 (November 2, 1960), p. 40.



where the heaviest concentrations were in Leopoldville and the lower Congo, in Banningville and Kikwit; and only thinly in Equateur and Orientale provinces, where there had been some retrenchment since September 1960.

The military effect of the political difficulties between Hammar-skjold and the militant African states which resulted in troop withdrawals by the Casablanca group<sup>11</sup> were beginning to be felt. The deteriorating relations between the United Nations and the Leopoldville Government were soon to overshadow the law-and-order mission. Several direct and serious clashes between the UNF and units of the ANC which were under Leopoldville control were overt manifestations of this worsening relationship.

Apart from the conduct of police-type operations, the UNF was required to set up special protective areas for both Belgian and Congolese civilians during the fall of 1960 and early 1961. About 1,200 persons in Stanleyville, Bunia, Bukavu, Goma, Kindu, Luena, Luluabourg, and Leopoldville were safeguarded in this manner.<sup>12</sup> This was in addition to the large camp in Elisabethville which was to accommodate as many as 35,000 Baluba refugees and became a major additional responsibility for the hard pressed U.N. Command there. Protection was also afforded to political leaders in Leopoldville, including Kasavubu, Lumumba, and Mobutu. Mobutu placed Lumumba under house arrest where he was guarded by the UNF. That Lumumba was able to leave his quarters secretly on November 27, 1960, without the apparent knowledge of the Ghanaian guard does not necessarily imply a dereliction of duty on the part of the UNF since it was not charged with the responsibility of preventing his movement, but rather only with affording personal protection.

U.N. public security measures reached what was perhaps the height of efficiency during the operation to protect the reconvening of Parliament at the University of Lovanium near Leopoldville in July 1961.<sup>13</sup>

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11. See Chapter 13, pp. 271-72.

12. U.N., SCOR, Supplement for Jan., Feb., and March, 1961, S/4757 (March 2, 1961), pp. 205-06.

13. See Chapter 5, pp. 94 and 95.

Acting on the request of both the Central Government and the secessionist Gizenga regime in Stanleyville, the U.N. Command undertook to secure Leopoldville and the conference site. Within Leopoldville, and with the agreement of the Congolese Government, no armed Congolese police or ANC personnel were allowed to circulate except for a limited number of police and gendarmerie who were normally on security duty at key installations and at the residences of some of the higher officials of the Congolese Government. With Parliament originally due to convene at the University on July 15 (it actually assembled on July 22), all faculty, students, and other personnel were moved out of the area on the 13th. On the following day a U.N. internal security detail (provided by field service personnel) and the administrative and housekeeping staff was moved in. The entire area was sealed off with electrified fencing, floodlit at night, and secured by a mixed U.N. battalion of troops from India, Malaya, Tunisia, and Sweden. Guard dogs were used for night patrol of the perimeter. Special security arrangements inside the perimeter included physical search for suspicious objects and clandestine radio equipment. All persons who entered and departed the site, including U.N. personnel, were likewise searched for weapons and currency or other negotiable instruments. U.N. military police manned check points on all access roads, and the guard battalion controlled the perimeter and the single gate into the University. Security was complete and no untoward incidents occurred during the session which ended on August 2.<sup>14</sup>

#### Operations to Prevent Civil War and Suppress Tribal Conflict

Although it was not until February 21, 1961, that the Security Council gave the Secretary-General a clear mandate to use force if necessary to prevent civil war and tribal conflict, the U.N. Command undertook a number of actions which had the practical effect of achieving this objective almost from the beginning of the operation. Cordier's closing of the

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14. U.N., SCOR, Supplement for July, Aug., Sept., 1961, S/4917 (June 19, 1961), pp. 66 ff.

airports on September 5, 1960, for example, had the end result of containing ANC troop movements against southern Kasai and northeastern Katanga and could be described as preventive military action.<sup>15</sup> The immediate effect was to limit direct Central Government military moves against the two secessionist regimes in Kasai and Katanga, although some penetration into these two areas had already occurred.<sup>16</sup> The Tunisian Brigade in Luluabourg which had only one company of troops stationed in Bakwanga, Kasai, at the time was unable to do more than to secure installations in the city,<sup>17</sup> but, by the end of September, arrangements had been made through negotiations in Leopoldville for the withdrawal of Central Government troops from north Katanga and southeastern Kasai.

Despite a request by Kasavubu that the United Nations set up a neutral zone in southern Kasai, U.N. forces there (comprising Tunisian and Liberian contingents) were unable to establish control. Belgian-led Kalonji troops reentered the area and a month of intertribal warfare between the Kalonji Balubas and local Kanioka followed before the United Nations could establish a cease-fire line between the tribal areas.<sup>18</sup>

Concurrently, a similar penetration by Stanleyville-based ANC under Central Government control took place along the Kasongo-Kongolo line in the Tanganyika district of northern Katanga. Balubakat leaders in this area, which extended southward along the main Kindu-Kamina and Albertville-Kabalo railway lines and included the north central town of Manono, were generally opposed to Tshombe. Since mid-August they had organized partisan youth groups for paramilitary operations against the Katanga gendarmerie. Partisan activity culminated in mid-September in serious fighting between the Balubakat and Katangan police in Manono in which between 30 and 40 Balubas were killed and the city looted after the departure of the Belgian

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15. See Chapter 5, pp. 84-86.

16. See Appendix P-3 and 5.

17. Hoskyns, op.cit., p. 194.

18. U.N., SCOR, Supplement for Oct., Nov., Dec., 1960, S/4557 (November 2, 1960), p. 24. See also Hoskyns, op.cit., pp. 217-18.

population. Fighting of a similar nature extended as far south as Luena and continued until U.N. intervention in Manono, Luena, and Kabalo produced a temporary cessation of hostilities in the main population centers. These U.N. operations and negotiations with the Katangan authorities ultimately resulted in the establishment of a neutral zone in northern Katanga and the assumption by the UNF of responsibility for the pacification of north-eastern Katanga.<sup>19</sup>

Although the official U.N. accounts of operations in northern Katanga from September 1960 into early 1961 emphasize the problems caused by the Belgian-led gendarmerie and the mercenaries, U.N. forces in the area (Irish, Malian, Moroccan, Swedish, and Ethiopian) were more often engaged during the fall of 1960 in actions against the Balubakat partisans.

A primary mission was to conduct patrols between the towns occupied by U.N. forces in Katanga and to keep the railway between Albertville, Kabalo, and Kamina open. Train escort efforts were never wholly successful and involved frequent clashes between the U.N. escorts and the Baluba. The latter cut tracks, ambushed trains, and attacked local stations and other railway facilities. The most serious problem faced by the U.N. troops was the restriction that they could not fire except in self-defense, since it was extremely difficult to define the precise point at which true self-defense became involved. Patrols in the area frequently met situations in which the personnel were surrounded by partisans armed with primitive weapons such as bows, bicycle chains, spears, and clubs. The only way they could protect themselves was to prevent the partisans from coming close enough to use these weapons. Firing warning shots which deliberately missed the target merely reinforced the witchcraft inspired beliefs of invulnerability and, hence, invited attack. In such situations U.N. personnel often interpreted the self-defense restriction as liberally as possible, shooting to kill before they were surrounded.<sup>20</sup>

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19. See Appendix P-6, and U.N. Doc. S/4557, op.cit., pp. 24-26.

20. For a discussion of these operations, see Edward Hymoff, Stig Von Bayer: Troubleshooter for Peace, (New York: Heineman, 1965), Chap.16, passim.

The effort to maintain railway communications between Albertville and Kabalo was terminated about the end of 1960 in the face of persistent Baluba attacks. The protection of the Elisabethville-Kamina line was continued. Here again differences in the interpretation of the fire-in-self-defense-only rule were considerable. One example serves to illustrate the point.<sup>21</sup> In early 1961 the Swedish contingent was assigned to train escort duty on the Elisabethville-Kamina line, while Moroccan troops occupied key points along the line. On one occasion, while the guarded train was approaching the town of Bukama, about half way between Tenke (on the junction between the Elisabethville-Dilolo line and the Elisabethville-Kamina line) the train was attacked by Baluba from a building along the tracks and in sight of the Moroccans. The Swedish escort returned the fire with rifles and light machine guns, destroying the building. When the fire-fight was over and the train had entered Bukama, the Moroccan contingent took issue with the Swedes over the propriety of their action in view of the restrictions against the use of initiative. Incidents similar to this continued, sections of track up to a mile in length were removed by the Baluba from time to time, and the Baluba interdiction of railway communications along this line remained successful until the line was cleared by Katangan forces in February 1961.

The temporary accommodation between the UNF and the Katangan authorities which had culminated in the October 17, 1960, agreement,<sup>22</sup> began to break down after Tshombe accused the United Nations of complicity in the Stanleyville occupation of north Katanga.<sup>23</sup> Thereafter the UNF in Katanga turned its attention away from the problem of preventing civil strife and toward the question of eliminating prohibited personnel. Elsewhere in the Congo, however, the civil war issue had become very real,

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21. Capt. Stig von Bayer was an eye witness to the following account. See Ibid., pp. 132-34.

22. See Appendix P-6.

23. See Appendix P-13.

and relations between the U.N. Command and the Central Government continued to worsen.

By November 1960, the anticipated withdrawal of the Mali contingent from northern Katanga had forced the U.N. Command to redeploy an Ethiopian battalion from the western border regions of Orientale province as a replacement force. Two battalions of the contingent and the brigade headquarters were concentrated in Stanleyville, leaving the border region very lightly covered. Central Government troops moved into Equateur province to counter attempts by the Stanleyville regime to expand to the west in February.<sup>24</sup> Lacking adequate strength in the area, the U.N. Command had to fall back on a negotiated settlement in which the Force Commander personally acted as an intermediary between Mobutu and Lundula.<sup>25</sup>

In late January and early February 1961, an additional civil war threat was posed by the Stanleyville regime which infiltrated troops into northern Kasai, reaching Luluabourg on February 23. Prompt action by the Ghanaian Brigade, which warned that it would take advantage of the February 21 mandate to use force in order to prevent an armed clash, kept the situation under control and resulted in the prompt withdrawal of the Stanleyville contingent.

As the U.N. operation entered the spring of 1961, the military problem faced in Katanga was not so much one of preventing the outbreak of civil war, as one of finding a legal means to eliminate the prohibited foreign presence and achieving the integration of the province into the Republic of the Congo. Elsewhere in the Congo the civil war issue became a diminishing problem. In its place, however, a more immediate crisis had to be met. This was the sudden and violent confrontation between the UNF and its ostensible host, the Central Government.

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24. See Appendix P-15.

25. U.N., SCOR, Supplement for Jan., Feb., and March, 1961, S/4750 (February 25, 1961), and Add. 1-7, pp. 162-63 and 170-71.

#### Operations against Units of the ANC

A continuing problem of the UNF in the Congo, especially during the first year of its operations, was the security and protection of its own military and civilian personnel. In most instances, the ANC, or elements of it, was the main instrument of Congolese acts of violence against U.N. personnel. These fell into several distinct categories, each of which presented the Force with a different operational problem. First was the locally inspired interference by small ANC groups and units with UNF personnel during the period of initial deployment and in the fall of 1960. Typical of these incidents, not inspired by the Central Government, were the manhandling of Canadian airmen at the Ndjili Airport in Leopoldville on August 18, 1960, and a similar incident involving both Canadian and U.S. air crews in Stanleyville on August 27, 1960.<sup>26</sup> The arrest and incarceration of an Austrian medical team in Bukavu on December 15, 1960, and its subsequent rescue the following day by Nigerian troops, and the massacre of thirteen Italian airmen in Kindu by mutinous Stanleyville ANC troops on November 11, 1961, were two other incidents of this kind.<sup>27</sup> The U.N. response to these incidents varied from the inaction of the Force in Stanleyville (although U.N. records show that the Ethiopian Brigade headquarters and two battalions of troops were in Stanleyville at the time), a hesitant effort by Ghanaian troops in Ndjili to extricate the Canadians, to the prompt and vigorous combat action by the Nigerian contingent in Bukavu. In this incident the Nigerian assault on the local prison where the Austrians were being held resulted in casualties to both sides.

ANC activity in these incidents was made possible by the absence of effective ANC headquarters control, and in the case of Bukavu, Stanleyville, and Kindu, followed on the heels of a breakdown in political control by the Central Government over the areas concerned.

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26. See Appendix P-2 and 4.

27. See Appendix P-10 and 21.

A second, and very different, category of ANC actions against U.N. installation and personnel were those directly associated with the deteriorating relations between the United Nations and the Central Government which reached their climax in February, March, and April, 1961.<sup>28</sup> These incidents were manifestations of Central Government hostility towards the U.N. effort. They ranged in seriousness from individual acts of brutality to a major military action against U.N. port facilities and other installations in the lower Congo in early March, and the cold-blooded massacre of almost an entire company of U.N. troops in Port Francqui on April 28, 1961.<sup>29</sup> ANC actions in these incidents were at least encouraged by Leopoldville's antipathy toward the U.N. effort, and at most (as in the lower Congo) directed and controlled by the military arm of the Central Government. Politically, they illustrate the extreme difficulty of conducting peacekeeping operations in the face of host country opposition, and militarily the inability of the U.N. Force to protect itself and perform its mission because of inadequate strength and political limitations.

In one of the first of these incidents (which, incidentally, was one of the major causes of serious friction between the UNF and the host country), the U.N. troops involved successfully performed their mission. This was the action between a unit of the ANC and the Tunisian-Ghanaian security guard at the Ghanaian Embassy in Leopoldville on November 21-22, 1960.<sup>30</sup> One Tunisian was killed and so was the Congolese ANC commander of troops in Leopoldville, Colonel Justin Kokolo. This incident occurred

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28. For the political background of the law-and-order problems created by the ANC, see Chapter 5, pp. 86-92, and Chapter 6, pp. 127-32.

29. These latter two incidents are discussed later in this chapter. See also Appendix P-17 and 18.

30. See Appendix P-8.



when a detachment of Congolese troops tried to enter the Ghanaian Embassy to apprehend Nathaniel Welbeck who was under Ghanaian protection and to expel him from the Congo.<sup>31</sup> Apart from the diplomatic and political aspects of this action which were extremely sensitive in terms of Congolese-Ghanaian relations and the relations between the United Nations and the Central Government, the Tunisian troops successfully resisted the forced entry of the ANC. It appears that the Ghanaian troops on internal guard duty opened fire when three unarmed Congolese attempted to force their way in. Members of the Tunisian detachment on external guard duty were forced by the exchange of fire that followed to defend their positions. The exact details of this incident, and particularly the role of General Rikhye, are still being debated.<sup>32</sup>

Bitterness over Kokolo's death seriously exacerbated the deteriorating relations between the United Nations and the Kasavubu Government leading ultimately to a series of small scale, but significant incidents between ANC troops and U.N. personnel in Leopoldville in late February 1961. These involved the blockading of all U.N. traffic; the disarming of U.N. troops; the incarceration, beating, and rape of U.N. civilian personnel; interference with U.N. military police; and the commission of other indignities on U.N. troops and civilians. The UNF was powerless to prevent these incidents and limited its action to a formal protest to the Government.<sup>33</sup>

The most serious incident of the entire Congo operation involving attacks on, and atrocities against, the UNF occurred in Port Francqui on April 27 and 28, 1961.<sup>34</sup> This act, too, was committed by ANC units

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31. Hoskyns, op.cit., pp. 263-64.

32. See for example, Major General H. T. Alexander, African Tightrope: My Two Years as Nkrumah's Chief of Staff (New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1966), pp. 50-60.

33. U.N., SCOR, Supplement for Jan., Feb., and March, 1961, S/4753 (February 27, 1961), pp. 203-04.

34. See Appendix P-18.

stationed in that town who were, in view of the regrets expressed by General Mobutu,<sup>35</sup> admitted to have been under the jurisdiction of the Central Government. The incident was set off when the local Ghanaian port security company gave protection to two provincial ministers from Lulua-bourg in a hotel being used as a U.N. officers' billet in Port Francqui. Some friction between the ANC and the U.N. contingent had apparently been developing for several days prior to the incident, which culminated in the ANC disarming about 40 Ghanaian troops who were stationed as security guards at the hotel. The ANC also took into custody 2 British officers of the Ghanaian unit and 3 Swedish movement control officers, beating the officer personnel severely, but apparently at that time not physically molesting the troops who were also under ANC guard in the billet area. Ghanaian regimental elements in Mweka, south of Port Francqui, sent a relief column to Port Francqui on the morning of April 28 which became engaged in a fire-fight with an ANC road block in the southern approaches to the town. The ANC responded to this attack by killing 43 of the Ghanaian troops, the two British officers, and two of the Swedish officers, the third successfully escaping while the massacre was in progress. A total of 47 U.N. personnel were deliberately murdered by the ANC and their bodies, according to eyewitness accounts, thrown into the river and never recovered.<sup>36</sup>

ANC and U.N. strength was evenly matched in Port Francqui at the time, the total for the ANC being about 100, and U.N. combat troops about 90. Given the deteriorating relations between the two forces, it appears that a lack of caution on the part of the Ghanaian contingent permitted its strength to be eroded by scattering men throughout the town. The relief column, according to one account, was less than successful in penetrating Port Francqui in time to rescue the port security company, in part because some of its personnel deserted the column when it engaged the

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35. In a letter to the Force Commander, dated May 8, 1961.

36. This account is based on an official U.N. Command inquiry which has not been made public.

ANC on April 28.<sup>37</sup>

The ANC assault on UNF facilities in the lower Congo on March 3-5, 1961,<sup>38</sup> differed from the Port Francoqui incident in one very important respect. Action in Port Francoqui appeared to have developed spontaneously as the result of local friction between the UNF and the ANC, and ANC actions were directed by local initiative.

The fighting which culminated in the defeat and ejection of the U.N. Sudanese guard company from Matadi also evolved from a minor skirmish between a Sudanese escort squad and a small ANC detachment at the airfield in Moanda. But, in this instance, the trouble had been preceded only a few days before by Kasavubu's violent outburst against the alleged intent of the United Nations to disarm the ANC, and the publication of an official Central Government bulletin which called on all ANC personnel to refuse to obey U.N. orders and resist any attempt at disarming to the death.<sup>39</sup> By the time the action was reaching its climax on March 4, the participation of the acting Chief of Staff of the ANC made it quite apparent that ANC actions were under full Central Government control and direction.

At the time of the Matadi action, the entire position of the UNF in the lower Congo was extremely vulnerable. The large Moroccan contingent had been withdrawn about two weeks previously and replaced by a Sudanese battalion of only 350 men, including headquarters personnel. One half of this unit was stationed in the key Kitona base at the mouth of the Congo, about 140 men in the Matadi Port area and about 24 at a small naval facility in Banana, near Kitona. A force of this size would have been more than adequate to protect these important installations against normal internal security hazards, but it had nowhere near the strength

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37. Ibid., Two truckloads of soldiers were found to be missing. This is also supported by the comments of a high U.N. official interviewed in New York on April 27, 1965.

38. See Appendix P-17.

39. U.N., SCOR, Supplement for Jan., Feb., March 1961, S/4758 (March 3, 1961), pp. 210-11.

needed to repulse the determined and coordinated military attack that was building up. ANC forces in the immediate Kitona-Matadi area totalled over 1,000, and about 600 of these were in Matadi, where the main action took place. They were armed with, and employed, heavy mortars and recoilless rifles up to 75 mm calibre as well as 37 mm antitank guns, and occupied positions on terrain which commanded the sites on the river lowland defended by the Sudanese. Had the need existed, the ANC was also in an easy position to reinforce the Matadi port area with troops from the garrison at Thysville, who were equipped with armor and artillery. Under these circumstances, and with ammunition beginning to run short by the second day of the fighting in Matadi, the Sudanese commander, with the approval of the U.N. Command (given through the U.N. liaison officer, a Major Bouffard), took the only action possible--acceptance of the Congolese conditions for a cease-fire and the withdrawal of the garrison to Leopoldville.

The U.N. Command did reinforce the key base of Kitona on March 4 with an Indonesian company, but it was in no position to relieve the Matadi unit without risking a complete rupture with the Leopoldville Government and placing the whole military operation throughout the Congo in serious jeopardy.

Military relationships with the Leopoldville regime improved gradually after the Matadi and Port Francqui incidents as more and more of the U.N. Command's attention was drawn toward Katanga and the overriding issue of reestablishing and insuring the political integrity of the Congo.

#### Restoring Territorial Integrity

The problem of restoring the territorial integrity of the Congo centered on, but was not limited to, Katanga. Two other areas needed to be brought under the authority of Leopoldville. One was southern Kasai, where ANC operations and the activities of the Kalonji regime had, by mid-1961, so disorganized communications and political organization that the area was effectively out of the provincial government's control. The other was in Stanleyville. The temporary reintegration of the Gizenga regime into the Central Government following the Lovanium Parliament was

broken again in late 1961, resulting in a request by the Central Government for military assistance.

Responsibility for securing and reestablishing civil order in Kasai province devolved on the Nigerian Third Brigade, which had only five companies of troops available, when it replaced the Ghana Brigade in Luluabourg in July 1961.<sup>40</sup> Although the Kalonji regime had agreed at Lovanium to join the Adoula Government, South Kasai was still not integrated into the province and almost all civil security, economic, communications and transportation facilities in the southern part of the province were at a standstill. With the heavy responsibility of protecting Luluabourg and the Kasai portion of the railway line between Port Francqui and Kamina, the brigade commander, Brigadier Coulson initiated what was to be called "Operation Union."<sup>41</sup> The operation was based on the concept that the military strength of the brigade should be committed to securing the city of Luluabourg (with two companies) and the rail line (with three).

Actions to reestablish control throughout the province and to achieve its reintegration into the formal structure of the Congolese Government were limited to a series of phased liaison and contact visits to the southern hinterlands of the province. The operation was conducted in three phases: 1) a series of visits to all possible areas by junior officer teams which included one military officer each from the brigade staff and the battalion, a doctor from WHO and an officer of the ANC, gendarmerie, or police; 2) visits by senior officers; and 3) a meeting of the provincial assembly in Luluabourg. Teams traveled by light aircraft to all of the important areas of the province. At times the use of helicopters was required so that landings, which were at great personal risk to the officers involved, could be made in the middle of the villages rather than at the more exposed airstrips. Follow-up visits of

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40. For this and the following account of Nigerian operations in Kasai, see Richard Lawson Strange Soldiering (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1963).

41. See Appendix P-11.

medical and technical teams were made, leading ultimately to free and secure operations by U.N. Technical Organization personnel in most areas. By early 1962, the brigade was making Operation Union visits to two or three villages a day and the province had been made reasonably secure.

The danger of secession in Stanleyville recurred in October 1961, when Gizenga who had gone there from Leopoldville refused to return to the national capital. By November had had created a group of gendarmerie numbering some 300 men who were personally loyal to him. Following votes of censure by the Chamber in Leopoldville on December 25 and on January 13, 1962, Prime Minister Adoula directed General Lundula, who had declared his allegiance to Leopoldville, to arrest Gizenga. Fighting in Stanleyville developed between Central Government ANC units and the Gizenga gendarmerie when the arrest was attempted and the Adoula Government asked for U.N. assistance in restoring order and arresting Gizenga.<sup>42</sup> The United Nations complied, under the law-and-order mandate. An Ethiopian platoon disarmed the Gizengist gendarmes without firing a shot. The arrest was made, and the United Nations provided air transportation to take Gizenga to Leopoldville on January 20, 1962. The Secretary-General justified this intervention on law-and-order grounds, but the practical effect was political and the net result was to protect the integrity of the country insofar as the immediate threat of a renewed Stanleyville secession effort was concerned.<sup>43</sup>

#### The Prevention of External Interference - Katanga

After the early spring of 1961, Katanga presented the UNF with two different environments. The most important and the most publicised of these was in Elisabethville and the surrounding area where the four major military actions of the U.N. effort took place<sup>44</sup> and where the question of

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42. See Appendix P-24.

43. See Chapter 5, pp. 97-99.

44. These were the round-up of mercenaries on August 23, 1961, Rounds One and Two, September and December, 1961, and Round Three, December 1962-January 1963, which effectively ended Katangan secession. The political background of these operations is given in Chapter 6. See also some of

Katangan secession was ultimately resolved in the final successful action in December 1962 and January 1963.

The other less well-known area of U.N. operations in Katanga was in the north in the general area of the "Independent State of Lualaba." Here the principal U.N. effort was directed against the Katangan gendarmerie-mercenary effort to recapture the area from Balubakat control.<sup>45</sup> Acting on the basis of the February 21, 1961, mandates to prevent civil war and to take measures to secure the withdrawal of foreign military personnel and mercenaries, U.N. Ethiopian troops in Kabalo repulsed a waterborne attack by mercenaries on April 7, 1961, and captured some thirty mercenaries who attempted to move into Kabalo by air. This action was in marked contrast to the previous failure of a Nigerian contingent in Manono to prevent the entry of the Katangan gendarmerie into that city just one week before. Although Indian reinforcements were moved into the Kamina base in Katanga, Katangan military actions against the Baluba areas continued to build up and no effective action was taken by the UNF to prevent the gradual assumption of control by the now French-officered gendarmerie over most of the main population and transportation centers in north Katanga. The gendarmerie reached its peak in organization and strength in August 1961.<sup>46</sup> U.N. forces in Katanga at that time comprised only 1,700 Indians, Irish, and Swedes in Elisabethville; 1,200 Indians in Albertville; 1,000 Indians in Kamina base; 500 Indians in Kabalo; 400 Indians and Ethiopians in Manono; and 120 Irish in Jadotville.<sup>47</sup> Operations in the Katangan interior between the Katangan forces and the United Nations remained generally stalemated between the middle of April and August 1961,

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the more specialized military aspects in Appendix P-20, 21, and 25. For the command and control aspects see Chapter 15.

45. Appendix P-16, and Hoskyns, op.cit., pp. 391-94.

46. Hoskyns, op.cit., p. 405

47. Hoskyns, op.cit., pp. 405-06. The figures given for Elisabethville in this source overestimate Indian strength which comprised a brigade headquarters and one, not two, battalions.

when the UNF initiated action against the mercenaries. Militarily, Rumpunch (the August 28 round-up of mercenaries) was significant only because it demonstrated the successful implementation of what was, essentially, a police action. It failed in achieving its full objectives because it was terminated prematurely, but on authoritative orders and for political reasons.

#### Round One<sup>48</sup>

Round One, or Morthor, which started on September 13, 1961, attempted to carry the Rumpunch objectives to completion. It was the first of the three serious military clashes in Elisabethville between the UNF and the Katangans. Operationally, Morthor differed from Rumpunch in several critical respects. The United Nations, anticipating greater resistance than the Katangans had offered during Rumpunch, had increased the size of the Elisabethville garrison from about 2,000 to 2,600 men through the transfer of an additional Indian battalion from North Katanga. The Swedish and Irish complements in Elisabethville, however, were understrength, the Swedes by two companies, and the Irish by the one company which was still stationed in Jadotville. These units were supported only by a Swedish armored car unit with four vehicles, and a Malayan armored car unit of 20 men, an Indian heavy machine gun unit of 40 men, and an Indian heavy mortar detachment of 30 men. Some of this strength was diverted, however, because of the need to maintain security over the Baluba refugee camp. Although opened as late as August 24, the camp already contained between 20,000 and 30,000 persons and completely surrounded the Swedish billet area.

Another important difference between Morthor and Rumpunch was that the element of surprise was missing in the September 13 action.<sup>49</sup> Forewarned of developing plans, the Katangan authorities had taken steps

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48. See Chapter 6, pp. 109-17, and Appendix P-20.

49. Hoskyns, op.cit., p. 420.



to prepare for a repetition of Rumpunch. Stocks of ammunition had been distributed throughout Elisabethville. Resistance to the UNF was determined and heavy on September 13, but the U.N. troops were able to capture several of their principal objectives (such as the post office and radio station) at the cost of moderate casualties (considering the number of troops involved). Only one of the key Katangan government officials, Finance Minister Jean-Baptiste Kibwe, was captured.

Fighting in the city, which continued until the cease-fire of September 20 went into effect, was largely confined after the first day to sporadic sniping, although the action in the vicinity of the Swedish camp and the refugee camp was fairly heavy for two days.

Unlike Rumpunch, Morthor degenerated into a military stalemate. The Irish company in Jadotville, surrounded by an overwhelmingly superior force and subject to air attack at will, had no choice but surrender following the failure of a U.N. relief column to reach it. In Elisabethville itself no good military or political reason existed to continue the operation when it became apparent on the first day that the intensity of the Katangan resistance would preclude the immediate attainment of its full objectives, which included the arrest of Tshombe. The UNF in Elisabethville was not capable of employing sufficient strength to complete the mission. Part of the problem was inexperienced military leadership.

The U.N. position in north Katanga vis-à-vis the Katangan gendarmerie improved somewhat as a result of operations undertaken concurrently there.<sup>50</sup> The elimination of gendarmerie in Albertville, Manono, and Nyunzu, relieved part of the UNF in that area to permit the gradual reinforcement of Elisabethville where pressure on the United Nations began to build up almost immediately after the cease-fire came into effect.

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50. O'Brien, op.cit., pp. 309 ff.

## Round Two<sup>51</sup>

Katangan harassment of the UNF eventually led to the second military action, Round Two (December 5-19, 1961), against Tshombe. It began with the UNF's forceable removal of a road block which impeded essential movement from the U.N. headquarters to the Elisabethville airport. The military position of the United Nations in Elisabethville and, for that matter, throughout the province had improved considerably. Total troop strength in the province by the time the operation was under way had increased from 6,800 in September to 8,450. Several fighter and light bomber aircraft had been added to the U.N. inventory and, by the height of the action, total strength in Elisabethville had been increased from the September figure of 2,900 to slightly over 5,000 men. The Swedish and Irish battalions had been brought up to full strength by the return of detached companies from outlying areas, but when action began on December 5, 1961, the U.N. Force in Elisabethville comprised only four battalions.

Two significant aspects of the December action stand out. The first was the essentially military objective--the reestablishment of the United Nations' freedom of movement in the Elisabethville area. Since the roadblocks were manned and protected by armed units of a hostile force, active combat was an inherent part of this objective.

The second important difference between Rounds One and Two was the successful reinforcement of the U.N. Force after the greatly improved military posture of the Katangan forces had become apparent. In addition to preparations which had been made to provide air support, the U.N. Command reinforced the ground elements with an Ethiopian battalion on December 6, and with a second Ethiopian battalion and five Swedish armored cars which were flown in by U.S. aircraft several days later. An effective

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51. See Chapter 6, pp. 117-22, and Appendix P-22. A full account of this action is given in Hoskyns, op.cit., pp. 447-55.

command structure was developed by the organization of two brigades, each of which was made responsible for specific areas of the city. Insofar as the reestablishment of freedom of movement in Elisabethville was concerned, the operation was a complete success. As an attempt to trap mercenaries and mercenary-led troops in the city, it did not succeed because of the failure of the Indian Brigade to seal the exit from the city in the vicinity of Camp Massart, a mission carried out by one of the Ethiopian battalions one day too late, and after the Katangan units had escaped the trap.

Given the determined opposition put up by the Katangan forces, the generally hostile atmosphere of the European population in the city, and the employment of sniper techniques, the excess violence which occurred on the part of some of the U.N. troops is understandable, though not excusable. This applies particularly to the Ethiopian unit which was thrown into battle and suffered casualties immediately upon its arrival on December 6. Heavy weapons were used by both sides throughout the fighting and damage to installations and buildings was a natural result. Considering the length of the operation, the number of troops involved, and the nature of city fighting, which tends to engender indiscriminate firing, total casualties, including civilian, were surprisingly light.<sup>52</sup>

The military situation in the Congo during the eleven months following the conclusion of Round Two was relatively stable. In Katanga U.N. forces had retrenched into Elisabethville, Albertville, Manono, and the Kamina base. Surveillance over the province was generally maintained by air reconnaissance and short range land patrols in the vicinity of the garrisoned towns. In south Katanga, the UNF was able to maintain freedom of movement in the Elisabethville area including the airport, but to no great extent outside of the city. Evidence of a new Katangan mercenary

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52. The number killed, according to the United Nations, were: 206 Katangan troops, 21 U.N. soldiers, and 50 civilians. See footnote 29 on page 119.

and air buildup became more and more frequent.<sup>53</sup>

Round Three<sup>54</sup>

The increasing hostility toward the United Nations manifested by Tshombe, including government-inspired riots in Elisabethville, and his refusal to participate in the Thant Plan for National Reconciliation, made it evident to the U.N. Command that preparations would have to be made for a final military action to end the secession of Katanga. Ostensibly intended to eliminate mercenaries and establish freedom of movement in Katanga, the ultimate purpose of the operations planned by the United Nations was political. Beginning in early December 1962, U.N. forces were relocated to concentrate the greatest possible strength in Katanga, reaching a total of 13,500 at the height of the operation. These troops included eight infantry battalions with supporting combat and service troops in Elisabethville and three battalions in Kamina, and the Malayan regiment in Albertville.

The military situation had changed in several other respects. The UNF was isolated from the outside world, except by air, as a result of the destruction of bridges throughout Katanga and the closing of the railroad and highway south of Elisabethville. The UNF buildup was met by increasing activity on the Katanga side, but not by increasing discipline on the part of the gendarmerie. Tshombe repeatedly threatened to employ a "scorched earth" policy if the UNF moved out into the province.

The expectation of action rose sharply with the arrival of an eight-man U.S. military mission in late December. Headed by Lieutenant General Louis W. Truman, its purpose was to determine how Washington could further assist the UNF. In Elisabethville General Truman met with Major

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53. U.N., SCOR, Supplement for Oct., Nov., and Dec. 1962, S/5053 (October 8, 1962), Add. 12/Add. 1. and Add. 12/Add. 2, p. 1.

54. See Chapter 6, pp. 122-27, and Appendix p-25.

General D. Prem Chand of India, the new U.N. sector commander, and Brigadier Reginald S. Noronha, the commander of the Indian Brigade. During the visit Washington promised to send immediately by air certain military supplies for the UNF in Katanga, including a temporary bridge. The Indian officers interpreted the Truman mission with its promise of immediate material aid as a guarantee that the United States was prepared to stand behind U.N. military action to extend "freedom of movement" throughout Katanga. Subsequent events verified the validity of their interpretation.

Even while the Truman mission was in Elisabethville sporadic firing took place between U.N. and Katangan positions. On December 24, 1962, the Katangan gendarmerie opened fire on a U.N. post and continued to harass U.N. installations. The U.N. commander got Tshombe to admit that his troops were firing. By December 27 Tshombe appeared to have lost control of his gendarmerie.

Late in the afternoon of December 28, orders were given for the U.N. troops to move against the Katangan forces. Thus began Round Three. Katangan opposition was ineffective and Elisabethville was quickly secured. The UNF then moved westward toward Jadotville, crossed the Lufira River<sup>55</sup> on January 1, secured Jadotville on January 4, and reached Kolwezi to be met by Tshombe on January 21, 1963. Tshombe's scorched earth threats never materialized. No hydroelectric dams were sabotaged.

Other concurrent operations extended U.N. control south to Sakania on the Rhodesian border and through northern and northeastern Katanga, to complete the operation with the occupation of Pweto on January 30. This action finished the military effort to remove the barriers to national integration. It was conducted with considerable restraint, and, except for some minor incidents, was a well-controlled, disciplined operation. It was successful in part because the United Nations had

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55. For the command and control aspect of the river crossing, see Chapter 4, p. 77, and Chapter 15.

finally been able to resolve its staff and command problems and to concentrate enough combat power to perform its mission, and in part because the Katangan will to resist, already eroded by external political pressures, collapsed in the face of the new strength and determination of the UNF.

At the beginning of Round Three, given the code name "Grand-slam," by the Indian officers, both the UNF and Katanga had tactical fighter aircraft. Katangan airpower was neutralized by an efficient U.N. air operation which hit most of the planes on the ground. The rest fled.<sup>56</sup> Casualties during Round Three were light. According to U.N. records, ten U.N. soldiers were killed and 77 wounded and Katangan casualties "also appear to have been low."<sup>57</sup>

#### Phase-out Period

U.N. military operations in the Congo did not end with the military collapse of the Katanga regime. Many serious law-and-order problems persisted, and a great deal of effort went into effecting a smooth turn-over of the law-and-order mission to the ANC and the Congolese police forces. By the beginning of August 1963, total U.N. strength had dropped to 7,700, disposed in Leopoldville, Luluabourg, Kamina, Albertville, Elisabethville, Kipushi, Jadotville, and Kolwezi. The diminishing capabilities of the Force were matched by a diminishing law-and-order role,

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56. According to the U.N. Air Commander at the time, Tshombe's airforce consisted of two jet Vampires, six or seven Harvards with machine guns, as well as some other small planes and transport craft. Because of good U.N. aerial reconnaissance, most Katangan aircraft were destroyed or disabled on the ground, "without loss of life," by ten Swedish J-29 jets. "We are very proud of that--it is the best memory I take away from the Congo." Interview with Major General Christian R. Kaldager, Oslo, Norway, June 5, 1965. After serving as U.N. Air Commander General Kaldager served as U.N. Force Commander, August-December 1963.

57. Annual Report of the Secretary General on the Work of the Organization, 16 June, 1962, to 15 June, 1963, U.N. Doc. A/5501, p. 11.

which included such activities as rescue missions,<sup>58</sup> surveillance, and the continuing task of providing a United Nations presence.

In terms of success, specific U.N. operations ranged from utter failure, as in Port Francqui, to remarkable accomplishments as in Operation Union when the Nigerian contingent effectively established a U.N. presence in Kasai province.<sup>59</sup>

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58. See Appendix P-27.

59. See Appendix P-11 and 18. A general assessment of the UNF is made in Chapter 18.



## CHAPTER 18

### MILITARY EVALUATION OF THE FORCE

It is difficult to make a meaningful military evaluation of the U.N. Force in the Congo because of its unique mission, its unusual composition, and the consequent absence of any adequate standard of comparison. It is not appropriate to measure the effectiveness of the UNF against the standards expected of an integrated force--say a reinforced division--of comparable size operating under the command of a single government. Nor is it appropriate to measure its performance by the standards of militarily competent states, such as Britain, France, and the United States, because most of its contingents were drawn from the less developed countries with less adequate military establishments.

The standards used to evaluate the UNF must take fully into account the uniqueness of the mission, including the politically imposed rules and constraints, as well as the multinational character of the Force. With these factors in mind, the most appropriate measure is the extent to which the Force performed the various military missions assigned to it.

It is perhaps best to confine basic evaluation to the first three years during which the Force had an average strength of about 15,000. By July 1963 the number had dropped to 8,000 and the UNF was phasing out rapidly. During the 1960-63 period the UNF succeeded in maintaining a



minimal degree of law and order. Comparing the internal security situation in July 1960 and July 1963, there was significant improvement. The success of the UNF in preventing civil war ranged from good to poor.<sup>1</sup> Tribal warfare was usually contained. It also should be said that this general improvement must be credited to several factors other than UNF military operations. Most important were the diplomatic efforts of friendly governments and U.N. officers to effect national reconciliation, and the efforts of U.N. civilian operations to get the administration and the economy going again after the initial breakdown.

Open foreign interference in Katanga was eliminated and external subversion was deterred. The territorial integrity of the Congo, for a time was assured. The closing of the airports in September 1960 helped to frustrate Soviet military intervention.

During the phase-out of the UNF the situation was different. Various rebel movements got underway in late 1963 and became a major threat to the authority of the Central Government. In 1964 they created a state of internal insecurity as serious, and perhaps more serious than that in July 1960. At its height in mid-1964 about one-third of the country was in the hands of or harassed by rebels. Further, the rebel movement was to some extent encouraged and supplied by Communist China and states working with Peking. The threat to internal security and foreign intervention posed by the rebel movements cannot be ascribed to a military failure of the UNF. The fact that it got underway as the U.N. troops were leaving and reached its high point after the Force had completely left is evidence of the stabilizing effect of the U.N. military presence, especially in a psychological sense since the actual number of troops in February 1964 was only 5,000. The decision to withdraw the UNF was a political decision.

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1. It was ineffective in dealing with the abortive invasion of Bukavu by Leopoldville ANC in late December 1960 and in the invasion of Katanga by Stanleyville ANC in January 1961. (See Appendix P-12 and 13.) It was fully successful in Orientale and Equateur provinces in February 1961. (See Appendix P-15.)

At the same time, the seriousness of the rebel movements was not wholly unrelated to one failure of the UNF--a failure that had little bearing on the effectiveness of the Force as such. This was the failure to transform the ANC into a reliable internal security establishment, a problem which was ultimately, and for largely political reasons, approached on a bilateral basis rather than under U.N. sponsorship.<sup>2</sup> The ANC problem, rooted in the absence of a reliable and competent officer corps, persisted into the post-UNF period, though some improvements were made through the bilateral assistance received from Belgium, Italy, Israel, and the United States.

On the question of protecting U.N. personnel and installations in the face of isolated provocations or deliberate attack, the principal weakness of the UNF was made clear on a number of occasions--especially in Port Francqui, Matadi, Stanleyville, Kindu, and Niemba. In some cases, such as Matadi, lack of adequate combat power was mainly responsible for the failures, but more often the cause was confusion over the rules of engagement on the part of the U.N. contingent officers concerned. This was particularly true of the Niemba incident.<sup>3</sup>

#### Command and Control

The most salient aspect of the U.N. military command and control system is that there was never any real loss of control over the Force by the Force Commander, or at lower command echelons. At the Leopoldville headquarters, as has been seen,<sup>4</sup> the Military Adviser to the Secretary-General did improperly interpose himself into the chain of command, but this situation was rectified before any serious damage had been done, and he thereafter remained only an irritant, rather than an obstacle, in the command system.

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2. See Chapter 6, pp. 127-35.

3. See Appendix P-7.

4. See Chapter 4, pp. 69-71, and Chapter 15.

Within the Leopoldville headquarters staff, no single nation or group of national representatives captured the key policy-making positions. None exerted undue influence. Civilian control over the operation was maintained both in the Congo and in New York, and the only real instance of some slippage occurred at the crossing of the Lufira River during Round Three in Katanga.<sup>5</sup>

If control over the military operation was ever close to being lost, it was during the first hectic weeks in 1960. This was principally by default on the part of the Headquarters in New York and in Leopoldville. Given an almost total lack of intelligence concerning developments throughout the Congo when the Force was first deployed, the Special Representative in Leopoldville was in no position to give clear-cut and unequivocal orders to the contingents being deployed. Local national commanders were permitted too much leeway to make their own rules, both in terms of operational objectives and rules of engagement. If any donor state had, at that time, entertained objectives incompatible with those of the United Nations, it would have been an easy matter to influence military policies in terms of such objectives. In fact, however, no untoward incidents did occur, with the possible exception of the still controversial decision of General Alexander to disarm the ANC in Leopoldville.

The principal weakness in the command and control system was within the Leopoldville headquarters, where staff work, and overall staff coordination, was generally conceded to have been poor. Here, again, the basic causative factor was the alleged political necessity for donor state representation on the staff. The result was a wide difference in the individual competence, experience, and training among staff officers, as well as language problems and differences in staff procedures. The situation was made worse by the too frequent turnover, often at six-month intervals. The problem of incompetent officers was recognized early in

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5. See Chapter 4, p. 77, and Chapter 15, pp. 324-25.

the operation and was resolved in part by the allocation of key staff positions to countries which could supply qualified personnel.<sup>6</sup>

#### The Role of the Key National Contingents

Considering the operation as a whole, the most active troop contingents were supplied by India, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Malaya, Ireland, and Sweden. The technical support units were provided by the Western donors. The key troop contingents in the major operations were Indian and Ethiopian in south Katanga during Rounds Two and Three, supported by Irish and Swedish battalions; the Malayan and Nigerian contingents in northern Katanga in the closing days of Round Three.

Overall force effectiveness improved as the number of national contingents decreased, and the size of the separate contingents became larger. The Force was least effective when it most nearly reflected Hammarskjold's original criterion for the composition of a peacekeeping force, that is, when its major elements were "in the first place" drawn from Africa; and it reached its maximum effectiveness (during Round Three) when its major components were supplied by countries outside of the African continent (India, Sweden, and Ireland).

There is no hard evidence showing that any of the national contingents subverted the U.N. effort, or deliberately attempted to support any of the Congolese secessionist movements, despite persistent allegations that such situations did develop. The extent to which particular national contingents reacted to the troop movements of the Stanleyville regime varied both in time and place. For example, the Nigerian contingent in Manono did not obstruct the entry of Stanleyville troops into that town in January 1961; this response certainly favored the interests of the

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6. Responsibility fell largely on officers from Canada, India, Pakistan, and Ireland, representatives of the British military system, and officers from the three Scandinavian states, Sweden, Norway, and Denmark. This does not mean that each officer from these countries was competent.

Gizenga regime and redounded to the disadvantage of Tshombe. Given the moderate political stand of Nigeria, it would be unfair to interpret this inaction as the deliberate attempt to enhance Gizenga's position, particularly since at that time most of the Nigerian contingent's officers were British. Conversely, Ghanaian troops, who were alleged to have been strongly pro-Lumumbist by the Central Government, vigorously opposed the entry of Gizenga troops into Luluabourg on February 23, 1961. In both cases, nonpolitical factors largely determined the response of the contingents. The principal means employed by the donor states to influence the operation was not by direct control of their contingents in the Congo outside of the chain of command, but, rather, through the threat or actual withdrawal of their units from the Congo and politically through their representatives at the United Nations in New York.<sup>7</sup>

Another area in which invidious comparisons have been made between the different contingents was that of discipline, including black marketing activities and "atrocities." The Indians, in particular, have been accused of extensive black marketing activity and of expropriating U.N. supplies. The extent of this type of activity is hard to judge, but it appears to have some foundation in fact, although the Indians were by no means alone, and all elements of the U.N. operation--civilian and military alike--engaged in black marketing. Such problems are almost universal when a foreign army with access to scarce items is placed in a community in which the civilian economy has broken down.

Like the black marketing issue, it is difficult to assess the full scope and implications of the question of the unwarranted use of force by particular contingents. The Indians, again, and the Ethiopians were the subject of considerable Katangan propaganda which alleged that acts of brutality and atrocities were committed by their troops, particularly during the Katanga fighting. Again, there appears to be some

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7. See Chapter 3, pp. 43-44.

foundation in fact, but in mitigation it should be pointed out that the Ethiopian troops, especially in Round Two, were thrown into violent city fighting without any preliminary orientation, and that civilians did engage in the resistance against them. The much publicised "atrocities" committed by Indian troops in Jadotville, who fired on a civilian vehicle killing the occupants in full view of a select body of newsmen, was one of the unfortunate incidents of war, particularly when partisan activity is involved.

A comparison of the operational efficiency of the several contingents does not provide meaningful basis for conclusions affecting future peacekeeping operations. The effectiveness of the separate contingents was directly related to several factors. Of these the most important was the maturity, experience, training, and leadership of the unit concerned. Units such as the Nigerian, Indian, Malayan, and Ghanaian contingents, which had long military traditions were up to acceptable standards, given the operational conditions and the ambiguity of the missions involved. Others were almost useless. The Malian battalion, for example, was organized on an ad hoc basis, and ultimately became disorganized, in part reflecting in the Congo the break-up of the Mali Federation at home.

Another effectiveness factor, also directly related to the degree of sophistication of the army from which it was drawn, was the ability of the unit to support itself. The most effective units, like the Indian Brigade, had the necessary combat and service infrastructure to operate in the isolated conditions under which they were employed. The conclusion is obvious: peacekeeping forces in remote areas such as the Congo should be drawn primarily from countries capable of supplying trained and self-contained units, preferably of brigade or, at minimum, battalion group size. Smaller units from other states may be used if they can be effectively integrated into the larger self-sustained units.

### Limitations of the Force

The principal cause of UNF inefficiency was its heterogeneous composition and the principal reasons for this were political. The Secretary-General felt compelled to seek troops from some countries which simply did not have fully qualified personnel of higher command and staff caliber. Because of the presumed need for national diversity some of the troop units were too small, there was a language and communication problem, and logistics and operations were hurt by the lack of standardized equipment and supplies. A substantial contributing cause was also rooted in the political and legal constraints under which the UNF operated.<sup>8</sup> This was the inability of the Force to exercise initiative or to conduct long-range planning. Plans had to be made on a short-range contingency basis, rather than a controlled basis. The U.N. inhibition against military intelligence made matters worse.<sup>9</sup> The vague and constraining mandate and the derived rules of engagement also made effective planning for meeting future events very difficult. This resulted in the over-stocking of material in some instances, and under-stocking in others. Operationally, it necessitated unduly hurried redeployment of units with unfortunate effect. Even under these circumstances, however, the UNF was able to plan effectively for Round Three.

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8. See Chapter 3.

9. See Chapter 15, pp. 320-21.

## CHAPTER 19

### FINANCING THE FORCE

The Congo peacekeeping effort was the most costly operation ever managed by the Secretariat of the United Nations. The total cost for the four-year period was \$411 million. Conflict over the policies and purpose of the mission among permanent members of the Security Council, reflected in the refusal of the Soviet Union and France to pay their portions of assessed costs, precipitated a financial crisis for the world organization and a protracted debate over the application of Article 19.<sup>1</sup> The U.S.S.R. did contribute \$1.5 million in the form of initial airlift of troops to the Congo.

#### Cost of the Operation

When the Congo mission was suddenly launched in July 1960 without prior military, logistical, or financial planning, no one could foresee its eventual size, duration, or cost. The Secretary-General and the

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1. This chapter will focus directly on the financing of the Congo operation and only tangentially on the Article 19 question. For analyses of the larger financial issues, see Ruth B. Russell, "United Nations Financing and 'The Law of the Charter,'" in the forthcoming issue of Columbia Journal of Transnational Law; Norman J. Padelford, "Financing Peacekeeping: Politics and Crisis," International Organization Vol. 19 (Summer, 1965), pp. 444-62; and John G. Stoessinger, Financing the United Nations System (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1964), especially pp. 100-90.



governments supporting the efforts were more interested in ending the crisis than in developing financial arrangements to underwrite the operation. The early decisions were made in an act-now-pay-later mood.

Averaging more than \$100 million a year, the total operation cost \$411,200,000. This figure includes the air- and sealoft of men and supplies to and from the Congo, military supplies and equipment, rations, and the reimbursement of "extra costs" to governments providing troop units or other military personnel.

On June 30, 1964, the day the last U.N. soldier left the Congo, the Organization still owed about \$104 million for the Congo operation. Approximately \$90 million was owed to governments and other payees for supplies or services and about \$14 million to other U.N. accounts. A year later, the United Nations still had unpaid Congo obligations of about \$48 million; almost \$25 million to governments and \$23 million to other U.N. accounts.<sup>2</sup>

Of the total Congo costs, the United States has paid or will pay \$170,722,802 or 41.52 percent of the total, including the U.S. share of the bond issue repayment. Of this amount, \$127,326,194 was the share assessed by the General Assembly. The remaining \$43,396,608 represented a voluntary contribution above the assessment. This voluntary donation includes the costs of the initial U.S. airlift in 1960, which amounted to \$10,317,622.

As of December 31, 1964, thirteen governments had voluntarily contributed a total of \$46,020,677, as follows:<sup>3</sup>

A. United States . . . . .	\$43,396,648
1) Cash . . . . .	\$33,078,986
2) Airlift . . . . .	10,317,662

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2. For a detailed breakdown of these obligations, including the \$4,577,000 owed to the United States, see Appendix Z-2.

3. For details see Appendix Z-1.

B. Twelve other governments . . . . . 2,644,029

- 1) Cash . . . . . \$1,474,029
- 2) Canada (airlift) . . . . 650,000
- 3) U.K. (airlift) . . . . . 520,000

It is interesting that of the twelve governments making voluntary contributions, eight were military allies of the United States and the remaining four (Austria, Ireland, Sweden, and Finland) were European and Western oriented. No African or Asian state made a voluntary contribution of money as of December 31, 1964. Several Asian and African states did, however, buy U.N. bonds with the full knowledge they were to pay for the peace-keeping expenses.

Cost Apportionment Between the United Nations and States Contributing Troops

From the start it was assumed that the United Nations as such would not be responsible for the total costs of the Congo operation and that the arrangements developed for UNEF in this matter would be applicable. Under the UNEF formula, proposed by Hammarskjold and endorsed by the General Assembly, the United Nations was obligated to pay only for the "extra and extraordinary costs" incurred by governments making military contingents available to the Force. The governments themselves were to pay the normal costs.<sup>4</sup> This principle was spelled out in general terms in the Regulations for the Congo Force, issued July 15, 1963, three years after the operation had begun:

Regulation 16: The Secretary-General . . . shall have authority for all administrative, executive and financial matters affecting the Force and shall be responsible for the negotiation and conclusion of arrangements and agreements with Governments concerning the Force.

Regulation 33: Responsibility for pay of members of the Force shall rest with their respective national State.

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4. See Resolution 1151 (XII), U.N., GAOR, Supplement No. 18, September 17 to December 14, 1957, A/3805 (November 22, 1957), p. 58.

Regulation 34: The Secretary-General shall fix a scale for a daily overseas service allowance to be paid by the United Nations in the appropriate currency to those members of the Force determined to be eligible for such allowance.

Regulation 42: Participating States may be compensated for all or part of the extra and extraordinary costs directly incurred with respect to the service of their contingents with the Force, in accordance with decisions of the General Assembly.<sup>5</sup>

In essence these Regulations meant that the United Nations was responsible for all "extra costs" incurred by a government contributing military units. Specifically, the Organization was obligated to pay the regular overseas allowance of every soldier and officer of the contributing state in accordance with the existing laws of that state. In addition, the United Nations paid a daily allowance of \$1.30 to every man and officer, regardless of nationality.

The donor government was entitled to compensation for any special supplies or equipment required because of U.N. service and for the loss or depreciation of any supplies or equipment in connection with the service of its unit in the Congo. It was also entitled to compensation for injury or loss of life of its nationals in the line of duty.

The United Nations, of course, was obligated to pay all logistical expenses of the operation, including transportation of units to and from the Congo, and their full support during the entire time they were out of their home country.

#### Contracts With Contributing States

Under these general terms of reference, Hammarskjold, in July 1960, quickly made informal contracts with Ghana, Tunis, Morocco, Ethiopia, Ireland, Guinea, Sweden, Mali, Sudan, Liberia, Canada, and India. Eventually such contracts were made with a total of thirty-three states which provided units or specialized military personnel for the Congo operation. These contracts, usually consisting of an exchange of messages,

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5. Emphasis added. The full text of the Regulations is found in Appendix Q.

have not been made public.<sup>6</sup>

Though all these contracts were drawn in accordance with the terms approved by the General Assembly, there were wide variations in the financial obligations incurred by the United Nations. These variations, due largely to differences in the laws and military traditions among the contributing states, led to some serious problems.

Perhaps the most serious situation was occasioned by the few governments, notably Sweden, Norway, and Denmark, that required the United Nations to reimburse them for the basic salary and allowances, including the overseas allowance, of officers and men recruited especially for the UNF. This requirement was based upon their respective laws on overseas military service. The basic salaries and allowances of the few officers and men provided by these governments from their regular army were not paid by the United Nations.

Another problem was the considerable difference in remuneration among the troops from different states. The average monthly salary of a member of the Swedish contingent, for example, was about \$270, and the average monthly overseas allowance was approximately \$120, or a total monthly income of \$390. In contrast, the average monthly salary of a member of the Indian contingent was about \$25 and the overseas allowance about \$8, or a total of \$33. This wide discrepancy between \$390 and \$33 for men doing the same job had an adverse effect upon morale, even though it may have been an accurate reflection of the general economic disparity between India and Sweden. It should be said, however, that the Indian soldier and officer had life-long security in the army, while the Swedish volunteer had no such guaranteed security.

There was an even greater disparity in the direct cost to the United Nations for Swedish and Indian men and officers. For the Swedish Force member the Organization paid \$390 and for the Indian \$8 since India,

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6. See Chapter 3, pp. 41-51.

like most of the contributing states, paid the salaries of its men and officers. But this was not the whole story. While not paying the salaries of Indians in the Congo, the United Nations was required to reimburse the Indian Government for the salaries and equipment of reserve units called up in India to replace some of the regular Indian troops in the Congo. There are no available figures on the cost per man of these indirect obligations to the Indian Government.<sup>7</sup>

These inequities are inherent in the system of using national contingents and cannot be eliminated without changing the system. There is little prospect of such a change because there is no prospect of an internationalized U.N. Force in the foreseeable future.<sup>8</sup> If the United Nations provided under the present national contingent system the same salary and overseas allowance to all UNF troops regardless of their national laws and customs, it would raise far more problems than it would solve.

Unable to do anything about the basic disparity in income among U.N. troops, the Organization did attempt to equalize the remuneration in the field by the payment of a daily allowance of \$1.30 to every member of the UNF regardless of nationality. This allowance yielded a monthly income of almost \$40 for every man and officer, payable in Congolese currency, and was considered sufficient to meet the immediate requirements of each. With it one could buy personal needs and other small items at the U.N. Post Exchange. Large purchases, such as cameras, had to be paid in a hard currency. Conversion of Congolese francs into hard currency required the approval of a superior officer. By the end of his tour of duty, any

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7. The United Nations has not conducted an analysis to ascertain the exact cost per man of the different national contingents for obvious political reasons. Such a study could not be done unless the contributing government released accurate financial data which they have been reluctant to do. In any event, such cost analysis is not essential to the problem of control.

8. An internationalized force is one in which members owe allegiance only to an international authority. Members of such a force cannot be withdrawn by the order of a national government. There has never been a force of this kind.

member of the UNF was permitted to convert up to 50 percent of his accumulated daily allowance into a hard currency.

Equalization of spendable money in the field was further advanced by a voluntary agreement among many of the contributing states not to make available the salary or overseas allowance to their men while in the Congo. This was done at the request of the Secretary-General.

The Congo experience suggests that in the future the Secretary-General should attempt to obtain the services of all national contingents on substantially the same basis, preferably each state providing its troops without direct reimbursement for either salary or overseas allowance. The state should pay its men and officers according to its national laws. The United Nations should underwrite all other costs. Under an equitable formula, donor states should receive some credit toward their peacekeeping assessment for any contribution of troops, but in no case should the extension of credit or a reimbursement permit a government to profit financially at the expense of the Organization.

In the early days of the operation a substantial blackmarket developed in cigarettes, liquor, and other U.N.-PX supplies. While a certain amount of blackmarketing is inevitable when scarce goods are introduced in any economy, the volume can be cut down by the adoption and enforcement of appropriate regulations, especially those governing the use and convertability of the daily allowance into a hard currency.

The obligation of the United Nations to reimburse contributing states for lost or depreciated supplies and equipment taken to the Congo created a major problem. The rules governing the adjustment of such claims had been developed and refined from the early UNEF experience. The final settlement of each claim was to be negotiated between the Secretary-General and the contributing state. The first step is for the donor government to submit a bill to the U.N. Office of the Controller as a basis for negotiation. These negotiations have been confidential and no single formula has been used by the United Nations because of widely varying circumstances, including the laws of the states concerned.

The negotiation process can be illustrated by one government's claim for more than \$1 million for the depreciation of armored cars and trucks which were taken to the Congo with its troops. Some of these vehicles were quite worn upon arrival, but there was no adequate U.N. inspection or record of their condition at the time. The Controller's Office was confronted by conflicting testimony from U.N. officials in the Congo. After long negotiations which took into account economic and political factors, including the financial plight of the United Nations, the government readily agreed to an outright purchase of the vehicles by the Organization for less than half of its original claim.

The United Nations was obligated to reimburse the donor states for personal injury or death resulting from the service of their nationals in the Congo, in accordance with the existing laws of each state. The actual death claims made under this provision ranged from a few hundred to \$40,000, depending upon the circumstances. This latter claim has been carefully investigated because of the amount involved, but as a rule the United Nations has paid these personnel claims with little negotiation.

The Controller's Office in the United Nations carefully examined every claim. In some cases the claim could be accepted as presented. In other cases the claims led to prolonged negotiations, which usually resulted in substantial reductions in the amounts claimed. Some governments required the assistance of U.N. officers in the preparation of their claims. As of September 30, 1965, the pending claims involved approximately \$18 million.

In addition to contracts with states contributing personnel, there were contracts with governments providing services. The most significant contract of this kind was the arrangement with the United States to provide airlift, sealift, and military equipment in support of the UNF. As of June 30, 1965, the United Nations still owed Washington \$4,577,000 for reimbursable services and equipment.<sup>9</sup>

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9. See Appendix Z-2.

### How the UNF Was Financed

Throughout the Congo operation the political decisions were made largely by the Security Council and the financial decisions by the General Assembly in accordance with the division of responsibility envisioned in the U.N. Charter. The financial obligation of member states for the Congo effort was based largely upon the principle of collective responsibility developed for UNEF, and expressed in terms of apportionment and assessment. This principle was stated in November 1957 in the following terms:

. . . the expenses . . . shall be borne by the Members of the United Nations in accordance with the scales of assessment adopted by the General Assembly . . . 10

The UNEF formula did not preclude voluntary contributions.

In July 1960, just after the Congo operation was authorized by the Security Council, the General Assembly, on the advice of its Advisory Committee on Administration and Budgetary Questions, authorized the Secretary-General to expend up to \$15 million. This ceiling was raised to \$40 million in September. By December, Hammarskjold warned the Committee that the actual cost was nearer \$66 million. The Committee then recommended that the total cost for 1960 be held to \$60 million.

On December 20, 1960, the General Assembly adopted its first basic resolution on financing the Congo operation by a vote of 46 to 17, with 24 abstaining.<sup>11</sup> This resolution, the text of which follows, set the pattern for payment and shortly thereafter became involved in a protracted debate over the obligation of member states for peacekeeping efforts.

Recognizing that the expenses involved in the United Nations operations in the Congo for 1960 constitute 'expenses of the Organization' within the meaning of Article 17, paragraph 2, of

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10. See Resolution 1151 (XII), U.N., GAOR, Supplement No. 18, September 17 to December 14, 1957, A/3805 (November 22, 1957), p. 58.

11. The negative votes were cast by the Soviet bloc, several Middle Eastern states, and Portugal. Among the abstainers were Belgium, France, India, Mexico, Indonesia, and Yugoslavia.



the Charter of the United Nations, and that the assessment thereof against Member States creates binding legal obligations on such States to pay their assessed shares . . .

1. Decides to establish an ad hoc account for the expenses of the United Nations in the Congo, . . .
3. Notes that the waiver of airlift costs announced by certain Governments will reduce the level of expenses from the amount of \$60 million recommended by the Advisory Committee on Administration and Budgetary Questions to the amount of \$48.5 million;
4. Decides that the amount of \$48.5 million shall be apportioned among the Member States on the basis of the regular scale of assessment . . . ;
6. Calls upon the former administering power of the Republic of the Congo (Leopoldville) to make a substantial contribution.<sup>12</sup>

On the day the resolution was adopted the General Assembly authorized \$8 million a month for the first three months of 1961. On April 3, 1961, it authorized a total of \$100 million for the first ten months of 1961. Further appropriations of \$10 million a month followed, covering the period until June 30, 1962.

In the meantime many states had not paid their assessments and the United Nations was facing a financial crisis. The Soviet Union and France refused to pay for political reasons, though each advanced legal arguments for its position.<sup>13</sup> The crisis resulted in two actions by the General Assembly in December 1961. One was the authorization of a \$200 million bond issue, an emergency measure to deal with the immediate U.N. peacekeeping deficit. The other was a request for an advisory opinion by the International Court of Justice to deal with the long-range question.

The United States agreed to buy \$100 million in bonds on a match-

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12. U.N., GAOR, A/4676, December 19, 1960, Annexes, Agenda items 49/50, pp. 11 and 12. The U.S.A. and U.S.S.R. had previously announced the waiver of their claims to \$10 million and \$1.5 million respectively for the initial transport of troops to the Congo.

13. See Chapters 5 and 6, above.

ing basis with other states. The prior authorization provided that annual payments covering the interest and principal for the next 25 years would become a part of the regular U.N. budget. During the period from July 1962 through June 1963, the entire Congo operation, totalling \$120 million, was financed from the proceeds of the bond issue, with no assessments levied against member states. Though successful in liquidating much of the Organization's unpaid peacekeeping obligations, the bond issue was only a stopgap. Further, the Soviet Union and France withheld from their 1963 and 1964 budget contributions amounts equivalent to their assessed bond payments.

In July 1962 the Court, by a vote of nine to five, advised that the costs of UNEF and the Congo operation were "expenses of the Organization" in the meaning of Article 17, paragraph 2, which states: "The expenses of the Organization shall be borne by the Members as apportioned by the General Assembly."<sup>14</sup> The Advisory Opinion was endowed with greater force when the General Assembly "accepted" it by a vote of 76 to 17, with 8 abstentions. According to the majority this meant that peacekeeping arrears of a member state could properly be included as part of the deficit by which it could be stripped of its right to vote in the General Assembly under Article 19. This action by the Assembly, however, did not succeed in inducing the Soviet Union and France to pay their assessments.

The Congo operation came to a close with unpaid obligations of \$104 million in spite of the bond issue which yielded \$120 million and direct voluntary contributions amounting to \$34.5 million, plus U.S. and Soviet airlift services of approximately \$11.8 million. And the larger financial questions, including the application of Article 19, remained unresolved.

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14. See International Court of Justice, Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter). Advisory Opinion of 20 July 1962: I.C.J. Reports, 1962.

## The Financial Problem as a Reflection of Political Discord

The financial difficulties of the Congo operation were not primarily economic or legal in character. They reflected serious political differences among the member states. If there had been a solid political consensus among the great powers there would have been no serious financial problem, though there would have been debate over how obligations should be apportioned. In an international environment of conflicting interests, any U.N. peacekeeping effort involving substantial costs will give rise to a financial problem.

The financial problem embraces two basic principles which cannot always be reconciled--the principle of collective responsibility and the principle of safeguarding the interests of member states. Collective responsibility for keeping the peace is central to the U.N. system, and the Organization could hardly justify its existence if this principle were surrendered. Collective responsibility for the "expenses of the Organization" is written into the Charter and has been upheld by the Court and the General Assembly as applicable to peacekeeping costs. Yet, if a state cannot be legally obligated to contribute men or materiel to a U.N. force, should the General Assembly have the authority to compel that state to contribute financially to a particular mission it believes is detrimental to its interests?

Reflecting these two principles, the actual financing of peacekeeping operations to date has not followed consistently either the assessment or the voluntary approach. The Congo effort and UNEF combined both.

The complexity of these fiscal questions suggests that the flexible and pragmatic approach expressed by the United States in 1963 (but not wholly followed in practice until more than two years later) may be wiser than the quest for a single formula applicable to all situations. In the working Group of Twenty-one established by the Assembly to deal with this question the United States said:

In the foreseeable future no single formula or single set of principles or criteria can be applied to any and all peace-



keeping operations. The method of financing of each peacekeeping operation should be dealt with as it occurs, learning from each operation what may be desirable for the future and adjusting each solution to the particular facts of the case. 15

Acknowledging that the financial problem results from political conflict, the capacity of the United Nations to underwrite peacekeeping operations would be enhanced by three measures that could be taken by the General Assembly:

1. Include in the budget of the United Nations, as a regular expenditure for Secretariat services, support for a small increase in the present military advisory staff. Also include in the budget the costs of any agreed-upon officer training program and any other staff or program connected with the permanent peacekeeping requirements of the Organization, as distinguished from the requirements of a specific operation.

2. Establish by regular assessment or by voluntary contribution or a combination of both a special contingency fund of perhaps \$50 million, to be available only for the immediate needs of newly authorized peacekeeping missions. Such a fund would permit some breathing space for grappling with arrangements to finance each new mission, the budget of which would provide for repaying the money drawn from the contingency fund. The establishment and operation of such a fund is far more complex and controversial than the provision of funds for an enlarged military staff within the U.N. budget.

At the present time, the Secretary-General, under the annual Assembly resolution on unforeseen and extraordinary expenditures, is authorized to commit up to \$2 million (and with the approval of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, up to \$10 million) to reimburse the states involved in initial arrangements for any approved peacekeeping operation.

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15. "Financing of U.N. Peacekeeping Operations: Report of the Working Group on the Examination of the Administrative and Budgetary Procedures of the U.N." U.N., GAOR, A/5407, March 29, 1963, p. 9.

3. Establish a special finance committee within the General Assembly to consider various ways of underwriting peacekeeping operations, "including direct financing by countries involved in a dispute, voluntary contributions, and assessed contributions;" it would make recommendations to the Assembly on how to pay for a given operation. These recommendations would take into account the political interests of members, their varied capacities to pay, and other factors. Such a proposal embodying the principle of flexibility, together with other recommendations, was laid before the Working Group by the United States on September 14, 1964.<sup>16</sup>

#### Finance as a Factor of Control

The old adage, "He who pays the fiddler calls the tune," is not an accurate statement of the role of financial support in the Congo operation, but it is not wholly inaccurate, at least as far as the financial behavior of the permanent members of the Security Council was concerned. The United States and the United Kingdom, both of which paid their assessed share of the cost, generally had more influence over the course of events than the Soviet Union and France which refused to pay any of the costs, except for Moscow's contribution toward the initial airlift.

The financial participation or nonparticipation of the smaller states, while important psychologically and diplomatically, was not significant enough to exert any real control over the operation. The small powers, particularly the Afro-Asian states, exercised their influence diplomatically in the Congo Advisory Committee and through their political influence on major powers. Their willingness or unwillingness to provide troops and their capacity to threaten to withdraw or their actual withdrawal of troops already in the field<sup>17</sup> also had a measurable but not

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16. "Financing of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations," Working Paper submitted by the delegation of the United Nations to the Working Group on the Examination of the Administrative and Budgetary Procedures of the United Nations, U.N., GAOR, S/AC.113/30, September 14, 1964, p. 3. See also National Citizens' Commission Report of the Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (The White House Conference on International Cooperation, Nov. 28-Dec. 1, 1965), pp. 21-24.

17. See Chapter 13.

determinative impact on the operation.

The United States, which will have paid 41.52 percent of the total costs, had greater influence on the Congo effort than any other state, but this influence fell far short of control. The Soviet Union and France, on the other hand, had less influence on the definition and implementation of the mandate, though the Secretary-General was restrained by their non-cooperation. This is not to say that there was a one-to-one ratio between financial support and influence. No such mechanistic and quantifiable relationship existed. But the extent of financial support among the great powers tended to be a barometer of influence because the degree of financial participation and the extent of influence are both functions of the basic political interest and support of the government in question. Washington was the most influential Government not primarily because it provided the greatest financial support. It bore a large share of the cost and was most influential because it was the strongest political supporter of the mission. And it gave such support because there was a high concurrence between the interests of the United States and the purposes of the Security Council as interpreted by the Secretary-General.

The Soviet Union and France, the chief nonsupporting states, had an ambiguous impact on the operation. Their relative lack of influence on the interpretation and implementation of the mandate must be seen against the negative influence implicit in their abstention or veto in the Security Council. Their consistent financial nonsupport reflected their deeper political aloofness or opposition, constituted a restraint on the operation, and contributed to its termination date.<sup>18</sup> The Secretary-General could not wholly ignore the financial nonsupport of these two permanent Security Council members. But he could move ahead as long as he had a working coalition which provided the necessary diplomatic and material support.

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18. For the general position of France, see Chapter 9. For the Soviet position, see Chapter 8.

In the Congo case financial nonsupport was a qualifying factor, but not a controlling force. It is not possible to know how the operation would have been different if France and Russia would have paid their assessed shares. In any event, if the United States had not provided any financial support, there probably would have been no operation at all--not only for the lack of funds, but, more important, for the lack of political support which the money represented. While the nonpayment of a few states was unable to prevent the authorization and fielding of the Congo force, the nonpayment of a sufficient number of states could have. In this concrete sense, payment or nonpayment represents the ultimate form of control.

The nonpayment of a particular member--whether recognized as a right, an excusable exception, or an unfortunate breach of the principle of collective responsibility--is in fact a safeguard for a dissenting state, as long as no sanctions, such as the invocation of Article 19, are taken against it.<sup>19</sup> This means that no sovereign government is required to contribute money to an operation which it believes to be against its best interests.

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19. On this point U.S. Ambassador Arthur J. Goldberg told the Special Political Committee of the General Assembly that "full collective responsibility is the first choice" of the United States, but that under present circumstances "we are prepared to accept . . . an opting out arrangement for Permanent Members as an interim measure . . . If we cannot have full collective responsibility, let us achieve as much shared responsibility as we can." U.S. Mission to the United Nations, Press Release 4719, November 24, 1965, p. 7.

## CHAPTER 20

### SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This study of the largest peacekeeping operation ever managed by the secretariat of an international organization has focused on the problems of political, executive, and military control. It has examined the behavior of the international instrument in terms of the changing mandate given it by the member states. It has also examined the behavior of the member states toward the instrument and the peacekeeping operation. The Security Council resolutions on the Congo crisis provide the basic point of reference for evaluating both the integrity and efficiency of the operation.

The Secretary-General, who was authorized to "take the necessary steps" to provide "military assistance" to the Congo, was at the center of the operation. He was responsible for interpreting the mandate, keeping the operation true to the mandate, and maintaining executive and military control. The member states, acting mainly through the Security Council, but also through the General Assembly, were responsible for the ultimate political control of the operation. Their first task was to provide a workable mandate, revising and updating it in response to changing conditions. They were responsible also for giving guidance to the Secretary-General in interpreting and implementing the mandate and for calling him to account if he failed to follow their guidance. The member states had an implied obligation to provide money and manpower to underwrite their political decision to send a peacekeeping mission to the Congo.



In addition to the control problem, the question of effectiveness has been analyzed. To what extent did the Secretary-General achieve the objectives of the mandate? To what extent was inadequate performance the result of deficiencies in executive control, failures by member states to fulfill their obligations or simply technical difficulties? To what extent were any failures or weaknesses in the operation due to factors beyond the control of any internationally authorized, managed, and manned operation of the size and character of the U.N. Force in the Congo?

Addressing these questions, this study has yielded conclusions of both fact and judgment. Since the Congo experience has been so recent and so confused, the ascertaining of basic facts was often difficult.

A major objective of the study has been to identify precedents and pitfalls for possible future peacekeeping operations.

The conclusions, including lessons or guidelines for the future, are presented here under the general categories developed in the study and in the same order of the chapters of the Report. The general conclusions follow.<sup>1</sup>

#### The Legal Problem

The U.N. peacekeeping operation was legally authorized by the Security Council and materially sustained by a coalition of states, each of which believed that its interests would be better served by supporting a multilateral effort than by other means for dealing with the Congo crisis.<sup>2</sup> The existence of a legal international instrumentality for performing certain functions in the Congo did not suspend internal Congolese politics

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1. For quick reference to major events in the Congo the reader may refer to the one-page chronology on page 82 of the Report or the last page of the Summary Report.

2. This section is related primarily to Chapter 3 of the Report

or international politics, but it did serve as a constraint on unilateral action by outside states and curbed political action on the part of Congolese factions. At the same time, political factions in the Congo and outside governments often attempted to pursue their interests and objectives through the instrumentality of the U.N. peacekeeping force.<sup>3</sup>

1. Assuming that actions of the Security Council and General Assembly which are in accord with the U.N. Charter are legitimate and enjoy a status of legality in international relations, the initial authorization of the peacekeeping presence and subsequent supporting resolutions by the Security Council and General Assembly were legitimate.<sup>4</sup>

2. The UNF was a peaceful settlement action and not an enforcement action under Article 42 of Chapter VII of the U. N. Charter. Implicitly the Congo action was authorized under Article 36 of Chapter VI, which states that the Security Council "at any stage of a dispute" that is "likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace" may recommend "appropriate procedures" with a view to "a pacific settlement of the dispute." No finding of aggression was necessary to act under this Article and the Security Council made no such finding.

3. By explicitly invoking Articles 25 and 49 in the August 9, 1960, Security Council resolution all member states of the United Nations were legally obligated to "accept" the decisions of the Council and to assist "in carrying out measures decided upon" by the Council. This did not mean that a state was obligated to comply with any request the Secretary-General might make, since both troop contributions and logistical support were clearly voluntary. In practical terms it meant that Belgium

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3. The particular interests of Congolese factions and states are dealt with below.

4. See pp. 28-34 of the Report. All subsequent page and chapter references are from the Report unless otherwise specified.

was obligated to withdraw its troops and other states were obligated to cooperate with and not obstruct the effort.<sup>5</sup>

4. A state contributing a troop contingent to the U.N. Force was legally obligated to accept the exclusive command and control of the Secretary-General and his Force Commander while the contingent was in the Congo. Since the troops were provided voluntarily, but also in "good faith" for the purposes specified in the resolutions, there was an implied obligation for the donor government not to withdraw them before the agreed termination date, except for compelling reasons of national interest.<sup>6</sup>

5. The U.N. Force entered the Congo and remained there with the consent of the host government. Since the "good faith" of both parties was emphasized from the start, the government could not simply terminate the U.N. mission at will. In practical terms, however, the UNF needed the consent and at least passive cooperation of the government if it was to function effectively.<sup>7</sup>

6. The far-reaching security objectives of the UNF, to be achieved independently or in cooperation with the Congolese Government, were beyond the limited legal authority and military capacity of the Force. In the beginning the UNF was authorized to use military force only in self-defense, but this authority was subsequently broadened by the Security Council to the use of force to "prevent the occurrence of civil war" and to apprehend and detain prohibited foreigners. The explicit constraints on the permissible use of force were somewhat offset by the right of the UNF to "freedom of movement" within the Congo, a right which was never interpreted by the UNF in a broad and unrestricted

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5. See pp. 34-38.

6. See pp. 41-44.

7. See pp. 44-47. Other aspects of UNF-host state relation are discussed below.



sense. With the exception of the September 13, 1961, action by the U. N. Troops in Katanga and the occasional use of undue force by U.N. soldiers, the UNF did not initiate the use of military force or otherwise violate the constraints on the permissible use of force.<sup>8</sup>

7. In spite of the vague mandate, the lack of adequate legal precedents, and continuous political pressures inside and outside the Congo, the Secretary-General (both Hammarskjold and Thant) largely succeeded in adhering to the legal principles of the Charter and observing the fundamental intent of the resolutions. Hammarskjold's interpretation of the objectives and constraints of the U.N. mission cannot be faulted on legal grounds. Neither he nor Thant exceeded his legal authority, though each man may have made errors of analysis or judgment. There is, however, no substantial evidence that either sought consciously to serve the special interests of particular governments, international blocs, or Congolese factions.

8. Many of the charges of illegality made by governments against the Secretary-General appear to be rooted in disagreements with his political judgments. There was at most points only a minimal political consensus in the Security Council sufficient to sustain the U.N. effort. Dissenting members, particularly the Soviet Union and France, were often critical of the Secretary-General's interpretation or implementation of the mandate. Nevertheless, neither Hammarskjold nor Thant was ever censured by the Security Council, and none of its members felt strongly enough to veto the enabling resolutions. If the Secretary-General pursued a course in the Congo contrary to the collective intent of the Council, it was the obligation of the members to call him to account. If the resolutions were so ambiguous that the Secretary-General could not act under one paragraph without violating another, the Council should have cleared up the ambiguity or have been prepared to accept the Secretary-General's interpretation of the mandate. In any event, if the Secretary-General exceeded his authority or otherwise violated the mandate, the Security

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8. See pp. 48-51

Council was ultimately accountable for failing to exercise its responsibilities for political control.<sup>9</sup>

Implications for the future: The Congo experience confirms that the Security Council and General Assembly are legally competent organs for authorizing international peaceful settlement operations which are deployed with the consent of the host state or states and which depend upon the voluntary contribution of troop contingents and specialized military units from member states. The Charter and the U.N. system generally have ample authority and procedures to authorize such operations in the future when there is a sufficient political consensus in the Security Council or General Assembly to get the necessary votes and if adequate arrangements for material support can be made. No charter revision is required to authorize peacekeeping missions of this kind.

Certain problems encountered in the Congo affair might be avoided in the future if the first enabling resolution for a peacekeeping effort more clearly identified the Charter articles under which it was being authorized. This would be especially helpful in clarifying the character of the obligation of member states with respect to the effort. Such clarity may not usually be politically possible, or in some cases desirable. Even if it were possible, the obligations could and probably would be challenged by some states, as they were in the Congo case by France and the Soviet Union.

When politically possible the terms of reference with respect to the permissible use of force of a UNF should be more clearly spelled out than in the Congo case, especially the relation of the UNF to members or units of indigenous or foreign military or police establishments in the host state or states.

The Secretary-General's legal guidelines, accepted by the Security Council, the host state, and the states contributing troops, are adequate for future peaceful settlement forces. No such guidelines have

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9. See pp. 56 and 57.

been developed for an enforcement action under Article 42 which has never been invoked.

### The Secretary-General

The problems of executive control by the Secretary-General, as distinct from those of military control by the Force Commander and political control by the Security Council, have to do with the basic integrity and efficiency of the command structure.<sup>10</sup>

Though the Secretary-General was fully responsible for the operation and accountable only to the Security Council and the General Assembly, throughout the four-year effort he had to remain sensitive to the shifting balance of political forces supporting or opposing the peacekeeping mission. Recognizing this, both Hammarskjold and Thant made a distinction between political advice in general harmony with the Security Council resolutions and political pressures contrary to them. It was this important distinction that enabled them to profit from the former and resist the latter.

1. In spite of an inadequate precedent, the novel situation, and other extenuating circumstances, the Secretary-General maintained reasonably effective executive control throughout the Congo operation. Though the integrity of this control was challenged by political pressures, administrative inefficiency, unqualified personnel, and several specific incidents involving unauthorized initiative in the Congo, it was never seriously eroded.

2. The widespread and persistent administrative inefficiency in the Congo operation can be attributed largely to inherent factors such as the vague mandate, the large number of different national units in the Force, some incompetent civilian and military officers, and the fact

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10. This section relates primarily to Chapter 4. Political and military control are discussed below.

that the existing structure of the Secretariat was not equipped to handle a field operation of that size and complexity. This inefficiency led to waste, delay, and unnecessary expense, but it did not seriously compromise the control of the Secretary-General.

3. The few top-ranking U.N. civilian and military officers who failed to perform their functions properly constituted perhaps the most serious threat to the integrity of the operation. The Dayal problem and the O'Brien incident (September 13, 1961) are linked to an apparent lack of objectivity and perspective. The same can probably be said of Khiary, General von Horn, and Linner. All of these men created or permitted problems for the operation which their replacements, confronting virtually the same situation, were able to avoid. Ironically, each of the problem officers was appointed by Hammarskjold who it must be acknowledged, was not always the best judge of character and competence. This weakness was also illustrated by Hammarskjold's asking or permitting his Military Adviser, Brigadier Rikhye, to intrude into the line of command in the Congo. Available evidence suggests that the question of dual loyalty was not present in any of these cases, that none of these men was taking his instructions from his own or any other government.

Implications for the future: The designation of the Secretary-General to administer the Congo operation worked reasonably well, but led to two problems. First, the large and complex task consumed such a large portion of the Secretary-General's energy and of the resources of the entire Organization that some other activities tended to be neglected. Second, inefficiency resulted from the fact that neither the Secretary-General, with his small internationalized staff, nor the Secretariat as a whole is equipped to manage large field operations, especially when sizeable military forces are involved.

This suggests that alternative ways of administering the larger peacekeeping missions should be seriously studied. The executive agent approach is one such alternative. In the Korean operation (which

involved a sanctions force as opposed to a peaceful settlement force) the United States served as the executive agent for the United Nations, providing both political direction and military command. In the much smaller West New Guinea operation, Pakistan provided the 1,500-man Security Force which was administered by the U.N. Temporary Executive Authority under the direction of the Secretary-General. The United States and Canada made a composite air unit available to support the Force.

Under certain political circumstances in the future, the Security Council might designate an acceptable government to police a truce, patrol a border, or keep the peace in a specified area in accordance with the objectives and constraints defined by the Council. The Secretary-General could be designated to monitor the performance of the executive agent in behalf of the Security Council. Single-government administration of such an effort, while not free of difficulties, would introduce a degree of efficiency not possible when personnel of many states are involved in planning and administration.

A variation of the executive agent approach would be the designation of a politically acceptable government for one major function of a mission. Washington, for example, might be given the sole responsibility for logistical support in some future mission.

To work effectively a government serving as an executive agent would obviously have to be acceptable politically, not only to the host state, but also to other interested states. To be responsible and impartial it would have to operate under the political guidance of the Security Council or the General Assembly, with the Secretary-General or some other designated agent playing a monitoring role.

#### The Host State

The relationship between the United Nations and the host state, more specifically between the Secretary-General and the top leaders of



the Leopoldville Government, was greatly complicated by chaos and confusion in the Congo.<sup>11</sup> The Central Government was always weak and at times two competing factions claimed to be the legitimate government. During the four years there were four different governments, two of which the Secretary-General did not regard as fully legitimate. The Central Government was seriously challenged by three different secessionist movements--Katanga, Stanleyville, and South Kasai.

Drawing heavily on the simpler UNEF experience in which there was no serious disorder within Egypt, the host state, Hammarskjöld formulated three basic rules to govern the relations between the U.N. Force and the Government, rules endorsed by the Security Council and the Congolese Government.

1) The UNF is present with the consent of the host state, but as long as the Force is authorized by the Security Council the Congolese Government is obligated to cooperate with it.

2) The UNF should cooperate with the host government, but should not become the instrument of the government. It should be an independent instrument, accountable only to the Secretary-General.

3) The UNF should be impartial. It should not "be a party to or in any way intervene in or be used to influence the outcome of any internal conflict, constitutional or otherwise."

The conclusions with respect to these three rules may be summarized as follows:

1. The requirement for host state consent for the presence of the UNF caused little trouble. Though Prime Minister Lumumba demanded that the UNF, or at least white U.N. troops, quit the Congo, and other Congolese leaders occasionally criticized some U.N. policies or UNF actions, these demands and criticisms had little effect on the operations of the Force and no effect on its duration. Such protests were never formally presented to the Security Council.

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11. This section is related primarily to Chapters 5 and 6.

Host state consent for the presence of the UNF implied host state cooperation with the UNF for the achievement of the objectives identified in the mandate. The record on cooperation is uneven. The relation between the Government and U.N. authorities ranged from hostility (including occasional clashes between Congolese and UNF troops) to active cooperation.<sup>12</sup> In general, however, the UNF performed its duties without either interference from the Government or active cooperation with it.

The relation between the UNF and the ANC presented the most serious problem. The persistent tension and hostility that characterized this relationship was due partly to the vague mandate and partly to Congolese resistance to U.N. efforts to disarm, retrain, or organize the ANC. In a sense, the UNF was intended to replace both the Belgian troops and the Congolese Army, but it lacked any explicit authority to expel the former or disarm the latter.<sup>13</sup>

During much of this period undisciplined units of the ANC, which had abruptly lost its Belgian officer corps in July 1960, were a source of disorder rather than order. The UNF had an implicit mandate to help discipline and retrain the Army, but U.N. efforts toward this end were stoutly resisted by General Mobutu and the Government generally as an infringement on Congolese sovereignty. As the situation unfolded, Congolese authorities expressed the desire to employ European military advisers, training officers, and technicians under normal bilateral military assistance arrangements. Further, the Congolese preferred Belgian officers above all others. Hammarskjöld and Dayal, on the other hand, were opposed to the utilization of Belgian officers. The U. N. Command made several attempts to establish an officer training school with a multinational staff, but the Congolese would not cooperate. In

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12. Military clashes between the UNF and the ANC are discussed in Chapter 17.

13. The problem of Belgian forces in the Congo is discussed in Chapter 11.

April 1961 Hammarskjold finally acknowledged the right of the Congolese Government to hire Belgian nationals, and in 1963 Leopoldville entered into a formal bilateral military agreement with Brussels for training officers and advisors. It also made military aid agreements with the United States, Italy, and Israel.

2. In those areas where it did cooperate with the host government, the UNF generally did so without compromising its integrity and independence. Hammarskjold effectively resisted Lumumba's demand that the UNF invade secessionist Katanga since such action would have violated the constraints against the initiation of military force. When the UNF, at the request of Prime Minister Adoula, assisted in consolidating Leopoldville's position in Stanleyville by arresting Gizenga, the UNF was in a literal sense acting as an instrument of the host government. But with its mandate to help maintain order and to protect the territorial integrity of the Congo, the modest police assistance in this case was compatible with the U.N. mandate.

The most dramatic and controversial problem arose in connection with O'Brien's attempt to end Katangan secession by force on September 13, 1961. He used arrest warrants prepared by the Leopoldville Government as the legal basis for attempting to apprehend and detain Katangan ministers, and a U.N. plane was used to transport a Government party to Elisabethville to take control of the province. Tacitly acknowledging that such collaboration with Leopoldville was a violation of U. N. independence, U. N. authorities in the two subsequent clashes with Katanga avoided both the fact and appearance of collaboration with the Central Government.

3. Given the deep and persistent domestic political struggle within the Congo, it was impossible for the UNF to avoid becoming involved in internal affairs. The U.N. presence in important respects did "influence the outcome" of internal conflicts. The net impact of the mission was clearly to support the fortunes of the Central

Government over the rival centers in Stanleyville, Katanga, and South Kasai. The U.N. effort helped to tip the scales in favor of the moderates over the extremists and in favor of those seeking a more unified state over those supporting a loose confederation. To a considerable extent these two internal objectives found expression, implicitly or explicitly, in the Security Council resolutions.

To acknowledge that the UNF had a significant impact upon the internal situation does not mean that U.N. authorities chose sides. Both Hammarskjold and Thant attempted to be as impartial under the difficult circumstances, but the resolutions themselves took sides. On the Katanga question, they were strongly anti-Tshombe, and Hammarskjold was less partial than the Security Council. Laying aside the question of the political wisdom of the three clashes between the UNF and Katanga or the merits of the dispute between Elisabethville and Leopoldville, there were ample legal grounds for the three military actions, except for certain aspects of the September 13 operation, and the unnecessary use of force by some U.N. troops in the first two clashes.

As a whole, the UNF maintained its integrity. It was not captured, subverted, used, or even misled by the host government. It was, however, frequently criticized by governments and Congolese factions for taking sides, but often in such a way that the conflicting views cancelled each other out.

Implications for the future: The Congo experience suggests that a peacekeeping force ought not be sent into a host state rent by civil disorder and conflict unless it is operating under fairly specific terms of reference with respect to the internal situation. Further, the peacekeeping operation should be accompanied by an effort to achieve a political settlement of the dispute which occasioned the authorization of a UNF in the first place.

The need for such guidelines was dramatically illustrated by the confusion and tension caused by the presence of three independent

and sizeable military establishments on Congolese soil during the early months of the U.N. mission. The ANC numbered some 25,000 men and was in the process of ousting its 1,100 Belgian officers. By mid-July 1960 Belgian forces including paratroopers, numbered about 10,000. The UNF had grown to 16,000 by the end of August. There were no designated zones of occupation and no demilitarized zones. The relationship between the three military forces was not defined. It is vitally important that the relationship of any future UNF to indigenous or foreign military and police forces in the host state be clarified in advance to the extent that this is politically possible. Neutral or demilitarized zones should be established before the UNF arrives or as soon thereafter as feasible. The U.N. troops deployed in Cyprus and the Gaza Strip are there under conditions that approximate the requirements of this guideline, though there has been some dispute over the application of the mandate in Cyprus.

#### Permanent Members of the Security Council

The Congo operation was created and sustained politically by the Security Council. (On September 20, 1960, the General Assembly endorsed the previous Council resolutions. The Assembly provided financial support for the operation.)<sup>14</sup>

Only one permanent member of the Council, the United States, supported the U.N. mission consistently. After the fall of Lumumba, the Soviet Union was almost consistently opposed to the mission, though in the Council it either supported or abstained on subsequent resolutions. The French position ranged from indifference to opposition. Britain gave selective support. Nationalist China voted for the mission in the Security Council but did not take an active part in the protracted Congo debates.

The operation was possible in spite of Soviet and French opposition, because neither felt strongly enough to veto the authorizing

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14. This section is related primarily to Chapters 7-10.

resolutions in the face of clear Afro-Asian support for them. Under these circumstances, Washington became the tacit leader of a working coalition of Western and Afro-Asian states supporting the effort, a coalition built upon a common view that the United Nations ought to do something and made possible by the unwillingness of the opposing big powers to press their position. The operation continued even though the Soviet Union and France refused to pay any of their assessed portion of the Congo peacekeeping costs.

Conclusions with respect to the role of the big four members of the Security Council may be summarized as follows:

1. United States: Without the assurance of American political and financial support the U.N. operation could not have been undertaken and probably would not have been authorized. Without the massive U.S. airlift, the operation could not have been launched nearly as quickly as it was. Without continued U.S. political and material support the mission could not have been sustained. Washington has provided or will provide 41.5 percent of the total cost of the operation which was \$411 million.<sup>15</sup> During the four years the United States transported 118,091 troops and 18,569 tons of cargo into or out of the Congo, and airlifted 1,991 troops and 3,642 tons of cargo within the Congo. This means that Washington provided approximately two-thirds of the total transportation of troops into and out of the Congo.

Strong and consistent American support was rooted in the fact that Washington supported the objectives of the U.N. mission and believed the U.N. option was the best one under the circumstances. By virtue of its power and active involvement Washington had more influence over the operation than any other state, but the United Nations was not simply an instrument of the State Department.

In terms of the U.S. objective for the Congo--a united state

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15. The financial aspects are discussed below.

with a moderate government representing all major factions and capable of sustaining mutually beneficial relations with Western states--the U.N. effort proved to be reasonably effective. The mission also contributed to stability in Central Africa and helped to impose rules that helped obstruct Soviet efforts to capture the Lumumba-Gizenga faction and install it as the legitimate government. The UNF did not and could not reasonably be expected to achieve the creation of a responsible Congolese army or a strong government. Nor did it prevent the increasingly serious rebel movements of late 1963 and early 1964, or the exploitation of this disorder by Moscow, Peking, and certain militant African states.

The fact that the U.N. mission helped to accomplish common objectives of the United States and other western powers does not necessarily mean that these interests might not have been equally or even better served by more direct means such as American bilateral assistance.

2. Soviet Union: At the outset Moscow saw the U.N. operation as a way of confusing or undermining the position of the West in the Congo and of advancing its own support of a Lumumba regime congenial to the purposes of the Soviet bloc. Quickly moving events in the Congo soon changed Moscow's initial support to hostility which expressed itself in virtually complete non-support of the operation and in a violent attack on the person and office of the Secretary-General.

Soviet leaders were unable to persuade the Security Council to accept their view of what should be done in the Congo, but their opposition placed some restraint upon Council resolutions and the actions of the Secretary-General. Their political opposition and financial noncooperation did not succeed in stopping the operation or even in significantly altering its course.

The net impact of the mission on Soviet interests in the Congo and Africa generally was negative. The UNF succeeded in frustrating Moscow's unilateral military support of Lumumba. The Soviet attack

on the Secretary-General prompted the Afro-Asians, whom Moscow was trying to woo, to come to Hammarskjold's defense and to reject the troika proposal.

3. France: The attitude of Paris toward the U.N. mission ranged from aloofness to opposition. As such it placed a constraint upon the operation without seriously altering its character. France's refusal to pay its assessment contributed to the financial crisis of the Organization. Occasionally French action amounted to minor obstruction of the U.N. effort, e.g. prohibiting U.N. planes from flying over French territory and the tacit permission for certain French officials in the Congo and at home to engage in pro-Tshombe activities. The covert military support of the Katanga regime from certain French Government quarters was a distinct violation of the U.N. mandate. Ironically, officially expressed French interests were served by the UNF to the extent that it helped to frustrate Soviet ambitions in the Congo and to restore stability to Central Africa.

4. Britain: London supported the U.N. operation in principle and paid its financial assessment. But Britain objected to the use of military means to effect the political settlement of internal disputes in the Congo. This was particularly true of Katanga which had close economic ties with the Rhodesian Federation. Thus, the British both helped and restrained the Secretary-General. Britain never endorsed Tshombe's secession and its officials in Katanga had a moderating influence on him. The broad British interests in the Congo and Africa, not significantly different from American and French interests, were served by the U.N. mission.

Implications for the future: The Congo effort makes it clear that a peacekeeping effort authorized by the Security Council does not require the unanimous support of its permanent members. The operation was sustained by a working coalition, led by the United States, which provided political support (the requisite votes in the



Security Council or the General Assembly) and material support in the form of men and money. Therefore, an effective and substantial UNF can be mounted and carried out if one major power strongly favors it, if there is a supporting coalition of smaller states, and if no opposing permanent members feel strongly enough to veto the enabling resolution. This would occur only when a vital interest of a permanent member was not at stake.

#### The Former Metropolitan Power

Belgium had a profound political, economic, and emotional stake in the restoration of order in the newly independent Congo.<sup>16</sup> It had an immediate interest in protecting the lives of some 87,000 Belgian citizens living there. Brussels wanted to prove to itself and to the world that it was not irresponsible in abruptly granting independence. Though the Communist and many Afro-Asian states held that Belgium was largely responsible for the Congo crisis, and though the first Security Council resolution called for the withdrawal of the Belgian troops that were attempting to restore order, Brussels from the beginning gave its support in principle to the U.N. peacekeeping effort.

Relations between Brussels and U.N. authorities were often strained because of the complex network of Belgian interests in the Congo, particularly in Katanga, and because of Hammarskjold's and Dayal's policy of excluding much-needed Belgian nationals from service in the Congo, a policy subsequently modified. Brussels speedily withdrew its troops from the Congo, except for Katanga. It was not until September 1961 that Belgian officers were finally recalled from the breakaway province where they had been assisting in the training and command of Tshombe's gendarmerie.

The seeming contradictions in Belgian policy can be understood in the light of her two major and sometimes conflicting objectives. The first was to support a strong and moderate government

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16. This section is related primarily to Chapter 11.

in Leopoldville. And the second was to support Katanga as a going concern whether or not the rest of the Congo would fall apart. The Belgian Government never endorsed the secession of Katanga as such and did not recognize diplomatically Tshombe's "independent" state.

Consequently, Brussels supported some UNF policies and opposed others. With the advent of the Spaak government, Belgium became increasingly cooperative with U.N. authorities and in late 1962 adopted a policy of active collaboration with the Organization's policy toward Katanga. In May 1965 Belgium made an agreement with Secretary-General Thant which involved Belgian claims against the United Nations amounting to \$1.5 million and Belgium's assessed portion of the Congo effort. As a result Brussels has paid fully her share.

In spite of the tense 1960-1961 period, the U.N. operation as a whole tended to serve Belgian interests in a viable Congo with a united and moderate Central Government.

Implications for the future: The Secretary-General's policy of opposing the full utilization of competent and knowledgeable Belgian nationals was understandable in the first hectic days, given the pressures and demands of the Afro-Asians. But the prolongation of this policy when there were many qualified Belgians willing to serve, when the Congolese wanted them, and when they were desperately needed was a serious error. Apparently this policy was rooted in the assumption that Belgians were somehow politically or morally disqualified. It was also a reflection of an "anti-colonial" bias of some members of the Secretariat, many leaders of the Afro-Asian states, and some Western leaders. In the future, any U.N. operation should make full use of experts of any nationality who are qualified and prepared to make a constructive contribution if such persons are acceptable to the host government. Further, the Secretary-General should encourage their use by the government.

### The States Providing Military Personnel

More than 93,000 men from 35 states served in the UNF, contributing a total of 675,000 man-months.<sup>17</sup> The bulk of the manpower (82.4 percent) came from 19 Afro-Asian states. Most of the specialized units and personnel came from 13 Western states (including New Zealand), ten of which were allied with the United States. Communist Yugoslavia provided 91 man-months during the first few months. The thirty-fourth donor state was the Congo itself which made available an ANC battalion to the UNF for 18 months, providing 12,953 man-months.

The Afro-Asian states fell into two broad political groups on the Congo question--the moderates (typified by Ethiopia, India, Nigeria, and Tunisia) and the militants (typified by Ghana and Guinea). All these states were interested in the successful decolonization of the Congo, and all believed, at least in the beginning, that the United Nations could play a constructive role. But they differed on what successful decolonization meant and how it was to be achieved. The militant states tended to be more "anti-colonialist," and especially anti-Belgian, and urged the UNF to use military force against secessionist Katanga. The moderates were prepared to accept continued and substantial Western and Belgian influence and investment in an independent Congo, and supported Hammarskjold's approach to Katanga. The differences between these two groups tended to subside after Katangan secession was ended.<sup>18</sup>

The interests and contribution of the Afro-Asian and Western donor states may be summarized as follows:

1. Every state contributing military personnel was motivated by multiple considerations. In the first place, it was reluctant to turn down a request for assistance, often stated in urgent

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17. See Volume 3, Appendix H, Charts B and E.

18. The role of the Afro-Asian states is discussed in Chapter 13.

terms, from the Secretary-General. Most states believed they should do something to help the United Nations because they regarded it as a useful organization. Many states, particularly the Afro-Asians, welcomed the experience and training for their units that UNF service would provide. The new states were often eager to show off their armed forces abroad as a symbol of their sovereignty. In political terms, most of them believed U.N. intervention would assist in successful decolonization, help maintain peace in Central Africa, and deter an East-West clash in the Congo.

2. The behavior of most of the Afro-Asian states suggests that they were more interested in decolonization (meaning primarily the ejection of the Belgians and the integration of Katanga) than in restoring order to the Congo as such. This was particularly true of the militant states, most of which withdrew their forces when the UNF failed to back Lumumba's demand to invade Katanga. But even the moderates lost interest in the Congo mission after Katanga was integrated. And none of them showed much concern about the challenges to the authority of the Central Government or to the territorial integrity of the country from Stanleyville in 1960 and 1961 or about the rebel movements of late 1963 and 1964, primarily because these threats were not "colonialist" in nature.

3. The Western donor states had a broader interest in law and order.<sup>19</sup> They were concerned about all challenges to a viable central government, including all secessionist movements, the subversive activities of the Lumumba faction, the unreliability of the ANC, the unilateral intervention on the part of the Soviet Union and some African states, and the Chinese-encouraged rebel movements in 1963-64. The more moderate Afro-Asian states had a somewhat greater appreciation for this spectrum of dangers than the militant ones.

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19. In Chapter 12 the role of Canada is analyzed to illustrate the interests and contributions of the Western states.

4. Providing 82.4 percent of the manpower, the military contribution of the Afro-Asian states was vital. Most important were the units of India, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Tunisia, and Ghana which accounted for 61.2 percent of the total Force. Their contribution in man-months follows:

1. India . . .	142,704	4. Tunisia . . .	48,368
2. Ethiopia . .	119,226	5. Ghana . . . .	39,203
3. Nigeria . .	63,617		

5. The political contribution of the Afro-Asian troops are also important because military personnel from the great powers were excluded and because non-Europeans were generally considered politically more acceptable than Europeans. Secretary-General Hammarskjöld was sensitive to the racial factor, but as events unfolded it became clear that in general the acceptability of troop units or specialized personnel to the Congolese Government or people bore little relationship to their racial background. Though Lumumba called for the expulsion of white U.N. troops, even he was not consistently racist. In most circumstances Congolese authorities tended to respect European troops and officers more than their own or other African troops.

6. The Western units and specialized personnel made a significant technical contribution to the UNF. This is illustrated by the provision of communications support for the over-all operation from Canada and electrical and mechanical engineers from the Scandinavian states.<sup>20</sup>

7. The military personnel from all states, with rare individual exceptions, were loyal to the U.N. Command when they were in the Congo. The national contingents did not take orders from their governments, though on several occasions some militant governments threatened to give such orders. Even when Ghana was opposed to UNF policy, the Ghanaian unit remained loyal to the UNF. The opposition to the UNF on the part of most militant states expressed itself first in the threat and then in the actual withdrawal of their units,

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20. See Chapter 12.

rather than in an attempt to use their units independently in the Congo. This withdrawal temporarily jeopardized the mission, but the slack was taken up by India's decision to send a large contingent.

8. The U.N. operation served the interests of all states that sought stability in Africa and wanted Congolese independence to succeed. The operation contributed to a unified Congo with a moderate government, thus disappointing the militant Afro-Asian states that sought a stridently nationalist government.

Implications for the future: When certain donor governments became convinced that the UNF was not serving their interests, they withdrew their units. This fact, as well as the behavior of the governments that supported the operation, suggests that states will contribute troops to a U.N. peacekeeping effort only when they believe it serves their objectives. This self-interest motivation should be taken into account in any future plans and expectations, recognizing that some states define their national interests more broadly than others. No government has shown the disposition to make troops available automatically to the United Nations for any future emergency. All governments making special arrangements for stand-by units have stated reservations to this effect.

The Congo experience demonstrated that the political acceptability of troops on the part of the host state is not narrowly related to racial or geographical factors. Acceptability is rather related to the extent to which the donor state and the host state share a common interest in settling the crisis in accordance with the terms of reference established by the Security Council. The troops of a friendly state committed to the U.N. mandate tend to be politically acceptable to the host state, especially when such troops are loyal to the U.N. Command and observe the constraints placed upon them. This is not to say that geographical and racial considerations will not come into play in future missions.

The problem of political acceptability of troops to the Security Council or General Assembly is quite another matter. In this larger setting, political considerations which transcend the immediate crisis in a particular state must be taken into account. In the Congo crisis U.S. troops would have been acceptable to the Congolese Government, but not to the Security Council. In some future situation military support units or even troops from America or Russia may be acceptable to both the Security Council and the states most directly involved.

### Military Problems

#### Recruiting and Maintaining the Force and the Role of National Contingents<sup>21</sup>

1. The initial recruitment of national contingents was less difficult than the maintenance of adequate force levels. In the early months Hammarskjold was able to meet his force level target and his political requirements for "African solidarity" and "universality." The Force was predominantly African, but there was significant representation from Europe and Asia. In general, the UNF depended upon the Afro-Asian states for manpower and upon the Western states for specialized support units.

2. The initial recruiting success was not based upon a common understanding among donor states of what the UNF should do, but rather upon a shared and largely spontaneous belief that something should be done. After the troops were in the Congo, political differences among the contributing states came to the surface. By mid-1961 all governments (except Ghana) having serious policy differences with the Secretary-General over the proper role of the UNF had withdrawn their troops. This pullout of the more militant states confronted the UNF with a replacement problem, but the replacements resulted in a numerically more stable and technically more competent Force.

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21. This section is related primarily to Chapters 14 and 18.

3. The UNF after the Casablanca pullout was more reliable politically than the initial Force. The more militant states with a specific interest in internal politics in the Congo had been largely eliminated. The more moderate states with a broader understanding of the U.N. mandate proved to be the mainstay of the UNF.

4. There is no evidence that any of the national contingents subverted or attempted to subvert the U.N. effort, or deliberately supported any of the factions challenging the Central Government. This is true even of the units of the militant states before their withdrawal. National contingents, it is true, reacted differently toward the Stanleyville faction, but this may be ascribed largely to different circumstances.

5. Though some national contingents had direct communications with their home governments, there is no evidence that the contingent commander took operational instructions from his government which conflicted with U.N. policies. There was, of course, consultation between U.N. authorities and contingent commanders in Leopoldville, but the unit commanders were loyal to the U.N. Command.

6. Some of the larger contingents had a slight policy influence on the operations of the UNF, but this influence was motivated only marginally by national political considerations. The clearest example of this is the role of the Indian Brigade in Katanga. The Indian officer corps and the Indian Sector Commander in Elisabethville as military men were unhappy about the inconclusive results of Rounds One and Two, in which UNF efforts to arrest prohibited personnel and to extend "freedom of movement" in Katanga were aborted because of external political pressures. They were anxious to finish the job. The essentially nonpolitical pressures in the Indian Brigade were an important factor in the development of contingency plans for Round Three and for the timing of this operation. Any pressure the Indians may have exerted in this direction was in harmony with the U.N. mandate.



7. The general effectiveness of the UNF improved as the number of national contingents decreased and as the size of the contingents became larger. The Force was least effective when it most nearly reflected Hammarskjold's original criterion, including his stipulation that the major elements were "in the first place" to be drawn from Africa. It reached its maximum effectiveness (during Round Three) when its major components were supplied by countries outside Africa (India, Sweden, and Ireland.) This suggests that in many conflicts distant troops are more acceptable than those from nearby states.

8. Invidious comparisons have been made between different national contingents with respect to their general state of discipline, including black marketing activities and "atrocities." There was considerable black marketing among U.N. personnel, but it was not confined to the units responsible for internal supply, or to military personnel. Such problems are inevitable and often widespread when troops in a foreign country have access to scarce items, especially when the civilian economy is seriously disrupted. There were some serious infractions of discipline committed by U.N. troops in Katanga, obviously by members of the national units located there. The fact that there may have been unusual provocation does not excuse this breach of discipline. In the interests of perspective, it should be noted that some atrocities were committed by the Katangan side and by irresponsible ANC units outside of Katanga and that the number of infractions of discipline on the U.N. side was small.<sup>22</sup>

#### Command and Control of the Force<sup>23</sup>

9. Just as the Congo operation as a whole did not escape the executive control of the Secretary-General, there was never any significant loss of control over the UNF by the Force Commander or by the lower command echelons. Civilian supremacy was preserved. The integrity

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22. See Chapter 3, pp. 51-52.

23. This section is related primarily to Chapters 15 and 18.

of the command and control system was challenged but never breached. At the Leopoldville headquarters the Military Adviser to the Secretary-General did in the early days improperly impose himself into the chain of command, but this situation was rectified before any serious damage was done, and he thereafter remained only an occasional irritant rather than an obstacle in the command system.<sup>24</sup>

10. The most significant negative aspect of the U.N. Command system was the potential for abuse it offered, primarily because of the large number of national units represented. The multinational headquarters staff was given to informal rather than formal lines of communication. The field command structure was of an essentially single-nation character, each contingent serving under a commander of the same nationality. Under these circumstances, especially in the hectic early days, national units could have exploited the situation for purposes contrary to the U.N. mandate. That they did not strike out on their own is evidence of their loyalty to the U.N. Command, a loyalty based upon the recognition that there were compelling reasons of national interest for them to observe the terms of their contract with the Secretary-General. If the states most critical of Hammarskjold's policies had kept their troops in the Congo instead of pulling them out, the likelihood of insubordination might have been substantially greater.

11. Within the Leopoldville headquarters staff no single state or group of states captured the key policy-making positions. None exerted undue influence.

12. The principal weakness in the control system was in the Leopoldville headquarters where staff work, particularly staff coordination, was generally conceded to have been poor. The main reason for this was the assumed political necessity of assigning officers from the various donor states to the headquarters. The result was

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24. See Chapter 4, pp. 69-71, and Chapter 15.

a wide difference in individual competence, complicated by language problems and different staff procedures. This weakness was partially rectified by the allocation of key staff positions to states which could provide competent personnel.

13. As a whole, the command structure, and the supporting communications and intelligence systems, left a great deal to be desired when compared to what a competent national army could offer, but the essential fact is that the system worked reasonably well.

#### Logistical Support of the Force<sup>25</sup>

14. The major internal logistical problems of the Congo operation were rooted in the multinational character of the UNF and the political constraints against the use of skilled logistical support units from major powers.

15. It is inappropriate to apply rigorous cost-effectiveness standards to the Congo operation because of the large number of non-economic factors involved, but even under these unusual circumstances, qualified logistics personnel operating under a system of movement priorities and regulations could have effected substantial savings.

16. The lack of standardization of equipment and vehicles caused a major problem. This problem resulted from the variety brought in by the contingents and from subsequent nonstandard procurement. Uncertainty about the duration of the UNF made it difficult to tackle the problem effectively, though some progress was made in 1962 and 1963.

17. As far as external supply was concerned, there was an overdependence on airlift which resulted in unnecessarily high costs. Though there were extenuating circumstances, more careful planning would have resulted in substantially lower costs. The same is true with respect to internal transportation.

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25. This section is related primarily to Chapters 16 and 18.

18. The most efficient and reliable airlift to and from the Congo appears to have been that provided by the U.S. Air Force. Although the contractual cost of U.S. airlift was higher than that of some private contractors, it was more reliable and hence more economical in the long run. Without American logistical support, including sea-lift, the Congo operation would have been virtually impossible.

19. The many weaknesses in the logistical system do not appear to have had a seriously adverse effect upon the direction or character of the operation as a whole. Nor did these weaknesses lead to the loss of military or executive control. This positive result was in part fortuitous--the UNF was never put to the test of serious and sustained combat, a situation which might have occurred in Katanga.

#### Deployment and Operations of the Force<sup>26</sup>

Serving as a temporary substitute for the ANC, the U.N. Force had four major functions: 1) maintain law and order, 2) prevent tribal conflict and civil war, 3) maintain the territorial integrity of the Congo, and 4) prevent external intervention. The U.N. peacekeeping mission had a fifth function, transforming the ANC into a reliable force for law and order, but this function was not the responsibility of the U.N. Force as such.<sup>27</sup> In performing all its tasks, the UNF had in the first instance to defend itself. It also had to protect the personnel and installations of the various U.N. civilian activities in the Congo. In evaluating the performance of the UNF it is not appropriate to invoke standards suitable for an integrated force of comparable size operating under the command of a single government. The unique mission, the multinational composition of the Force, and

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26. This section is related primarily to Chapters 17 and 18. The larger political context is dealt with in Chapters 5 and 6.

27. The problem of retraining the ANC is summarized above [pp. 403-404].

the unusual political constraints under which it operated must be taken into account when judging how well the UNF performed its four tasks.

20. Maintaining law and order: The UNF was responsible for law and order throughout the vast area of the Congo, including Katanga where the major task was to eliminate prohibited foreigners and help restore the province to the political control of Leopoldville. At no place outside of Katanga could order be taken for granted. In addition to tribal and political conflict, the ANC units, deprived of a professional officer corps, were a constant source of disorder. Twice as many U.N. troops were killed by Leopoldville ANC soldiers, Stanleyville ANC soldiers, and anti-Tshombe tribal elements in Katanga than the 40 U.N. soldiers who died in the three clashes between the UNF and Katanga forces.<sup>28</sup> There was hostility between the U.N. Command and the Central Government.

Despite these circumstances, the UNF during its first three years succeeded in maintaining minimal order and actually improved the general situation somewhat. This modest improvement was due in a great measure to the political and economic efforts of friendly governments and U.N. civilian officials as well as the psychological impact of UNF presence. After July 1963 the U.N. force level dropped rapidly and the UNF was unable to prevent the rising rebel movements of late 1963 and 1964 which by mid-1964 constituted a threat to law and order and to the authority of Leopoldville as serious, or perhaps more serious, than the crisis which provoked U.N. intervention in 1960.

21. Preventing tribal conflict and civil war: The UNF

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28. According to U.N. Records 235 members of the UNF died in the Congo, 34 of natural causes, 75 by accident, and 126 in action. Forty were killed in the three Katanga actions and 86 in other clashes. See Report by the Secretary-General on the Withdrawal of the United Nations Force in the Congo (S/578, June 29, 1964), Annex VII, p. 1.

undertook a number of actions, including the setting up of neutral zones, to prevent tribal conflict and war between rival political factions and regions. Though there was considerable fighting during the four-year period, no full-scale civil war erupted. This suggests that the UNF had a positive effect. It is not possible, however, to ascribe to the UNF a decisive influence because, as in the case of law and order generally, there were many other forces working to prevent open conflict. It should be noted here that the UNF, in spite of pressure, did not join either the Leopoldville or the Stanleyville forces in a civil war against Katanga.

22. Maintaining the territorial integrity of the Congo:

Here, perhaps, the UNF made its clearest contribution. Through its operations, combined with political and conciliatory efforts on the part of interested governments, none of the three secessionist movements succeeded. Nor did any of the dissenting political factions capture the Central Government. In Round Three the UNF succeeded in ending the secession of Katanga, the most serious separatist challenge to Leopoldville.

23. Preventing external intervention: This function involved eliminating prohibited foreigners and deterring outside intervention. Belgian troops, except for a small number of officers and other ranks retained in Katanga, left the Congo by September 1960. Those who stayed on in Katanga left a year later. In August and September 1961 the UNF rounded up prohibited foreign personnel of several nationalities, thus expediting their departure. When the Soviet Union was preparing to use its aircraft and ground vehicles in the Congo in behalf of Lumumba against the Central Government, the U.N. Representative in Leopoldville closed the airports, thus frustrating the Soviet design. The UNF was powerless to deter or contain the rebel movements of 1963-64, which to some extent were encouraged, influenced, and supported by Communist China. In sum, the U. N.

operation, backed by repeated resolutions from the Security Council, largely succeeded in eliminating the "Belgian factor" and in frustrating Soviet intervention, but it did not prevent the rebel movements of 1963 and 1964. This was not a military failure of the UNF, which was then being rapidly phased out, but a product of many internal and external political factors.

24. The principal cause of UNF inefficiency was its heterogeneous composition and uneven quality, and the chief cause of these weaknesses was the assumed political necessity for wide national representation. Taking these factors into account, along with the uncertain mandate and the tensions between the UNF and Leopoldville, the performance of the Force as a whole was good.

Implications for the Future: All the major military weaknesses and limitations of the UNF were rooted in political constraints, and to a considerable extent are inherent in any internationally authorized force composed of units from many states. Hence, great improvement in readiness, command and control, and efficiency cannot be expected in the future without significant changes in the political factors surrounding the establishment of a U.N. mission. Assuming the persistence of the general pattern of international conflict and accommodation which has prevailed since World War II, with the obvious constraints this places upon what the Security Council and the General Assembly can do, the Congo experience suggests a number of ways to improve the performance of future peacekeeping missions involving significant military forces. The following observations focus on efficiency, recognizing that a U.N. peacekeeping effort should be judged primarily on how well it fulfills its political purpose and only secondarily by its military efficiency. It is possible for a UNF to be politically effective without being highly efficient.

Since the efficiency of the Congo mission suffered in part because of the virtual absence of prior planning, a distinction should be made between readiness and operational efficiency.

Readiness is the capacity to deploy a fully-equipped UNF efficiently and on short notice. Operational efficiency has to do with the material cost of carrying out a mission. A state of readiness on the part of the U.N. Secretariat would contribute to a more speedy response after a mission is authorized and would help to deter certain small breaches of the peace. Many of the measures for enhancing readiness and efficiency summarized below have been advocated by governments such as the United States, Canada, Britain, and the Scandinavian states.<sup>29</sup>

1. Since the establishment of a sizeable permanent U. N. force is out of the question for the foreseeable future,<sup>30</sup> the United Nations will have to rely on improvisation in the years ahead. The quality of this improvisation can be improved modestly by a degree of prior planning on the part of the Secretariat and interested member states. It should be noted, however, that improvisation has the

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29. For detailed suggestions, see Institute for Defense Analyses, National Armaments and International Force (IDA, Final Report R-101, Study DAIS, 1963), pp. xi-xx and 51-74.

There is a remarkable consensus among U.N. officials, statesmen, and military officers who have served in peacekeeping missions, and scholars of the problem on the next steps to be taken. This consensus was expressed at an off-the-record International Conference on United Nations Security Forces held in Oslo, Norway, February 21-22, 1964, which included sixty participants from fifteen countries. The views expressed at the Ottawa Peacekeeping Conference, November 2-6, 1964, were in substantial accord with those of the Oslo Conference. The Canadian Conference, called by Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson, was restricted to official delegates from governments which had provided troops for peacekeeping efforts.

30. The idea of a standing military force of any size has been consistently opposed by ranking U.N. officials and virtually all governments. The political infeasibility of such a force does not necessarily mean that a small permanent observation corps would be impossible to create. A permanent U.N. peace observation corps has been recommended by a report prepared for the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, published as David W. Wainhouse and others, International Peace Observation: A History and Forecast (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1966).



significant virtues of flexibility and responsiveness -- virtues that should not be sacrificed by the wrong kind of prior planning. Each U.N. peacekeeping mission has been unique. In terms of men, equipment, and weapons the requirements have varied greatly and would have been difficult to anticipate in specific terms. Stockpiles of almost any kind tend to obsolesce quickly. Further, the ad hoc character of peacekeeping missions to date has not prevented them from being reasonably successful.

2. One major way of enhancing readiness and operational efficiency would be to designate a competent government to serve as the executive agent of the United Nations for a specific peacekeeping mission.<sup>31</sup> Assuming that such a government would be politically acceptable to the host state and other interested states, this approach would eliminate much of the inefficiency inherent in an operation involving military personnel from many states. The international character of a peacekeeping mission derives primarily from the authority of the international mandate, not from the number of states sending personnel.

3. When the executive agent approach is not politically feasible, the Secretary-General should attempt to keep the number of participating states to a minimum and to utilize the services of governments best qualified to perform the necessary functions. His range of choice will obviously be limited by political considerations. It is significant that the Security Council never instructed the Secretary-General on how the UNF should be made up. It was Hammarskjöld who insisted that the UNF must have very broad national representation. In retrospect, the operation might well have been more efficient, and just as acceptable politically, if troop and support units had been limited to ten or fewer states rather than the 34 that did participate.

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31. This idea is discussed above. [pp. 400-402]

4. Generally the size of military units in a U.N. force should be larger rather than smaller. A brigade, including all the necessary support services, is the optimum size for efficient operation. The Indian Brigade in Katanga, for example, had the necessary combat and service infrastructure to function for a sustained period under isolated conditions. Battalions and smaller units may be used efficiently if they are augmented by support elements, if they are integrated into larger self-sustaining contingents, or if they provide some special technical service such as the Canadian communications unit did in the Congo.

5. The Congo mission demonstrates that multinational units do not perform as efficiently as single-nation units. This applies to mixed infantry battalions as well as to smaller mixed support units. If the UNF is multinational, the headquarters staff probably has to be multinational. The inevitable inefficiency of a multinational staff can be mitigated somewhat by filling the key positions with qualified personnel who speak the same language and share the same general military tradition.

6. Under present political conditions and for pragmatic reasons, English is recommended as the official working language of any sizable U.N. operation. All key officers, including all contingent commanders should be required to pass an oral and written English test before assignment. This test should be comprehensive and not confined to military terminology. Second languages may be necessary.

7. In future U.N. missions, the Secretary-General should be prepared to face the intelligence problem more directly than was the case in the Congo where the euphemism "military information" was used. The Congo operation suffered from this inhibition as well as from the lack of qualified intelligence personnel. In a multinational UNF the gathering and use of intelligence is obviously more difficult than in a single-nation operation.

8. For reasons of sovereignty, pride, and national tradition, states will rarely if ever transfer to a multinational command the responsibility of imposing punitive sanctions on members of their own military establishment serving in a UNF. In all serious disciplinary cases in the Congo the man involved was turned over to his national contingent commander to be dealt with according to the laws and customs of his state. Nevertheless, the U.N. Secretariat could attempt to develop a minimal code of military discipline in consultation with past donor states for the moral and symbolic effect it might have. At the very least, any future donor state should agree in advance to deal with severe cases of indiscipline, crime, or insubordination involving one of its nationals in a UNF according to its national code. The U.N. Command should retain the right to repatriate any soldier or officer found guilty of a serious violation of military discipline.

9. The United Nations is not expected to engage in "psychological warfare," but it should be in a position to interpret the purpose and policies of any peacekeeping mission to the public in the immediate area of operations as well as to the world at large. The Congo operation suffered because of fair to poor public information program. This problem can be corrected only by a full recognition of the importance of public information and the employment of qualified specialists.

10. Turning to the question of readiness, the capability of the United Nations to move quickly would be enhanced by further "earmarking" of units and other military capabilities by member states. About a dozen countries have indicated to the Secretary-General their intention of providing certain capabilities in support of future peacekeeping operations. Washington has repeatedly expressed its intention to make available logistical support, reserving the right to judge each U.N. request for assistance in terms of its national interests. All other "earmarking" governments have stated the same reservation. Earmarking does not require that the unit or capability

be segregated from the regular military establishment of the potential contributing state, but in some cases, such as the Scandinavian Brigade, the units will receive some special training and indoctrination for possible U.N. service. The Congo experience demonstrates that special indoctrination, while desirable, is not an essential prerequisite for effective performance. Far more important is the quality of the unit and the willingness of the troops and officers to take orders from the U.N. Command, including orders which define the constraints under which the UNF is operating. Any good soldier can make an effective contribution to a mission if he has the necessary equipment and obeys his superiors, assuming his superiors are loyal to the mandate and make wise decisions for implementing it.

11. As states indicate their intention to provide military support for a future mission, the Secretary-General can compile what might be called a "capability inventory," from which he can draw when a mission is authorized, if the potential donor politically supports the mission. The larger the "capability inventory" the more political options the Secretary-General would have.

12. The establishment within the Office of the Secretary-General of a modest Military Advisory Staff of perhaps six to ten competent officers would enhance both readiness and operational efficiency, but the prospects of achieving this staff increase are very slim due to the opposition of the Soviet Union, France, and other members.<sup>32</sup> Should the political situation eventually permit the creation of a modest

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32. As of March 1966, for example, the Military Adviser, Major General Rikhye who had held the post since 1960, was serving as the UNEF Commander, and his New York staff consisted of two officers--a Canadian Army colonel, who had been serving as the U.N. military representative in the Dominican Republic since the summer of 1965, and a Finnish Army major who was actually on duty in the otherwise empty Office of the Military Adviser.

Advisory Staff, such a staff could perform a number of important tasks, including information gathering, operational planning, the compiling of a "capability inventory," and the preparation of regulations and manuals to standardize future U.N. operations.<sup>33</sup> The manuals, for example, should deal with general military doctrine, discipline, administration, command, and control, and the unusual political constraints of a U.N. peacekeeping mission, as well as with logistics, intelligence, communications, and other customary military problems. The writing of competent manuals is a formidable task and should probably be assigned to experts outside the U.N. Secretariat. Their preparation need not await the creation of a more adequate Military Staff. Canada might prepare the manual on communications, the United States the one on air transport, the World Health Organization the one on preventative medicine, and so on.

13. None of the above measures designed to enhance readiness or operational efficiency, or all of them together, will have more than a marginal effect on the probability of a U.N. mission being authorized in any future crisis. Whether the Security Council or the General Assembly will authorize a UNF will be determined by the interplay of power and interest among member states at the time.

#### Financial Problems<sup>34</sup>

The Congo effort was the most costly operation ever managed by the U.N. Secretariat. Political differences over the purpose of

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33. It is not difficult for any military staff officer to identify functions appropriate for a small U.N. Military Advisory Staff. If the Staff is large, the task is even easier. The problem is to achieve sufficient political consensus among U.N. members to permit the establishment of even a small permanent staff.

34. This section is related primarily to Chapter 19. See also Appendix Z in Volume 3.

the mission resulted in the refusal of the Soviet Union<sup>35</sup> and France to pay their shares of assessed costs. Their refusal precipitated a financial crisis for the Organization and ignited a protracted debate over the application of Article 19 for peacekeeping operations.

1. Averaging more than \$100 million a year, the total operation cost \$411,200,000. On June 30, 1964, the day the last soldier left the Congo, the Organization still owed about \$104 million for the mission. A year later there were still unpaid obligations of about \$48 million--almost \$25 million was owed to governments and \$23 million to other U.N. accounts.

2. Of the total costs, the United States has paid or will pay \$170,722,802 or 41.52 percent; this includes the U.S. share of the bond issue repayment. Of this total, \$43,396,608 was a voluntary contribution in addition to Washington's assessed share.

3. Twelve other governments (eight of them U.S. allies) contributed voluntarily a total of \$2,644,029.

4. The United Nations was obligated to reimburse governments providing troops only for the "extra and extraordinary costs" incurred. Specifically, the U.N. obligation included reimbursement for the regular overseas allowance of every man and officer in accordance with the laws of the contributing state. The Organization paid in addition a U.N. daily allowance of \$1.30 to every man and officer in the UNF, regardless of nationality. Several governments, notably Sweden, Norway, and Denmark, required also U.N. reimbursement for the basic salary of all personnel serving in the UNF.

5. Different economic levels and laws of the contributing states led to drastic differences in pay for men serving in the Congo.

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35. The Soviet Union did, however, contribute \$1.5 million to the Congo effort in the form of initial airlift for which it did not request U.N. reimbursement.

The average monthly salary of a member of the Swedish contingent was about \$270 and the average monthly allowance was about \$120, or a total of \$390. This stood in sharp contrast to the average monthly income of \$33 for an Indian in the UNF. This disparity in income for performing the same function had an adverse effect on the morale of the low income soldiers. Unable to alter the basic disparity, the U.N. daily allowance of \$1.30 tended to equalize the remuneration in the field. Equalization in the Congo was further advanced by an agreement with many contributing states not to make the salary or overseas allowance available to their troops while in the Congo.

6. There was even greater disparity in direct U.N. costs for troops. For the average Swede, the Organization paid \$390 compared to \$8 for the average Indian, since India, like most contributing states, did not require U.N. reimbursement for salary. Later India was paid somewhat more, but a very wide gap remained.

7. The U.N. obligation to reimburse contributing states for lost or depreciated supplies and equipment taken to the Congo has resulted in a protracted series of claims negotiations. As of September 30, 1965, there were unsettled claims from donor states involving approximately \$18 million. As of June 30, 1965, the United Nations still owed Washington \$4,577,000 for services and equipment.

8. Through most of the Congo operation the political decisions were made by the Security Council and the financial decisions were made by the General Assembly. The costs have been financed by a combination of assessment, a bond issue, and voluntary contributions.

9. The United States, which will have paid 41.52 percent of the Congo costs, had greater influence over the operation than any other state, but this influence fell far short of control. U. S. influence was less the result of its strong financial support, than of its active political support of which its financial assistance was a symbol. The degree of financial support or non-support of a state was usually a

barometer of political support. This was particularly true of the major powers. France and the Soviet Union opposed the mission and have refused to pay anything for it.

#### Implications for the Future

1. The pragmatic approach to financing the Congo peacekeeping operation reflected two basic principles that are difficult to reconcile--the principle of collective responsibility and the principle of respecting and safeguarding the interests of member states. The United States, which adheres to both principles, adopted the pragmatic approach in 1965. The combination of various kinds of voluntary support appears to be the accepted solution among U.N. members for the foreseeable future. This means that the burden of financing will fall on the governments supporting, or at least not opposing, a particular U.N. mission. If there is sufficient political consensus to authorize a UNF, the problem of financial support will focus on an equitable plan for sharing costs among the non-opponents.

2. The nonpayment of a particular state--whether recognized as a right, an excusable exception, or an unfortunate breach of the principle of collective responsibility--is in fact an important safeguard for a dissenting state, so long as no efforts to compel payment are taken. In a voluntary international organization no government should be compelled to help finance an operation it believes to be against its vital interests.

3. Though the financial problem is fundamentally a political problem, the capacity of the United Nations to underwrite peacekeeping operations could be enhanced by any or all of three measures that could be legally adopted by the General Assembly:

a) Include in the U.N. budget, as a regular expenditure for Secretariat services, support for a modest increase in the present Military Advisory Staff. The Soviet Union and some other states would doubtless oppose this measure.



b. Create by regular assessment or by voluntary contribution a fund of perhaps \$50 million, to be available only for the immediate needs of an authorized UNF. This proposal would probably receive considerably more opposition than the provision of funds for an enlarged Military Advisory Staff.

c. Maintaining within the General Assembly a special finance committee to consider various ways to underwrite present and future peacekeeping costs.

4. The Congo experience suggests that the Secretary-General should attempt to obtain the services of all national contingents on substantially the same financial basis, preferably each government providing its troops without direct reimbursement for either salary or overseas allowance. The state would pay its men and officers according to its own laws. The United Nations should underwrite all other costs. Donor states should have a right to claim some credit toward their peacekeeping assessment for any troop contribution, but in no case should a state be permitted to profit financially at the expense of the Organization.

5. Recognizing that in any multinational force including troops from developed and underdeveloped states there will be great differences in remuneration, the United Nations should continue and strengthen its efforts to equalize spending money in the field.

#### Concluding Note

It should be emphasized that the foregoing summary is a necessarily over-simplified picture of the analysis and findings developed in the first 19 chapters of the Report.

Though this study focused almost exclusively on the Congo peacekeeping operation which came to an end on June 30, 1964, occasional references have been made to subsequent U.N. developments in the peacekeeping field. All these developments, whether in New York or in Cyprus, have reinforced the conclusions drawn in the first instance from the Congo experience.

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